Dog Days
James P. Cannon vs.
Max Shachtman
in the Communist League
of America, 1931-1933
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013
http://archive.org/details/dogdaysjamespcanOOcann
Dog Days:
James P. Cannon vs. Max Shachtman
in the Communist League of America
Books from the Prometheus Research Library
James P. Cannon and the Early Years of American Communism:
Selected Writings and Speeches, 1920-1928 (1992)
This volume of Cannon's writings covers the period when he was one
of the principal leaders of the American section of the Communist
International.
The Communist International After Lenin
First Russian language edition (1993)
By Leon Trotsky. Published in Moscow, from the original Russian
texts. Includes Trotsky's Critique of the 1928 draft program of the
Communist International.
Bulletins in the Prometheus Research Series
No. 1 Guidelines on the Organizational Structure of Communist Parties,
on the Methods and Content of Their Work (August 1988). Complete and
accurate English translation of 1921 Comintern Resolution from final
German text.
No. 2 Documents on the "Proletarian Military Policy" (February 1989).
Includes materials from the Trotskyist movement in the U.S. and
Europe during World War II.
No. 3 In Memoriam, Richard S. Fraser: An Appreciation and Selection of His
Work (August 1990). A selection of the writings of comrade Richard S.
Fraser (1913-1988), who pioneered the Trotskyist understanding of black
oppression in the United States.
No. 4 Yugoslavia, East Europe and the Fourth International: The Evolution
of Pabloist Liquidationism by Jan Norden (March 1993). Covers the
internal discussion within the Fourth International over its flawed
response to the Yugoslav Revolution and the 1948 Tito-Stalin split.
No. 5 Marxist Politics or Unprincipled Combinationism? Internal Problems of
the Workers Party (September 2000). Includes Max Shachtman's document
from the 1936 internal bulletin of the Workers Party of the U.S.
Dog Days:
James P. Cannon vs.
Max Shachtman
in the Communist League
of America 1931-1933
James P. Cannon, Max Shachtman,
Leon Trotsky, and Others
Compiled, Introduced, and Edited by the
Prometheus Research Library
Prometheus Research Library
2002 NEW YORK CITY
Cover photos: Leon Trotsky at his desk in Prinkipo, 1931.
Photo by Jean Weinberg.
Inset: Shachtman (left) and Cannon in Paris at time of founding
of Fourth International, 1938. Photo courtesy Albert Glotzer.
Prometheus graphic from a woodcut by Fritz Brosius
Publisher's Cataloging-in-Publication
Dog Days: James P. Cannon vs. Max Shachtman in the Communist
League of America, 1931-1933 /James P. Cannon, Max Shachtman,
Leon Trotsky, and others; compiled, introduced, and edited by the
Prometheus Research Library. — 1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
LCCN 2002105685
ISBN 0-9633828-7-X(hard)
ISBN 0-9633828-8-8(Pb)
1. Communism— United States— History— Sources. 2. Socialist
Workers Party. 3. Communist League of America (Opposition).
4. Communists— Correspondence. I. Cannon, James Patrick, 1890-1974.
II. Shachtman, Max, 1903-1972. III. Trotsky, Leon, 1879-1940.
IV. Prometheus Research Library.
HX83.D64 2002 335.43'3'0973
QBI02-200415
Prometheus Research Library books
are published by:
Spartacist Publishing Company
Box 1377, G.P.O.
New York, New York 10116
Copyright© 2002 by Spartacist Publishing Company
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992
(Permanence of Paper).©
To our comrades
Susan Adams (1948-2001)
Mary Van De Water-Quirk (1954-2000)
whose work contributed to this book
Contents
Editorial Note xvi
Introduction by the Prometheus Research Library 1
I. Shachtman in the International
The April Conference: A Disappointment in All Respects
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 16 April 1930 83
Where Is the International Secretariat?
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 18 August 1930 86
Shachtman to Be Part of International Bureau
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 17 November 1930 ... 89
Crisis in the French Ligue
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 25 November 1930 ... 92
We Must Endeavor to Collaborate With Naville and Rosmer
Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky, 17 December 1930. ... 98
Landau Has Proven to Be a Very Unreliable Fellow
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 6 January 1931 102
The Fight Against Landau and Naville Is Too Sharp
Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky, 4 March 1931 106
What Is Your Position on the German Crisis?
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 4 April 1931 108
On Landau, Prometeo, and Weisbord
Max Shachtman to the International Secretariat,
[Early May 1931] 109
I Sought to Avoid a Premature Split in the German Section
Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky, 2 May 1931 112
You Bear Some Responsibility for Landau's Course
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman,
23 May 1931 114
vii
Naville Plays With Ideas
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman,
2 August 1931 117
Get the Secretariat's Cart Out of the Mud
Jan Frankel to Max Shachtman, 14 November 1931 .... 119
Molinier Is Far From Correct
Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky, 1 December 1931 ... . 121
Who Then Should Lead the Ligue?
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 11 December 1931 . . 132
You Were Never on Our Side
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 25 December 1931 . . 133
Shachtman's Personal and Journalistic Sympathies
Leon Trotsky to the CLA National Committee,
25 December 1931 135
Too Much the Journalist
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman,
31 December 1931 136
Why Did the Militant Print Felix's Article?
Leon Trotsky to the CLA National Committee,
5January 1932 139
I Do Not Agree With Shachtman
Albert Glotzer to Leon Trotsky, 21 January 1932 ...... 141
Shachtman Acted on His Own Authority
Arne Swabeck to Leon Trotsky, 22 January 1932 144
We Should Have Informed Trotsky of American Problems
Albert Glotzer to Maurice Spector, 3 February 1932 ... 147
You Must Remain at Your Post
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 10 February 1932 . . . 149
II. The Fight
Uphold Our Revolutionary Classics!
Arne Swabeck, published 5 March 1932 153
Statement on "Uphold Our Revolutionary Classics!"
Max Shachtman, 12 March 1932 155
via
A Bad Situation in the American League
Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky, 13 March 1932 170
Statement on the Situation in the
International Left Opposition
James P. Cannon, 15 March 1932 174
Draft Statement on International Questions
Albert Glotzer, 15 March 1932 177
Draft Statement on the ILO
Martin Abern, 15 March 1932 179
A Definite Conflict of Views
Arne Swabeck to the International Secretariat
and Leon Trotsky, 2 April 1932 180
On the Motion for a Plenary Session of the NC
Max Shachtman, 4 April 1932 184
Statement on Holding Plenum
James P. Cannon, 4 April 1932 186
The Real Basis of Our Differences
Albert Glotzer to Leon Trotsky, 5 April 1932 187
Report on National Tour
Albert Glotzer, 11 April 1932 197
Cannon and Swabeck Have Rightist Tendencies
John Edwards to Max Shachtman,
16 April 1932 208
The Organizational Status of the CLA
Arne Swabeck, 18 April 1932 212
The Coal Drivers in Minneapolis
Carl Skoglund to the National Committee,
18 April 1932 216
Personal Combinations vs. Revolutionary Politics
Leon Trotsky to Albert Glotzer, 1 May 1932 218
You Must Take Us Into Your Confidence
Maurice Spector to Max Shachtman, 10 May 1932 220
ix
On Weisbord and International Questions
Leon Trotsky to the CLA National Committee,
19 May 1932 222
I Prefer Weisbord's Methods to Shachtman's
Leon Trotsky to Albert Glotzer, 3 June 1932 224
I Am Not an American Naville
Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky, 4 June 1932 225
The Situation in the American Opposition:
Prospect and Retrospect
Martin Abern, Albert Glotzer, and Max Shachtman,
4June 1932 230
Minutes of the Plenum
CLA National Committee, 10-13 June 1932 282
Some Considerations on the Results of the
National Committee Plenum
[Shachtman Group], 16 June 1932 298
Draft Statement to the Membership on the
National Committee Plenum
James P. Cannon, 25 June 1932 306
Statement of the National Committee (Minority):
The Results of the Plenum of the National Committee
Martin Abern, Albert Glotzer, and Max Shachtman,
29 June 1932 315
What Position Will You Take?
Max Shachtman to John Edwards, 3 July 1932 323
A Great Relief
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 4 July 1932 325
Reply of the National Committee to the Minority Statement
James P. Cannon, 14 July 1932 326
Molinier's Personality Is Not the Issue
Max Shachtman to Andres Nin, 19 July 1932 341
A Reply on Field and Weisbord
Leon Trotsky to the CLA National Committee,
20 October 1932 345
x
Cannon Is Prepared to Break With the ILO
Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky, 31 October 1932 349
Developments in Light of the Failed Co-optations
Max Shachtman to a Comrade, 26 November 1932 .... 352
Mobilize Against Swabeck's Trip to Europe
Max Shachtman to a Comrade, 2 December 1932 361
We Want More Direct Contact
Arne Swabeck to the International Secretariat
and Leon Trotsky, 16 December 1932 363
Cannon Overreaches Himself
Maurice Spector to Max Shachtman,
29 December 1932 367
Results of the Postplenum Discussion
Martin Abern and Max Shachtman, 3 January 1933. . . . 371
Cannon's Regime Is on a Par With Landau's
Max Shachtman to Maurice Spector, 3 January 1933 . . . 384
Cannon's Suave Calumny
Max Shachtman to Albert Glotzer, 8 January 1933 391
Against Cannon as National Secretary
Martin Abern and Max Shachtman, 9 January 1933 .... 395
For Cannon as National Secretary
Arne Swabeck and Hugo Oehler, 10 January 1933 397
On Assuming the Post of National Secretary
James P. Cannon, lOJanuary 1933 402
No Financial Sabotage
Martin Abern and Max Shachtman, 23 January 1933 . . . 403
Cannon a New Man in Chicago
Albert Glotzer to Martin Abern and Max Shachtman,
6 February 1933 412
Resolution on the Proletarianization
of the New York Branch
National Committee [Cannon GroupJ,
[Early February 1933] 416
xi
Reject the Proposal on the Proletarianization of the
New York Branch
NY Executive Committee [Shachtman Group],
[Early February 1933] 418
Motion on the Situation in Germany and the Role
of the Red Army
Max Shachtman, 20 February 1933 421
The Red Army and the German Revolution
James P. Cannon, 24 February 1933 424
Motion on the Illinois Mining Campaign
Max Shachtman, 24 February 1933 429
Statement on the Dispute over the Red Army
and the German Situation
Max Shachtman, 12 March 1933 435
Note on Shachtmans Statement
James P. Cannon, published 18 March 1933 446
Motion on April Gillespie Conference
James P. Cannon, 29 March 1933 448
Motion on CLA Delegate at Gillespie
Max Shachtman, 29 March 1933 452
III. The International Intervenes
Resolution on the Situation in the American Section
International Preconference of the ILO,
4-8 February 1933 455
The International Must Apply the Brakes
Discussion Between Leon Trotsky and Arne Swabeck,
27 February 1933 456
On the Situation in the American League
Leon Trotsky to the International Secretariat,
7 March 1933 467
The Majority Has No Right to Impatience
Leon Trotsky to Arne Swabeck, 7 March 1933 472
xii
I Accept Your Criticisms
Arne Swabeck to Leon Trotsky, 8 March 1933 474
You Were Wrong to Campaign Against Swabeck's Trip
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 8 March 1933 477
Trotsky Expects More of Us
Arne Swabeck to James P. Cannon, 8 March 1933 478
A Split Would Be a Catastrophe
Leon Trotsky to Albeit Glotzer, 14 March 1933 488
Germany and the USSR
Leon Trotsky, 17 March 1933 489
We Have Made Some Errors
James P. Cannon to Comrades, 27 March 1933 492
Resolution on the Situation in the American League
International Secretariat, [April 1933] 493
Concession on Organizational Questions
James P. Cannon, 5 April 1933 495
Response on Organizational Questions
Max Shachtman, 7 April 1933 496
Request for Advice on Allard
James P. Cannon to Leon Trotsky, 14 April 1933 498
We Don't Want a Split
Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky, 15 April 1933 499
Setting a Date for the Conference
Arne Swabeck to James P. Cannon, 16 April 1933 504
An Offensive for Unity
Arne Swabeck to James P. Cannon, 16 April 1933 506
I Am Not More Favorable to the Minority
Leon Trotsky to the International Secretariat,
17 April 1933 507
Shachtman Flounders Between Scholasticism
and Softness on Stalinism
Arne Swabeck to James P. Cannon, 17 April 1933 509
xiii
We Will Not Suspend Our Fight
Max Shachtman to Albert Glotzer, 17 April 1933 512
Allard Must Take a Stand Against Redbaiting
James P. Cannon, 19 April 1933 513
Allard Discredits Left Opposition
Martin Abern and Max Shachtman, 19 April 1933 516
A Cold Douche
Maurice Spector to Max Shachtman, 24 April 1933 .... 518
Our Group Must Not Dissolve
Max Shachtman to Albert Glotzer, 1 May 1933 519
The European Sections Will Not Support You
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 1 May 1933 529
International Consultation Is Key
Arne Swabeck to James P. Cannon, 12 May 1933 530
Resolution on the American Question
Plenum of the International Left Opposition,
13-16 May 1933 534
Foolish and Petty Actions Did Not Help Us
Albert Glotzer to Max Shachtman, 23 May 1933 536
Peace Treaty
Communist League of America National Committee
published 29 June 1933 542
We Must Call a Retreat
Max Shachtman to Comrades, 9 June 1933 543
Report from Prinkipo
Max Shachtman to Martin Abern, 6 July 1933 552
The "Master's" Ways
Martin Abern to Albeit Glotzer, 6 July 1933 557
A Possible Leap Forward
Arne Swabeck to the International Secretariat
and Leon Trotsky, 10 July 1933 565
A Radical Change Is Necessary
Leon Trotsky to Albert Glotzer, 12 July 1933 568
xiv
I Won't Make an Issue of Chicago Move
Max Shachtman to Martin Abern, 13 July 1933 570
Action Program of the Communist League
National Committee, [August 1933] 581
Implementing the Action Program
Max Shachtman to Albert Glotzer,
7 September 1933 583
A Big Mistake
Max Shachtman to Albert Glotzer,
19 September 1933 586
Trade-Union Problems in America
Leon Trotsky, 23 September 1933 591
Cannon Is Reneging
Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky, 5 October 1933 594
The News Is Disquieting
Leon Trotsky to Arne Swabeck, 20 November 1933 598
A Turn for the Worse
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 25 November 1933 . . 599
Reasons to Postpone the Move
Arne Swabeck to Leon Trotsky, 20 December 1933 .... 600
As Opportunities Grow, Internal Struggle Will Diminish
Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman, 30 January 1934 605
Notes 607
Glossary 652
References 693
Index 699
Photo Credits 714
xv
Editorial Note
In the political youth of James Robertson, co-editor of this com-
pilation, the subject matter of this book had a somewhat mysti-
cal and mythical quality, wherein might be found the origins of
the profound 1940 scission in the Trotskyist (i.e., the authentic
communist) movement. In 1939-40 Max Shachtman, bowing to
the anti-Communist hysteria that accompanied the Hitler-Stalin
pact, abandoned the program of unconditional military defense
of the Soviet Union and split along with some 40 percent of the
membership from the American Socialist Workers Party led by
James P. Cannon. Shachtman and some of those who left with
him went on to establish the rival Workers Party (WP).
The fight in the SWP coincided with the outbreak of World
War II in Europe; many Trotskyist organizations were function-
ing in conditions of illegality. Thus the six-month discussion in
the SWP "became in effect a discussion for the entire Fourth
International and was followed with passionate interest by the
members of all sections" (Fourth International, May 1940). Claim-
ing that the Fourth International had been destroyed by the out-
break of the war and the SWP split, Shachtman sought to extend
his support internationally. But the WP's American Committee
for the Fourth International was upheld by only a few weak and
demoralized sections such as the Brazilian and Uruguayan. Even
before the Workers Party changed its name to the Independent
Socialist League (ISL) in 1949, it had ceased to claim any connec-
tion with the Fourth International.
As a member of Shachtman's organization from 1949 to 1958,
and then of the SWP until 1963, Robertson heard talk about a
factional struggle in the Communist League of America of the
early 1930s, pitting Cannon and his supporters on one side against
Shachtman and his supporters on the other. Robertson was natu-
rally curious, since this political struggle predated by almost a
decade the definitive split. But it was next to impossible to find
documentation. Cannon's History of American Trotskyism, published
in 1944, gave intriguing hints, but not much substance. Albeit
Glotzer's scathing review, "James P. Cannon as Historian," pub-
xvi
lished in New International in 1945, contained more. But most of
the (very few) veteran WP/ISL cadres and (more numerous) SWP
cadres whose history stretched back to the CLA claimed that the
early fight had little significance. Copies of the CLA Internal Bul-
letins were very rare. Robertson still remembers how his hands
were pried off CLA bulletins left in the care of the New York WP
literature maven. Having tantalized Robertson, the New Yorker
finally refused to sell the bulletins because their previous owner
might reclaim them.
As part of the Revolutionary Tendency expelled from the
Socialist Workers Party in 1963, Robertson became one of the
founding leaders of the Spartacist League. In the early 1970s he
and other SL members interested in archival research interviewed
CLA veterans who had split from the Trotskyist movement with
the ultraleftist Hugo Oehler in 1935. These former members of
Oehler's Revolutionary Workers League (by then dissolved) also
claimed the CLA fight had little bearing on later developments in
the Trotskyist movement. Around the same time the SL finally
acquired copies of the long-sought CLA Internal Bulletins. These
supplemented Robertson's personal holdings, which became the
nucleus for the collection of the Prometheus Research Library,
archive and research facility of the SL Central Committee.
Only part of the story of the CLA fight was told in the bulle-
tins. The picture was rounded out a few years later when the PRL
finally procured a copy of "The Situation in the American Oppo-
sition: Prospect and Retrospect," Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer's
4 June 1932 magnum opus. In 1979 most of Trotsky's letters on
the CLA fight were published in Pathfinder's collection, Writings
of Leon Trotsky, Supplement 1929-33. In 1985 Monad Press pub-
lished James P. Cannon's Writings and Speeches: The Communist
League of America 1932-34, which included many of Cannon's let-
ters and documents from the CLA factional struggle.
In the early 1990s, Emily Turnbull began to work with
Robertson, looking for additional material to accompany "Pros-
pect and Retrospect" in a Prometheus Research Series bulletin.
They expected to find only a few additional documents, but they
were wrong. Searching the personal papers of most of the key pro-
tagonists, now deposited in various libraries around the country,
Turnbull found a wealth of correspondence, minutes, and docu-
ments that fleshed out the story of the 1931-33 dispute in the
xvii
CLA. The PRL determined to make the key documentation
accessible to future generations of revolutionaries in book form.
We include in this collection only a very few of the documents
available in Monad's selection of Cannon writings for the period,
published as James P. Cannon's Writings and Speeches: The Commu-
nist League of America 1932-34. Readers are referred there and to
Monad's edition of James P. Cannon's Writings and Speeches: The
Left Opposition in the U.S. 1928-31 for useful companion volumes
to our collection.
At the end of this book readers will find a References section
listing the archival collections consulted. Footnotes to individual
documents give their archival origins; abbreviations used in the
footnotes are delineated in the References section. An extensive
glossary of names, organizations, and terms possibly unfamiliar
to the contemporary reader is provided at the end of the volume.
Acronyms used throughout the volume are listed in the index.
We thank the librarians at Archives of the Hoover Institution
of War, Revolution and Peace, the Houghton Library at Harvard
University, the Tamiment Library at New York University, and the
Wayne State University Archives of Labor History and Urban Affairs
for their help, and for permission to publish material from their
collections. We are grateful to the librarians and staff at the State
Historical Society of Wisconsin for their assistance to our research.
Special thanks go to Peter Filardo of the Tamiment Library for
giving us early access to the papers of George Breitman, and to Dale
Reed of the Hoover Institution Archives, who helped us in innumer-
able ways, including deciphering handwriting in some of the letters.
Most of the Trotsky letters published here have been trans-
lated from the German; if the original is in English, or if the
translation is from a language other than German, this is speci-
fied in the footnotes. Mary Ann Shiffman, Robert Michaels, Doris
Altman, Frank Beaton-Wralter, and Christoph Stiidemann trans-
lated from the German. Translation from the French was by
Blandine Hauser, Francois Diacono, and Susan Adams. Transla-
tion from the Russian was by Victor Granovsky.
Many of the documents that appear in this book are letters,
draft manuscripts, and minutes not originally meant for publica-
tion. We have limited editing to standardizing spelling, punctua-
tion, and style, and to correcting what appeared to us to be obvi-
ous errors in the originals, such as dropped words. We have not
xviii
checked the accuracy of quotations cited by the authors, but we
have edited all quotations to conform to our style of punctuation
and spelling. The official name of the American Trotskyist orga-
nization was the Communist League of America (Opposition),
reflecting its political orientation as an expelled faction of the
Communist Party. Since the word "(Opposition)" was inconsistently
used by most authors, we have used the simple Communist League
of America throughout. We have always capitalized League when
the authors use this term to refer to the CLA; when the French
section of the ILO is referenced, Ligue is used.
To help the reader, we have standardized some inconsisten-
cies of the original authors, who sometimes referred to the CLA's
leading body as the National Executive Committee instead of its
constitutionally established name, National Committee. Similarly,
we have standardized to "resident committee" all references to the
smaller body composed of National Committee members resident
in New York. In the original documents this body was variously
referred to as resident National Committee, resident Executive
Committee, and Resident Committee. But the reader should be
aware that many authors use "National Committee" to refer both
to the New York resident body and to the broader committee. All
bracketed insertions are by the editors; unless ellipses and paren-
theses are bracketed, they are the original author's. Brief intro-
ductions give background information about some selections and
state their published source, if any. The date given for most docu-
ments is the date of writing; where we list the publication date,
this is specified. Dates in brackets are estimates by the editors.
The compilation and selection of the material, as well as the
introduction, glossary, and editorial notes, were centrally the work
of Emily Turnbull and James Robertson. Amy Richardson copy-
edited the manuscript, checked facts, and prepared the References
section. Helene Brosius was production manager. Cover and photo
pages designed by Victor Granovsky and Bruce Mishkin. Robert
Michaels prepared the index. Naoli Bray, Michael Doerner,
Francois Diacono, Lisa Diamond, Rena Herson, Therese Jahn,
Janet John, Sam Kaehler, Diana Kartsen, Carl Lichtenstein, Gayle
Lovell, Tim Marinetti, Gary Mueller, Koula Quirk, Paul Ricks,
Martha Robertson, Janet Root, Caron Salinger, Mary Ann
Shiffman, and Mary Van De Water-Quirk aided in the archival and
historical research and/or were part of the production crew.
Wh
hat is the primary purpose of a discussion in a
communist organization? It is not to discredit one
another, not to exalt some and push others down,
not to present matters as prosecution on the one side
and defense on the other. No, the primary purpose
is to clarify the principled questions, to educate the
comrades on the meaning of the dispute of the
moment, to teach them to penetrate the essence of
a question and draw their inferences accordingly, so
that the lessons are firmly gained and remembered
for the future, when similar problems will arise in
different forms. In other words, the primary aim of a
discussion conducted by communist leaders is to teach
the comrades to think and to fight politically, to grasp
the main aspects of a question, to go by principle and
not to be sidetracked by incidental matters. The
acquisition of this method is the condition sine qua
non for our comrades to fulfill their mission as the
vanguard of the vanguard, not only in future disputes
within the ranks of the Left Opposition, but also, and
especially, in conflicts with the other party factions,
and beyond that in the broad class struggle and in the
general labor movement, where they will encounter
all kinds of demagogues who are masters of all kinds
of tricks.
— James P. Cannon, "Draft on the Internal Struggle"
July 1932, Writings and Speeches: The Communist
League of America 1932-34
Introduction
When the Fourth International (FI) was founded in September
1938 to carry on the struggle for international proletarian revolu-
tion betrayed by the Stalinist Third (Communist) International,
the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) of the United States was its larg-
est and apparently most stable section. The SWP leadership core
around James P. Cannon and Max Shachtman had benefited from
some years of close political collaboration with Leon Trotsky,
especially after his arrival in Mexico in early 1937. The U.S.
Trotskyists were the only national group of the FI to have aug-
mented their forces through regroupment with a centrist forma-
tion (A.J. Muste's American Workers Party in 1934) and through
short-term entry into the leftward-moving Socialist Party (SP) in
1936-37. These tactics, advocated by Trotsky, met with little suc-
cess elsewhere. At its founding in early January 1938, the SWP
had some 1,500 members, with organized support in the Team-
sters, United Auto Workers (UAW), and maritime unions.
Yet from 1931 to 1933, during a period of stagnation that
Cannon later aptly labeled "the dog days of the movement," an
intense internal struggle rent the American Trotskyists, then num-
bering fewer than 200 members and known as the Communist
League of America (CLA).1 As the letters, articles, circulars, and
minutes in this collection reveal, the two factions, around Cannon
on the one hand and Shachtman on the other, came to the verge
of an organizational break in early 1933, a split that Trotsky feared
could lead to the stillbirth of American Trotskyism.
The CLA was the American section of the International Left
Opposition (ILO), which was founded a few months after Trotsky
was forced into exile from the USSR. In a June 1929 declaration
issued after a series of meetings at Trotsky's residence in Prinkipo,
Turkey, the ILO claimed the heritage of the first four congresses
of the Communist International (Comintern or CI). The ILO
declared its principal aim to be the regroupment of dissident
Communists on the basis of the program that the Russian Left
Opposition had fought for in the internal party struggles of 1923-
28. 2 Regarding itself as an expelled faction of the Comintern, the
2 CLA 1931-33
ILO fought to return the Soviet Union and Communist Interna-
tional to Lenin's revolutionary internationalism. Thus when the
Trotskyists refer to "the Party" in the documents in this book, they
mean not the CLA or any other ILO section, but the Communist
Party (CP) or Comintern.
Many dissident Communists attracted to Trotsky's banner had
only a hazy idea of the Russian Opposition's platform since most
of its documents were banned in the Russian party and unavail-
able abroad. Some ILO adherents had been supporters, not of the
Trotskyist Left Opposition, but of the mercurial centrist Grigori
Zinoviev, with whom the Trotskyists were allied in the United Oppo-
sition of 1926-27. Some were followers of the Italian ultraleftist
Amadeo Bordiga, organized in the Italian Prometeo Group. The
first four years of Trotsky's exile therefore saw intense political
struggle within the ILO, as he sought, largely unsuccessfully, to win
the Bordigists and those trained in the maneuverist school of
Zinoviev to genuine Bolshevism and to weed out accidental, dilet-
tantish, and cliquist elements. Only with the authoritative Interna-
tional Preconference, held in Paris in February 1933, did the ILO
achieve a degree of political cohesion and organizational stability.
Origin of the Conflict
The factional polarization in the Communist League of
America was precipitated in early 1932 when Cannon sought— over
Shachtman's opposition— to put the CLA on record in support of
Trotsky's positions in the internal struggles then roiling the ILO
in Europe. Shachtman was the first CLA representative to meet
with Trotsky in Prinkipo, and he attended the first European ILO
gathering in April 1930, which Trotsky hoped would put the
Opposition on a firmer organizational and political basis. In
November 1930 Shachtman was co-opted onto the International
Bureau as a representative of the CLA. In late 1931 he traveled to
Fiance, Spain, and England. Yet, as the documents reveal,
Shachtman attempted to blunt Trotsky's sharp attacks on the
opportunism and cliquism of those with whom he had worked in
Europe— Kurt Landau, Pierre Naville, Andres Nin, and M. Mill.
Increasingly frustrated with Shachtman, in December 1931 Trotsky
finally wrote to the CLA National Committee (NC) to inquire if
Shachtman's actions in international matters reflected the views
of the CLA leadership. In answer Cannon initiated a fight for the
Introduction 3
CLA to take a formal position against the trade-union opportun-
ist and dilettantish elements represented by Naville in France. This
collection documents how Shachtman and his allies, Albert
Glotzer, Martin Abern, and Maurice Spector, obstructed Cannon's
efforts, seeking to cover for Shachtman's irresponsibility in Europe
and revealing in their cliquist approach to internal party struggle
their affinity with Trotsky's opponents in Europe.
Shachtman retreated from his course of confrontation with
Trotsky in June 1932, to the great relief of Trotsky, who feared
that Shachtman's alignment with Naville, Nin, and Mill might
precipitate an international split and the creation of a centrist
tendency opposed to the ILO. Yet the factional warfare within
the CLA continued and even deepened over the next year, fueled
by myriad organizational disputes and grievances going back to
1929. In the absence of decisive programmatic differences, Trotsky
and the ILO secretariat (I.S.) intervened sharply in spring 1933
to put an end to the destructive polarization. A continuation of
the fight could only have meant the disintegration of the CLA
into two competing groups with no obvious differences, both claim-
ing adherence to the ILO, as was the case in Austria and elsewhere.
The I.S. intervention coincided with an upturn in domestic class
struggle that provided the Trotskyists with the opportunity in 1934
to lead the strikes that won union recognition for the Minneapo-
lis Teamsters. This was one of the three great proletarian struggles
in the United States that year, the others being the Auto-Lite strike
in Toledo, Ohio and the three-day general strike precipitated in
San Francisco by a hard-fought longshoremen's struggle. The open-
ing for broader work and recruitment from the working class was
the precondition for the subsequent six years of close political
collaboration between Cannon and Shachtman and led to the
formation of the Socialist Workers Party in 1938.
Yet Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer's lengthy 4 June 1932
document, "The Situation in the American Opposition: Prospect
and Retrospect" (hereafter referred to as "Prospect and Retro-
spect"), published here for the first time, harps on many of the
organizational themes that obsessed them in 1940, when they
broke definitively from revolutionary Marxism. Capitulating to the
anti-Communism sweeping the petty bourgeoisie in the wake of
the Hitler-Stalin pact, the Shachtmanites in 1940 followed the petty-
bourgeois pedant James Burnham in insisting that the USSR's
4 CLA 1931-33
military alliance with Germany negated the international pro-
letariat's duty to unconditionally defend the Soviet degenerated
workers state against imperialist invasion and internal counterrevo-
lution. Trotsky and Cannon, their collaboration cemented by years
of joint work— beginning in 1933 with the resolution of the CLA's
destructive fight— led the programmatic struggle against Shacht-
man and Burnham in the SWP, a fight that remains decisive for
Trotskyism to the present day.3
Shachtman's abandonment of the program of military defense
of the USSR was the first step on the road to outright support for
U.S. imperialism. By 1957 he lamented the 1919 Socialist Party
split that led to the formation of the Communist Party, and in
1958 he liquidated his organization into the pathetic remnants of
the American social democracy. At that point Cannon wrote:
Despite my long association with Shachtman from the days of his
earliest youth, I have not been able to summon up a trace of sympa-
thy for his evolution from a slim young rebel into a fat and fatheaded
old social democrat. An old man repenting the "follies" of his youth,
which were in reality his glories, merely nudges me to cold disgust.4
Shachtman moved ever more rapidly to the right after entering the
SP; he ended his life a member of the Democratic Party and sup-
porter of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and U.S. imperialism's
bloody war against the social revolution in Vietnam.
In 1931-33 no principled or programmatic element was in
dispute after Shachtman gave way on the international questions.
But the earlier struggle in the CLA clearly presaged the definitive
1940 split. The factional lineup within the SWP National Com-
mittee cadre whose membership dated to the early CLA was almost
identical in both fights, with Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer pitted
against Cannon, Arne Swabeck, Vincent Dunne, and Carl Skoglund
(the one exception was Morris Lewit, a Shachtman supporter
in the CLA but a Cannon stalwart in 1939-40). The earlier fight
reverberated throughout the 1939-40 struggle. In a December
1939 delegated conference of the New York City membership,
Shachtman challenged Cannon to circulate "Prospect and Retro-
spect," which had never been published in the CLA Internal
Bulletin.3 In sending Trotsky his central polemic against Shachtman
and Abern, "The Struggle for a Proletarian Party," Cannon noted,
"Its length must be excused on the ground that the dam of ten
years patience has been broken dowTn."6
Introduction 5
Unearthing the Historical Record
Except for the period of the 1939-40 fight, the near split in
the CLA was downplayed or hidden by the principal protagonists
on both sides. In History of American Trotskyism, a series of lec-
tures delivered in spring 1942 and subsequently published by the
SWP, Cannon aptly characterized the internal struggle in the CLA
as "the premature rehearsal of the great, definitive struggle of
1939-40." But he described only a "sea of petty troubles, jealou-
sies, clique formations and internal fights"— not a deep-going
organizational polarization and near split.7 In autobiographical
interviews recorded in 1963 Shachtman gave an even more cur-
sory treatment, mentioning only "more than one polemical and
factional struggle inside the Trotskyist movement, some of them
very sharp" between "Cannon and his friends on the one side and
myself and my friends on the other side."8
When the Prometheus Research Library made a concerted
attempt to find out more about the CLA faction fight, interview-
ing participants such as Carl Cowl, Morris Lewit, Hugo Oehler,
Tom Stamm, and Arne Swabeck, they all denied the gravity of
the situation revealed in the documents we publish here.9 Albert
Glotzer was the sole participant in the earlier struggle who kept
his memory— and anti-Cannon diatribes— alive. By the time of our
interview in 1993, Glotzer was a leader of the rabidly anti-
Communist Social Democrats USA and his sympathies lay with
the imperialist secret services. (Richard Valcourt, editor of the
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, spoke at
his 1999 memorial meeting.) Obscenely, Glotzer continued to insist
that Cannon had never been a true Bolshevik-Leninist.10
Secondary histories have unfortunately followed the cursory
reminiscences of most CLA leaders. Constance Ashton Myers
describes only a "minor quarrel" in the CLA over Cannon's criti-
cisms of the sterile intellectualism of the New York youth.11 The
CLA faction fight is ignored in Trotskyism in the United States, a
collection of essays by George Breitman, Paul Le Blanc, and Alan
Wald.12 Peter Drucker's 1994 biography of Shachtman contains
only a few cursory paragraphs that trivialize Shachtman's disagree-
ments with Trotsky on the work in Europe.1^
Our search of known archival sources (see the References sec-
tion) unearthed some 600 documents on the 1931-33 fight and
6 CLA 1931-33
the preceding organizational disputes and correspondence with
Trotsky on international questions, including letters, minutes of
the New York resident committee of the CLA National Commit-
tee, documents from CLA Internal Bulletins, and draft resolutions
and circulars.14 Of these, 118 appear in this book, divided into
three chronological sections. The first, "Shachtman in the Inter-
national," centers on Trotsky's correspondence with Shachtman
on the ILO in 1930-31. The second, "The Fight," contains motions
and documents on the central CLA disputes in 1932-33, from the
international question to the feud over co-optations to the National
Committee, disputes over the proletarianization of the New York
local, CLA work among the miners in southern Illinois, and prop-
aganda over the potential role of the Soviet Red Army in fighting
Hitler's ascension to power in Germany. This section includes
representative factional correspondence, as well as key documents
and motions.
The final section, "The International Intervenes," begins in
early 1933 and includes Trotsky's letters to CLA leaders, a tran-
script of his discussion with Arne Swabeck, motions from the
International Secretariat, and responses to Trotsky from both sides.
Despite the "Peace Treaty" adopted by the NC in June 1933, the
factional flame continued to burn through the end of that year,
as the two sides jockeyed for position over Cannon's proposal to
move the national headquarters to Chicago. The projected move
was shelved in late 1933, and the fight petered out by early 1934
as a new political configuration evolved in the CLA. Shachtman
recounted these developments in his seminal 1936 document,
"Marxist Politics or Unprincipled Combinationism?", a savage
indictment of his former and future bloc partners, Abern and
Glotzer.15
Twenty-five of the documents included in this book are avail-
able, in other translations, in the relevant volumes of Writings of
Leon Trotsky, which provide the international context for the CLA's
internal dispute. We publish here only four items also available in
Cannon's Writings and Speeches: The Communist League of America
1932-34. Both Cannon's CLA writings and Cannon's Writings and
Speeches: The Left Opposition in the U.S. 1928-31 are essential com-
panions to our collection, providing the broader national back-
drop for the CLA struggle. The Communist League of America
includes Cannon's two main documents from the internal struggle
Introduction 7
and letters to his factional supporters that we do not reproduce
here. We include eight items by Cannon, not available in the Path-
finder volume, that were circulated at the time with resident com-
mittee minutes and in bulletins of the CLA. Published here for
the first time are seven letters by Trotsky and the documents of
the Shachtman faction, centrally "Prospect and Retrospect."
The Shachtman documents are replete with accusations against
Cannon as an unrepentant Zinovievist and a bureaucratic maneu-
verer with little interest in Marxist theory or international ques-
tions. Revived in 1940, these accusations crop up in histories of
American Trotskyism to the present day. 16 The record of the dis-
pute reveals how little basis these accusations have. Cannon was
intimately familiar with the issues in dispute in the European ILO
and deeply concerned with the education of the CLA member-
ship in an internationalist spirit. As he wrote in hailing the first
issue of the English-language International Bulletin, which the CLA
in 1931 took responsibility for publishing:
All sections must steer a deliberate course toward real participation
in the affairs of the others and in the common international tasks.
This duty is particularly insistent for us because we inherit from the
past a certain insularity and we are hampered by barriers of dis-
tance and language. All the more necessary, therefore, is a conscious
struggle to surmount them.17
Cannon took this admonition to heart most of all for himself. As
he wrote in his draft reply to "Prospect and Retrospect":
I had to acquire internationalism. It took a long time. The process
was a painful and difficult one, and very probably remains uncom-
pleted. In this field I am still a seeker, a learner. It is very hard for
an American to be a thoroughgoing internationalist in the genuine,
not superficial, sense of the word. He is not born with this gift. The
difficulties of distance, plus language handicaps, determined, and
yet determine for me a slowness of orientation and a difficulty in
quickly understanding international questions. (Example: The first
stages of the struggle in the Russian party.)18
All leading CLAers— miseducated in the school of the degen-
erating Comintern— had much to learn from Trotsky, as the docu-
ments show. The process of basic Leninist education was a source
for much of the early tension, as Cannon noted years later when
he mused on the causes for the 1931-33 fight:
As we began to get the writings of Trotsky, it opened up a whole
new world for us. And they [Abern and Shachtman] discovered, this
is my assumption, that while they had always taken what I said for
8 CLA 1931-33
gospel, they discovered there were a lot of things I didn't know. That
I was just beginning to learn from Trotsky. What they didn't know
was that I was learning as well as they were. Shachtman at least, I
think, had the idea that he had outgrown me. 19
In overcoming the CLA's unmerited factional polarization
Cannon completed his education as a Leninist, learning to put
program and principle qualitatively above organizational consid-
erations. In later years Cannon recognized that it took Trotsky's
guidance to break him from the bureaucratic factional practices
of the degenerating Comintern:
When I came out of the nine years of the CP I was a first-class fac-
tional hoodlum. If not, how would I ever have survived? All I knew
when somebody started a fight, let him have it. That existence was
all I knew. I think Trotsky is right when he says that in the long
drawn-out fight between Cannon and Abern that historical right is
on the side of Cannon. But that doesn't mean I was right about
everything. No, I was wrong about many things, including my meth-
ods and my impatience and rudeness with comrades and repulsing
them. My past record— but that is years ago. I don't do that anymore.
I don't insult comrades. I don't persecute them or give them grounds
for thinking I am doing it. I know more about how to lead a party
than that. I have had responsibilities on my shoulders and I have
had the Old Man's instructions and some day I am going to publish
the Old Man's correspondence on this question and it will be very
illuminating as one of the great sources of my information and
change. I improved myself, cleaned myself up, and you have got to
judge me as I am today.20
The resolution of the fight cemented Cannon's trust in Trotsky
and his commitment to building a democratic-centralist interna-
tional tendency. In contrast, Abern and Glotzer remained mired
in the politics of cliquist gang warfare that had defined Zinoviev's
Comintern. The "Abern Clique" was a fault line at the center of
American Trotskyism, a remnant of the 1931-33 CLA fight, through-
out the decade. In 1939-40 the fault ruptured and Shachtman
rejoined his clique partners.21
The documents reveal the myriad tensions that can tear apart
a small communist propaganda nucleus. How the CLA overcame
the "dog days" to become one of the strongest sections of the Fourth
International is an important lesson in the struggle to forge a revo-
lutionary party and its cadre. The Prometheus Research Library,
central reference archive of the Central Committee of the Spartacist
League, U.S. section of the International Communist League, is
unique in understanding the importance of the CLA fight and
Introduction 9
making its history accessible to our own and future generations.
The ICL, like the ILO, is a fighting communist propaganda group
with the goal of forging parties of the proletarian vanguard to lead
to victory new October Revolutions internationally.
The CLA's Origins in the CP's Cannon Faction
As a delegate to the Comintern Sixth Congress in 1928,
Cannon, a founding leader of the American Communist Party,
was won to Trotsky's fight to return the Soviet Communist Party
and Communist International to the revolutionary international-
ist program of Lenin's day. Cannon, as a member of the Program
Commission, was given a partial copy of Trotsky's "The Draft Pro-
gram of the Communist International: A Criticism of Fundamen-
tals" (hereafter referred to as the Critique).22 Trotsky's powerful
essay distilled the lessons of the international class struggle of the
preceding years, in which the Communist International, initially
under the leadership of Zinoviev and then of Bukharin-Stalin, zig-
zagged between adventurism and the crassest opportunism. The
abandonment of a revolutionary perspective bore its most terrible
fruit in the Chinese Communist Party's subordination to the petty-
bourgeois nationalist Guomindang, leading to the defeat of the
Second Chinese Revolution of 1925-27.
Trotsky exposed the source of the Comintern's betrayals in
the bureaucratic caste that had seized power from the Soviet pro-
letariat in early 1924, defeating the Left Opposition and later that
year generalizing its accommodation to the bourgeois order with
Stalin's dogma of "socialism in one country." The Left Opposi-
tion fought a series of battles to maintain the Soviet Union as a
bastion of world revolution, first in 1923-24 and then in alliance
with Zinoviev and Kamenev in the 1926-27 United Opposition,
but Trotsky's Critique was the first programmatically comprehen-
sive treatment of the corrosive effects on the Comintern of the
conservative bureaucracy's hold on the Soviet party and state.23
Already at an impasse in the factional warfare dominating the
American Party in the 1920s, Cannon was electrified by Trotsky's
document, which he described as "a searchlight in the fog of offi-
cial propaganda, scholasticism and administrative decree which
has been substituted for the ideological leadership of the Execu-
tive Committee of the Communist International in earlier years."21
Cannon found an ally in Canadian party leader Maurice Spector,
10 CLA 1931-33
a member of the Program Commission who had long been sym-
pathetic to the Trotskyist Opposition.25 Resolving to fight for
Trotsky's views, they smuggled out of Moscow the partial copy of
Trotsky's Critique. In New York, Cannon immediately won over
his companion, Rose Karsner, as well as two of his key lieuten-
ants, Abern and Shachtman.
Cannon, Shachtman, and Abern were expelled from the CP
in October 1928; in History of American Trotskyism Cannon recounts
that the self-serving hacks in the Lovestone Party leadership labeled
them the "Three Generals Without an Army." This description
downplays the support in the Party for the expelled Trotskyists.
Cannon had been the coleader— along with William F. (Bill)
Dunne— of the smallest of the CP's three established factions. The
Cannon group split over Cannon's adherence to the Left Oppo-
sition. Bill Dunne, at the time on foreign assignment for the
Comintern, chose the security of his Party membership over
revolutionary program and principle. So did prominent Cannon
faction members such as Manuel Gomez, leader of the Anti-
Imperialist League, and William Schneiderman, a leader of the
Young Communist League and later district organizer of the Cali-
fornia CP. However, some 150 Cannon faction members were
expelled simply for questioning Cannon's expulsion. The major-
ity declared for Trotsky after reading his Critique, joining the CLA
at its founding in May 1929.
Among the League's initial members was Arne Swabeck, like
Cannon and Abern a full member of the CP Central Executive
Committee (Shachtman was an alternate). A former editor of the
SP's Scandinavian weekly paper and a member of the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW) from 1918 to 1920, Swabeck had
been a leader of the 1919 Seattle general strike. A founding Ameri-
can Communist, he served as a delegate to the Comintern Fourth
Congress in 1922. An SP member from 1908, Rose Karsner
was the secretary of Max Eastman's journal Masses during World
War I. She was also a founding Communist and, like Abern and
Shachtman, a central administrator of the International Labor
Defense (ILD), the CP-initiated united-front defense organization,
headed by Cannon, that led the great campaign against the
execution of the anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti in 1927.
Most of the Minneapolis CP branch leaders— each one with
more than two decades of experience as workers leaders— came
Introduction 1 1
over to the CLA. This included Bill Dunne's brothers, Miles and
Vincent, as well as Carl Skoglund and Oscar Coover. Vince Dunne
was a founding member of the I WW and an itinerant Wobbly
organizer in the western U.S. from 1906-08. Active thereafter in
the Minneapolis labor movement, he joined the Communist Party
in 1920. Skoglund joined the Socialist youth in his native Sweden
in 1905 and participated as a young draftee in its antimilitarist
activity. Blacklisted after leading a 1909 mill strike, he emigrated
to the U.S. in 1911, where he joined the SP in 1914 and the IWW
in 1917. He was a leader of the SP's Scandinavian Federation, an
early supporter of the Bolshevik Revolution, and a founding Ameri-
can Communist. A railway mechanic, he was chairman of the local
strike committee during the 1922 railway strike and was there-
after blacklisted from the industry. Coover was a leader of the 1922
railway strike along with Skoglund, and also a founding Ameri-
can Communist.
Attending the first CLA conference was Hugo Oehler, one of
the CP's best trade-union field operatives and former organizer
of District 10— headquartered in Kansas City and encompassing
ten western states, including Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico.
Oehler was a secret Trotskyism He remained officially a member
of the CP until June 1930 and was a leader, along with Bill Dunne,
of the explosive textile strike in Gastonia, North Carolina in 1929.
Louis Basky, leader of a group of Hungarians independently won
to Trotsky's views, veteran of the 1919 Hungarian Revolution, and
long-time leader of the American Party's Hungarian Federation,
also joined the CLA. Dr. Antoinette Konikow, member of the Rus-
sian Socialist movement in exile from 1888, founding member of
the SP and the American Communist movement, and pioneer of
birth control in the United States, adhered to the League with a
small group she had recruited in Boston.
The CLA's new National Committee included the majority of
the founding leaders of the American Communist youth group—
Abern, Shachtman, John Edwards, and Oliver Carlson.2'1 Joining
them on the CLA NC was Albert Glotzer, who was in 1928 a full
member of the National Executive Committee of the Young Com-
munist League (YCL). Glotzer had risen rapidly to leadership in
the YCL's Chicago organization after joining in 1923 at the age of
15. Joseph Friedman (later known as Joseph Carter) was another
Communist youth leader who joined the CLA. A leader of (lie
12 CLA 1931-33
Socialist Party's New York youth, he had recently come over to
the Communists.
Six of the seven members of the National Committee elected
at the CLA's First National Conference in May 1929 were veter-
ans of the "Cannon group"; the seventh was Maurice Spector, a
member of the Canadian CP's Political Committee as well as of
the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI),
who was expelled from the Canadian party with some 30 others
in late 1928. The Canadian comrades were initially organized as
the Toronto branch of the CLA; later a Montreal branch was also
organized. In late 1934 the Canadian Trotskyists formed a sepa-
rate national organization.
The creation of the CLA from an established group within
the Communist Party, with a history of collective work, gave it an
organizational stability lacking in most Trotskyist groups interna-
tionally. The only other comparably organized group to come over
as a whole to the ILO was Eduard Van Overstraeten's in Belgium.
A leading opponent of World War I and a founding Belgian Com-
munist, Van Overstraeten headed a faction in the Belgian party
that also predated the development of the Left Opposition. Over
one-third of the Belgian party went with him when he was expelled
in early 1928 for supporting the Russian United Opposition;
Cannon brought over a much smaller proportion of the Ameri-
can Party.27 But Van Overstraeten had been trained in Zinoviev's
maneuverist school of politics. He disagreed with Trotsky on the
fundamental issue of military defense of the USSR in the Chinese
Eastern Railroad dispute and deserted the ILO in 1930 while his
organization splintered. Part of it— the Charleroi Federation led
by Leon Lesoil— became the Belgian section of the ILO. Deeply
rooted among the miners, the Belgian section was the most pro-
letarian of the early European Trotskyist organizations.
Expelled en masse in late 1926, Zinoviev's supporters in the
German party, led by Hugo Urbahns, Ruth Fischer, and Arkadi
Maslow, founded the Leninbund, which adhered briefly to the ILO
in 1929. 28 Writing off the Communist International and the Soviet
Union itself as "state capitalist," the Leninbund lasted less than a
year in the ILO. The small group led by Josef Frey, a founder of
the Austrian Communist Party, remained mired in cliquist maneu-
verism and was never recognized as an ILO section. Henricus
Sneevliet, a founder of both the Socialist and Communist move-
Introduction 1 3
ments in the Dutch East Indies, as well as a founding Dutch Com-
munist, was expelled from the Dutch party with a group of sup-
porters in 1929. But his Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) stood
apart from the International Left Opposition, adhering to the
Trotskyist movement only later, from 1933-38. Even then the RSP
maintained its membership in the centrist London Bureau, which
it retained after the break with Trotsky in 1938.
Andres Nin in Spain, Alfred Rosmer in France, and Chen
Duxiu in China were won to the Left Opposition on a firmer
programmatic basis. Nin and Rosmer, like Cannon, had long pre-
Communist histories as revolutionary syndicalists. But Nin had
lived for years in the USSR and lost his direct connection to the
Spanish party. Rosmer was expelled from the French party in
December 1924, before the issues in dispute in the Russian party
were clear internationally. The founder and preeminent leader of
the Chinese Communist Party, Chen followed Moscow's orders,
despite misgivings, implementing the disastrous policy of class-
collaboration that led to the crushing of the Second Chinese
Revolution. After the disaster, he was made the scapegoat for
Stalin's policy. He brought only a few close followers into the ILO,
and many of the Chinese section's young recruits unjustly ques-
tioned his leadership from the beginning.29
Cannon is distinguished from other early leaders of ILO
sections not only by the number of supporters won to the ILO,
but by the fact that he stayed the course, becoming a leader of the
Fourth International when it was founded in 1938. The most
capable Leninist the United States has yet produced, Cannon was
the leader of the SWP through World War II and after, going to
jail for the party's opposition to the imperialist war and leading
the struggle, however belated and partial, against the Pabloite
revisionism that destroyed the Fourth International in 1951-53.
He remained the SWP's national chairman through the party's
degeneration into reformism in the 1960s until his death in 1974.™
Rosmer, unable to function as a leader of a small propaganda
group, deserted the ILO in 1930. Nin, whose group of Spanish
Bolshevik-Leninists had an increasingly attenuated relationship
to the ILO, split in 1935.31 Chen was arrested in late 1932 and
spent the next six years in Chiang Kai-shek's prisons, unable to
play much of a role in the internal disputes of the ILO. He broke
with the Fourth International in the prelude to World War II,
14 CLA 1931-33
advocating support for the "democratic" imperialists against Nazi
Germany.32 Outside of the Russian Opposition, Cannon was the
only one of all the former Communist leaders who was able to
achieve the revolutionary programmatic intransigence necessary
for the Leninist proletarian vanguard.
Left Opposition vs. Right Opposition
Trotsky's Critique was effectively the founding document of
the International Left Opposition. But in early 1929 the Critique
was just beginning to be circulated internationally; it had been
published only in French in Maurice Paz's journal, Contre le cou-
rant, and in English (in partial form) in the Militant. Other docu-
ments of the Russian Opposition were hardly available even in the
Soviet Union. The Platform of the United Opposition, written for
the 15th Party Congress in fall 1927, was banned as "anti-party"
and circulated only clandestinely. Max Eastman had obtained a
copy, which he published in his 1928 The Real Situation in Russia,
along with Trotsky's October 1927 "Letter to the Bureau of Party
History."33 Thus some basic documents of the Russian struggle
were available in English. Eastman donated the royalties from the
book to help produce the Militant.
The issue of Soviet domestic economic policy came to the fore
in 1929. Opposing the economic autarky that underlay the dogma
of "socialism in one country," the Left Opposition had insisted that
the gains of the revolution could only be defended in the long term
through its extension to the advanced industrial countries. But in
the meantime they sought to build the Soviet state and economy
as key resources in the fight for world revolution. The Left Oppo-
sition fought for a planned rate of industrialization so that the
social fabric necessary for a proletarian dictatorship could be
rebuilt after the devastation of World War I and the Civil War. They
sought to maintain the "smychka" (link between workers and peas-
ants) through the production of manufactured goods for the
peasantry. During the period of the United Opposition, they fought
for higher workers' wages, financing industrialization through
higher tax rates for the kulaks (well-off peasants who hired labor),
and for incentives to foster voluntary collectivization among the
poorer peasants.
In contrast, the ruling Soviet faction under Stalin, then in a
bloc with Nikolai Bukharin, followed the policy of increasing con-
cessions to the kulaks and petty traders created by the 1921 New
Introduction 15
Economic Policy (NEP). Bukharin and his school of "red profes-
sors" were the most vocal advocates of these concessions, with
Bukharin calling on the kulaks to "enrich" themselves. Mikhail
Tomsky— the head of the Soviet trade unions— stood with Bukharin.
Trotsky saw the bloc between Stalin's centrist group, based on the
party and state apparatus, and the rightists around Bukharin and
Tomsky, as unstable. Social support for Bukharin's neo-Narodnik
agrarianism was to be found among the kulaks and NEPmen.
Trotsky predicted disaster as the grain surpluses at the disposal
of the hostile kulak forces continued to grow. Indeed, the kulaks
began to withhold grain from the Soviet cities in late 1927. By
1928 the shortage in grain collections portended urban famine
and threatened the very foundations of the workers state.
By spring 1928 the Stalinist faction, fearing for the future of
the Soviet state, had embarked on an anti-kulak turn. In early 1929
this became a full-scale political about-face, accompanied by an
open assault on the Bukharinite right. The Stalinists' hasty and
brutal forced collectivization of the peasantry and initiation of a
five-year plan for industrialization foreclosed the immediate threat
of capitalist restoration in the USSR. In order to bring interna-
tional policy in line with the domestic left turn (and to undercut
the Left Opposition), the Communist International, now unam-
biguously under the control of Stalin, promulgated a Third Period
of post- 19 17 capitalism in which proletarian revolution was declared
to be imminent more or less everywhere.
By the end of 1929 the Right Opposition (RO) leaders had all
capitulated. Bukharin remained a member of the Soviet party Cen-
tral Committee, but his supporters in other sections of the Com-
intern (including Jay Lovestone, M.N. Roy, Heinrich Brandler, and
Joaquin Maurin) were expelled as the CI embarked on an ultra-
leftist and sectarian course. The Stalinist parties abandoned the
established trade unions to reformist leadership in order to build
their own "revolutionary" unions. They opposed joint actions with
parties of the Second International, which were labeled "social
fascists." Third Period ultraleft rhetoric and bureaucratic adven-
turism tended to assuage the doubts of Communist militants
formerly sympathetic to Trotsky's criticisms of the CI's growing
opportunism, undercutting the ILO's recruitment. The Third
Period remained the policy of the centrist Comintern leadership
throughout the period covered by this book. The subsequent turn
16 CLA 1931-33
to open class collaborationism with "democratic" imperialism
culminated in 1935 with the CI's adoption of the policy of the
"Popular Front" with which Stalinism is generally identified today.
Heinrich Brandler, the vacillating head of the German party
during the aborted revolution of 1923, became the leading inter-
national spokesman of the Right Opposition. The Right too
opposed the Stalinist Comintern leadership, but from an evolving
reformist perspective that was to lead most of its supporters to the
Social Democracy— if not to outright capitalist reaction— before the
decade was out. Given Bukharin's capitulation, the RO supported
Stalin's domestic Soviet leadership, including the persecution of
the Left Opposition. The RO's American organization was the
Communist Party (Opposition), headed by the unprincipled
adventurer Jay Lovestone, who, as leader of the official CP, had
expelled Cannon and the other founding Trotskyists. Lovestone
ended the decade as a shameless backer of U.S. imperialism's entry
into World War II. This was but the prelude to his postwar role as
a braintruster for the anti-Communist machinations of the Ameri-
can CIA in the international labor movement.
Trotsky correctly viewed the Soviet Right Opposition as a
bridge within the party to the openly counterrevolutionary
elements— including kulaks, NEPmen, would-be exploiters, and
residual tsarist elements in the state apparatus— who were the only
social base of support for the RO's economic policies. Interna-
tionally, it was clear that a political divide separated the Bolshevik-
Leninists from the multiple capitulators of the RO, who also
regarded themselves as unjustly expelled from the CI. Trotsky had
been willing to include the Bukharinites in negotiations for the
reestablishment of Soviet party democracy when it appeared that
dissension with the Stalinist left turn opened up that possibility
in 1928. He remained ready to include the RO if the possibility of
such negotiations appeared in the future. But his aim was to lay
the basis for the RO's conscious elimination from the proletarian
vanguard: "The purge from the party of real opportunists, to say
nothing of the Thermidorians, must be carried out freely and
openly, by the will of the party masses."34 He adamantly refused
to merge political banners with the Brandlerites in a fight against
Stalinism:
We Bolshevik-Leninists never looked upon party democracy as free
entry for Thermidorian views and tendencies; on the contrary, party
democracy was trampled underfoot in the promotion of the latter.
Introduction 1 7
What we mean by the restoration of party democracy is that the
real revolutionary proletarian core of the party win the right to curb
the bureaucracy and to really purge the party: to purge the party of
the Thermidorians in principle as well as their unprincipled and
careerist cohorts.35
This was also Trotsky's position toward other rightist oppositional
elements that emerged from the Soviet party in 1931-32:
It is true that the slogan "Down with Stalin" is very popular right
now not only inside the party but also far beyond its perimeters. In
this one can see the advantage of the slogan, but at the same time,
undoubtedly, also its danger. To assume a protective coloring and
politically dissolve into the general dissatisfaction with the Stalinist
regime is something we cannot, we will not, and we must not do.36
Political Differentiation in the Early ILO
Many dissident Communist elements who sought to regroup
under the ILO's banner did not fully grasp the significance of
the struggle in the Russian party. All were attracted to the Left
Opposition's struggle against bureaucratism in the Soviet party
and state. But many saw this as a simple "democratic" issue, mis-
understanding or disagreeing with the underlying programmatic
basis— the fight to forge the politically homogenous revolutionary
proletarian vanguard in opposition to all varieties of centrism and
reformism. Political softness toward the Right Opposition was com-
mon. Trotsky laid out the general problem:
It is the task of the Left Opposition to reestablish the thread of his-
toric continuity in Marxist theory and policies. However, the differ-
ent groups of the Left Opposition in the various countries arose
under the influence of the most diverse national, provincial, and
purely personal factors, and have often, cloaked in the banner of
Leninism, brought up their cadres in a completely different and
sometimes even in a contrary spirit.
We must not shut our eyes to the facts. We must openly say: many
opposition groups and groupings represent a caricature of the offi-
cial party. They possess all its vices, often in an exaggerated form,
but not its virtues, which are conditioned by the numerical strength
of the workers within them alone, if by nothing else.37
Trotsky's primary task was the systematic education of the ILO
cadre and the weeding out of opportunist, sectarian, accidental,
and dilettantish elements. This entailed almost constant internal
political struggle.
18 CLA 1931-33
The first major fight Trotsky waged in exile was over the duty
of the international proletariat to defend the gains of the Russian
Revolution. In 1929, when Chiang Kai-shek tried to break China's
treaty with the Soviet Union and seize the Chinese Eastern Rail-
road, the Leninbund, along with Van Overstraeten and a small
group of French syndicalists then adhering to the ILO, refused to
take a clear stand in defense of the world's first workers state.38
Generalizing his refusal to defend the USSR, Urbahns, leader of
the Leninbund, adopted the "theory" that the bureaucratized
Soviet state represented not the dictatorship of the proletariat but
a new form of "state capitalism." In late 1929, with Urbahns threat-
ening to expel them, Trotsky's supporters left the Leninbund. The
ILO's German section, the German United Left Opposition of the
KPD (hereafter referred to as the German United Opposition),
was formed in April 1930 through a merger of the former
Leninbund minority with the so-called "Wedding Opposition," a
dissident leftist current within the KPD whose leaders had been
expelled in February 1928 for meeting with Left Opposition leader
Christian Rakovsky.
The fight with Van Overstraeten continued through fall 1930,
with the issue of Soviet defensism intersecting the interlinked
question of the ILO's orientation as an expelled faction of the
Comintern. Van Overstraeten's Belgian majority not only termed
the USSR "imperialist" for its retention of the Chinese Eastern
Railroad, it also wrote off the entire Communist International,
arguing it was dead as a revolutionary force and that the Left
Opposition should fight for the creation of a new party and
international.
Trotsky had originally considered Belgium an exception to the
Opposition's general orientation as an expelled Comintern fac-
tion, believing the official party to be insignificant there. In
October 1929 he wrote, "The Belgian Opposition can and must
aim to become an independent party. Its task is to win over the
proletarian nucleus, not of the Communist Party, but of the social
democracy."39
Yet Trotsky fought hard against Van Overstraeten's attempt
to write off the Communist International as a whole. With the
Stalinists still claiming to stand on the program of the Russian
Revolution, the CI organized the overwhelming majority of
revolutionary-minded workers. The ILO's orientation as an expelled
Introduction 1 9
faction, critically supporting the party's electoral and other cam-
paigns, was necessary to a serious proletarian perspective. Lesoil's
Charleroi Federation united with a small group led by Georges
Vereeken in Brussels to defend the ILO's orientation, and split
with Van Overstraeten in October 1930 to become the official ILO
section in Belgium.40
The fight over the Chinese Eastern Railroad is briefly touched
on in the documents. Of greater centrality is Trotsky's ongoing
battle with Andres Nin and the Spanish Opposition, beginning
with Nin's release from the USSR in late 1930. Nin insisted, "In
Spain the proletariat will organize its party outside the official
party (which does not exist in fact), and in spite of it."41 Nin's
Opposicion Communiste de Espana (OCE) oriented instead to the
former Catalan Federation of the Spanish Communist Party led
by Joaquin Maui in. Expelled from the CI in June 1930, the Catalan
Federation was a rightward-moving centrist organization defined
by its capitulation to petty-bourgeois Catalan nationalism. Trotsky
characterized its politics as a "mixture of petty-bourgeois preju-
dices, ignorance, provincial 'science,' and political crookedness."42
In March 1931 Maurin's Catalan Federation founded a "mass"
organization called the Workers and Peasants Bloc (BOC) which
was, in Catalonia at least, far larger than the Communist Party.
The BOC, affiliated with the Right Opposition, refused to
condemn the Stalinist leadership of the Communist International.
Trotskyists were officially banned from membership. Thus Nin's
insistence on seeking unity with the BOC— while ignoring the
official Spanish Communist Party— contradicted the very political
foundations of the ILO. From the fall of the monarchy in early
1931, Spain was in the midst of a prerevolutionary crisis in which
even a small nucleus, armed with a revolutionary program and
acting independently of Maurin's centrist swamp, could have grown
exponentially. Trotsky wrote endless letters trying and failing to
convince Nin of his criminally wrong course.43 As the documents
reveal, Nin briefly found support in early 1931 from other sectors
of the ILO, including the international secretary, M. Mill. Further
distancing itself from the ILO, the Spanish Opposition changed
its name to Izquierda Communiste de Espana (ICE) in March 1932,
in implicit solidarity with the Gauche Communiste trade-union
opportunists who had split from the Trotskyist movement in
France.
20 OLA 1931-33
The fight on the trade-union question in France features
heavily in the correspondence between Trotsky and Shachtman
that opens this collection. The Ligue Communiste de France (the
Ligue) was founded in April 1930 through the fusion of a num-
ber of disparate groups supporting Trotsky in France. Even before
the Ligue was founded, Alfred Rosmer had met with the i ightward-
moving centrist elements in the leadership of the teachers union,
themselves recently expelled from the Communist Party, and
decided upon the formation of a new opposition group within
the Communist-led trade-union federation, the Confederation
Generale du Travail Unitaire (CGTU). The Opposition Unitaire
(OU, Unitary Opposition) was promoted with great fanfare in the
pages of the French Trotskyist paper, La Verite, which published
its program, an opportunist mishmash that catered to lingering
syndicalist prejudices within the CGTU, without a word of criti-
cism. Trotsky strongly objected to the Ligue's perspective of
subordinating its activity among the proletariat to an ongoing bloc
with nonrevolutionary elements. Pierre Gourget countered with
the old syndicalist argument against party "control" of the trade
unions.44
Within the Ligue, Raymond Molinier led the fight for Trotsky's
position against Pierre Naville, Pierre Gourget, and Rosmer.
Apparently piqued over Trotsky's support to Molinier, Rosmer with-
drew from the Ligue in late 1930. Molinier's remaining opponents,
led by Gourget and Naville, sought to obscure the programmatic
difference between themselves and Molinier on the trade-union
question with accusations against Molinier's allegedly shady busi-
ness dealings as the head of a debt collection agency. When
Molinier's faction won a majority in the Ligue in early 1931,
Gourget and a group of supporters split from the Ligue and began
publishing a journal, Bulletin de la Gauche communiste, on which
Rosmer also collaborated.45 Rosmer subsequently visited Spain,
attempting to poison the Spanish Opposition against Molinier.
Naville remained a member of the Ligue and continued the
anti-Molinier machinations within it. He was aligned with Kurt
Landau in Germany. The founder and ideological inspirer of the
Austrian Mahnruf Group, Landau had moved to Berlin and pro-
pelled himself into leadership of the German United Opposition
when it was founded in early 1930. An unprincipled cliquist and
adventurer, Landau's unserious approach to the struggle for
Introduction 2 1
programmatic clarity can be judged by Trotsky's condemnation
of the Mahnruf Group:
During the last two years, in the course of which I have had an
opportunity to observe this group through its press and through
correspondence with its representatives, the group has passed
through the following evolution: (1) at first it swore movingly in the
name of the Russian Opposition; (2) then it declared unexpectedly
that it would not join any international faction; (3) then it made the
attempt to unite all the groups, including the Rights; (4) following
this it dissolved its bloc with the Brandlerites and swore, anew, loyalty
to the International Left; (5) later on it adopted— to bring about uni-
fication, so to speak, but in reality for self-preservation— a platform
in the spirit of Comrade Landau; (6) next it rejected the platform
of Comrade Landau and adopted the capitulationist platform of
Comrade Graef; (7) finally it split off from Graef and declared itself
once more to stand on the platform of the International Left.46
In a detailed exposure of Landau, Jan Frankel, Trotsky's secretary,
wrote, "He appears completely beyond reproach as long as it is a
matter of repeating general formulas that do not immediately
affect the political activity of the individual and his group or obli-
gate them. The difficulties and disagreements begin only at the
moment that it becomes a matter of getting to the real core of
these questions and implementing them."47 Landau's organiza-
tional methods consisted of unprincipled maneuvering and
draconian expulsions, designed to cement his role as unchallenged
"leader" of the German organization. Although a member of the
ILO's International Bureau, Landau refused to take a position
against the trade-union opportunists in France, seeking to protect
his friend and ally, Naville. He organized a conference of the
German group in October 1930 that was solely occupied with
personal and organizational squabbles— this just after Reichstag
elections where the Nazis' votes jumped to over 18 percent of
the total.
In early 1931, after months of fruitless attempts to educate
Landau through personal letters, Trotsky brought the fight against
him into the ILO with a devastating attack, "The Crisis in the
German Left Opposition." At the time Landau was threatening
to expel the Leipzig (Saxony) branch, led by Roman Well and
A. Senin (later unmasked as Stalinist agents). Trotsky called for
the reinstatement of the unjustly expelled German comrades, the
organization of a democratic discussion within the section to be
moderated by the International Secretariat, and the convening of
22 CLA 1931-33
a politically prepared German conference. Landau quit the
Opposition rather than comply.48
Landau was typical of the dabblers, dilettantes, and adven-
turers seeking affiliation with the ILO in its early days. Boris
Souvarine and Maurice Paz in France were even more dilettantish
and distant from the working class. Josef Frey's Austrian group,
which competed with Mahnruf for designation as the official ILO
section (the international recognized neither) was cut from the
same cloth. Trotsky later described the phenomenon as:
Individuals and little grouplets, predominantly of intellectual or
semi-intellectual character, without clear political views and with-
out roots in the working class. Accustomed neither to serious work
nor to responsibility, closely tied up to nothing and nobody, politi-
cal nomads without baggage, who carried some cheap formulas,
smart critical phrases, and practice in intrigue from town to town
and country to country.49
Followers of the ultraleft Amadeo Bordiga, organized as
Prometeo, worked with the ILO sections in Brussels and Paris (and
briefly in New York). The Bordigists opposed the struggle for
democratic demands, essential to a revolutionary proletarian per-
spective in the unfolding Spanish revolution. Opposing the united
front in principle, they fought against Trotsky's urgent call for
united actions of the Communist Party and Social Democrats to
stop Hitler in Germany. Trotsky fought hard to win them to
Leninism, but their ILO membership became increasingly unten-
able. In early 1930 three members of the Italian CP's Political
Bureau in exile in Paris, including Pietro Tresso (Blasco) and
Alfonso Leonetti (Souzo), declared for Trotsky and formed the
New Italian Opposition (NOI) to distinguish themselves from the
Bordigists. Under the influence of the NOI, a pro-Trotskyist fac-
tion crystallized within Prometeo. Trotsky's supporters, led by
Nicola Di Bartolomeo, were expelled from Prometeo in 1931 after
six months of discussion and joined forces with the NOI.50
Prometeo was not invited to the February 1933 International
Preconference that stabilized the ILO.
The numerous fights waged by Trotsky were detailed in docu-
ments circulated in all ILO sections; the most important documents
were published in the International Bulletin, which contributed
greatly to the education of the early Trotskyist cadre. Cannon
cogently summarized the history of four years of struggle in out-
line notes for a speech to the CLA membership:
Introduction 23
Early groups "supporting" Russian Opposition consisted primarily
of elements alien to Bolshevism— party democracy, etc.
Right— 1. Souvarine; 2. Van Overstraeten; 3. Lore, etc.; 4. Rosmer-
Paz.
Ultraleft— 1. Prometeo; 2. Fischer-Ma slow-Urbahns.
Suppression of Russian Opposition worked to prevent an under-
standing of its platform.
Together with that— the tactics of the Russian Opposition-
necessitated by special conditions— prevented clear understanding.
The real process of selection and differentiation began in 1929
with exile of Trotsky.51
The Fight to Forge an International Secretariat
The fights in the French, German, and Spanish sections inter-
sected and overlapped with Trotsky's ongoing struggle to forge an
authoritative and centralized leading body for the ILO, which also
figures heavily in the first section of this book, "Shachtman in
the International." The Provisional Committee of the Left
Opposition established in Prinkipo in June 1929 mandated the
publication of an international journal to "push forward the
regroupment of communist workers by the study and discussion
of the problems posed before the proletariat in every country."52
Prinkipo was far too out of the way for an international cen-
ter and Trotsky's precarious position in exile made a direct
administrative role in the ILO untenable. At first Trotsky relied
on Rosmer, the most prominent of the European Trotskyists, to
conduct the work of international consolidation and expansion.
But Rosmer did nothing to make the international center a reality
and Trotsky began pushing for a more authoritative gathering of
Opposition groups. This meeting was held in Paris in April 1930,
soon after the founding conferences of the German United
Opposition and the French Ligue.53 Disabled by political disagree-
ment and vacillations among the leading participants, the confer-
ence failed to issue a political manifesto, earning from Trotsky
the bitter sobriquet "mute conference." But the gathering did vote
to form an International Bureau of representatives of the three
most established European sections: the French, Russian, and Ger-
man (both factions of the divided Belgian party refused to serve
on the bureau and the CLA could not afford to keep a permanent
representative in Europe). Leon Sedov (Trotsky's son), Landau,
and Rosmer (with Naville as his deputy) were appointed to serve
24 CLA 1931-33
on the bureau, which was charged with the publication of a regu-
lar ILO discussion bulletin. The bureau was to be based in Paris,
where the Ligue published a regular weekly, La Verite.
Sedov, however, could not get a visa for France. Moreover, the
conference made no arrangements for the bureau's technical work,
leaving it dependent on the French Ligue, which was increasingly
polarized between Rosmer-Naville and the group led by Molinier.
The bureau barely functioned even in the period before Rosmer's
defection in late 1930. The first issue of the International Bulletin
(published in French) appeared only in late August 1930, and in
the meantime Trotsky had to distribute his own international
circulars to keep the Opposition sections informed of develop-
ments. In the first of these circulars Trotsky wrote:
The main reason for this loss of months, almost a year, in the forma-
tion of the international organization is, in my opinion, the lack of
understanding that can be observed among a number of comrades
about the reciprocal relationship between national and international
organizations of the proletariat. Among certain elements in the
Opposition the struggle against bureaucratic centralism has revived
a non-Marxist conception of the reciprocal relationship between the
national sections and the international organization, according to
which the national sections are the foundation and walls and the
international organization is the roof to be added at the end.54
The Communist International had been established on the
premise that, "In order to achieve permanent liaison and methodi-
cal leadership for the movement, the congress will have to create
a common fighting body, a center of the Communist International,
subordinating the interests of the movement in each country to
the common interests of the revolution internationally."55 Accord-
ingly, in its statutes adopted at the Second Congress, the delegated
world congress was established as the highest body of the revolu-
tionary proletarian organization, whose decisions and those of its
elected executive were binding on all sections. The ILO had to be
built on the same internationalist premise. Given Trotsky's over-
whelming political authority, his enforced physical separation from
the ILO center lent a certain artificiality to any International Sec-
retariat. While the technical and financial difficulties were real,
the reticence to make the calling of an international conference a
priority reflected continuing political differences in the ILO. These
differences were also behind the resistance to Trotsky's attempts
to create some semblance of an interim leading body.
Introduction 25
In October 1930 Trotsky, Sedov, Frankel, Molinier, Naville,
and Mill held a meeting in Prinkipo to deal with the disputes in
the French Ligue. They also proposed a provisional arrangement
for international functioning: the creation of a new Administra-
tive Secretariat (A.S.), which was not to supersede the International
Bureau elected at the April conference but to work under its
direction.56 The new secretariat was composed of Naville, M. Mill,
and Souzo. Mill, a Ukrainian, a leader of the Paris Jewish Group,
and fluent in Russian, was appointed by the Russian Opposition
to work full-time as the international secretary.
The new secretariat sent a circular to all sections projecting
"the convening of an early international conference as one of its
most important tasks" and the holding of continental conferences
as a preparatory measure. The most important job of the interna-
tional conference would be the adoption of a "binding platform
for all sections."57 It wasn't until the Molinier faction won the
majority in the Ligue in early 1931, replacing Naville with Pierre
Frank as the Ligue's representative on the A.S., that international
functioning improved. The International Bulletin appeared regu-
larly for the rest of the year, and minutes of secretariat meetings
were circulated internationally.58 But the projected international
conferences did not occur. In mid-1931 Myrtos, a representative
of the Greek Archio-Marxist organization that had recently adhered
to the ILO, was added to the A.S.
A source of confusion rather than clarity, Mill proved unsuited
to the task of political leadership. Continuing intrigues in the
French Ligue brought the situation to a head. Molinier's majority
in the Ligue fell apart when he aligned with Albert Treint, a former
CP leader and Zinovievist who joined the Trotskyists for a brief
period in 1931. The Paris Jewish Group, under the direction of
Mill and Felix, broke with Molinier and wrote sympathetically to
Rosmer, whose trade-union policy they had recently opposed "in
principle." Outraged, Trotsky demanded that Mill be replaced and
the secretariat reorganized, with the most important European
sections each appointing a representative who would be respon-
sible to his national organization.59 In a deliberate slap in the face
to Trotsky, the Spanish OCE demanded that Mill be reappointed
to the I.S. as its representative.
The secretariat was reorganized and moved to Berlin, where
Sedov had been living since early 1931.60 The ILO international
26 CLA 1931-33
center remained in Berlin for most of 1932, but its functioning
was erratic, and few sets of I.S. minutes and bulletins from this
period are available. A meeting of ILO representatives, held in
Copenhagen in association with Trotsky's visit in November 1932,
decided to hold an International Preconference of the ILO in Paris
early in 1933 in preparation for a larger, representative confer-
ence later in the year. The preconference, held in Paris in Febru-
ary 1933, established a plenum of representatives of the Russian,
Greek, German, Belgian, and French sections to replace the
International Bureau as the authoritative leading body of the
international between conferences.61 This plenum appointed a new
International Secretariat as the administrative body in Paris. This
I.S. intervened in spring 1933— at Trotsky's urging— to bring the
CLA's factional struggle to an end.
Trotsky's fight to establish an authoritative international lead-
ing body continued throughout the decade, even after the found-
ing of the Fourth International and the adoption of an interna-
tional program in 1938. 62 The extreme poverty of the early
Trotskyist movement was a major hindrance, as was continuing
political resistance and unclarity among Trotsky's supporters. The
disruptive activities of the Stalinist secret police, the GPU, also
played a role, although not the all-encompassing one insisted on
by self-serving centrists such as Georges Vereeken.63
The extent of the Stalinist penetration of the Trotskyist move-
ment has never been fully revealed, but some facts are known.
M. Mill returned to the Stalinist fold in late 1932; if he was not
working with the GPU during his tenure as international secre-
tary, he certainly worked with it afterward.64 A few months later
Well and Senin, Latvian-born brothers and leaders of the German
section, also "defected," leading a fight that utterly disrupted the
German Trotskyist organization on the eve of Hitler's appointment
as chancellor. The brothers' real name was later revealed to be
Sobolevicius. They were exposed as GPU operatives working under
the name Soble or Soblen in the United States in the 1950s.
In February 1938 the Stalinists assassinated Sedov with the
help of one "Etienne," aka Mark Zborowski, a Stalinist agent.
Zborowski had earlier helped arrange the murder of Ignace Reiss,
a decorated Soviet intelligence agent who declared for the Fourth
International in 1937. Later in 1938 Rudolph Klement was mur-
dered on the eve of the founding conference of the Fourth Inter-
Introduction 27
national. Trotsky himself fell at the hands of a Stalinist assassin in
1940, but his death did not stop the Stalinist campaign of spying,
disruption, and assassination aimed at the Fourth International.
With the onset of World War II the Sobolevicius brothers set up
shop in New York, where the headquarters of the Fourth Interna-
tional was transferred. Zborowski soon joined them. This GPU
spy ring ran a series of agents in the SWP, including Cannon's
secretary, Sylvia Cauldwell (Sylvia Franklin), as well as one Michael
Cort (Floyd Cleveland Miller), who wormed his way into responsi-
bility in the party's maritime fraction.65 The GPU's persistent
attempts to crush the movement that sought to continue the work
of the revolutionary Communist International was not the least
of Stalin's services to the imperialist world order.
Despite the shallow understanding, dilettantism, and cliquism
of many of Trotsky's early supporters in Europe, and persecu-
tion by the Stalinist secret police, Trotsky was able to cohere a
disciplined international organization of cothinkers, leading to
the foundation of the Fourth International in 1938. This is testi-
mony to the power of Trotsky's fight to preserve the internation-
alist program of the Bolshevik Party which led the Russian
Revolution, a legacy on which proletarian revolutionaries must
proudly stand today.
Shachtman's Role in the ILO
Shachtman was the first CLA leader to meet with Trotsky and
other European Oppositionists. Delegated by the CLA National
Committee, he went to Prinkipo in March 1930 to inquire about a
subsidy for the weekly Militant, for which the CLA did not have
sufficient financial resources. After a few weeks in Prinkipo,
Shachtman went to Berlin with Naville to assist the founding con-
ference of the German United Opposition; afterward he went to
Paris to help organize the ILO's April conference.
While in Europe Shachtman worked closely with Naville,
Rosmer, and Landau. In large part because of Shachtman and
Naville's intervention, Landau was able to assume a leading role
in the German United Opposition.66 Shachtman brought to Paris
a manifesto drafted by Trotsky for adoption by the ILO's April
conference. Capitulating to Van Overstraeten's and Prometeo's
political differences, Shachtman, Naville, and Rosmer decided not
to present Trotsky's manifesto to the conference, to Trotsky's fury.
28 CLA 1931-33
Shachtman later sought to explain:
I look back upon it now and can see more clearly that I should,
nevertheless, have insisted upon the presentation of the manifesto,
or declaration. But at the conference it seemed, not only to me, but
to other comrades I spoke to (Rosmer, Naville), that to do this was
extremely dubious. Nobody was in the least prepared for such an
act. The ground had never been laid for it. The articles in La Verite
for weeks had said everything and suggested everything, except an
international conference that would issue a principled statement
(emphasis in original).67
After Shachtman's return to the U.S., Landau and Naville were
frequent contributors to the Militant on German and French issues.
Despite his co-optation to the International Bureau and
Trotsky's patient letters explicating the political issues, Shachtman
never made a declaration against Naville-Rosmer-Gourget on the
trade-union question, nor did he attempt to get the CLA to do
so. When Trotsky opened the fight against Landau's unprincipled
cliquism in February 1931, Shachtman stood mute. His silence only
encouraged Landau, who, as Trotsky noted, was banking on the
support of both the French and American organizations.
After the A.S. wrote to the CLA to insist that Shachtman's
intervention as a member of the International Bureau was urgent,
the CLA resident committee took up the crisis in the German sec-
tion. Their 27 April 1931 meeting was the scene of the first clash
between Shachtman and Cannon on international questions.
Shachtman's motion supported only Trotsky's operational propos-
als, reserving judgment on the political issues until more infor-
mation was received. Cannon put forward a motion to send the
letters by Trotsky and the A.S. on the Landau question to the CLA
branches for discussion— the motion failed when Shachtman
refused to support it.68
Shachtman's demand for more information was merely a
political cover for Landau. This became clear in late May 1931
when Landau split from the ILO, declaring his intention to form
a new international. The minutes of the June 12 resident commit-
tee meeting reflect evident anger at Shachtman for withholding
key Trotsky correspondence about Landau. The body passed two
motions, one directing Swabeck as League secretary to write to
Trotsky requesting that he address all official correspondence to
the secretary, the other mandating the translation for NC members
Introduction 29
of all Trotsky's letters (at the time Trotsky lacked an English-
speaking secretary and usually wrote to the CLA in German).
The very next day Swabeck sent a letter to Trotsky and the
A.S. promising a comprehensive CLA National Committee reso-
lution to condemn not only Landau's "personal and national clique
formations," but also "the wrong views and practices of the
Gourget group in France, particularly in regard to the question of
trade-union policies and tactics." The June 12 meeting was the
venue for the second clash between Cannon and Shachtman on
international questions; Cannon proposed the publication of the
forthcoming resolution in the Militant in the name of the NC, while
Shachtman wanted only an unsigned (hence less authoritative)
Militant article. In the end, the committee adopted a compromise
motion for a signed article embodying only the "conclusions" of
the NC resolution. Shachtman delayed writing the mandated reso-
lution until the eve of the CLA's Second National Conference in
September.69
After Landau's departure Trotsky observed in a letter to
Shachtman that Naville "is staying in the Ligue in order to sabo-
tage it from within and to help Landau set up a new international"
("You Bear Some Responsibility for Landau's Course," 23 May
1931). In July, under the direction of Naville, the Ligue's journal,
Lutte des classes, published an article by Landau, prompting Trotsky
to break relations with the journal.70 Yet at the CLA conference,
Shachtman's international report omitted the fight against Naville
and the programmatic disputes with Prometeo. In the discussion
period came the third clash between Cannon and Shachtman on
international questions, when Cannon attacked Naville and noted
that the Prometeo documents must be sent to the branches. His
remarks were widely seen as a thinly veiled polemic against
Shachtman. The rift widened when Cannon vehemently opposed
Shachtman's proposal to add Lewit and Basky to the National
Committee. The motion to enlarge the committee lost.71
After the convention Shachtman demanded a two-month
vacation in order to travel again to Europe. Pique was undoubt-
edly a factor in Shachtman's plans to leave New York, but he wrote
to Trotsky that he wanted to report for the Militant on the
developing revolutionary situation in Spain, as well as aid in
the formation of a Left Opposition group in England.72 The
30 CLA 1931-33
documents show how Shachtman's actions in Europe in Novem-
ber-December 1931 brought Trotsky's dissatisfaction to a head,
prompting Trotsky to write to the CLA National Committee and
precipitating the factional struggle in the CLA. These documents
explode the image of Shachtman as Trotsky's happy international
commissar, a myth spread by Shachtman and his supporters in
later years and more recently purveyed by Peter Drucker in his
biography of Shachtman. In fact. Trotsky's opponents in Europe
invoked Shachtman's name in defense of their own actions.73
The Impasse of the CLA
The fight against Shachtman's conciliation of Naville. Mill,
and Landau ignited the factional fire that burned in the CLA for
the next two years. The documents reveal that personal tensions
within the CLA leadership going back to 1929 fueled the fire.
These tensions were rooted in the impasse in which the CLA found
itself soon after it was founded.
In their first few months of existence the American Trotskvists
recruited steadily from the Communist Party. For the most part
the new members were former Cannon faction supporters who
refused to endorse the initial expulsions, but there was also a
trickle of former Foster faction supporters such as Joe Giganti.
The Trotskvists expected to recruit more Foster faction support-
ers disaffected with the ascendancy of the despised adventurer and
blatant opportunist Jav Lovestone to Partv leadership.74
Lovestone, however, failed to see the signs of the rift between
Bukharin and Stalin, and broke too late with Bukharin. his princi-
pal friend and backer in Moscow. He was purged from the Ameri-
can leadership in May 1929. just after the CLA founding confer-
ence, and expelled from the Partv in June. At first Cannon
anticipated that Lovestone would take the majority of his faction
with him, cohering a new partv with the followers of Ludwig Lore
and the right-wing CP Finnish Federation:
The appearance of a right communist, or rather left socialist, party
is clearly indicated. And this in turn will only be a bridge toward
the Socialist Partv. toward incorporation within it as its left wing.
The disruption of the Communist Party as we have known it, the
decline of Communist influence, and the temporary revival of the
Social Democracy as a factor in the labor movement, is now taking
shape as an actual probability and not merely a speculation on future
developments.
Introduction 3 1
The banner of communism and the entire heritage of the Ameri-
can movement as a revolutionary factor will pass into the Opposi-
tion. The official party of Stalinist centrism, hammered mercilessly
from the right and the left, will lose to both and depend for its
existence more and more on subsidy and faith.71
The Stalinist regime in the Comintern succeeded, however,
in isolating Lovestone. Stalin's reported threat to Benjamin Gitlow
and other Lovestoneites in Moscow, "When you get back to
America, nobody will stay with you except your wives," was not
much of an exaggeration.76 Many of Lovestone's key lieutenants
and most of his factional base remained in the CP; he was able to
rally barely 200 members to his Communist Party (Opposition).
As a concession to the sensibilities of the former Lovestoneites
who remained loyal to Moscow, Foster was passed over for Party
leadership. Earl Browder, an unexceptional former Foster lieu-
tenant, emerged as Stalin's new choice for American leader. Brow-
der had spent two years on assignment in the Far East for the
Comintern in 1927-28, supporting every twist and turn of the CI's
opportunist policy in China. Such foreign tours of duty were, at
the time, required as proof of unquestioning loyalty to Moscow.
Thus the Communist Party retained its numerical strength and
the allegiance of the majority of the class-conscious workers who
identified with the Russian Revolution. After Lovestone's expul-
sion, Third Period ultraleftism came into its own in the American
Party. The left turn effectively blocked further substantial recruit-
ment to the CLA, as Shachtman later recounted:
Our first expectations for growth were centered around the pros-
pects that we thought were in the offing among the rank-and-file
Fosterites....How seriously many of them at that time took the heresy
of Trotskyism can be judged by the fact that it was not at all unusual
for a Fosterite rank-and-filer to reply to our agitation by saying, "Why
did you have to go where you are now? Why couldn't you have stayed
with us and continued the fight against the Lovestoneites?" And
primarily our reply would be, "That's no road whatsoever. That's
blocked off completely by the Comintern, by the Stalinists."
Then early in 1929— that is to say, not many months after we our-
selves were expelled by the Lovestoneites and the Fosterites— came
the new crisis in the Party which was far deeper so far as numbers
are concerned than the smaller crisis that had been precipitated by
our own expulsion from the Party.... This created a most embarrass-
ing situation for us, given the tactic that we were employing toward
the members of the Party and given our perspective for the ulterior
development of the Party. We could no longer speak of the Party
32 CLA 1931-33
going further and further to the right. We could no longer speak of
the Lovestoneites ruining the Party. We could no longer speak of
the Fosterites having illusions that they would get the leadership of
the Party. If anything resulted from that, it was a counteroffensive
by the Fosterites— in the ranks, to be sure, unofficially, to be sure—
to get us to return to the Party. They didn't succeed in convincing a
single one of our people, but not even the possibility of success
existed any longer for us in recruiting dissident Fosterites.77
The Third Period was, in Cannon's words, a "devastating
blow": "There were, I would say, perhaps hundreds of Communist
Party members who had been leaning toward us, who... returned
to Stalinism in the period of the ultraleft swing."78 The Party's
authority continued to grow due to the rapid growth of the Soviet
industrial base under the first five-year plan, a sharp contrast to
the capitalist world economy spiraling downward in the Great
Depression. Moreover, the CP's Third Period street militancy and
active fight against black oppression were attractive to young work-
ers. The CP doubled its membership from 1930 to 1933, growing
from 7,545 to 14,937.79
When Lovestone was still its leader the Party had greeted the
first public activities of the Trotskyists with an outburst of bloody
gangsterism. Two Militant saleswomen were attacked outside New
York Party headquarters in December 1928; subsequently public
Trotskyist meetings in New York and Minneapolis were broken up,
while the New York Hungarian Opposition group was attacked in
its meeting hall by at least 50 Stalinists armed with brass knuck-
les, blackjacks, knives, clubs, and lead pipes.80 After Lovestone's
expulsion the attacks were more erratic. From the foundation of
the CLA in May 1929 through late 1932 (when the CLA's propa-
ganda for united-front action against the Nazis in Germany found
some support in Party circles), the Trotskyists were frozen out
politically. Effective propaganda produced a trickle of recruits from
Communist-led organizations, especially the Young Communist
League, but CLAers were rarely able to participate in Party-led
struggles.81 They were generally denied membership in the Party's
"mass" organizations such as the International Labor Defense,
Soviet American Friendship Societies, and Unemployed Councils.82
It is hard for Trotskyists today to fathom what it meant for the
CLA members to be cut off from the movement of thousands of
militant working people that had been their whole life. Cannon
had been the Party's most popular public speaker, often address-
Introduction 33
ing meetings of many hundreds of workers across the nation.
Swabeck and Oehler had won authority as workers leaders in south-
ern Illinois and elsewhere. Even younger Cannon faction mem-
bers such as Abern and Shachtman had participated in the "Save
the Union" opposition to John L. Lewis in the United Mine Work-
ers through the ILD.8S Now the CLA was thrown in on itself. The
political isolation from the proletarian vanguard elements in the
CP intersected the onset of the Great Depression in late 1929. Until
1933 class struggle in general was at a low ebb and the CLA was
in the period of stagnation that Cannon dubbed "the dog days."
The Great Depression
The Militant went weekly in November 1929; the first weekly
issue reported on the stock market crash. The ensuing global eco-
nomic crisis led to a fall in industrial production of 48.7 percent
in the United States between 1929 and 1933.84 There were imme-
diate mass layoffs in late 1929, but the crisis escalated over the
next two years. The 5 million unemployed in September 1930 had
increased to nearly 11 million by December 1931; by March 1933
there were over 15 million. Those laid-off were overwhelmingly
unskilled and semiskilled workers in the urban areas, including
many CLA members. Coal mining, already in decline, was one of
the hardest hit industries; by 1931 starvation was reported in
Franklin County in the southern Illinois coalfields, the one region
where the CLA initially had a working-class following.
While wage rates for unionized workers who remained
employed held steady for the first year of the Depression (due to
pressure from the Hoover White House), wage slashing began in
earnest in fall 1931. An across-the-board 15 percent decrease in
hourly wages was standard, but since most people worked fewer
hours, take-home pay fell still further. Total national income
dropped by more than 50 percent from 1929 to 1932, from $81
billion to $39 billion. CLA members who maintained their jobs
were earning less and had little to spare for the organization.
There was no money to pay the nominal wages due the
national secretary and the Militant editor; the League was forced
to resort to a revolving fund of comrades' rent money to pay bills.
More than once in this period the CLA abandoned an office rather
than pay the back rent; a telephone was an impossible luxury. The
financial priority had to be the Militant, but this too was often
34 CLA 1931-33
beyond the CLA's means and issues were missed. Press frequency
was cut back to biweekly in July 1930, and weekly publication was
not resumed for another year. Swabeck described how he financed
activities through "floating checks": "A check would be made out
under pressure from a creditor without sufficient funds in the bank
to cover the amount. The check would bounce and thus provide a
little additional time to cover the amount of the check that had
bounced previously." The deaf-mute linotype operator "would
regale the young comrades by his highly developed mimicry show-
ing what he thought of my checks."85 Swabeck was constantly
scrounging for money to finance national tours, regional organ-
izers, or international travel.
The devastated economy meant that there was little prospect
of class struggle— those who retained jobs were too fearful of losing
them. American Federation of Labor (AFL) membership, down
from approximately 4 million in 1920 to just over 3.4 million in
1929, fell further to a low of barely more than 2.1 million in 1933.
Strikes were already at a low point, averaging 914 per year in the
last half of the 1920s; there were only 637 in 1930, 810 in 1931,
and 841 in 1932. The ossified craft-union AFL leadership under
William Green marched so much in tune with the capitalist class
headed by Republican president Herbert Hoover that it even
opposed unemployment insurance until July 1932.
In the 1932 national elections, overwhelming mass dissatis-
faction with the Hoover administration was reflected in the land-
slide vote for his opponent, Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt. The
AFL did not support Roosevelt; the labor bureaucracy formed its
alliance with the Democratic Party during FDR's first term in
office. The election returns indicated an incremental stirring of
class consciousness in response to the Depression: Socialist Party
candidate Norman Thomas received 918,000 votes, the Commu-
nist Party slate of William Z. Foster and James Ford— the first black
vice-presidential candidate in United States history— received
102,991. Not since Eugene V. Debs' run for president in 1912 had
there been a combined total of over one million votes for working-
class candidates.86
In early 1933 the class struggle began to pick up in the United
States. There were 1,695 strikes reported in 1933; the upsurge
began months before Roosevelt's National Recovery Act (NRA)
recognized the right of workers to collectively organize. This
Introduction 35
coincided with new political openings for the CLA among CP
members, many of whom reacted with fear and horror at the fail-
ure of the German party to fight Hitler's ascension to power
in January. Opportunities for the CLA to intervene in broader
working-class milieus provided the backdrop for the end of the
factional polarization that plagued the League during the dog days.
Cannon's Personal Crisis and Political Slump
The onset of the Depression and impasse of the CLA coin-
cided with a personal crisis for Cannon that contributed to an
evident period of political demoralization in 1929-30. In spring
1929 Cannon's first wife, Lista Makimson, died, leaving Cannon
and Karsner with the responsibility for two teenage children who
had previously been raised by Makimson, in addition to Karsner's
daughter, Walta. These personal responsibilities weighed heavily
on Cannon as the League was thrust into a period of stagnation.
The Cannon family moved out to Long Island in the summer of
1929 and Karsner too underwent a period of personal withdrawal
and ill health.87
Cannon's need for a steady income was urgent, but, with every
available penny poured into the Militant, the League could not
afford to pay him. Through the good offices of Rose's ex-husband,
journalist David Karsner, in August 1929 Cannon began to work
for the circulation department of the Herald Tribune. Cannon was
lucky to get the job and even luckier to keep it as the Depression
hit. Nonetheless the Cannon-Karsner family lived in poverty
throughout the early 1930s, even after young CLA member Sam
Gordon joined the household to help pay the bills. Personal cor-
respondence indicates that the family lived from hand to mouth,
often enduring eviction notices and periods without electricity due
to unpaid bills.88 Cannon's binge drinking no doubt also contrib-
uted to family tensions during this period. Cannon told Sam
Gordon that he drank "to get away from some insurmountable
problem he didn't want to think about for a while."89
Cannon had been editor of the Militant from its inception in
November 1928; he became national secretary of the CLA at its
first conference in May 1929. But in the period following the
conference he was rarely in the office, nor did he attend branch
meetings.90 He wrote little for the Militant, publishing only three
articles between mid-June and the first of the year. Over the
36 CLA 1931-33
summer Cannon had a nasty blowout with Maurice Spector, and
Spector left New York for Toronto vowing to remain in Canada
permanently.91
Shachtman and Abern were left holding the fort, and this
engendered much resentment, the subject of extensive personal
correspondence beginning in fall 1929.92 After Cannon began
working for the Herald Tribune, there was evidently a rearrange-
ment in the division of labor; in October 1929 the Militant ceased
listing Cannon as editor, publishing simply the names of the edi-
torial board members: Abern, Cannon, Shachtman, Spector, and
Swabeck. National Committee members outside New York were
informed of the situation, and in December Arne Swabeck wrote
urgently to Cannon from Chicago to inquire about the reasons
for his withdrawal:
Your complete absence from all activities in our movement for a
long time has become noticeable not only to such comrades as my-
self, who are able to keep our finger fairly close to the pulse, but by
the comrades in general. Personally I have received several inquir-
ies from several comrades in regard to it. I am speaking of com-
plete absence because this is what it practically amounts to when
one compares the past with the present....
Of course, I recall very clearly the extremely great personal diffi-
culties you had to face when your children were left entirely in your
care and I know from observation what great sacrifice it all meant
on your part. Hence I thought, shortly after the change of staff had
taken place and you retired so far to the background, a short relief
for adjustments is quite in order. I found it reasonable as a matter
of temporary— that is very temporary— arrangement. I realized, of
course, that you would have to devote some time to relieve your mind
of these responsibilities of a personal character. Now, however, I
feel quite alarmed, noting that this retirement or absence of yours
has become so complete and of such a permanent character.93
The deterioration of personal relations between Abern/
Shachtman and Cannon during this period had political and per-
sonal dimensions. The two younger men had little empathy for
Cannon's problems. With working wives and without children they
were in a better position to endure the hardship of working for
the League without pay (both men also took occasional part-time
jobs). Cannon later wrote, "If I had been dealing with grown-up
people— in the personal as well as the revolutionary] sense— it could
have been straightened out."94 When Cannon requested that the
League buy him a typewriter so he could write for the Militant at
home, Abern indignantly refused.95 Reflecting the rancor that lin-
Introduction 37
gered for years afterward, Cannon wrote of "Personal difficulties
which piled upon me and for a time overwhelmed me. This was
the moment they seized to turn on me like treacherous curs."96
With little opportunity for the CLA to implement aspects of
its working-class program, Cannon's strengths as a proven working-
class leader receded into the background. Moreover, the writings
of Trotsky that all leaders of the CLA were now avidly reading clari-
fied the political deficiencies of the old Cannon faction. Early
issues of the Militant serialized "The Right Danger in the American
Party," the document that had been presented jointly to the CI Sixth
Congress by the Cannon and Foster factions.97 Its quirky mixture
of Stalinist doublespeak and legitimate criticism of the opportun-
ism of the Party under Lovestone's leadership was painfully inad-
equate compared to Trotsky's precise programmatic Critique.
At the First National Conference Cannon took two positions
with which a number of CLA members disagreed: He insisted that
the program include the call for a labor party in the United States,
and he supported the demand for self-determination for the
majority-black counties in the American South (the so-called "black
belt"). After discussion, Cannon changed his opinion on both
issues, but his initial positions were later raised by the Shachtman
side in an attempt to discredit Cannon's political leadership. How-
ever, it was Cannon's opposition to the League's attempts to
publish the Militant as a weekly in 1929-30 that solidified
Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer's hostility to Cannon.
The Labor Party Slogan
The labor party slogan was a subject of dispute within the
American Communist Party almost from its inception.98 For most
of the 1920s the Party called for a "farmer-labor" party, reflecting
its orientation to the remnants of petty-bourgeois Progressivism
embodied in the 1924 presidential campaign of the ex-Republi-
can governor of Wisconsin, Robert M. La Follette. With its policy
of the "third party alliance," the early American CP came very
close to supporting La Follette's Farmer-Labor Party candidacy; it
was Trotsky's intervention in the Comintern in Moscow that pulled
the CP back from this opportunist course. Under the tutelage of
Zinoviev's Comintern, however, the American Party continued to
support the anti-Marxist call for a two-class "farmer-labor" party.
Trotsky's exposition in the Critique of the opportunism
38 CLA 1931-33
underlying the "farmer-labor" position was one of the arguments
that won Cannon to the Left Opposition, as is evident from
Cannon's 1929 introduction to the CLA's pamphlet version:
The formation of "farmer-labor" parties— that source of such exag-
gerated hopes and unbounded mistakes in the American Party— is
reviewed at length in this volume. The underlying falsity of the whole
idea of a "two-class" party is analyzed from the theoretical stand-
point of Marxism and the history of the Russian revolutionary move-
ment, and is condemned in principle— for the West as well as for
the East. Trotsky's comment on the "third party alliance" with
La Follette, the fight against which was led by him, will be espe-
cially interesting to American Communists. All of which is a timely
reminder of the heavy debt our Party owes to Trotsky."
The "Platform of the Communist Opposition," the first central
programmatic statement by the American Trotskyists, addressed
to the CP's Sixth Convention in February 1929 and subsequently
adopted by the CLA's First National Conference, rejected the call
for a "farmer-labor" party. But it continued to support the labor
party slogan: "The perspective of a labor party, as a primary step
in the political development of the American workers, adopted
by the Party in 1922 after a sharp struggle... holds good today."
Arne Swabeck explained, "All indications and historical experi-
ence indicate that the labor political reformist stage is quite
unavoidable also in the United States, with possibilities of some
form of a labor party; and that such must be our perspective." 10°
Shortly before the founding conference of the CLA, Glotzer
raised objections to the idea that the American working class must
necessarily go through a reformist stage. At the conference he was
supported by John Edwards and others from Chicago. But the plat-
form formulations on the labor party were adopted by the CLA
with strong support from Cannon.101
Shachtman raised the labor party controversy during his first
visit with Trotsky in Prinkipo in March 1930. Trotsky had reserva-
tions about the slogan and wrote that he needed to study the
question.102 By the time of the Second National Conference in
September 1931, the CLA had arrived at the evidently unanimous
view, codified in the conference theses, that the labor party slogan
should be dropped. Trotsky subsequently elaborated:
One can say that under the American conditions a labor party in
the British sense would be a "progressive step," and by recognizing
this and stating so, we ourselves, even though indirectly, help to
establish such a party. But that is precisely the reason I will never
Introduction 39
assume the responsibility to affirm abstractly and dogmatically that
the creation of a labor party would be a "progressive step" even in
the United States, because I do not know under what circumstances,
under what guidance, and for what purposes that party would be
created. It seems to me more probable that especially in America,
which does not possess any important traditions of independent
political action by the working class (like Chartism in England, for
example) and where the trade-union bureaucracy is more reaction-
ary and corrupted than it was at the height of the British empire,
the creation of a labor party could be provoked only by mighty revo-
lutionary pressure from the working masses and by the growing
threat of communism. It is absolutely clear that under these condi-
tions the labor party would signify not a progressive step but a hin-
drance to the progressive evolution of the working class....
That the labor party can become an arena of successful struggle
for us, and that the labor party, created as a barrier to communism,
can under certain circumstances strengthen the Communist party,
is true, but only under the condition that we consider the labor party
not as "our" party but as an arena in which we are acting as an
absolutely independent Communist party.103
Trotsky's largely conjunctural arguments were colored by the
CLA view of the slogan as a call for a reformist party rather than
as an algebraic and propagandists call for the working class to
break with the capitalist parties. At the time, the Lovestoneite Right
Opposition was agitating for a "labor party," which they repre-
sented as a bloc between themselves and the social-democratic
trade-union bureaucracy against the Communist Party. It was out
of the question that the CLA, as an expelled faction of the Party,
would participate in such a formation.
As late as 1935, Shachtman was still mechanically extrapolat-
ing from the CP's experience with La Follette's farmer-labor
movement:
In the battle between the revolutionary party and the third capital-
ist party for the support of the masses who are breaking away from
the old bourgeois parties, the slogan of the "labor" party— or even
the slogan of the "mass, class labor party" (whatever that is)— does
not possess sufficient class vitality or distinction from the third party
to make it possible to wean the masses away from the latter by means
of it.104
Thus Shachtman insisted that it is historically impossible for
the American class struggle to generate a genuinely independent
workers organization, moving toward communism and counter-
posed to the third bourgeois parties which typically arise in times
of social unrest. At bottom, this is nothing but a statement of
40 CLA 1931-33
historical pessimism about the revolutionary capacity of the Ameri-
can working class.
Shachtman and Abern had so much invested in their opposi-
tion to the labor party slogan— a key part of their challenge to
Cannon's leadership in the early CLA— that they refused to aban-
don it even when the conjuncture changed in the mid-1 930s. The
working-class upsurge that produced the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) posed the possibility that the American pro-
letariat would break from the bourgeois parties. Precisely in order
to head this off, the reformist trade-union leadership cemented
an alliance with Roosevelt's Democratic Party. Cannon noted a
change already in 1934.105 Yet only in 1938— at the insistence of
Trotsky— did the American Trotskyists finally readopt the call for
a labor party. 106 Even then 40 percent of the organization voted
against the slogan.107 Thus the American Trotskyists in the trade
unions from 1934-37 had no programmatic demand that counter-
posed the need for the political independence of the working class
to the procapitalist politics of the anti-Stalinist progressives with
whom they were allied. This weakness is but one of the ways that
the first Cannon-Shachtman fight reverberated in the Trotskyist
movement for the entire decade.
The CLA and the Fight Against Black Oppression
The capitalist social structure of the United States is profoundly
shaped by the legacy of black chattel slavery. It took a bloody Civil
War, which was also a bourgeois social revolution, to eliminate
the slave system. The American labor movement did not begin to
organize until after the Civil War, and within it the fight for black
rights has always sharply drawn the line between revolution and
reform. The early Socialist Party included open racists among its
leaders. Later, the antiracist Eugene V. Debs represented the best
of the SP. Yet he still insisted, "We have nothing special to offer
the Negro, and we cannot make separate appeals to all the races."108
Following World WTar I and the Russian Revolution, the cadre of
the American Communist Party emerged from the class-struggle,
antiwar, left wing of the SP— which was pretty much antiracist—
and from the revolutionary syndicalist Industrial Workers of the
World (I WW). The I WW fought the Jim Crow craft unionism of
the AFL, sometimes organizing across race lines. But neither the
IWW nor the old SP left wing ever transcended the simplistic
Introduction 4 1
approach of "black and white, unite and fight." It was the Russian
Bolsheviks, whose party had been forged in battle against Great
Russian chauvinism in the tsarist empire, who taught the Ameri-
can Communists that the party must develop special demands and
special methods for work among the black population, and that
the struggle for black emancipation was a powerful motive force
for proletarian revolution.109
The fight for black rights took on even more urgency with
the black migration to northern cities during World War I, creat-
ing a key black component of the industrial working class.
Throughout the 1920s the Comintern fought to get the American
Party to make the struggle against racial oppression central to its
work. In 1928 the Comintern's bureaucratic degeneration intruded
into this struggle. Under Stalin's direct tutelage as part of the Third
Period turn, the American Party was forced to adopt the view that
black oppression in the United States was a national question,
expressed in the demand for "self-determination" for the "black
belt." Cannon was won to this position by the discussion at the
Sixth Congress, where he participated in the commission on the
"Negro question" (as it was then called). The "Platform of the Com-
munist Opposition" endorsed the demand for self-determination.
As in the case of the labor party slogan, it was Glotzer who raised
objections shortly before the CLA's founding conference. The
demand was correctly dropped from the platform.110
In Trotsky's first letter to his American supporters he inquired,
"Is there some connection with the Negroes? Is somebody espe-
cially appointed for the work among them?"111 After the CLA's
conference, Cannon replied:
Unfortunately we have no connection yet among the Negroes. All
our efforts to win at least one of the Negro comrades in the Party
to our side failed. We recognize the great importance of this ques-
tion for the future and shall not cease our efforts to make a begin-
ning in this field. On this question we had a big discussion at our
conference over the section of our platform in which we advocate
the slogan of the right of self-determination for the Negroes. This
position was adopted by the Party at the direction of the ECCI, but
it met with strong opposition there from many of the Negro com-
rades. There are big sections of the southern part of the United
States where the Negro population is the majority and where they
are now deprived of political and other rights more flagrantly than
in the North. It was decided to conduct a discussion on this whole
question in our ranks, and the National Committee decided to ask
42 CLA 1931-33
your opinion about the appropriateness of this slogan of the right
of self-determination for the Negroes.112
We can find no record that Trotsky replied directly to Cannon's
question, but he probably made his inclination to support the CI's
self-determination line known when Shachtman visited Prinkipo
in March 1930. In any case debate continued within the CLA. In
1930 two discussion articles in the Militant opposed the "self-
determination" slogan, upholding instead the call for full social,
political, and economic equality.113 The question was scheduled
for discussion at the CLA's Second National Conference in
September 1931, but it was dropped from the agenda when the
conference went over schedule. Swabeck reported in the Militant:
While a general consensus of opinion exists within our ranks of
deep skepticism in regard to the correctness of this slogan [self-
determination for the black belt], the conference accepted the
National Committee on this question. It decided to instruct the
National Committee to create a commission which is to make an
exhaustive study of this problem in such a way that when a policy is
finally arrived at it can be fully motivated and definitely based on
Marxian conclusions.114
Hugo Oehler was a member of the CLA Negro Commission.
As a CP field organizer he helped lead the 1929 textile strike in
Gastonia, North Carolina, working as a team with Bill Dunne. The
CP sought to link the strike to the fight against the Southern Jim
Crow system, organizing black and white workers into the same
union. The strike exploded into a major class battle, and it was
smashed with the full force of racist lynch-law reaction. Drawing
lessons from this experience, in 1932 Oehler published in the
Militant "The Negro and the Class Struggle" and concluded: "The
program of the Communists (Marxists) is the only one possible
for the American Negro for social, political, and economic equal-
ity and freedom. The road is the road of class struggle."115 CLA
propaganda on the Scottsboro case centered on demands for full
social and political equality, dropping the call for self-deter-
mination. Cannon was won to an integrationist line, as is evident
from his notes for a speech on the Scottsboro case:
The chief demand of the enlightened Negroes— the only one that
really moves them— is the demand for equal rights:
1. Political
2. Economic
3. Social
Introduction 43
All the so-called white bourgeois movements on behalf of Negroes
smell of patronage and charity.
Conditions can be really changed only by struggle against the class
regime which breeds them.
The Scottsboro case is the first large-scale dramatization of a
struggle on this line....
The idea that can really stir the Negroes is the idea of solidarity of
the white and Negro workers.
One act by the white workers worth more than a thousand
arguments.116
Trotsky, however, continued to support the demand for self-
determination. Swabeck argued with him in Prinkipo in 1933. In
March 1933 Shachtman wrote a lengthy treatise, "Communism and
the Negro," which he sent to Trotsky, who replied, "My opinion
on the Negro question is completely hypothetical in character. I
know very little about it and am always ready to learn" ("The
European Sections Will Not Support You," 1 May 1933). There is
no evidence that Trotsky ever read Shachtman's thesis.117 In his
discussions with Swabeck, Trotsky assumed that the oppression
of blacks in the United States paralleled that of national minori-
ties in the tsarist empire and most of the rest of the world, where
language and, less commonly, religion are defining characteris-
tics. Thus he posited the existence of a separate black language in
the United States. But American slavery had created a genuinely
unique situation. The slave population had been drawn from West
Africa, a patchwork of peoples and languages. Torn out of their
native societies and forcibly carried across the Atlantic Ocean in
the horrific Middle Passage, the ancestors of American blacks were
stripped of their previous tribal identities and thoroughly amal-
gamated as slaves via the English language and Christianity.
Slaveholders consciously separated slaves who spoke the same
native language (even in liberated Haiti the black population spoke
a patois of the colonial language, French).
Shachtman's theses correctly defined the American black
population as a caste, and saw the migration of rural Southern
blacks to urban areas as a crucial development for the American
class struggle:
The formation of an industrial Negro proletariat is the last contribu-
tion to the advancement of the black race by the American capitalist
order. But this contribution has attached to it such a monstrous system
for the double exploitation, oppression, and persecution of all the
44 CLA 1931-33
Negroes, as has reduced them to the lowest rank in the social order,
where they are forcibly retained as the pariah, the low caste, the
untouchable of American capitalist democracy....
The Communists not only fight for the general interests of the
Negroes as workers and poor farmers, but they raise the special
demand for the abolition of all discriminatory legislation and prac-
tices directed against the Negro, for the establishment of full social,
economic, and political equality of the colored race. The militant
fight (and not cringing subservience to the white master class) for
these demands is a revolutionary democratic struggle directed
against the whole ruling class and one of the principal props of its
domination, as well as against the petty-bourgeois Negro stratum
which is allied to this ruling class.118
By 1932 the Communist Party's authority among the black
masses in the urban North, and in Birmingham and areas of rural
Alabama, had grown enormously. For most of the 1920s the Party
had insisted on "boring from within" the AFL craft unions, most
of which excluded blacks. This made it almost impossible to organ-
ize black workers. Third Period dual unionism removed that
barrier and the Party took up the struggle against Jim Crow
unionism to explosive effect in Gastonia. After the CP's 1930
convention determined that the demand for self-determination
applied only to the American South, the thrust of the Party's
propaganda in the urban areas became the championship of full
social and political equality. The Party aggressively organized
racially integrated Unemployed Councils and anti-eviction squads
and campaigned against lynch law, culminating in the Scottsboro
defense effort.
While the CLA continued to agitate for full social, economic,
and political equality for blacks— the programmatic kernel of a revo-
lutionary perspective— they lacked a fully elaborated program or
theoretical understanding of how the fight for black liberation
intersects the American class struggle. This question, integral to
the American revolution, deserved much more attention in the
CLA than it got. Neither side in the factional polarization sought
to fight the issue through to a conclusion with Trotsky, leading to
an irresolution that cost the American Trotskyists dearly during
the next decade.119
Tensions Over the Weekly Militant
Cannon grasped earlier and more thoroughly than Shachtman
and Abern that Lovestone's purge would cut off further substan-
Introduction 45
tial growth from the Party. By August 1929 he was writing to
Glotzer, "We realize more and more that we have to build anew,
almost from the ground up."120 That this was a source of the early
tension was later recognized by Shachtman:
Cannon began to advance the point of view that we were in it for a
long, long haul; and while we were not at all inclined to reject that
point of view, and while we had no particular illusions that we would
become a huge organization overnight, or even in a very short time,
we seemed to detect in his attitude on our perspectives a feeling
that nothing much could be done in the coming period and that he
himself was going to withdraw more or less from active participa-
tion in the leadership.121
Before the CLA founding conference the American Trotskyists had
embarked on an ambitious program to raise $2,000 to make the
Militant weekly.122 This goal was never met and the Militant skipped
three biweekly issues in summer 1929. 123 By fall Cannon was
evidently arguing against increasing the frequency of the paper.
Nonetheless in November the Militant went weekly, shortly after
Cannon had taken a full-time job outside the League and in the
midst of his personal crisis.
The League's slender resources could not sustain the weekly.
When it was proposed that Shachtman visit Trotsky in Prinkipo
to ask for a subsidy, Cannon vehemently opposed the trip. The
issue was taken to the National Committee members outside of
New York. In February 1930 a rump NC meeting of Skoglund,
Glotzer, Swabeck, and Shachtman was held in Chicago, in con-
junction with a visit by Shachtman for a family funeral. We have
found no minutes of the meeting, but it clearly authorized
Shachtman's journey to Prinkipo, which was financed by the per-
sonal savings of Morris Lewit, a skilled plumber.124
Cannon's opposition to asking Trotsky for money was based
on more than a belief that the weekly was unviable. He appears
to have argued against accepting international subsidy in principle.
This comes through in two letters Swabeck wrote in answer to
Cannon's arguments:
I am certain that the disastrous effects of a subsidized movement in
this country, and for that matter elsewhere, have been sufficiently
demonstrated to convince all of us. That is on the basis of subsidizing
which has been established by the Stalin regime. But I am of the opinion
that what was proposed and now carried out by the departure of
Max could not in any way be considered a matter of establishing
that practice and certainly not in the Stalinist sense.125
46 CLA 1931-33
Swabeck admitted that he had his own misgivings about the weekly,
but argued that returning to a biweekly would be a retreat, hence
not a step to be taken lightly.
Only a year earlier Cannon had written to Trotsky, "It seems
to us that international collaboration and coordination of work is
now one of the most pressing needs of the Oppositionists in all
countries."126 Beginning in late 1929, however, there are indica-
tions of a certain wariness toward Trotsky on Cannon's part. In
notes for an internal speech he wrote "no more master servant"
in describing the League's attitude toward international collabo-
ration.127 After July 1929 he did not write to Trotsky for three and
a half years.
This wariness may have been fueled by Trotsky's urging the
CLA to "exert heroic efforts to maintain the weekly," evidently
taking a side against Cannon in the CLA's internal dispute.128 More-
over, in his greetings to the weekly, Trotsky posited that the Ameri-
can Left Opposition should develop directly into a revolutionary
party instead of acting as an expelled faction fighting to win the
cadre of the Communist Party. Shachtman convinced Trotsky that
the American CP still organized the vanguard elements of the pro-
letariat, and Trotsky wrote to the CLA to admit his error. Cannon
published a Militant article hailing Trotsky's correction— this in a
period when he wrote very little.129
In May 1930 the CLA National Committee held a plenum to
discuss the tensions in the New York resident committee. Trotsky
had been unable to offer the League immediate financial help,
although he did promise help in the future.130 Nonetheless, the
plenum decided to maintain the weekly and to appoint Shachtman
managing editor. Abern was appointed national secretary. Spector
was to move to New York to assist in the production of the Militant.
It was also decided that Arne Swabeck, known as an objective
comrade, should move to New York at the earliest opportunity to
work in the League office.131
Cannon later wrote to his Minneapolis supporters that he
believed Shachtman and co. had withdrawn at the last minute from
their plans to replace the "degenerated" Cannon leadership at the
May plenum. He noted:
I got the impression that you comrades, and Swabeck also, held your
judgment in abeyance on that occasion. You had every right to do
that, because the merits of the dispute seemed to hang on the say-
Introduction 47
so of the disputants— there was not much tangible material to go
by.... As long as the issues remained obscure, indefinite, or at least
so indefinite that the organization as a whole would not be able to
comprehend them, it was best to seek the path of conciliation in
the committee and not stir up the members.132
After the May 1930 plenum, Glotzer, Abern, and Spector with-
drew from active participation in the League's leadership.
Shachtman, in contrast, began to collaborate with Cannon, as the
latter noted in the same 1932 letter:
Out of the group of four that was to supplant the outlived leader-
ship, three went to sleep, and not like the bear, for the winter months
only, but for the whole year round. The necessity of establishing
some kind of working relations with what was left of "Cannon" then
suggested itself to Shachtman, since there were no others. I met him
more than halfway, and together we soon began to pull the League
out of the hole.133
The decisions of the plenum did not succeed in saving the
weekly Militant; its frequency returned to biweekly in July. An-
nounced as a temporary expedient for the summer, biweekly pub-
lication continued for an entire year. Spector's stay in New York
to help with the Militant was apparently brief. Swabeck arrived
in December 1930, taking over the job of national secretary.
Karsner had already assumed the post of Militant business man-
ager, and the League bought an old linotype machine and press,
moving into a larger headquarters to accommodate them.
Swabeck initiated another $2,000 fund drive for an Expansion
Program to stabilize the League's publishing capabilities. Over
the next year the CLA created the Pioneer Publishing Company
and, in July, transformed the Militant from a tabloid to a full-size
weekly paper.134
The full $2,000 was never raised, however, and the Militant
remained on shaky financial ground. The CLA still poured virtu-
ally all its monetary resources into publishing efforts. Trotsky
donated $1,000 in December 1931, which brought stability for a
few months. In a letter to Shachtman, Trotsky expressed the hope
that part of this money would be used to launch a long-promised
English-language theoretical journal.13"' While the League did pre-
pare to launch a theoretical magazine, International Communist
Review, the bulk of the donation appears to have gone to publish-
ing projects to reach new layers of the immigrant working class: a
youth paper, Young Spartacus; a Yiddish paper, Unser Kamf; and a
48 CLA 1931-33
Greek paper, Communistes. In March 1932 the CLA was forced to
abandon plans for the theoretical journal.136
Certainly the publication of three new journals was an opti-
mistic undertaking. Its wisdom has to be judged against the fact
that by April the League had to undertake another urgent fund
appeal to keep the weekly from going under. Communistes and Unser
Kamf appeared irregularly; Young Spartacus had a more-or-less
monthly frequency. While the youth paper had a base in the
Spartacus Youth Clubs, it is less clear that the two foreign-language
journals had a firm readership among the foreign-born workers
they targeted.137 None of the journals could sustain itself finan-
cially over the long term, while their continued publication took
desperately needed resources away from the Militant and the pro-
jected theoretical journal. However, there is no record in the resi-
dent committee minutes that Swabeck opposed the publication
of the new journals, as Shachtman and his cohorts asserted in
"Prospect and Retrospect."138
The CLA seems to have united around its ambitious publish-
ing program, which also included pamphlets and books. Cannon
proposed the publication of Problems of the Chinese Revolution, as
well as Trotsky's Permanent Revolution}^ Edited by Shachtman, the
books appeared in 1931, along with pamphlets on the Soviet
economy and the unfolding revolution in Spain. In 1932 Trotsky's
"Germany, the Key to the International Situation" was published.
Morris Lewit did much of the early translating from the Russian;
he would translate aloud to Shachtman, who would type the text. 140
Trotsky praised the League's editions of his works; indeed, the
American Opposition's record in this regard was unparalleled.
Their heroic publishing program provided the basis for the Ameri-
can cadre to programmatically assimilate the lessons of Stalinism's
betrayals that Trotsky hammered into the historical record of the
working class.
Cannon Revives
In December 1930 Cannon led a crucial internal fight, with
Shachtman's collaboration, against the views of Albert Weisbord,
who had won support among some CLAers in the New York
branch. Expelled from the CP in 1929, Weisbord tried to straddle
the line between the Left and Right Oppositions, advocating that
the CLA unite with the Lovestoneites for "mass work" in the trade
Introduction 49
contributed greatly to Cannon's political revival. In early 1931
Cannon began to write a regular Militant column, which contin-
ued into 1933. 142 The close collaboration between Swabeck and
Cannon in the League's Expansion Program laid the basis for their
political alliance against Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer in 1932.
Without Swabeck's efforts in stabilizing the CLA in 1931, there
would certainly have been further organizational disintegration
and perhaps a split. Swabeck undertook the move to New York at
great personal sacrifice, giving up a high-paying job in Chicago.
For the first few months, he and his family lived on personal sav-
ings. In April the resident committee decided to pay him a salary
of $25 a week so he could forego outside work. (Shachtman, with
a working wife and no children to support, got $10.) The CLA
rarely had the money to pay even these nominal wages. Swabeck's
family took in boarders to help pay the rent; his wife worked clean-
ing houses.143
Despite the apparent unity of the national office in 1931,
bitterness over the early disputes lingered, fueled by the unrelent-
ing financial crisis and Shachtman's view of his position on the
ILO International Bureau as a personal fiefdom. Cannon's veiled
polemic against Shachtman's international report at the CLA's
Second National Conference in September and, even more, the
fight over Shachtman's proposal to add Lewit and Basky to the
National Committee, were signs that the tensions were about to
boil over. In December, while Shachtman was on leave in Europe,
Cannon wrote to Swabeck, "The situation is becoming impossible."
Projecting a budget cut, he advised Swabeck, then in Chicago
on a speaking tour, to look for work in case a temporary retreat
became necessary:
Take a little warning from my experience two years ago.... I had plenty
of time to reflect over everything, while Rose and I were going about
from place to place trying to bum a place to sleep for the night.
That was when I began to make an interesting discovery that I was
the son of a bitch who was the cause of all the trouble. Well, I won't
forget that, and I will not wish that experience on another. That is
why I am giving you due warning.144
Shachtman had a very different view of the years 1929-30, as
is apparent in "A Bad Situation in the American League" (13 March
1932), where he complained that Trotsky's criticisms of his inter-
national functioning were being used against him:
50 CLA 1931-33
It is unfortunate that certain paragraphs from these letters have been
made the foundation for such factional attacks which can only result
in counteracting the few years of effective work which we conducted
in this country and to which I sought to contribute as much as I
could, while others who now accuse me so violently were in com-
fortable retirement.
Shachtman, Glotzer, and Abern made much of Cannon's
1929-30 partial political withdrawal in their lengthy June 1932
document, "Prospect and Retrospect." But they objected with far more
vehemence to Cannon 's political revival. Shachtman chafed under
Cannon's attempts to get the National Committee to take control
of Shachtman's international functioning. Before the fight on this
question broke out in early 1932, Shachtman and his allies skir-
mished with Cannon over his so-called "theory of gestation." This
remained an issue throughout the CLA's long factional polarization.
Gestation?
The controversy over "gestation" appears to have arisen from
the following passage in a May 1930 article by Cannon on the gen-
esis of the CLA from the CP's Cannon faction:
We were "prepared by the past" for our place under the banner of
the International Left Opposition. Lovestone and Company served
their apprenticeship and became journeymen opportunists, quali-
fied for union with Brandler, in the American party struggles.
The protracted period of our gestation as a faction on the line of
the Bolshevik-Leninists has not been without compensating advan-
tages. The rich experiences of the international struggle were real-
ized for us, as it were, in advance, and we have been able to build
on their foundations. This ensured for us a clearer perspective and
tactical line.145
Shachtman and his friends denied emphatically that there was
any political basis for the Left Opposition in the views defended
by the CP's Cannon faction. Shachtman countered:
The Cannon group maintained a sort of independent position, lean-
ing now toward one faction, now toward the other. The struggle for
what it considered the Marxist position, against opportunism, for
party democracy, constantly confronted one enormous obstacle,
which it failed to understand or perceive for years: the obstacle of
the international implications of the struggle. It conducted its
struggle on an essentially national ground, interesting itself little
and knowing less about the burning fight between Marxism and
national socialist opportunism that was taking place in the Russian
party and the international. It went along with all the policies of
Introduction 5 1
the ruling regime in the international, even though its concurrence
lacked the venomous enthusiasm of the Lovestone faction; even
though, in private conversation, its adherents expressed doubt about
the course of the Stalin-Zinoviev machine against the Russian
Opposition.146
As late as 1954, Shachtman was still insisting that Cannon's adop-
tion of Trotskyism at the Sixth Congress was a historical fluke:
"That Cannon should have decided in 1928, out of the clear blue,
to support the Russian Opposition, was an accident, and the
motives that prompted him have been the subject of all sorts of
speculation in the past (some interesting; others preposterous)."
Glotzer maintained that Cannon was an unreformed Zinovievist—
that he never fundamentally broke from the bureaucratism and
unprincipled organizational maneuvering of the degenerating
Comintern.147
But the simplest and most straightforward explanation for
Cannon's coming over to Trotsky is that he wanted to make a prole-
tarian revolution. Unlike Foster, Bedacht, Bittelman, and the rest
of the future Stalinist hacks— to say nothing of the unspeakable
Lovestone crew— Cannon did not resign himself to accepting a
lesser goal. The Critique of the Comintern's Draft Program was
Trotsky's first programmatically comprehensive treatment of the
erosion of the revolutionary fiber of the Comintern. Its cogent
political analysis won Cannon over immediately. Previous Oppo-
sition documents available in English were only partial, and
Cannon may not have even read them.
As we have previously noted, the Cannon group members were
not "Trotskyists in embryo," i.e., they had not broken with the
program of socialism in one country and were motivated largely
by nationally limited concerns. But there was much in their
worldview that predisposed them to the Left Opposition's views:
The fight of the Cannon-Foster faction against an orientation to La
Follette's bourgeois third party movement after the 1924 elections;
Cannon's insistence on the leading role of the working class in any
farmer-labor party; the strong, if skewed, internationalism that made
Cannon break with Foster and refuse to lead a rightist revolt against
the Communist International in 1925; Cannon's attempt to reverse
the dead-end factional wars which crippled and deformed the party
after 1925; his willingness to break with the party's adaptation to
the AFL unions in 1928: all this predisposed Cannon to make the
leap to the Left Opposition when that option presented itself.
Cannon, unlike the other Workers Party leaders, had not been made
52 CLA 1931-33
cynical by the corrupt maneuvering inside the degenerating
Comintern. The fact that a number of Cannon's factional support-
ers, including Abern and Shachtman, made the leap to Trotskyism
with Cannon only reinforces this point.148
Cannon fought hard against the Shachtman group's denigra-
tion of the record of the CP's Cannon faction, as the following
1932 speech notes indicate:
He [Shachtman] demands that we should have developed from the
first as supporters of the Left Opposition.
Where in the world did that happen?
Further: Where in the whole world, outside of Russia, did a faction
come to the Left Opposition and give it convincing proofs of its
right?
All of this refutes the idea that it came by chance, as a maneuver.
Take the examples: Urbahns; Fischer-Maslow; Paz; Van Overstraeten,
etc.; Lore.
All these groups proved to be false representatives.
How do you account for the fact that we proved to be true represen-
tatives*
If we were "prepared by the past" of the Russian Opposition alone—
and not by our own past— why weren't these groups so prepared?
To put this question is to answer it— Shachtman has to falsify Party
history and our own history— to make this absurd contention.149
The Cannon faction in the CP was forged in hard opposition
to the unprincipled maneuvei ism and organizational adventurism
of the Ruthenberg-Pepper-Lovestone faction, which took on an
increasingly opportunist political coloration after Ruthenberg's
death in 1927. With Lovestone the leader of the Right Opposi-
tion in the U.S., the majority of the CLA leadership was inocu-
lated against softness on the RO, the issue that shipwrecked the
Spanish section, led to the foundering of Polish Trotskyism, and
ruined the building of a Danish Trotskyist organization.150
Shachtman et al.'s arrogant dismissal of the record of the Cannon
faction is an indication of their trivialization of this defining
programmatic issue.
In May 1930 Shachtman wrote to Trotsky inquiring about the
permissibility of blocs with Lovestone's supporters in the trade
unions, noting that he was "not entirely clear in my mind as to
how this situation can be handled." Trotsky replied, "Of course it
is out of the question for us to enter into any kind of bloc with the
right that the Party does not participate in."151 Insisting the
Introduction 53
CP-led Third Period unions threatened "trade-union unity,"
Lovestone's group invariably supported the AFL trade unions and
their reactionary leadership. Sharply distinguishing its policy from
the AFL cretinism of the Lovestoneites, the CLA supported the
CP-led new industrial unions in industries where these unions had
some mass support and where the reactionary AFL unions had
proved to be open agents of the bosses. This was the case in min-
ing, the needle trades, and the textile industry. Calling for a
massive campaign to organize the unorganized into the new
unions, the CLA denounced the sectarian and adventurist policies
of the Stalinist leadership that by 1930 had reduced to hollow shells
even these relatively well-based Third Period unions. They called
on the Party to form a united front with the "progressives" in the
trade unions, either through organizing new unions or building
oppositions within the AFL unions.152
There were wobbles on the question of unity with the Love-
stoneites. In 1930 a new Farmer-Labor Party based in Plenty wood,
Montana included Finnish cooperatives recently expelled from the
Communist Party, as well as disaffected members of the Minne-
sota Farmer-Labor Party and Lovestoneites. The Minneapolis
branch of the CLA participated in a left-wing journal supporting
this bloc, and Tom O'Flahei ty, a CP Cannon faction member and
founding CLAer, was editor of the journal. The CLA National
Committee publicly disavowed the effort in the Militant.™ While
the Minneapolis branch majority came to agree with the NC,
O'Flaherty, whose membership was already tenuous, broke with
the CLA over the issue.154 In the New York local, Weisbord found
some support for "mass work" with the Lovestoneites in late 1930.155
In July 1931, however, both Swabeck and Shachtman wrote to
the A.S. to oppose the Spanish section's plans to unify with
Maurin's BOC. (Maurfn's centrist group had called a conference
to unify all Communists, and the A.S. was debating the ILO's
orientation.) Swabeck wrote:
We find it entirely correct that the Left Opposition should be
represented at the unity conference to utilize it as one more
opportunity to state our views of unification and of the tasks of the
Communist movement in Spain. But. we find it would be a fatal error
for the Left Opposition to become a part of the "unified" group
which is expected to ensue. We believe the Left Opposition should
state in advance and at the conference that it will not furnish a left
shield to the right-wing Maurin leadership.156
54 CLA 1931-33
Shachtman criticized Nin's refusal to pay attention to the Com-
munist Party:
The official party has resources that it hasn't used yet The near
future will prove it. The Maurinistas will increasingly discredit them-
selves and the official party will be able to win over many of the
working-class elements who now follow the Federation. We too will
be able to win over these elements if we don't compromise ourselves,
i.e.. if we don't fall into the game oi lies oi the Maurinista "Unity
Congress."1
The CLA NC's quick action m taking a position against unity with
Maunn in Spam contrasts sharply with its hesitation on the French
trade-union question and Landau's cliquism.
Non-Leninist Organizational Practices
The documents in "The Fight" section of this volume trace
the CLA fight as it unfolded in early 1932 through the June ple-
num, when Shachtman capitulated on the international questions,
to the subsequent hardening of organizational lines on a series of
issues in early 1933. "Some Considerations on the Results of the
National Committee Plenum" (16 June 1932) makes it clear that
Shachtman. Abern. Clotzer. and Spector maintained an organized
grouping going into the June plenum and afterward, despite the
apparent resolution of the international dispute. This document
is strongly reminiscent of the letters routinely circulated by the
various permanent factions in the Communist Party in the 1920s.
Even after the I.S. intervened and the two sides agreed to
dissolve the factions, Shachtman's letters from Prinkipo were
mimeographed and circulated among his supporters in the U.S.,
exactly as the factions within the Communist Party, including the
Cannon group, had circulated letters received from their repre-
sentatives in Moscow. The internal Shachtman factional correspon-
dence in this volume contrasts sharply with Cannon's letters to
his supporters in The Communist League of America. Where
Shachtman, Clotzer. and Abern are politically vague and gossipy,
Cannon is programmatic and forward-looking.158 The same con-
trast can be drawn between Shachtman and Glotzer's lengthy let-
ters to Trotsky and Swabeck's terse, informative, correspondence:
Examples of both appear in this volume. "Prospect and Retrospect"
centers on gripes about Cannon's behavior during his personal
crisis in 1929-30; its authors knew this would put him on the
Introduction 55
defensive. Cannon was never able to finish his draft reply, in which
he wrote:
In the thirteen years that I have been active in the Party— that is,
since its foundation— and, I may add, in my activity in the revolu-
tionary movement before the foundation of the Party, I never once
took the time to reply to personal attacks.... I never construed the
Party struggles as personal struggles. I never advanced any personal
claims, and do not do so now. I can say quite honestly— and there is
sufficient material marking the traces of all the disputes to confirm
it— that I never took part in a faction struggle without political aims
which transcended persons.159
The permanent factional lineups that plagued most parties
of Zinoviev's Comintern were both the result of, and a contribut-
ing factor to, the lack of authoritative national leaderships.
Delineated largely by social composition and personal loyalty, such
factions often obscured emerging political differentiation. Espe-
cially after the break with Foster in 1925, the Cannon group sought
to put program first, attempting to break down the system of
personalist factionalism in the American party. This stand was no
small part of the reason that a section of the group, with Cannon
in the lead, made the leap to Trotskyism. Within the CLA, Cannon
sought to forge a collective national leadership along Leninist lines.
Abern and Glotzer, joined by Shachtman in 1931-33, continued
the practice of clique warfare.
Cannon saw the Shachtman faction as a manifestation inside
the CLA of the Naville-Landau personalism that was so destruc-
tive to the ILO in Europe. In an unfinished draft statement on
the dispute commissioned by the International Secretariat in early
1933, he wrote:
The conflict in our National Committee first broke out into the open
over the international question. This was no accident. On the con-
trary it stamped the whole conflict, which has raged for over a year,
with its real significance. The struggle against the NC began as a
clique-intrigue, it is true, and at every turn and in the face of every
question of real importance in the disputes, the minority has sought
to bury the fundamental issues under a shower of personal accu-
sations and slander, to explain everything by the faults and bad
intentions of this or that person.... By their methods in the conflict—
clique-combinations, personal campaigns, unprincipled blocs, for-
mal acceptance of resolutions and a contrary practice, undermin-
ing of discipline— by these methods they have shown that the first
open clash with us on the international question gave the real mea-
sure of their differences with us in a fundamental sense.160
56 CLA 1931-33
Yet there was no qualitative programmatic differentiation
between the two groups. The lack of substantive differences frus-
trated Cannon immensely. Indicative of the senseless heat was
Shachtman's attempt to expel alternate NC member Bernard
Morgenstern for his religious wedding (on the night he was
released from prison!) to which he consented in order to please
his parents. Shachtman's vindictive attempt to railroad Morgen-
stern out of the League for an act which was under the circum-
stances understandable was opposed by Cannon, who was in turn
accused of running a factional protection racket.
It must be noted, however, that non-Leninist organizational
practices in the CLA hardened the factional lines. This was par-
ticularly the case with the dispute over the co-optations to the
National Committee voted at the June plenum. Before the plenum,
Abern, Shachtman, and Glotzer had been able to outvote Cannon
and Swabeck on the resident committee, and so a poll of the entire
National Committee was required before an authoritative state-
ment on the international question could be issued. In a Bolshe-
vik organization, it is untenable for the resident leading body not
to reflect the National Committee majority. This situation was
formally resolved at the plenum when Shachtman capitulated on
the international question. Cannon, however, did not want to risk
a repeat of the preplenum situation. He therefore proposed to
co-opt Basky and Gordon (both Cannon supporters) to full mem-
bership in the National Committee and to co-opt George Clarke
as an alternate member. As New York residents, all three would
sit on the resident committee. The plenum adopted this proposal
over the objections of Shachtman and co. Because altering the
composition of the National Committee in the absence of politi-
cal differences or a delegated national conference was irregular,
Cannon proposed to submit the co-optations to a referendum of
the CLA membership.
Holding a written poll of the entire membership runs counter
to Leninist organizational practice: It substitutes for deliberation
and decision at the highest level (a delegated conference) the vote
of a membership atomized in the absence of collective national
discussion. Without defined programmatic differences, Cannon
could not effectively motivate his proposal to the CLA member-
ship. Shachtman et al. were able to use innuendo and gossip to
appeal to the least conscious elements in the CLA. Feeding their
Introduction 57
accusations of bureaucratism was the fact that one of the proposed
new NCers, Gordon, had been a member for two years only, a
violation of the CLA Constitution, which required four years of
membership in the Communist movement for election to the lead-
ing body.161 There is no Leninist ground for requiring a certain
"tenure" in the organization before taking a leading post, but the
Shachtman faction was able to take advantage of Cannon's pro-
posed violation of the CLA Constitution.
Cannon lost the vote on the co-optations. But Glotzer—
wittingly or not— resolved the situation by relocating to Chicago,
insisting that was the only place he could find a job. Shortly after
Glotzer left, Oehler, a Cannon supporter and full NC member,
moved to New York from Chicago, giving Cannon a majority of
three to two on the resident committee.
Though it was not officially codified in the League Constitu-
tion, the CLA appears to have unthinkingly carried over from the
Stalinizing Comintern the policy of National Committee "disci-
pline," i.e., that disputes within the NC should not be reported to
the membership except in an official preconference discussion
period before they are brought to the conference for decision. But
the "unanimity" of the leading committee cannot be decreed.
While it is preferable to debate disputed questions in the leading
body first, such differences are often an indication that similar
differences— or at least confusion— exist among the membership
as well. Thorough discussion can politically sharpen the organi-
zation as a whole, although this possible gain has to be weighed
against the disruption such discussion can cause to ongoing work.
A major dispute in the leading committee generally mandates the
calling of a national conference so that the membership can discuss
and decide the issue. In the case of disagreements over principled
or programmatic issues, it is the right and duty of a Leninist to
attempt to mobilize the whole party behind his/her position and,
ultimately, to build a faction.
"Committee discipline" was in any case honored only selectively.
Disputes within the NC were reported, at least to some members,
through factional communication, as the documents amply show.
Operationally discipline was along factional lines. With "informal"
lines of communication predominating, the membership was
denied collective discussion and the clash of opinion in the
branches, the only possibility of clarifying the political basis of
58 CLA 1931-33
the disputes. This fueled the Abern clique, which thrived on
giving its members the "real scoop." Unfortunately "committee
discipline" remained the policy of the American Trotskyist lead-
ership at least through the degeneration of the Socialist Workers
Party in the 1960s.
Irregular financial practices also contributed to the fight. In
November 1932 the League tried to regularize its financing by
creating a graduated dues structure based on income. lb2 The flow
of money into the party center, however, remained erratic. In lieu
of wages, staff meal expenses were sometimes paid out of petty
cash, leading to bitterness and accusations of favoritism that
fueled Abern's gossip mill.163 Itinerant organizers were frequently
stranded in the field with no cash; when they were paid, this too
led to insinuations of favoritism.164 Funds raised for one purpose
were often used for another.165
The financial irregularities of the American section were
noted with some consternation in the international. The staff of
the Russian-language Bulletin of the Opposition, financed by pay-
ments from national sections for Bulletins received, was continu-
ally furious with the CLA: "The Militant is the only one that does
not pay us. There is no doubt that if the other groups had acted
as the League, we would have had to cease publication of the
Bulletin a long time ago.... Frankly, I must say that the Militant's
attitude, known in the various sections in Europe, causes profound
amazement."166 Payments to the International Secretariat were also
irregular.167
In November 1932 Trotsky was granted a visa to go to Copen-
hagen to speak to a student conference— his first trip out of Turkey
since his exile from the USSR. Cannon proposed that the League
send Swabeck, a Dane by birth, to consult with Trotsky and attend
the anticipated ILO conference, to be held in connection with
Trotsky's trip. Shachtman and Abern refused to vote for Swabeck
as an official CLA delegate, insisting that the proposed trip was
"personal." Swabeck never made it to Copenhagen, although the
Cannon faction did manage to raise the funds to send him to
Europe. He attended the February 1933 International Precon-
ference in Paris, and then went to Germany to consult with the
ILO section just after Hitler's ascension to power.168 He contin-
ued to Prinkipo, where his discussions with Trotsky were invaluable
in laying the basis for Trotsky's intervention into the CLA. He
Introduction 59
returned to Paris, again traveling through Germany, and attended
a May ILO plenum. As indicated by his letters to Cannon, Swabeck
was stranded for lack of funds in both Prinkipo and Paris.
Shachtman and Abern vehemently opposed putting Cannon
on the CLA payroll as national secretary during Swabeck's
absence. The personal bitterness fueling Shachtman's opposition
and his dismissiveness toward party organization were apparent
when he wrote to Antoinette Konikow about the question:
Although we are quite reliably informed that Cannon has been laid
off from his job, he came in to the committee meeting with the story
that he was ready to "quit" his job in order to sacrifice himself for
the movement by taking up the post of secretary during Swabeck's
absence, and very likely, even after his return from Europe. It was
also proposed that he be guaranteed a minimum of $25 a week,
with a similar "guarantee" for Shachtman of $15 a week. It now be-
comes quite clear why, after a silence of the grave on this delicate
subject for seven months, Cannon has for the past two weeks been
talking with considerable indignation about the fact that the func-
tionaries in the office are not being paid; that they are consequently
demoralized and unable to take care of themselves or their work.
To put it brutally, it was all part of a low advertising campaign in
preparation for the proposal to put Cannon into the office of
secretary.169
Given the controversy, Cannon assumed the post on a voluntary
(i.e., unpaid) basis. The document by Oehler and Swabeck on
Cannon's appointment, "For Cannon as National Secretary"
(10 January 1933), is an excellent statement of the professional-
ism necessary in the building of a Leninist vanguard.
Even with Cannon assuming Swabeck's administrative duties,
there was still a great danger of paralysis of the resident commit-
tee: Tie votes of two to two would have been likely with only
Cannon, Oehler, Shachtman, and Abern voting. Cannon attempted
to solve the problem by using his majority on the National
Committee to deprive Abern of his vote. Trotsky strongly objected
to this undemocratic procedure, which he saw as part of a pattern
of organizational impatience by the Cannon group. Abern was
given back his vote. Relations, however, remained at a breaking
point through spring 1933. Both Cannon and Shachtman fled
New York— Cannon to the Midwest and Shachtman to Europe. For
most of May 1933 there was no resident committee in New York.
Abern had withdrawn in pique, and Rose Karsner administered
the organization.
60 CLA 1931-33
The CLA began to publish an Internal Bulletin after the June
plenum in order to circulate to the membership the major fac-
tional statements on both sides. This was in itself a major innova-
tion—in the earlier period, internal discussion material, usually
reflecting only minor disputes, had been published in the Militant.
However, Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer's "Prospect and Retro-
spect," written for the June 1932 plenum (where it was withdrawn,
only to be resubmitted a few weeks later) never appeared in the
IB. Cannon insisted it could only be published with a written reply,
which he was never able to complete. Throughout the period of
intense factional polarization, Cannon's NC majority refused to
open the IB to membership discussion and contributions. Under
Leninist norms, internal discussion is supposed to be regulated
by the leading body, with discussion arrangements (or lack thereof)
justified in each particular case. The point is to strive for maxi-
mum political clarity while maintaining the partv's capacitv for
intervention into ongoing social struggle. The League member-
ship was in fact intensely polarized by the fight. Spartacus Youth
leader Nathan Gould caught an essential quality when he com-
mented in a letter to Oehler:
The inevitable result of a split would be the existence of two groups
in America, both agreeing fundamentally upon all political prin-
cipled matters with the international. Both arriving upon the same
conclusions on all political questions, only one calling Cannon a
lazy, moody Irishman and the other calling Shachtman a supercil-
ious, literary Jew who is impressed more by the literary value of a
document than the political contents. This must not be.170
In later years, beginning with the Workers Party/U.S., the Internal
Bulletin was open to comment on disputed issues within the part v.
Cannon was rightly concerned that the League could become
a talk shop. Shachtman and Abern's coddling of the glib petty-
bourgeois youth in the New York local (the "Carter group") was
an issue leading up to the June 1932 plenum. As the documents
which open "The Fight" section indicate, the dispute broke out
over Carter's misrepresentation of Engels' 1895 introduction to
Marx's The Class Struggles in France. The malicious falsification of
Engels' introduction by the Social Democrats was a well-worn issue
in the revolutionary communist movement, and Cannon and
Swabeck effectively demolished Shachtman's defense of Carter in
their document, "Internal Problems of the CLA."171 The issue,
Introduction 6 1
however, was not so much Engels' introduction as the flippant and
overly literary political approach of the Carter group, which
Cannon and Swabeck described as "a grouping of youth elements
of the scholastic student type, who have not yet assimilated the
communist proletarian spirit, who combine a sterility of ideas and
criticism with a detestable parvenu self-assurance."172
New York City was the center of Shachtman, Abern, and
Glotzer's support. Cannon saw the material basis for their clique
in the overwhelmingly petty-bourgeois composition of the branch.
This problem continued to dominate Cannon's view of the fight
in later years:
Our difficulties were increased by the fact that many recruits were
not first-class material. Many of the people who joined the New York
branch weren't really there by justice. They weren't the type who,
in the long run, could build a revolutionary movement— dilettantes,
petty-bourgeois undisciplined elements.173
Notably, Shachtman later wrote about the CLA's national recruit-
ment in the same vein:
We tended in the early days to attract mainly the younger people,
students, intellectuals good and bad, very few workers, even fewer
active trade unionists, still fewer unionists active in the basic and
most important unions, but more than a few dilettantes, well-
meaning blunderers, biological chatterboxes, ultraradical oat-sowers,
unattachable wanderers, and many other kinds of sociological
curiosa. Most of them made bivouac with us for a while, but not for
too long.174
Cannon sought to break his own young supporters from the
petty-bourgeois mold, dispatching Tom Stamm and Sam Gordon
as field organizers to build proletarian branches in Pennsylvania
and Ohio. By fall 1932, the combination of increased field activ-
ity and the CLA's effective propaganda was having a growing
impact on Communist Party members concerned about the
German party's failure to fight Hitler's growing power. In late
September the Party district organizer in Davenport, Iowa was
forced to debate George Papcun, a recent CLA recruit, on the
subject of "socialism in one country"; three CP branch members
subsequently wrote a letter demanding a serious discussion of the
ILO program. CLA supporters were also having success in Des
Moines, Iowa. In October the CLA recruited Sebastian Pappas, a
prominent member of the Party's Food Workers Industrial Union
in New York.175 In November Cannon wrote to Gordon:
62 CLA 1931-33
We created a good central propaganda machine, but we must see
to it that we direct the machine and that the machine does not direct
us and keep us in a vicious circle. As the problem now presents itself,
we cannot broaden our activities and develop the organizational side
of our work as it must be developed now, without more resources.
And we cannot create more resources without broadening the
activities. It will be very bad for us if we do not recognize the sec-
ond contradiction and devote ourselves to the solution of it....
A decisive new orientation in conformity with the needs and op-
portunities of the moment will also soon introduce a qualitative
change in the composition of the League. If you ask my opinion, I
will tell you frankly that I think we have a hell of a lot of dead wood
in the League, too many purely literary recruits.176
In early 1933 Cannon proposed that the New York local admit
only bona fide workers into membership for the next six months,
a proposal that was vehemently opposed by the branch leadership
and ultimately defeated ("Resolution on the Proletarianization of
the New York Branch" and "Reject the Proposal on the Proletari-
anization of the New York Branch," [early February 1933]). As
Trotsky later noted, this mechanical proposal for increasing the
working-class membership of the branch was an administrative
proposal for a political problem.
The CLA and the Progressive Miners of America
The majority of the Minneapolis branch, led by Vincent Dunne
and Carl Skoglund, formed a solid base of support for the Cannon
faction throughout the fight. Branch members were at the time
working to organize the coal drivers into the Teamsters Union,
efforts that came to fruition in the great Minneapolis Teamsters
strikes of 1934. In 1929-30 the New York CLA also had some
members who worked as a fraction within the Needle Trades Work-
ers Industrial Union (NTWIU), the CP's Third Period union. CLA
supporters argued for an aggressive organizing campaign to unite
the old AFL unions, centered in the men's apparel industry and
the furriers, with the NTWIU, centered among the dressmakers,
into one industrial organization.177 Unser Kamf prominently covered
developments in the needle trades unions.
For most of the CLA's history, however, it appeared that the
Trotskyists' best chance to win a base in the working class lay in
southern Illinois, where a militant coal miners movement chal-
lenged John L. Lewis' United Mine Workers of America (UMW).178
The CLA's work in this area was often a subject of dispute in spring
Introduction 63
1933. In these fights the Shachtman group's cavalier attitude
toward the League's links to the working class became manifest.
The CLA had an early base of support in the Illinois coalfields
due to Swabeck's work as organizer of the CP's District Eight (cen-
tered in Chicago and including southern Illinois) during the "Save
the Union" movement of 1927-28. The Party leadership had been
so concerned about Swabeck's influence that William Z. Foster him-
self was sent to tour southern Illinois shortly after the Trotskyists
were expelled in late 1928. Foster managed to stampede back into
the Party some of the miner cadre who had earlier supported the
Trotskyists, including Gerry Allard. But the Militant continued to
publish letters from Party miners in southern Illinois protesting
the expulsions, including a 13 January 1929 letter that reported
the suspension from the Party of Joe Angelo, who was to remain a
CLA member through 1934.179 The CLA had two locals in south-
ern Illinois in 1929, and a defense guard of miners stood ready to
repulse any Stalinist provocation at the CLA founding conference.180
The mine worker recruits were not programmatically grounded,
however, and the League did not have the resources to support a
regional organizer to politically educate them. The industry was in
steep decline, with widespread closings and massive layoffs, and
the devastation increased with the onset of the Depression. The
number of Illinois miners fell from 103,566 in 1923 to 51,544 in
1932; many were working only half-time or in worker-run coop-
erative mines abandoned by their owners as unprofitable. The
League's southern Illinois branches disintegrated, but it retained
individual supporters and a reputation in the area.
An ill-prepared and losing strike by the CP's Third Period
National Miners Union (NMU) destroyed the Party's credibility
in the coalfields by spring 1930. Allard quit the Party and gravi-
tated back into the League's orbit in early 1931. Cannon wrote
some hard criticism of Allard's earlier capitulation in the Militant,
but Allard was allowed to rejoin the League in September.181
In the Illinois District of the UMW (District 12), by far the
strongest, the tyrannical head of the union, John L. Lewis, was
widely despised. In late 1929 Lewis tried to bring the district lead-
ership under Harry Fishwick to heel. The district responded in
early 1930 by declaring itself the "real" union, the "Reorganized
UMW" (RUMW). The new union represented an uneasy alliance
of class-collaborationist District 12 bureaucrats with well-known
64 CLA 1931-33
"progressive" unionists. Backed by A.J. Muste's Conference for Pro-
gressive Labor Action (CPLA), the RUMW included John Brophy,
former leader of the "Save the Union" movement, as well as Kan-
sas miners leader Alex Howat. Brophy soon withdrew, but Howat,
who had collaborated with the Communists in the past, was elected
RUMW president. From March 1930 until March 1931 (when the
capitalist courts declared Lewis' UMW to be the "real" union) vir-
tual civil war ensued in the Illinois coalfields.
The CLA supported the Reorganized UMW, while calling
upon the Party's NMU to join forces with Howat and Brophy within
the new union to "push it consistently to the left." The Militant
was uncritical of the RUMW's "progressive" face.182 Trotsky wrote
his first criticism of his American supporters over their uncritical
treatment of Brophy and Howat, whom he recognized as careerists
who would in the end side with the reactionary AFL bureaucracy
led by William Green:
The adherence of Howat and Brophy to the corrupt bureaucracy
of Fishwick and Company is one of the indications of the weaken-
ing of the revolutionary positions in the trade unions. Howat and
Brophy are not unconscious elements who honestly but confusedly
swing from right to left, but they are experienced politicians who
are now turning from left to right. They are careerists who no longer
find it useful to cover themselves with sympathy for communism,
because they consider it sufficiently weakened and compromised.
In the present conditions, the principal danger in the trade unions
is represented by elements of the type of Howat and Brophy. It is
they that are, and above all will become, the whips in the service of
the Green bureaucracy.... No illusions at all are permissible about
these gentlemen who call themselves by the absolutely inconsistent
name of progressives; in the best case it can signify an American-
ized species of trade-unionist centrism.183
This letter was written in March 1930, while Shachtman was in
Prinkipo. Shachtman had authored the Militant article, but Trotsky's
criticism targeted the shared orientation of the entire NC, in whose
name the article was published.184 Trotsky's points on Howat and
Brophy were incorporated into a subsequent Militant article, and
the CLA sought to be more critical of the "progressives."185
According to notes for a speech on "Communists and Progressives"
a year later, Cannon argued that "'progressives' are not a third
tendency between precapitalist labor bureaucrats and communists,
but are seeking to lead the labor radicalization into precapitalist
channels."186
Introduction 65
However, while the CLA supported the CP's revolutionary
unions in areas where they had a social base, within the AFL
unions they maintained a strategy of building a so-called left wing
with "progressive" elements. The "Draft of the Thesis on the Trade
Union Question" adopted by the Second National Conference in
September 1931 laid out the League's orientation as both "build-
ing of the new militant unions under revolutionary leadership"
and "developing and strengthening of the left wing wherever the
masses are grouped."187 The League saw its policy of building the
"left wing" in AFL unions as an application of the united front.
As developed initially by the Communist International, the
united front is a tactic to be used when there is a chance of agree-
ment with reformist or centrist organizations on common action
in defense of the working class; such agreement generally comes
only episodically as a result of the pressure of their working-class
base on the reformist leaders. The communists must retain their
own programmatic identity, exposing the vacillations of the
reformist leadership and attempting to win its working-class base
away from illusions in the "neutrality" of the bourgeois state and
reformability of capitalism. In the early American Communist
Party, this tactic had been transformed into a strategy of forming
blocs with the progressives and was advocated by both the Foster
and Cannon factions in building the Party's trade-union arm, the
Trade Union Educational League. That this strategy was carried
over uncritically into the CLA shows that the League leadership
had not fully assimilated a key point of communist politics that
was central to Trotsky's polemics against the Opposition Unitaire
in France:
The conception of the party as the proletarian vanguard presup-
poses its full and unconditional independence from all other
organizations. The various agreements (blocs, coalitions, compro-
mises) with other organizations, unavoidable in the course of the
class struggle, are permissible only on the condition that the party
always turns its own face toward the class, always marches under its
own banner, acts in its own name, and clearly explains to the masses
the aims and limits within which it concludes the given agreement.188
In the early 1930s, "progressive" elements in the AFL unions
were generally organized by A.J. Muste's Conference for Progres-
sive Labor Action, the Socialist Party, or the Lovestoneites. As an
expelled faction of the Communist Party, the League was careful
not to enter into blocs with these forces against the Party and its
66 CLA 1931-33
red unions. But the strategy of building a "left wing" with pro-
gressives in the trade unions impacted the work of the American
Trotskyists later in the decade.189
The "Reorganized UMW" reunited with the Lewis UMW in
March 1931, but anti-Lewis sentiment remained strong in Illinois.
Howat, backed by Muste's CPLA, sponsored a mine workers con-
ference in St. Louis, projecting the formation of a new union. At
the conference CLA supporters fought for a new union that would
merge with the CP's National Union of Miners. But Howat and
his backers decided that they did not yet have enough support to
found a new union.190
A year later a wildcat strike swept the Illinois coalfields when
Lewis attempted to enforce a new contract with a substantial wage
cut (the $5-a-day scale). After a particularly bloody massacre per-
petrated by company thugs at Mulkeytown, outrage against the
coal operators and their UMW toadies boiled over, leading to the
formation of the Progressive Miners of America (PMA) in Sep-
tember 1932. Playing a big role at the PMA's founding conference,
Gerry Allard was elected to the executive board and became editor
of its journal.191
Discredited in the region, the Communist Party had lost
almost all its supporters, who were precluded in any case from
participating in the PMA by the CP's Third Period sectarianism.
But the Socialist Party, which still had a base there, supported the
PMA, as did Muste and the CLA. The predominant element in
the PMA leadership, however, was the old UMW District 12
bureaucracy. To gain a toehold in the industry, the PMA leader-
ship soon signed contracts accepting the same $5-a-day wage scale
that the miners had been striking against for over six months. The
CLA opposed accepting the $5 scale, but continued to support
the PMA. The Trotskyists seem to have underestimated the
increasing hold of the procapitalist and anti-Communist elements
in the leadership.
Baiting the PMA as a Communist front, Lewis targeted Allard
in particular. After accepting the same rotten wage cut, the PMA
had little justification for its independent existence. The congeal-
ing bureaucracy turned to virulent anti-Communism, laying the
basis for the purge of leftist elements. Allard capitulated before
the anti-Communist onslaught, and the CLA NC's repeated criti-
cisms of him sometimes appeared in the Militant.191
Introduction 67
Cannon, well-known in the area as a Communist leader, was
invited to address a January 1933 conference called by the Trades
and Labor Assembly in Gillespie, Illinois. The PMA was the
dominant organization at the conference. Unable to speak as a
representative of the CLA because political groups were banned,
Cannon chose to speak instead as a representative of a group of
"militant New York workers." The ban on political speakers was
certainly motivated by the PMA leadership's burgeoning anti-
Communism, yet it is notable that they felt compelled to let a
known Communist address the delegates, who were to decide the
question of initiating a new labor federation counterposed to the
AFL. Cannon argued strongly against this course, which could only
have further isolated the PMA in the labor movement. Allard told
Cannon that his speech was a big factor in the conference deci-
sion against a new federation.193
Shachtman subsequently attacked not the substance of
Cannon's speech, but its auspices. As Cannon wrote, whether or
not he spoke as a member of the CLA was an "incidental ques-
tion." The real question was one of choosing: "1. To speak and
influence the gathering; 2. Or to retire with honors and give the
right wing best grounds."194 Shachtman's motion at the February 24
resident committee meeting implicitly attacks Cannon as an op-
portunist. Shachtman was explicit in his private correspondence:
In the last few years, I have not concealed from myself, at least, the
conviction that Cannon has an essentially opportunist bent, espe-
cially in trade-union questions. In Swabeck, as you know, it is more
than a "bent." The Illinois situation and problem is showing it.195
Shachtman had earlier sent Angelo a copy of "Prospect and
Retrospect."196 His attempts to line up the CLA miners against
Cannon certainly did not help the League's work. In a partial
report probably written shortly after he returned from Gillespie,
Cannon said:
It appears to me that the Progressive Miners' movement in Illinois
is today the most important link in the chain of the left-wing labor
movement. Much will depend on what happens there in the next
few months. The catastrophic collapse of the Party in this field, the
revival of the socialist organization on the basis of the Party's defeat,
and the entering wedge already gained by the Left Opposition puts
us before an opportunity and a test.1'17
Oehler was sent to the southern Illinois coalfields in March
and remained through the end of May, leaving Cannon,
68 CLA 1931-33
Shachtman, and Abern on the resident committee. Shachtman
tried to obstruct a proposed tour by Cannon to the coalfields and
to a national conference in Chicago called by the ILD and oth-
ers in defense of Tom Mooney. His proposal to go in Cannon's
place was a petty factional maneuver; he completely lacked
Cannon's personal authority among the miners.
Trotsky subsequently condemned Shachtman's obstruction of
Cannon's trip. He also supported Cannon's stance at the Gillespie
conference: "The point is not to unfurl our 'flag' in the trade
unions once or twice, and perhaps precisely for this reason, to
disappear from them, but rather to gradually win points of sup-
port through which we will gain the possibility of unfurling our
flag fully" ("The European Sections Will Not Support You," 1 May
1933). Expecting Trotsky's support, Shachtman and Abern were
devastated. Cannon recalled, "Trotsky's letter ended the discus-
sion, bango! Just like that!"198
However, Trotsky later wrote a more substantial document,
"Trade-Union Problems in America" (23 September 1933), an
implicit criticism of Cannon's approach in the PMA. Trotsky
stressed the importance of party fractions in the unions, an ABC
for revolutionary Marxists. Essential to consistent work in any
milieu is the organization of party cadre in working bodies that
regularly meet, discuss how to implement party perspectives, and
continually evaluate ongoing work, as laid out in the resolution
on organization adopted by the Third Congress of the Commu-
nist International.199 This is the only way the party can act as a
"fist" in social struggle. In the absence of fractions responsible to
geographically organized local committees, cadres, especially in
the trade unions, are inordinately susceptible to political pressures
that can pull them off course. Cannon recognized the need for
party branches, but he placed the stress on building a broad "left
wing" within the PMA:
The organization of groups and branches of the League in various
localities is a self-evident necessity for the establishment of a clear
line of struggle in the union. But this struggle can be really effec-
tive only if it draws in and organizes a much wider circle of mili-
tants in a left-wing formation. It is false and abstract to counterpose
the League groups to the broader left-wing formation and to insist
that the one shall come "first." Such a schematic order does not at
all coincide with the real conditions and cannot stand up in prac-
tice. In some localities where groups of the LO can be formed they
Introduction 69
will naturally take first place and be the medium for the creation of
broader organizations. In other localities— and from all indications
they will be the majority— it will be necessary to begin with a broader
group, in the absence of convinced oppositionists, and work for the
crystallization of a League nucleus within it.200
The League organized ad hoc caucuses of CLA supporters at
PMA conferences and regional gatherings, but by and large Allard
and Angelo functioned as individuals, backed up by Clarke and
Oehler, who periodically toured as regional CLA organizers. It is
impossible to organize consistent Bolshevik work in the trade
unions on this basis. Without a League presence, Allard could only
be a blunted instrument, whatever his authority as an individual
militant in the PMA.
Oehler's reports back from the coalfields in spring 1933
are instructive. Allard wasn't friendly, and the anti-Communist
witchhunt was blossoming into full-blown terror.201 One Militant
subscriber wrote of being beaten on the street.202 In such a situa-
tion, Allard was bound to capitulate. While in Chicago for the
Mooney conference in early May, Cannon came to some agree-
ment with Allard, but the editor of Progressive Miner never lived
up to the bargain. Karsner wrote tellingly to Cannon about the
CP-dominated Mooney conference:
It looks like Gerry took you in again. Fine promises, then goes back
and writes a signed report in the Progressive Miner in which he
mentions everyone at the conference except the LO. He seems to
be catering to the Party this time. From right to left and back again
but never straight out with us.203
Cannon's rosy view of the opportunities in the PMA was
motivated in part by the CLA faction fight: He was desperate to
find an entry point into a mass proletarian movement and thus
recruit a way out of the factional impasse caused by the political
weight of the League's literary recruits. It was the responsibility
of the CLA leadership to search urgently for opportunities to win
mass working-class support. Because the CLA leadership was orient-
ing toward trade-union opportunities such as the PMA, the Trotsky ists
were able to take advantage of the breakthrough in the Minneapolis Team-
sters a year later.
League relations with Allard came to a head in April 1933,
with Shachtman et al. demanding an immediate break. Cannon
knew that he was walking a fine line. It is significant that he wrote
Trotsky for advice on the question: "Request for Advice on Allard"
70 CLA 1931-33
(14 April 1933) is the first letter Cannon had written to Trotsky in
three and a half years. It is published here for the first time. We
can find no record that Trotsky replied. In any case, the issue was
soon moot because Allard quit the CLA and joined Muste's CPLA.
The League's other prominent supporter, Joe Angelo, was expelled
from the PMA in October. Later in the decade the PMA became
a tool of the AFL against John L. Lewis and the CIO.
Cannon Tests Trotsky
Cannon ceased writing to Trotsky in summer 1929. That more
was involved than his personal withdrawal from day-to-day admin-
istration of the CLA is confirmed by his later reminiscences: "We
wondered, especially I personally, how it was going to be in the
new International with Trotsky. Was he going to push us around
like manikins, or would he give us a little leeway and show us a
little respect?" In fall 1932 Cannon tested Trotsky over the rela-
tively trivial question of Trotsky's relations with expelled CLA
member B.J. Field (later famous for flouting party discipline dur-
ing the 1934 hotel workers strike). Not until Trotsky passed the
test did Cannon seek his intervention in the CLA's internal dis-
pute, sending Swabeck to Prinkipo and asking for advice about
Allard. Cannon later described the period of tension with Trotsky
around Field as "the greatest emotional crisis of my life." 204
A statistician by training, Field was expelled from the New
York CLA in late 1932 for refusing to allow the branch executive
to supervise an economics study group he had organized.205 Field
went to Prinkipo in September, where Trotsky soon enlisted his
help to prepare an economic thesis for the projected ILO confer-
ence. Field's documents were published in the press of the French
Ligue, with an introduction by Trotsky, just as the CLA was pre-
paring to break off negotiations with the megalomaniacal centrist
Albert Weisbord. Weisbord had also gone to Prinkipo to seek
Trotsky's support for his quest to fuse his organization with the
CLA. It was only because of Trotsky's urging that the CLA had
begun negotiations with him.
The publication of documents by an expelled CLA member
in the press of another ILO section was formally a breach of demo-
cratic centralism and strongly implied a political attack on the CLA
leadership. The resident committee's decision to protest Trotsky's
collaboration with Field behind the back of the CLA was not
Introduction 71
controversial. The protest letter was written by Cannon and signed
by Swabeck as League secretary.206 Whether or not Cannon was
contemplating a break with the ILO over Field, as Shachtman later
alleged, he invested the question with an importance out of
proportion to its political substance:
I must admit at that time I was somewhat impressed with the great
wave of propaganda about Trotsky's domineering the movement and
his ruthless pushing aside of people who didn't carry out his will.
And the Old Man was a little imperious. He had a way of command-
ing and in his impatience to get things done, making a shortcut
through organization even more than I do.... And I remember— talk
about my soul-searing periods— in that period I was brooding in my
mind that I was not going to under any circumstances tolerate such
a thing and if comrade Trotsky was going to insist upon such arbi-
trary methods, he would have to find somebody else to carry them
out. And I lived with the most terrible apprehension of what he
would write back.207
Trotsky's conciliatory answer, "A Reply on Field and Weisbord"
(20 October 1932), greatly relieved Cannon: "I tell you it was a
happy day when we got that letter. That convinced me that we
could get along with Trotsky, that we could live with him, that we
could have a party of our own which would have its own leaders,
and that even the great Trotsky would have respect for our
rights."208 Afterward, however, some distrust lingered on Cannon's
part: During his fall 1934 meeting with Trotsky in France Cannon
made a point of smoking in Trotsky's presence, an act he later
regretted.209 Shachtman's 1954 description of Cannon as a simple
bureaucratic hack for Trotsky's political views was purely self-
serving tendentiousness.210 The collaborative relationship between
Cannon and Trotsky was forged through internal fights in the ILO, not
least against Shachtman.
Events in Germany and the New Party Turn
The February 1933 fight over Cannon's public remarks about
a possible role for the Soviet Red Army in the battle against fascism
in Germany raised programmatic issues prefiguring the decisive
1940 battle over the Russian question. The fight occurred shortly
after Hitler was appointed chancellor. Having insisted through-
out 1930-32 on the urgent need for united-front actions of the
KPD and SPD to stop Hitler, the ILO went all-out to campaign for
working-class struggle to prevent the Nazi consolidation of power.
72 CLA 1931-33
The International Preconference mandated a special fund drive
for the German Trotskyist organization. Publishing the Militant
three times a week from February 11 to March 18, the CLA sold
thousands at a penny each, primarily to CP supporters transfixed
by the unfolding disaster in Germany. The criminal betrayal of
the Stalinists and Social Democrats, who refused to fight against
the smashing of all German workers organizations, demoralized
many Party members but convinced others of the validity of
Trotsky's struggle against the Stalinist perversion of Leninism. The
CLA won a number of recruits from the Party, including Chicago
lawyer Albert Goldman.
Desperate to shut off the growing support for the CLA, the
Stalinists began a hysterical counterattack against the Trotskyists,
claiming that Cannon had called for war between Germany and
the USSR in public forums in New York. Shachtman and Abern
echoed the anti-Cannon chorus within the CLA. What Cannon
actually said was in dispute, but in speech notes written a month
later he simply followed Trotsky in asserting that Hitler's victory
would inevitably lead to war between Germany and the USSR,
insisting, "The Red Army must be made ready."211
As is apparent from "Motion on the Situation in Germany and
the Role of the Red Army" (20 February 1933) and "Statement on
the Dispute over the Red Army and the German Situation"
(12 March 1933), Shachtman and his allies balked at the mere sug-
gestion that the Red Army could be used as a revolutionary force
outside Soviet borders. This presaged their abandonment of the
military defense of the USSR in fall 1939 when the Red Army
invaded Poland and Finland. But in 1933 Shachtman backed off
after Trotsky intervened to support the thrust of Cannon's posi-
tion in "Germany and the USSR" (17 March 1933). However,
Trotsky noted that the Red Army was hardly in a state of military
preparedness, given the economic privation and demoralization
within the USSR.
The episodic Red Army dispute was not central to the CLA's
factional polarization. In any case the events in Germany soon
led to a radical turn for the ILO. Already in March Trotsky had
declared that the German party's prostration before Hitler's con-
solidation of power meant that it was dead as a revolutionary force.
At first Trotsky limited the call for a new party to Germany, but
when no organized opposition emerged within the Comintern to
Introduction 73
the suicidal Third Period policies that had disarmed and demor-
alized the German proletariat, Trotsky declared that the Commu-
nist International, too, had become a corpse, making an analogy
to Rosa Luxemburg's characterization of the Second International
as "a stinking corpse" after its betrayal in the face of World War I.
He argued for the ILO to fight to regroup subjectively revolution-
ary elements who were now growing outside the Comintern.212
In August an I.S. plenum in Paris approved the new orienta-
tion, although not without controversy. The majority of the
German organization had opposed the call for a new party in
Germany. Now the full-time I.S. secretary, Witte, a representative
of the Greek Archio-Marxists, voted against the call for the Fourth
International, as did Giacomi of the New Italian Opposition. Witte
was soon removed from his post. In 1934 the Archio-Marxists
split over affiliation to the Trotskyist movement and Witte took a
minority into the centrist London Bureau. The French Jewish
Group also opposed the turn and split from the Ligue. The NOI
disintegrated and some of its leading elements joined the Jewish
Group to form a new organization, Union Communis te.213
The rest of the ILO moved ahead energetically to implement
the turn, initiating "The Declaration of Four," a call for the Fourth
International jointly issued by the ILO and three centrist groups,
the German Socialist Workers Party (SAP), the Independent
Socialist Party of Holland (OSP), and the Revolutionary Socialist
Party of Holland (RSP).214 The declaration was addressed to a joint
meeting of Socialist and Communist parties in Paris in August
1933. In September, to reflect its new tasks, the ILO changed its
name to the International Communist League. The CLA National
Committee unanimously endorsed the new orientation, which was
discussed in the individual branches and approved in early
September.215 Later that month, the Militant published the CLA's
call for a new revolutionary working-class party in the United States.
The turn toward building a new party, which occurred simul-
taneously with an upturn in the American class struggle, opened
new possibilities for growth and laid the basis for a resolution of
the CLA's destructive factional polarization. The two League
factions signed a "Peace Treaty" in July 1933, agreeing to dissolve
themselves. But the documents we publish illustrate that internal
tensions continued into fall 1933. Only due to Cannon's withdrawal
of the plan to move the League headquarters to Chicago did
74 CLA 1931-33
the Trotskyists avoid the danger of a "cold split" advocated by
Shachtman and Abern (who planned to stay in New York while
the rest of the leadership moved to Chicago). Nonetheless, by early
1934 BJ. Field was complaining of the "Cannon-Shachtman lead-
ership"—the first linking of the two names inside the Trotskyist
movement since 1929.216 The PRL introduction to Shachtman's
"Marxist Politics or Unprincipled Combinationism?" describes the
realignments that occurred in the CLA in 1934, as Shachtman
and a few of his supporters such as Lewit and Bleeker came over
to political collaboration with the core of the Cannon faction.
The united Trotskyists went on to lead the Minneapolis strikes
and fuse with Muste's leftward-moving centrist organization to
found the Workers Party of the United States (WPUS) in November-
December 1934. The WPUS cadre entered the U.S. Socialist Party
in 1936 and won substantial support, especially among the youth;
when the Trotskyists were expelled in mid-1937, they had doubled
their membership. The SWP, founded on New Year's Day 1938, in-
cluded a core of experienced trade-unionists who looked to Cannon,
and a real component of intellectuals such as James Burnham, who
gravitated toward Shachtman. Burnham and Shachtman were
co-editors of the SWP theoretical journal, New International.
The SWP was tempered in the fight against Shachtman and
Burnham's repudiation of the unconditional military defense of
the USSR as World War II began. Due to its location in North
America and the strength of its leadership, the SWP was the only
Trotskyist organization internationally to emerge from the war
relatively unscathed. Later, Cannon led the fight, partial and
belated as it was, against the revisionist current of Michel Pablo
that destroyed the Fourth International in 1951-53.217
Prescient and Equivocal
In historical overview the CLA's factional polarization in
1931-33 is both equivocal and prescient: equivocal, because a split
in the absence of programmatic differentiation would likely have
destroyed the basis for the development of the American
Trotskyists, and prescient because in every aspect other than the
decisive one— program— the lineup in 1931-33 presaged the key
1939-40 struggle over the Russian question. In his draft reply to
"Prospect and Retrospect" Cannon wrote of the petty-bourgeois
Introduction 75
methods of the Shachtman group in terms almost identical to those
he would use in 1939-40:
On our side one can trace the insistent effort to put in the
foreground the most important and actual questions which require
definite decisions at the moment, namely the international question
and the question of the New York branch, which is organically con-
nected with it. On the side of the Shachtman group there has been,
as their controversial documents show, a constant attempt to shift
the discussion away from these actual disputes to secondary,
incidental, outlived, and personal questions which do not require a
decision at the moment and concerning which they do not even
demand a decision. ...The Bolshevik method— which puts all
questions first of all politically— and the petty-bourgeois method—
which construes every dispute primarily as a personal one— are
mutually exclusive. They cannot live together.218
When the Shachtman-Burnham opposition broke from the
Fourth International, they claimed the "real" issue was not the
USSR, but Cannon's "bureaucratic conservatism," using terms very
similar to those in "Prospect and Retrospect."219 Like the early
Shachtman faction, the 1939-40 petty-bourgeois opposition was
an unprincipled personal combination. Though united in their
desire to reject the Fourth International's program of uncondi-
tional military defense of the USSR, Burnham, Shachtman, and
Abern maintained different theoretical views on the class nature
of the Soviet state.
In both 1932 and 1939-40 Shachtman and his supporters were
cavalier about the revolutionary party's relationship to the prole-
tariat. Shachtman's opposition to Cannon's "opportunist" work
around the Progressive Miners of America had a direct parallel
in the "Auto Crisis," which preceded by a few months the 1939
fight on the Russian question. While Cannon was in Europe in
early 1939 Shachtman and Burnham tried to force the SWP's
fraction in the United Auto Workers, the party's only major
implantation in the CIO, to support the bureaucratic clique led
by Homer Martin against a Stalinist-supported faction in the union
leadership. Yet Martin wanted to take the UAW back to the craft-
dominated AFL, while the Stalinists were solidly in the industrial
union camp. The pro-Martin line pushed by Burnham and
Shachtman would have discredited the Trotskyists in the UAW, and
it was rightly resisted by the fraction.220 Shachtman's actions in
the Auto Crisis severely damaged his authority in the party.
76 CLA 1931-33
Flippancy toward the proletariat was coupled with fundamen-
tal dilettantism in matters of organization. After Spector's major
blowout with Cannon in late 1929. he returned to Toronto and
began studying law. willfully withdrawing from the national lead-
ership. He remained active in the Toronto branch, but he repeat-
edly failed to send promised articles to the Militant and refused
appeals by Shachtman and Trotsky that he return to New York to
take up a more central role.-2' Glotzer and Abern also withdrew
after the May 1930 plenum. In a fit of pique Shachtman quit as
Militant editor in early 1932 and refused, despite repeated entreat-
ies, to take up the post again until after the June plenum. Such
egoistic, personalis behavior is intolerable in a Bolshevik leader.
Similarly, Glotzer decided to move back to Chicago just as he,
Shachtman. and Abern were about to become a majority on the
New York resident committee due to the failure of Cannon's
co-optation proposal. Glotzer's departure was accepted without
protest by his faction, showing the unseriousness of their claim
that Cannon and Swabeck were a "conservative" danger to the
League. Shachtman et al. did not want to take full organizational and
political responsibility for the work of the League. Abern withdrew from
organizational responsibility in the CLA in late 1933 through 1934
as Shachtman began to work closelv with Cannon.
The pettv-bourgeois opposition in 1939-40 was similarly dilet-
tantish on organizational questions. A few months before the fight
broke out. Shachtman tried to refuse the post of editor of the
party's journal, saying that he needed for financial reasons to get
a job outside the party.222 Cannon fought repeatedly with Burnham
to quit his job as a philosophy professor at New York University
and become a full-time party worker: his refusal was the statement
of a pettv bourgeois unwilling to come over all the wav to the pro-
letariat. Burnham broke with his erstwhile factional allies and quit
the Marxist movement just a few weeks after the Workers Party
was founded in May 1940. He was not alone. Fully one-half of the
approximately 800 Shachtman supporters did not join the Work-
ers Partv and exited Marxist politics altogether, a telling comment
on the pettv-bourgeois and demoralized basis of the opposition.
In 194<) the pettv-bourgeois opposition won the overwhelm-
ing majority of the SWP's vouth organization: in 1931-33
Shachtman et al. had a strong base of support in the CLA youth.
Abern was the head of the National Youth Committee set up by
Introduction 77
the CLA at its Second National Conference to oversee the youth
clubs formed around the launching of Young Spartacus. In Minne-
apolis the only Shachtman supporters were youth around Carl
Cowl. The "Carter group," centered in the New York youth lead-
ership, was nominally independent of both major factions but in
practice blocked with Shachtman/Abern on every important issue.
This was true despite Carter's initial opposition to establishing
the youth clubs along Leninist lines— organizationally independent
of the League, but politically subordinate. Carter wanted the clubs
to include Lovestoneites and Socialists and not to expressly affili-
ate with the CLA.223 Shachtman and Abern, former leaders of the
Communist Party's youth organization and familiar with Leninist
youth-party relations, at least fought Carter on this issue.
According to "Prospect and Retrospect," Cannon initially
opposed establishing independent youth clubs. There is no record
of this in the resident committee minutes. However, Cannon
certainly came to disapprove of the youth clubs as organized. The
young cadre who were closest to him— Gordon and Clarke— were
sent into the field to act as itinerant party organizers on the model
of the old Wobblies instead of organizing support for their faction
in the youth clubs. Rightly condemning petty-bourgeois dabbling
and hyper-intellectualism in the youth, the Cannon faction did not
pay enough attention to training and winning youth cadre. Oehler
took the more proletarian-oriented youth out of the Trotskyist
movement on an ultraleft trajectory in 1935. Thus there was little
counterposition to Shachtman-Abern-Burnham in the SWP's youth
organization, the Young People's Socialist League-Fourth Inter-
nationalist (YPSL-4th). The unemployed youth who formed the
core of that organization were a protean mass without an inwardly
defined class identity, keenly susceptible to petty-bourgeois social
pressures.
In both 1931-33 and 1940 the core of Shachtman's support
was to be found in the New York local organization. But the
political milieus from which the CLA recruited in this most cos-
mopolitan of American cities were very different in the early part
of the decade from those of the latter half. The core of the CLA's
New York membership had been politically shaped by the over-
lapping political milieus of the city's vibrant immigrant working
class. The restrictive immigration quotas adopted by the U.S.
78 CLA 1931-33
Congress in 1924 strangled those milieus at their source. The
Depression later cut into the city's light industrial base, the source
of many union jobs. By 1939-40 the young recruits to YPSL-4th,
many the sons and daughters of immigrant workers, had petty-
bourgeois aspirations, if not origins.
In later years Glotzer insisted that the CLA's Shachtman faction
was defined not by its New York social base, but by the Jewish
origins of many of its members. Thus he was quick to explain
Cowl's support to the Shachtman side with the remark, "He was
Jewish."224 Glotzer's assertion of some kind of shared Jewish soli-
darity on the part of the CLA's Shachtman faction is belied by its
vicious campaign to railroad Cannon supporter Bernard
Morgenstern out of the League simply because he agreed to be
married by a rabbi! There were Jewish members on both sides of
the CLAs factional divide. In fact Cowl appears to have been a
consistent ultraleftist— his 1932 polemic against the "opportunism"
of Cannon's Minneapolis supporters reveals the same political
impulses that induced him to follow Oehler out of the Trotskyist
movement a few years later.225
The main dividing line in 1939-40 was not ethnicity, but class.
Thus Bleeker and Lewit were key factional operatives for
Shachtman during the 1931-33 fight; when they toured the U.S.
to set up Unser Kamf clubs in late 1932, their trip was also an
organizing effort for their faction.226 But the Jewish garment
worker milieu in which Unser Kamf sought roots was a far cry from
the petty-bourgeois circles that formed the Trotskyist youth later
in the decade, as Trotsky himself noted in 1937:
You have, for example, an important number of Jewish nonworker
elements in your ranks. They can be a very valuable yeast if the party
succeeds by and by in extracting them from a closed milieu and
tving them to the factory workers by daily activity. I believe such an
orientation would also assure a more healthy atmosphere inside the
party.227
In 1939-40 Bleeker and Lewit were stalwarts of the SWP major-
itv; Lewit became one of Cannon's central political collaborators
for the next two decades.
In a discussion with Swabeck ("The International Must Apply
the Brakes," 27 February 1933), Trotsky noted that the different
social composition of the Cannon and Shachtman groups was not
a barrier to the building of a revolutionary party:
Introduction 79
The mere fact that both factions have a different social composi-
tion and different traditions is not enough to necessitate a split, since
every party arises from various groups, elements, etc., is not socially
homogeneous, and is a melting pot. But there must be active work.
In the League the current situation coincides with the beginning of
more energetic external work. Whether the League will become a
melting pot through this work— that is the question that counts.
But the American Trotskyist organization never really became
a melting pot. The CLA's factional polarization left a fault line,
centered on the Abern clique, which ruptured again in 1939-40.
At that time Shachtman gave programmatic expression to the politi-
cal impulses that had earlier led him to sympathize with petty-
bourgeois adventurers such as Landau and Naville, and with those
who sought unity with the Right Opposition, such as Nin. Under
the pressure of the anti-Communist hysteria provoked by the Hitler-
Stalin pact, Shachtman chose to follow the impressionistic pedant
James Burnham— the co-editor of New International and his closest
collaborator in the preceding period— instead of the proletarian
revolutionary James Cannon. This was not the inevitable denoue-
ment of the 1931-33 fight, but the result of subsequent political
developments within the American Trotskyist organization and in
the world at large.
In 1939 Shachtman took the majority of the petty-bourgeois
elements of the party, his historic base, but Cannon took the pro-
letarian majority. Not only were the programmatic issues clear,
but the Socialist Workers Party was more deeply rooted in the
working class than the CLA had been. As Cannon noted:
It was the "turn to mass work," started in 1933, which in the end
sealed the doom of the petty-bourgeois opposition in 1940. The new
people recruited and the cadres selected in the process of develop-
ing the mass work of the party shifted the weight steadily against
the "internal" specialists of whom Abern was the archetype. By 1939-
40 we had a different and better composition of the party member-
ship to appeal to. This was decisive.228
Cannon brilliantly exposed the personalist, petty-bourgeois
character of Shachtman-Abern-Glotzer's political approach in
Struggle for a Proletarian Party. He subsequently wrote:
Note Trotsky's analysis of Shachtman's tendency, not by a single
incident but by a long series over a long period of years. Lineups
are a certain indication. Shachtman lined up with Naville, Landau,
Nin, etc., in the most critical situations in the formative period of
80 CLA 1931-33
the Left Opposition. He was never convinced but yielded to the joint
pressure of LD [Trotsky] and our own party majority.
His first manifestation of political independence took the form
of opposition to us, and every independent step thereafter. His posi-
tion was a simulacrum of Bolshevism when he worked under the
influence of others. His own instinctive tendencv is always oppor-
tunist. For example, he never could fully understand why we would
hear nothing of unity, or even a united front, with the Lovestoneites.
His unification with us (1933) after four vears of falsely motivated
factional struggle was made unwillingly, under compulsion: the
disintegration of his faction and the pressure of LD.229
The history of international working-class struggle in the 20th
century proves that, as Lenin insisted, revolutionary socialist con-
sciousness must be brought to the working class from the outside
by a steeled vanguard. Internal programmatic struggle within the
vanguard party is key to overcoming the inevitable pressures of
the more privileged layers of the working class and the petty bour-
geoisie on the vanguard and its revolutionary program. Through
the fight in the CLA in 1931-33 Cannon completed his assimila-
tion of these basic tenets of Bolshevism. He became a master at
applying them to the American terrain, and proved to be the best
Leninist the United States has yet produced.
The lessons for new generations of revolutionaries are pro-
found. While the revolutionary character of a proletarian organi-
zation is defined by its program, which represents nothing other
than the historic interests of the international working class, there
is an interplay between a party's program and its social composi-
tion. Marx insisted that "being determines consciousness," and this
applies as much to aspiring revolutionaries as to other sectors of
society. A Marxist vanguard without deep roots in the working
class not only lacks the means to implement its program, but is
necessarily more susceptible to the social pressures of alien classes.
— Prometheus Research Library
March 2002
I.
Shachtman in the International
83
The April Conference:
A Disappointment in All Respects
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman230
16 April 1930
This criticism of the April 1930 Paris conference of the International
Left Opposition is a response to an April 3 letter by Shachtman report-
ing on the founding conference of the German Left Opposition, which
Shachtman attended before going to Paris.231 The Italian group referred
to is Prometeo, supporters of the ultraleftist Amadeo Bordiga. The Belgian
representatives at the April conference were split between supporters
of the Charleroi federation and the Brussels organization around
Eduard Van Overstraeten.
My belated thanks for your detailed report on the Berlin
events. At any rate the picture you paint was not very rosy. Now
I am told, with reference to Seipold, that the situation has taken
a turn for the better. I have expressed to our friends in Berlin
quite frankly my suspicion that there may be some agents of
the official Party bureaucracy in their midst, who are pursuing
their unholy work as splitters. Moreover, I believe that this mode
of operation would be wholly in the spirit of Stalinist bureau-
cratic practices and that one must be on the alert for it every-
where, including in America.
Now on the international conference: It is a big disappoint-
ment for me in all respects. To convene a mute international
conference was really not advisable. If our opponents are even
halfway clever— and in this direction they are quite inventive—
they will immediately and openly conclude: The assembled
representatives of the Opposition were so disunited, or so
unclear, or both together, that they did not even dare express
any political thought at all. Because nobody, no politically think-
ing person, will be able to believe that people come to Paris
from New York, Berlin, Prague, Spain, etc., in order to say noth-
ing. Travel expenses for silence are really superfluous expenses
in politics. It would take only four to five postcards, nothing
84 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
more, to create a secretariat. Of course, one can say that the
majority of delegates were in Paris anyway. But the reader of
the official communiques does not know this, and it changes
absolutely nothing in substance.
So why was no short declaration of principles (manifesto)
published? Why? Such a document would be of the utmost
political significance. You could show it to every thinking worker
in every country and on that basis do propaganda work for the
international Opposition. It must always be kept in mind that
most of the national groups are rather weak, without tradition,
without authority among the workers, which initially presents
great obstacles and difficulties. Reference is made to the Russian
Opposition, which to the worker appears rather abstract. This
reference is often given a personal edge, which is politically in
every respect uncomfortable and impermissible in principle. A
worker who generally sympathizes with the Opposition, but who
does not yet place sufficient trust in the national group, would
breathe a sigh of relief if one were to lay before him a concise,
clear, principled document. And we have robbed ourselves of
this weapon for an unforeseeable period of time. What are the
reasons? Comrade Naville, in a hastily written letter, names but
one: the failure of the Italians and the half-failure of the
Belgians. But I can by no means accept this argument. We con-
vened a conference in order to give expression to the ideas of
those groups that are clear about the issues, not those who
persist in their confusion. In any event, the Italians were not
officially represented, and the Belgians were split. Thus the
manifesto could have been adopted unanimously or against
the vote of one Belgian. One could object that we did not
want to repel the representatives from Brussels. That I would
understand even less, for they are in a struggle against the
comrades from Charleroi, to whom we are committed to give
our complete support. I also consider the wait-and-see "for-
bearance" toward the Italians to be completely false. If we
had posed the alternatives to the Italians through articles and
open questioning, we would presently be much further along
with them than we unfortunately are.
It must be admitted that we already lost too much time be-
fore the conference. The secretariat should have been consti-
tuted at least half a year ago. Urbahns would never have been
The April Conference 85
able to come off as relatively well as he did in his organization
if, in the last half year, he had been under a certain amount of
control by the international Opposition, and if the members
of the Leninbund had understood that it really is a matter of a
break with the entire international Opposition. Because of this
utterly inexplicable delay we helped Urbahns against us, just as
we are now helping the muddleheads among the Belgians, Ital-
ians, and elsewhere through our mute conference (thus will it
go down in history).
I insist on this because I sense tendencies in this important
question that are not in agreement with the active, revolution-
ary internationalism of the Opposition, and if they are not
clarified and eliminated in a timely fashion, they can become
dangerous.
In a formal sense as well, the affair is not quite in order, if
I am not mistaken, and here, my dear Shachtman, I indict you
directly. Through your friendly mediation I addressed propos-
als to the conference. But the conference never learned of them.
Who then decided behind the back of the conference that an
important proposal, addressed to the conference, should not
even be brought before it? It seems to me that this is not quite
"democratic" toward the conference itself. What is really
undemocratic— without quotation marks— is that 99 percent, if
not more, of the membership of the international Opposition,
if asked, would doubtlessly be for the adoption of a mani-
festo of this sort. Moreover, a referendum on this question
would not be so difficult at all, for we are unfortunately not
yet very numerous. Thus it seems to me that the entire
procedure is politically utterly wrong and organizationally a
bit arbitrary.
What you tell me, on comrade Pfemfert's authority, about
the alleged suggestions regarding the publication of the biog-
raphy in Yiddish is a misunderstanding. We are dealing with a
sum that is ten times more modest than what you cite in your
letters. I am very sorry that the Militant's profit will be much
smaller than you imagined because of this misunderstanding.232
I gratefully acknowledge receiving comrade Martin Abern's
letter with his important communications.2"
I received a very kind letter from Harry Winitsky and am
sending him the enclosed reply, with your help.231 Unfortunately
86 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
I must also write this in German. If your consul thinks the reply
is unadvisable, do not deliver it, but communicate the practi-
cal contents verbally.
4> + 4>
Where Is the International Secretariat?
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman235
18 August 1930
Trotsky's complaint about the functioning of the I.S. is a response to a
June 30 letter by Shachtman that chided Trotsky for issuing his own
circular letter to the ILO sections.™ Trotsky addresses the crisis in the
French section, which within a few months was to lead to Alfred Rosmer's
withdrawal from the Opposition. The new Italian group he refers to is
the New Italian Opposition, which broke from the Italian Communist
Party in solidarity with the ILO in early 1930.
1. It is of course very regrettable that the Militant has had to
revert to a biweekly. In any case this is not catastrophic. I am a
bit worried, however, about a purely technical symptom that
sometimes also has political significance. The proofreading of
the most recent issue is miserable. This may be completely
accidental, of course, but sometimes this is a sign of demoral-
ization in the editorial board, and sometimes a crisis in the
organization begins with neglect of detail work. I am sure that
this is not the case in the "League."
2. I regret that nothing came of all our financial plans. The
Yiddish edition of my autobiography was completely botched
by Rieder. As I see, you have also not been able to place chap-
ters of the new book in the non-English press. Scribner's writes
me that the crisis has sharply impaired sales of the autobiogra-
phy to date. To date he has sold only 4,000 copies.
3. On the French Opposition: The communications on the cri-
sis that have reached you seem to be very exaggerated. Rosmer
has not resigned. He is now on vacation and will return to his
post again in a couple of weeks. At any rate, the dispute, as
Where Is the International Secretariat? 87
always, has left a bitter aftertaste, but I believe that in time its
positive consequences will outweigh the negative ones. Some
questions have been clarified by the crisis; some positions have
been made more precise. The work of the "Ligue" has not been
obstructed; it continues, and with success. We expect comrade
Molinier here shortly; Naville is coming later. I will then be
able to give you more concrete information about personal
matters. However, I believe that the crisis has basically been
overcome, politically as well as personally.
4. The international work is in much worse shape. All of my
efforts to find out what was actually decided at the April confer-
ence have yielded no satisfactory results, because, as I understand
it, no formal decisions were made at this conference and no min-
utes were taken. (Comrade Frankel corrects me in this respect
by noting that detailed minutes and written resolutions must
exist.) At any rate I have not received them to date. The April
conference was more or less a misunderstanding. The work was
summarily pushed off onto the French Ligue without detailing
a division of labor, for, the political manifesto aside, at least
organizational-technical matters should be thoroughly carried
out. I insist on this because I very much fear that on the national
level there is a great deal of similar sloppiness that damages the
cause enormously. Bureaucratism also has its good side: preci-
sion, punctuality, precise resolutions, etc. The Opposition should
begin to acquire this side of "bureaucratism."
5. You write that actually the International Secretariat should
decide the question of my circular letter. You maintain, not
incorrectly, that the secretariat was in fact created for such a
purpose. Yes, it should be that way. But, as I have said, despite
at least a dozen letters I have not even been able to learn what
the actual decisions were. There were certain shadings of opin-
ion with regard to a number of international questions. These
shadings are absolutely unavoidable, and to a certain extent they
constitute a driving force. However, there must be an organi-
zation that passes over from discussion of shadings to decision
and to action. I had hoped to find the road to this in Paris—
with your collaboration, dear Shachtman. But because this was
not the case, there was no other way than to turn to the Oppo-
sition directly and, through its public opinion, create a clear
88 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
situation. At any rate, by means of the circular letter I achieved
what I had been unable to achieve by means of innumerable
personal letters. An independent editorial board of the Inter-
national Bulletin has now been created, and I am expecting the
first issue any day.
6. You write that my circular will be communicated to the mem-
bers of the leadership. Of course you know better how to
proceed in America. But in principle I believe that we should
proceed as democratically as possible. What we have in the
ranks of the Opposition are cadres; they must be trained, fully
capable of acting on their own. This will not happen by their
believing in a powerful International Secretariat but by their
participation in all questions and actions, which will gradually
lead to the creation of a capable center.
7. On the Bordigists: In the last issue of Lutte des classes you
will find the most important documents that illuminate the situ-
ation of the two groups of the Italian Opposition. Relations
with the Paris Bordigists are somewhat tense. The situation
would be better if in this question as well one had not acted
somewhat undemocratically— that is, if the negotiations at the
top had long ago been supplemented by educating all the
French and Italian Oppositionists. Nothing forces leaders to
precisely define their ideas and actions so much as being under
observation and thus controlled by the public opinion of those
being led. This rule is not only applicable to the Stalinists but
to us as well. This should never be forgotten.
The new Italian group is very active and possesses, it seems,
capable and trained forces. We plan to have both groups repre-
sented in the International Secretariat by one comrade; in the
worst case, by two. If the Parisian Bordigists were less sectarian,
they would have to hail the new Opposition as their political
success. Unfortunately, they attribute much significance to main-
taining their position as an oppositional aristocracy at any price.
At any rate, I do not believe that you have to change your
attitude toward the New York Bordigists in any way. In my opin-
ion, however, you must open wide the discussion of the disputed
issues in the organization, including in front of the Bordigists,
on the basis of the material in the last issue of Lutte des classes.
8. On the united front of the three Communist organizations.237
Shachtman Part of International Bureau 89
Of course, it is out of the question for us to make any kind of
bloc with the Right in which the Party does not participate. The
most important thing in Gitlow's letter is the recognition that
his organization differs from the Party tactically, but from us
programmatically. In other words, despite all the claims of the
Stalinists, the Right recognizes that they are much closer to the
centrists than to us. This must be utilized politically. Winitsky
sent me the major resolution on "Trotskyism" from the national
conference of the Right. It is nine pages long; I have only
skimmed it. I will comment on this in an article in the near
future. The fact that you have forced these people to make their
standpoint precise is in itself a great gain for us.
9. I am turning the matters of the Russian Bulletin over to Lyova
since that is his department. He will be writing you about it.
10. Received the line intact. Maestro Charalambos tried it out and
found it to be excellent. I hope that American technology will live
up to its reputation in the coming season.238
^ + O
Shachtman to Be Part of
International Bureau
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman239
17 November 1930
In addition to reporting on the decision to co-opt Shachtman to the In-
ternational Bureau, Trotsky here congratulates the CLA on the produc-
tion of a pamphlet containing his article "The Turn in the Communist
International and the Situation in Germany. " He refers to the situation
in Austria, where both the Arbeiterstimme group, led by Joseph Frey,
and the Mahnruf Group, founded by German Opposition leader Kurt
Landau, claimed membership in the ILO while refusing to unite.
The little pamphlet caused a big sensation here. A nice press
run and, even more important, a very good translation as far
as I can judge. The French translation in La Verite is full of
mistakes, the German inadequate, the American very good. You
90 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
now have a translator in the person of comrade Morris Lewit.
I congratulate you on this acquisition. I found only a single
misunderstanding on the last page, where in the sentence: "It
especially overlooked the economic crisis" it should read "pros-
perity" Please send the pamphlet to Ivor Montagu, 80 Wardour
St., London Wl.
A few words about the situation in Austria. I do not know
whether you receive the two competing journals. Their polem-
ics are apt to make the international Opposition ridiculous and
contemptible in the eyes of the workers. Meanwhile, a year and
a half of protracted effort to bring the comrades to their senses
has passed, without success. I had the impression the entire time
that Mahnruf leads an artificial existence but hoped to bring
about a unification with comrade Landau's help. Comrade
Frankel is writing you at the same time about the facts based
on a comprehensive inquiry by two comrades who had traveled
to Austria from here.240 Comrade Landau took an absolutely
wrong position on this issue. Enclosed you will find his letter,
my reply, and my proposal to the International Bureau. All this
material will be sent to you as a member of the International
Bureau. Because of a technical oversight, the matter has not been
settled, but de facto it is settled. While Naville was here we
(M. Mill, Molinier, Markin, Frankel, and I) proposed to make
you part of the International Bureau as representative of the
American League, on the assumption that the League appointed
you to handle international relations. Your participation— at least
until you have three to four Lindberghs [transatlantic flyers]—
was conceived as follows: a. You will receive all material intended
for the members of the International Bureau; b. You of course
will participate in all votes; c. In issues more or less urgent for
Europe they will not wait for your vote. In American matters,
of course, everything will be determined only with your partici-
pation. Comrade Frankel is now proceeding to arrange this
matter formally.
I receive everything from the Mexican comrades in New York
and am very pleased with their energy and abilities.241 A small
and even an old mimeograph can accomplish wonderful things
if you are on the right track and pursue matters energetically,
which seems to be the case here in particular. I would write to
Shachtman Part of International Bureau 91
the comrades immediately but am not sure whether they are
fluent in foreign languages besides English and Spanish.
I received a letter from comrade Malkin, sent to the address
of the Russian Bulletin from the Great Meadows Prison. Do
you know this comrade? If so, please convey to him my warm-
est greetings.242
I am sending you a letter from Australia that I have had a
long time. I have not been able to decide whether to answer
the correspondent, because I am not sure whether it isn't a trap.
Perhaps you or Eastman can find a way to feel out the man.
Of course it would be good to have someone in Australia. Per-
haps you could use him for the Militant or other things. If the
man is okay, send the letter back to me and I will answer it. I
would also be willing to send him a copy of my autobiography
in English.
My letter to Lore written when you were here was returned
"addressee unknown." Subsequently I sent the letter for you
to forward but never heard anything more. What is the state of
it? Did you deliver the letter? I also do not know whether com-
rade Spector in Canada received the letter that I wrote jointly
with you.
The people from the Weekly People wrote me a rather friendly
letter a few months ago and have been sending me their paper
since then.243 In any case I have not replied, which of course is
not very polite. But I do not want to take any formal step that
could cause the slightest harm to the Militant. What should I write
them? I await your advice.
+ 4- 4-
92
Crisis in the French Ligue
Letter bv Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman244
25 November 1930
The latent crisis in the French Ligue has again suddenly become
acute, and now the point is for everyone to take a position. You
know that Naville and Mill spent quite a while with us, that we
discussed all the disputed issues in more than enough detail,
and then thoroughly determined the necessary measures.
N. was quite sure that he would have difficulties with some
comrades, particularly comrade Rosmer. but he was completely
prepared to overcome the difficulties together with the others.
In his parting words, quite spontaneously he said he would
conduct an open, undiplomatic correspondence. Since his
departure he has not written me one line. The second issue of
the International Bulletin, which we jointly put together here and
which should have appeared in Paris only a few days later, has
not been published to this day. The provisional Administrative
Secretariat that we established together does not function
because it is boycotted bv Naville. Despite all of comrade
Molinier's attempts to ensure collaborative work, nothing hap-
pens, thanks to Naville's continual resistance.
Now, this situation is not merely, or— if you will— not in the
final analysis, caused by Naville's bad faith, but by new compli-
cations that outweigh all else. You know from your own experi-
ence how organizational matters are handled in Paris. You, my
dear friend, also contributed something to this sloppy function-
ing and then rebuked me later, after the April conference, for
not haying published my circular through the International Bul-
letin and the secretariat, at a time when, despite all efforts, it
was impossible in Paris to initiate any international work. But
that only parenthetically. In French affairs the work was just as
confused and perhaps even more sloppily organized, particu-
larly in the most important arena: trade-union work. The entire
responsibility for propagating Communist ideas inside the trade
Crisis in the French Ligue 93
unions has fallen to comrade Gourget personally: no directives,
no control, no regular reporting. In letters to Rosmer, Naville,
and Gourget himself I repeatedly expressed my astonishment
at this method of work and urgently advocated collective work
in this important area, but to no avail. The reason for my con-
cern was also the way comrade Gourget approaches things and
people. He prefers a diplomatic-personal method over prin-
cipled, propagandistic, and, if required, polemical education. I
am not at all against the art of individual diplomacy, but it can-
not replace programmatic work. For this reason, I considered
comrade Gourget to be invaluable as a member of a trade-union
commission, which, of course, should be completely subordi-
nated to the leadership of the Ligue. But since Naville, Rosmer,
and the others soft-pedaled considerably for the sake of the sub-
stanceless internal struggle, they found no opportunity to place
matters on a normal track. When Naville was here I under-
scored this sticky point most energetically and predicted that
Gourget's personal character, coupled with his complete inde-
pendence from the Ligue in this most important arena, could
have very nasty consequences. Unfortunately, this has proved
to be the case much sooner than I imagined.
The conference of the "Opposition Unitaire" was to have
been held in Paris on November 20. Gourget undertook to work
out theses together with a semi-Communist who stands out-
side the Ligue. What he produced is a political/ trade-union
platform cobbled together from syndicalist, Communist, and
reformist fragments. One sees clearly where the good Gourget,
out of consideration for his partner and diplomatic politeness,
has thrown overboard one Communist principle after the other,
while, for the same reasons, incorporating into the document
one prejudice after another. I will ask comrade Frankel to write
out at least the most important parts (the document is enor-
mous) and enclose them with this letter. I have written a short
critique, unfortunately in Russian. But I am enclosing it; perhaps
you now have someone who can translate it into English for
you. If the document had been produced by non-Communist
trade unionists halfway friendly to the Ligue, a friendly, prin-
cipled criticism of the mess would be in order. I would gladly
do this for La Verite, with a tone of complete friendliness toward
the confused authors. But it is absolutely out of the question
94 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
that a Communist, a member of the Ligue, should sign his name
to it, that Communists organized in the trade unions should
vote for it, let alone that we, as the International Opposition,
should take responsibility for it.
These theses, as I have said, were produced completely
behind the back of the leadership. Comrade Gourget made his
document available only upon comrade Molinier's plea and then
reluctantly. Both Naville and Gerard, not to mention Molinier,
Frank, and others, had to recognize immediately that the plat-
form is unacceptable. That immediately induced comrade
Gourget to submit his resignation, with the written explanation
that the Ligue wanted to subordinate the trade-union opposi-
tion to itself— that is, the same accusation that the syndicalists
are wont to raise against the Communists, albeit with the dif-
ference that here it is not at all a question of the "subordina-
tion" of the trade-union opposition, at least temporarily, but
rather of the Ligue's control over a member who has been
entrusted with its trade-union work.
Since then Naville's attitude has been so wavering and
ambiguous that he, as I mentioned, does not dare write me a
few lines, although I, always expecting his letter, was engaged
in friendly correspondence with his wife during this time. Instead
of condemning comrade Gourget's absolutely impermissible
method of functioning, he initiated a guerrilla war against
Molinier and Mill and is sabotaging the work of the Interna-
tional Secretariat. No one knows what conclusions Naville will
draw from the situation, because unfortunately he is not accus-
tomed to being guided by principled and organizational motives,
instead of personal and sentimental ones.
It goes without saying that comrade Rosmer's attitude plays
the greatest role here. It is difficult for me to touch on this
delicate point, but the issue stands above the individual, even
if one is dealing with an old friend. With one brief exception,
comrade Rosmer never belonged to a large political organiza-
tion. Like Monatte, he was active in the framework of an inti-
mate anarcho-syndicalist group that never took on strict forms
of organization and always remained a loose federation of
individual characters. I often admired the meetings of this or-
ganization, Quaijemmapes 96 (the old headquarters oi La Vie
Ouvriere): no agenda, no minutes, an informal exchange of
Crisis in the French Ligue 95
opinion, no resolutions; they dispersed, and they all did as they
pleased, or they did nothing. And so it went from week to week,
for years. The way the April conference was organized (to be
sure, with your collaboration, my dear friend), represents the
transmittal of the same habits and methods into the Left
Opposition. That also explains why Rosmer found it quite nor-
mal that Gourget, on his own responsibility, without an account-
ing to anyone, ran nothing more and nothing less than all the
trade-union work. You also know that after his expulsion from
the Party, Rosmer stood completely outside the movement for
years. Now, one must take into consideration that he is a sick
man who can maintain his physical equilibrium only by lead-
ing a very quiet life. He is happy working in a group of good
friends but cannot bear internal conflicts at all, reacting in such
cases by leaving the field to the combatants.
After the April conference the International Secretariat
under Rosmer's leadership could not begin its work, because
Overstraeten had objections, because Naville had some doubts,
and because Rosmer had absolutely no desire to struggle against
the false objections and the no less false doubts. The same story
was later repeated with the Bordigists, to whom I addressed an
open letter that Rosmer refused to publish in La Verite, know-
ing that this would cause no friction with me but would avoid
new complications with the Bordigists.245 I hope you will under-
stand that I am not complaining to you about Rosmer. I merely
want to acquaint you with those character traits of his that
explain his attitude in the current crisis.
If I had freedom of movement I would go to Paris immedi-
ately to have a talk with my old friend. Unfortunately this is
denied me. Thus I have urgently asked comrade Rosmer to come
to Prinkipo again in order to seek a clarification of the situa-
tion together. No matter how this personal aspect will develop,
the general situation in the Ligue— that is, the character of the
crisis— is completely clear. The Ligue is on the road to trans-
forming itself from a small propagandistic group with a famil-
ial character into a public organization in which habits are less
intimate, relations and obligations have a more formal charac-
ter, and conflicts are sometimes brutal. Politically, this means
great progress, which is also very clearly expressed by the
development of La Verite. Now comrade Rosmer seems to find
96 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
the unavoidable negative aspects of this progress unbearable,
and this explains the personal case of Rosmer.
As far as Naville is concerned, one should not forget that,
with all his good and promising traits, he belonged to Revolution
surrealiste as late as 1927, later worked on Clarte, and still stood
between the right and left wing until the autumn of 1929 in
close connection with Souvarine. These are not rebukes. Naville
is quite young, comes from a bourgeois milieu, and makes his
way not without inhibitions and disruptions. Marxist theoreti-
cal education does not substitute for revolutionary training in
the proletarian milieu, and that is precisely what Naville and
the Lutte des classes group both lack. He accepts the correct
standpoint in principle; but then in dealing with a practical
question, quite different factors— individualistic, even national
ones— come to the fore and make the choice difficult for him,
sometimes even forcing him onto the wrong track. These non-
proletarian traits that he has not overcome are so strongly
pronounced that one can almost always predict what kind of
error he will make in this or that question. I repeat again that
his errors become all the more unavoidable the less they are
theoretical— that is, purely theoretical— and the more they
embrace practical and personal questions. So is it now, as he
has begun to waver because of Gourget's impermissible attitude
and tries to exert pressure not on Gourget but on those who
are entirely correct. In doing so he naturally enlarges the scope
of the crisis, because one can overcome the wavering of others
only if one does not waver oneself.
Today I wrote Naville a letter, a copy of which is enclosed.246
At the same time I wrote comrade Mill, who is the liaison
to the Russian Opposition in Paris, that the secretariat's work,
in my opinion, must not be interrupted for a single day; he
should go to comrade Souzo and together they should ener-
getically demand of comrade Naville that he not neglect his
obligations to the international Opposition despite the crisis
in the French Ligue.
These are all unpleasant side effects. It would be better if
they did not exist. But to fall into despair over them or even
into a pessimistic mood would be utter folly. For despite every-
thing we have come a long way in the course of this year, and
these crises no longer grow out of the old, unfortunate stagna-
Crisis in the French Ligue 97
tion of the foreign Opposition groups but rather out of their
development, transformation, and growth.
This letter is meant for you personally, not because I have
something to hide here but because comrades who are not
acquainted with the personal aspects might not interpret this
letter in the spirit in which it has been written.
If you want to know my opinion about your attitude, I will
give you the following advice: Do not support comrade Naville's
wavering or even go easy on him, but prove to him most
emphatically that beginning with the key trade-union question
he must orient himself according to principle and not accord-
ing to personal motives. If this side is secured, together we
will do everything to avoid losing even our dear Gourget,
because he is a very good comrade, very smart, and some of
his traits that prove to be weaknesses in an inadequate organi-
zation could serve the international Opposition excellently if
put to proper use.
PS: In my letter to Naville you will find an allusion to comrade
Landau's preparations for the German conference. I do not know
whether you are informed about this. The conference was sup-
posed to take place five days after the elections— that is, at a point
when nothing had yet been clarified. The date was announced
suddenly, so that I personally had to make do with a short letter,
which was published in Kommunist. At the last minute the confer-
ence was postponed for a few weeks, ostensibly to give the delegates
the possibility of taking a position on the elections. That gave me
time to write the little pamphlet you published so excellently. I
also wrote letters to Landau and Well, asking them to send the
international comrades, including me, the draft resolutions. I
insisted that my pamphlet be sent to the local organizations in
manuscript form as a basis for discussion, which should be an
obvious thing to do. None of this was done. No resolutions were
prepared for the conference. My pamphlet was published almost
at the same time as the American edition. The conference con-
cerned itself exclusively with personal garbage— that is, it was an
expanded repeat of the conference you yourself attended. The se-
lection of delegates and the entire way the conference was handled
had only one goal: to determine and affirm that not Neumann and
Grylewicz, but Landau, was right, without, to be sure, indicating
to which great and important questions this right and wrong
98 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
refers.247 Before the conference I asked comrade Landau about
the preparations and received from him the best assurances that
he was proceeding together with Roman Well and would seek to
shape the conference into a real, political-revolutionary represen-
tative assembly. The delegates, robbed of every political idea, could
do nothing other than concede that the leadership was right and,
as comrade Seipold admits, go home in an utterly depressed mood
without having adopted the slightest political resolution. Comrade
Landau regards this as his victory, and I fear that he tempted
Naville into trying to achieve such a victory in France. Landau's
weaknesses— inarguably he also has his strong sides— are analogous
to comrade Naville's, and their alliance therefore rests on a not
quite healthy basis. So now you have been informed by me; for
now I have nothing more to add.
^ ^ ^
We Must Endeavor to Collaborate
With Naville and Rosmer
Letter by Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky248
17 December 1930
This is excerpted from a letter about developments in the CLA.
1. It appears to me, from an examination of the situation in
various countries, that the Opposition is passing through a criti-
cal stage in its development. This is to a certain extent the
aftermath of the previous situation in which— so far as the
non-Russian Opposition was concerned— it was represented by
such groups as Paz and Urbahns, which did us more harm than
good. Their mode of work— the one dilettante and the other
opportunist-sectarian— has left its mark on the Opposition to this
day. The efforts of the past year to issue out of the stagnation
caused by this state of affairs naturally had to assume abrupt
and sometimes harsh forms, as in the break with Urbahns, Paz,
and now with Overstraeten. This was unavoidable and in part
advantageous to our cause. It made it impossible for the Stalinist
We Must Collaborate With Naville and Rosmer 99
liars to use the expressed standpoint of the German Opposition
against that of the Russian, or that of the French against that of
the American, etc. In a word, it laid the basis for establishing a
uniform international platform and centralized organizations of
the Opposition. This work is evidently still proceeding in such
countries as Austria, China, and elsewhere.
Because of the whole past of the Opposition, its origin, the
traditions (good and bad) of its proponents outside of Russia, the
difficulties are still with us to a large extent. To these factors, I
believe, should be added the fact that in reacting to the exagger-
ated internationalism and mechanical centralization of Stalin-
Zinoviev, a tendency, largely unconscious, has grown up in the
Opposition to ignore the burning needs of centralization, disci-
pline, and the Communist functioning of comrades.
This, together with the reasons you mention, explains the state
of affairs among the French comrades. It is obviously an abso-
lutely impossible situation when one of our leading comrades
draws up a political declaration not only in collaboration with a
non-Communist but without the knowledge or sanction of the
executive committee. And particularly when the declaration— at
least those parts I have read— is so faulty, untenable, and impos-
sible for us to take responsibility for. In the Party— in its best days-
such an action would have met with immediate repudiation and,
if serious enough, with strenuous disciplinary measures. I cannot
understand how Naville or any of the other leading comrades can
defend such a step, even if the defense consists of centering
the attack upon those comrades who first proposed measures
against Gourget.
What must be taken into consideration in this regard are
certain personal relationships in the leading group of the
French Ligue that I remarked during my stay in Paris. For some
mysterious reason, there is evidently a very poor regard for each
other held mutually by comrades Naville and Molinier. Of the
two, of course, I believe Naville to be by far the more capable,
despite those shortcomings which you mention. It is all the more
distressing, therefore, to have to think of a situation in which
Naville and, even more, Rosmer should be in a sort of semi-
retirement. Without attaching an exaggerated significance to
leaders, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that they
play a highly important role. Rosmer and Naville, despite the
100 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
peculiar and bad traditions of their respective milieus, are
extremely valuable for the movement. Leaders are not made or
born or developed overnight, except in the Stalinist factories.
A lack of capable leaders is a sure sign of the weakness of a
movement. (Our German group is a case in point: Landau and
very little more!) And for this reason, while I cannot for a
moment condone the attitude the comrades have taken toward
the principled question of the Communist standpoint in the
trade-union question and the elementary requirements of
organizational discipline, I believe the greatest efforts should
be made to facilitate a collaboration in which the abilities of
both Rosmer and Naville can be utilized to the utmost. These
are, in a sense, abstract considerations which may not fit accu-
rately into the realities of the situation in France, nor are they
to be understood as negating the analysis you give of the weak-
nesses of "French organization" or of Naville and Rosmer. But
such weaknesses cannot be overcome in 24 hours. Meanwhile I
shall write to Naville on my own responsibility.
2. I am glad to learn that the Austrian situation is in the pro-
cess of liquidation. Here, as in China for instance, I have favored
drastic measures in which a unification is either compelled or
else one group chosen as a basis for the establishment of an
Austrian section of the Opposition. Our cause has been suffi-
ciently compromised by the eternal, baseless polemics there to
make such an action imperative. I have for a long time had the
impression about the two groups there which is verified in the
report of comrades Molinier and Mill.249 The Mahnruf Group
appears to live largely by attacks upon the Arbeiterstimme and
Frey, and has been, in the past, falsely supported by Landau in
Der Kommunist and other non-Austrian Opposition papers. By
this I do not mean that Frey has always acted correctly. All the
polemics in that country were characteristic of "osterreichisierte
Politik" [Austrianized politics]. Frey has frequently adopted so
violent a position that it became arrogant and, worse than that,
attempted to make his whole past record in the Party, for ten
years, the basis of a unification of the Opposition. That the
unity document elaborated by him does not contain this "pre-
requisite" is a good sign, and in consideration of his indubi-
table qualifications, there does not appear to be any reason why
the Mahnrufer should not unite with Frey's group. Of course,
We Must Collaborate With Naville and Rosmer 101
comrade Landau's position in this case is based far more upon
the desire to maintain the sectional prestige and honor of his
former group than upon a wish for unity. The action of the
Molinier-Mill committee is to be endorsed, I believe. Yet I would
urge that the International Bureau should endeavor to create a
situation in which the Austrian Opposition is no longer domi-
nated so exclusively by comrade Frey, that the leadership be
extended, since I am not convinced that he is always capable
of taking an objective position particularly in internal organi-
zational affairs.
3. In connection with Landau, the German question arises
again apparently. From its press alone, it seems that the group
is at a standstill and what you write only confirms that impres-
sion. When we were at the Berlin conference, comrades Naville
and myself endeavored to establish such a leading committee
in which none of the two uniting groups would have absolute
domination. This not because we had too great a confidence
in such people as Joko, but because the German group was
obviously lacking in material for leadership, in experienced
functionaries, in capable directing forces. Neumann, for
instance, despite certain shortcomings, would have been a valu-
able addition to the leading committee. I cite his name only as
an example. Without these two or three former Leninbundler,
the committee would have been composed of one leading intel-
lectual force (Landau) and an Austrian to boot, with the bal-
ance composed of what amounted to active rank-and-file com-
rades. I have never found such a combination to work out
successfully. Joko, I am sure, had to be removed from the com-
mittee, for he is entirely out of place in the Opposition. But
the art of leadership, so to speak, should have consisted in draw-
ing closer such elements as Grylewicz and Neumann, so as to
broaden and extend the leadership. Their alienation had inevi-
tably to result in the present situation where, according to your
letter, the principal task of the recent conference was to bury
for the tenth time the political corpses of the former Lenin-
bundler. Not a very heroic task. We call it "flogging a dead dog."
Landau had a very vindictive attitude toward Joko-Grylewicz-
Neumann and their friends and seemed to think that the group
would be far better off if it did not unite with the Leninbund
minority. I have a world of respect for comrade Landau's
102 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
abilities, but I am afraid that he is another instance of insuffi-
cient ability to orientate himself correctly in internal affairs
where his own organization is involved.
4. I am happy to accept the proposal for membership on the
International Bureau. At its last meeting, our National Commit-
tee endorsed my nomination and I presume that I can now begin
to serve formally— by mail. Up to now I have received no commu-
nications from the bureau or secretariat, excepting what was so
kindly furnished to me by comrade Jan Frankel and you. As soon
as I can establish connections with comrade Mill I shall endeavor
to function on the bureau as actively as the separation of the
Atlantic Ocean will permit.
^ ^ ^
Landau Has Proven to Be a
Very Unreliable Fellow
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman250
6 January 1931
Trotsky refers here to Jan FrankeVs document "Comrade Landau's Role
in the Austrian and German Questions: A Brief Account on the Basis
of Documents" of the same date.251 Written to provide the leading bodies
of the Opposition with a factual account of the rather strange and dan-
gerous politics that comrade Landau has manifested in the Austrian and
German questions, " FrankeVs treatise sought to illustrate how Landau
"uses the international Opposition merely as a decorative shell for his
own cliquist politics. " Sending the document to Shachtman, Frankel wrote,
"We see here that there are comrades who know how to use Marxist phrase-
ology very skillfully, but whose communism is only superficial."252
According to Frankel, Landau admitted (in response to international
criticism) that the program of his former compatriots in the Mahnruf
Group was "a miserable and opportunist piece of hack work." Nonethe-
less, he continued to insist that this was "not decisive for an evaluation
of this group. " Backing Mahnruf 's claims to represent the ILO over those
of the rival Frey group, Landau supported Mahnruf s unsubstantiated
charge that Frey harbored a police spy. Frankel wrote:
Landau a Very Unreliable Fellow 103
For every observant person, it is clear that the Oppositional groups in
Austria have abused, disparaged, ridiculed the ideas of the Interna-
tional Lefts in the most shameful manner. Cleansing the ground in
Austria and creating a new, authentically revolutionary group will be
most difficult. It must be said openly that Germany runs the danger of
developing in the same direction if the international Opposition looks
on passively.
The German section's journal Der Kommunist dealt hardly at all
with international questions. Landau had shown such a frivolous atti-
tude toward program that he had not released any of the resolutions writ-
ten for the October 1930 German conference, held shortly after Reichstag
elections in which the Nazi vote had sharply increased. Frankel wrote
that the conference almost exclusively "dealt with organizational-personal
squabbles. What is the political content of these squabbles? What ideas
are involved? What permitted the Landau group, which based itself on
the authority of the international Opposition and thus played the deci-
sive role in preparing the conference, to point the conference in such a
direction at a moment of greatest revolutionary significance?" Landau
had trampled on the proletarian principle of proportional representa-
tion, turning the conference into "a body for counting up mandates in
the manner of the English trade unions. " Citing Landau 's war against
the Leipzig leadership and the expulsions of Neumann, Joko, Grylewicz,
and others, as "the crassest excrescences of a bureaucratic regime, "Frankel
advocated that the international Opposition oversee a democratic inter-
nal discussion in the section, including the expelled comrades, culminat-
ing in the convocation of a politically prepared German conference.
Trotsky proposed similar measures in "The Crisis in the German
Left Opposition. " Landau broke with the ILO rather than carry out this
perspective.
I acknowledge receipt of your new publication, "The Strat-
egy of the World Revolution," which proves that you aspire to
become the biggest deluxe publisher in the United States.253
None of the sections can measure up to you in the splendor of
the publications. I have not yet checked the translation enough
to be able to state my opinion. In any case the first impression
is good.
Comrade Frankel is sending you a copy of his confidential
letter on comrade Landau's politics. What you say, dear friend,
about the leaders, their education, etc. is generally correct.
I too am not hostile to these ideas. That I am inclined to
104 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
attentively and amiably judge the young comrades capable of
development has been demonstrated, it seems to me, by my use
of a great deal of paper and ink in corresponding with these
comrades. Really, one might be able to use this time to say some-
thing important to the workers at this juncture, but precisely
because I consider it of the utmost importance to train indi-
vidual comrades for responsible work in the workers movement,
I am always ready in personal letters to solve, dispose of, or
contribute to the solution of complicated and contested ques-
tions. However, I cannot place this consideration above the in-
terests of the cause as a whole. Landau has proven to be a very
unreliable fellow, and I hope that comrade Frankel's letter,
based on documents and facts, will adequately prove that to
you. It is no accident that Landau and Naville have formed an
alliance and that this alliance is in reality directed against the
ideas and methods of the Left Opposition. The similarity be-
tween Landau and Naville consists in the fact that they can go
just as easily one way as another. Their own role is always more
important to them than the cause itself. Political ambition is
entirely justified, but on the one small condition that ambition
is subordinated to the great idea. That is the case neither with
Landau nor Naville. It is not precluded that this quality of theirs
has driven them to the Opposition, and by no means do I want
to claim that these two comrades are incapable of becoming
what they are not now: revolutionaries. But first they must feel
in their own bones, I mean their mental bones, that there are
ideas with which one does not trifle.
I enclose my theses concerning the mistakes of the Naville-
Gourget right wing on the trade-union question.254 Of course
Naville will claim, and is already doing so, that he does not agree
at all with the politics of the Opposition Unitaire. But that is
the most reprehensible thing about him— he only embraces revo-
lutionary criticism in order to continue to pursue an opportu-
nistic policy. That is how Bukharin plagiarized our critique of
Purcell's policy; he adorned his resolutions with this critique
and with these adorned resolutions he supported Tomsky's
policy.235 In a word, this time I am making no compromises,
and if the Naville-Landau brotherhood persists in its course, it
means a complete break with them. This too will be a salutary
educational experience for them, because if they are worth any-
Landau a Very Unreliable Fellow 105
thing, the experience of muddling along alone for a few years
will cause them to find their way back to genuine revolution-
ary politics. It is also precisely from the standpoint of the future
of these comrades that one must proceed unsparingly.
You no doubt know that Nin has been arrested. Yesterday I
received a very encouraging letter from his wife. He is in prison
with eight other Communists who do not belong to the Oppo-
sition. However, together with Nin they have agreed to a plan
to immediately raise the slogan of forming Spanish workers
councils. Nin is hopeful that this means the founding of the
real communist party. The revolutionary atmosphere is the
atmosphere of a political hothouse. A small group today can
become a major political factor in just a few months. That is
what we experienced in Russia. I was very worried that the Span-
ish comrades would be too cautious with regard to the slogan
of Soviets. In general the Left Opposition is often more radi-
cal in its criticism than in action. Fortunately my worries have
not been borne out this time, and Nin has been able to weld
together very good workers on a program of revolutionary
action. One can look with hope to the future.
On the Eastman question: As early as 1928 I explained my
"repudiation" of Eastman in a circular that was widely distrib-
uted in the Russian Opposition and sent abroad.256 I was cer-
tain that the document was long known to the American com-
rades and had been published somewhere. Only now from your
letter do I learn that this is not the case. Fortunately I have a
copy. I am sending one to comrade Eastman and am enclosing
another with this letter.
In a footnote to my French theses I have briefly stated my
position on the wild idea of a bloc with Lovestone.257
Enough for now, for I have much to do.
^ ^ >
106
The Fight Against Landau and Naville
Is Too Sharp
Letter by Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky258
4 March 1931
These are excerpts from a letter in which Shachtman detailed the CLA's
Expansion Program and publishing plans.
1. I am a little worried about the events in Germany. It seems
to me that the situation is being sharpened too much. I am, to
be sure, not in agreement with the policy that Landau is pur-
suing—in the organizational sense, at least. The results of the
national conference made an especially bad impression— rather
the lack of results. As to the political differences, I naturally
do not know to what extent they are developed, nor have there
yet been presented any political documents of the contending
sides, and not having any theses, no judgment can be expressed.
I am quite certain that political differences exist, since I have
never yet seen an "organizational struggle" inside the movement
which did not have at bottom some political dispute— unless it
is a question of bandits who are fighting. But what does arouse
some disquietude is the organizational acuteness that the
struggle has already assumed in consideration of the fact that
no clear political differences on fundamental, principled ques-
tions have yet been demonstrated, at least not to my knowledge.
The proposal by Well to expel Landau from the Opposition I
consider an unnecessary accentuation of the dispute. Naturally
this does not for one moment justify the steps that Landau has
taken and the fact that he has, in a sense, provoked the Leipzig
comrades. I intend to write in the same sense to the Interna-
tional Secretariat and propose that the two contending forces
in Germany present their respective political theses for the dis-
cussion of the international Opposition so that we may be in a
position to judge objectively.
2. The situation in France seems to have reached a state of calm.
Too Sharp Against Landau and Naville 107
Naville has written me a few words on the situation which went
into no details on matters, but informed me that he was no
longer a member of the executive committee. More than that,
he writes me, the new executive of the Ligue contains only rep-
resentatives of "one tendency." I do not know whether this is a
result of the decision of the executive (the present majority) or
the withdrawal, the abstentionism, of Naville's group. Either
way, I believe, there is no reason for such a situation, nor should
it be concurred in. The removal of every single representative
of the Naville group from the executive would be a mistake;
the withdrawal from the executive by the Naville group would
be equally wrong. Naturally, here too, I am expressing a per-
sonal opinion, since our own executive committee has not yet
taken a formal position on the matter. However, until additional
or more detailed information on the reasons for the condition
of the French executive are at hand, information which would
explain its constitution on so unilateral a basis, I believe that if
a basis of political collaboration exists, the necessary steps
should be taken. [...]
6. A personal question. So as to avoid any misunderstandings,
do you consider that the letters you send to me are to be com-
municated to the National Committee formally and officially?
I gained the impression from some of the letters from you (for
example, the one in which you refer to your personal views on
the question of Rosmer and other French comrades) that they
were meant to be confidential and personal. Perhaps I am wrong
in this impression. Will you be good enough to make it clear?
4- 4> +
108
What Is Your Position on the
German Crisis?
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman259
4 April 1931
In early 1931 the fight between Landau in Berlin and a group of com-
rades around R. Well in the Saxon city of Leipzig reached a crisis point,
with each group threatening to expel the other. Trotsky here requests the
CLA's position on organizational measures proposed in his "The Crisis
in the German Left Opposition. " 260
I have left your letter of March 4 unanswered for so long
not because I have no time— I always find time to answer let-
ters—but because my friend Frankel has had absolutely no time
in the last weeks, because the entire work of moving rested on
his shoulders, which here in Turkey is no mean feat.261 In any
case the leadership of the French Ligue sent comrade Henri
Molinier to help, who really performed a great service by spend-
ing two weeks here.
Unfortunately I cannot tell from your letter whether you
and your leadership have taken an unambiguous position on
the purely practical, organizational side of the German crisis.
The proposals pertaining to this are included at the end of my
circular letter and were approved by the International Secre-
tariat, and the members of the bureau have been invited to
express their opinion about them. My proposals in particular
aim at avoiding a split. The comrades in Saxony have withdrawn
their demand that Landau be expelled and have accepted the
proposal for an honestly prepared and honestly convened con-
ference with the participation of international comrades. Now
Landau does not accept this because he, as other comrades
seem sure, would remain in the minority, and that he cannot
do. So, what now? That is the question. And here it is impor-
tant to take a position and not be evasive. If Landau had felt
pressure from different directions a few months ago that the
On Landau, Prometeo, and Weisbord 1 09
international Opposition would not tolerate his subversion, he
might have come over and we might have saved him for work
in the future. Unfortunately the other sections have taken quite
a wait-and-see, conciliatory-passive stance. Not only did Naville
support Landau, he also nourished his false hopes and illusions.
Thus Landau ended up in a blind alley, and I doubt very much
that there is a way out for him.
I will send you the necessary Chinese materials as soon as
we have gotten a bit settled in the new flat.262
I will have to devote the next five months entirely to the
second volume (October Revolution) and thus will have little
time in the short term for the international Opposition.263
You write about Scribner. This gentleman, as you call him,
really buried my autobiography: a delay of half a year, a prohibi-
tive price, and, as I discern from his catalogs and magazines, he is
embarrassed to provide the necessary American publicity for the
book. I have bad luck with American publishers. No comparison
to the German publisher Fischer.
4> * +
On Landau, Prometeo, and Weisbord
Letter by Max Shachtman to the
International Secretariat264
[Early May 1931]
On April 10 the International Secretariat wrote to the CLA requesting
Shachtman 's urgent intervention, as a member of the International
Bureau, on the dispute with Landau. In this undated answer Shachtman
reports on the decisions of the CLA resident committee at its April 27
meeting.
On the German Situation
At the last meeting of our National Committee, we consid-
ered the situation in the German Opposition, on the basis of
all the documents we had on hand (letter-circular of L.D. Trotsky,
letters from Landau, statements of Reichsleitung [national
110 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
executive], etc.). After a lengthy discussion, the committee unani-
mously adopted the following proposal submitted by me:
We endorse the practical proposals of comrade Trotsky contained
in his letter entitled "The Crisis in the German Left Opposition"
as a basis to approach a solution of this crisis. Further, that we
reserve a formulation of our opinion on the political and prin-
cipled issues involved in the controversy until such time as we
have had further opportunity for study. That we further protest
against the organizational measures taken by the Berlin execu-
tive committee (Reichsleitung) which are calculated not to bring
closer the solution on the basis of political discussion, but artifi-
cially to anticipate the decision through what is at best prema-
ture organizational measures.
Since comrade Landau has written to me in my capacity as
a member of the International Bureau, I am recording my entire
agreement with the above declaration, which is identical in
essence with the statement of comrade Nin. It must be added
that it is as yet difficult to estimate the political character of
the dispute between the Reichsleitung and the Saxon comrades
since we have not at hand any theses from both sides. But the
organizational measures and the attitude thus far taken by com-
rade Landau are unmistakably prejudicial to the interests of the
German and International Left. It is clear that not only in the
Austrian affair but also in Germany, comrade Landau has failed
to measure up to his position as a member of the International
Bureau. In the Austrian question at least, he acted more as a
member or former member of one specific group than as a
responsible member of the bureau. This is all the more regret-
table in consideration of comrade Landau's unquestioned ability
to serve the movement. Moreover, the disloyalty and distorted
use comrade Landau makes of Lenin's Testament in his effort
to discredit comrade Trotsky's intervention in the German dis-
pute in itself deserves a severe repudiation by the German
Opposition. It is on a level with Frey's "interpretation" of Stalin's
"cleverness in factional work" as the cause for the victory of the
reaction in the Soviet Communist Party.
On the Proposal of the Italian Left
Here also our NC discussed the resolution of the Prometeo
Group, and adopted the following proposal made by me
which will be communicated to you by our secretary, comrade
Swabeck:
On Landau, Prometeo, and Weisbord 111
We reject the proposal of the Italian Left (Prometeo) Group and
its conception that the International Secretariat should be a mere
"liaison" center between the national sections, and we propose
in its place that up until the time when the coming European
conference will elect an even more authoritative executive body,
we fully recognize the authority of the International Secretariat
politically and organizationally.
Considering the disruption of the bureau in the past
months (withdrawal of Rosmer, imprisonment of Nin, distance
from America, "imprisonment" of the Russian member), the
secretariat not only had to assume political functions up to a
certain point, but it was in the interests of the Opposition that
this be done. Without an authoritative international body, there
would have been no adequate means of intervening to solve the
crises that broke out in various countries and threatened to dis-
credit or weaken the Left Opposition (Austria, Belgium, France,
and now Germany). It is not without symptomatic significance
that the attack upon the secretariat comes from those comrades
and groups who have adopted in the past or today a false posi-
tion, and against whom the secretariat generally adopted a
correct position.
Weisbord Group
The group of Weisbord has finally been constituted as an
"organization" and one issue of its paper issued. It is necessary
that the clearest line of demarcation be drawn between the
Opposition and this group of opportunist confusionism. The
fact that Weisbord has arbitrarily arrogated to himself the title
"adhering to the International Left Opposition" has already had
a confusing effect in certain circles. This confusion must be
eliminated by a sharp declaration of position by the secretariat.
From his theses, which you have already received, and from
other parts of his paper, it will be observed that it is not only
filled with outrageous slanders and falsifications addressed to
the Communist League of America, but that he has not, despite
our criticism, changed his political course. The proposal for a
bloc with Lovestone "for mass work and against (?!) Menshe-
vism," forms the central tactical slogan for his movement. To
prevent him from any longer compromising the name of our
movement— and his idiocies are exploited against us by the
Stalinist apparatus— the International Secretariat must establish
112 CLA 1931—33:Shachtman in the International
its position immediately and unambiguously. From your last let-
ter, it appears that such a statement will be made public.
I shall try to write in more detail on other questions in the
next few days.
^ <► ^
I Sought to Avoid a Premature Split
in the German Section
Letter bv Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky
2 May 1931
This is an excerpt from a letter in which Shachtman also discusses the
CLA s projected book, Problems of the Chinese Revolution, and other
publishing matters.
1. I am enclosing a letter I have just sent to the International
Secretariat which will adequately present not only the position
of our National Committee on the crisis in the German Oppo-
sition, but also my own. I observe from your letter, as well as
from a note which I have just received from comrade Frankel.
that you were in doubt as to my attitude on this question, but I
do not believe that there was any foundation for uncertainty.
The only phase of the question that concerned me was to pre-
vent a premature split in the German Opposition before the
political position of both sides had been established, so that if a
split was unavoidable it would at least take place on a principled
basis and not merely on artificially hastened organizational mea-
sures. It appeared to me that both Landau and Well were push-
ing the organizational questions to the fore and not the politi-
cal questions (naturally, this applies far more to Landau than
to Well). The fact that Well withdrew the demand of the Saxon
comrades for Landau's immediate expulsion was unmistakablv
a step in the right direction. Landau's obstinacv. however, does
not speak well for him. With the practical proposals made bv
vou pour regler la lutte [to moderate the struggle]. I am and
have been in thorough agreement. I repeat, the only question
/ Sought to Avoid Split 113
on which doubt existed and for that matter still exists, is in the
political dispute (we have only Landau's opinion on the tempo
of the development of fascism, just as we have only Well's opin-
ion on the trade-union problem— neither of the two groups have
adopted detailed theses on both of these questions, or on other
tactical and strategical problems). That Landau is driving clearly
toward a split is quite evident, and every measure should be
taken, in my opinion, to prevent such a split— at least until a clear
political line of demarcation shall have been established. In such
a case, the ranks of the German Opposition (and outside of
Germany too) will have the possibility of aligning themselves
on fundamental lines of policy and not upon "conjunctural" and
"nebensachliche" [subsidiary] organizational disputes. The latter,
it is true, always reflect political undercurrents. The whole prob-
lem is in bringing these undercurrents to the surface. It has been
one of the worst features of the internal struggles of the
Comintern in the past that the organizational measures have
been pushed to the foreground unexpectedly in order to con-
ceal the political differences and make it impossible for the
Communist workers to judge the political merits of the disput-
ing groups until they were confronted with an organizational
fait accompli. You have frequently referred to this system in ref-
erence to the appearance of the Leningrad Opposition in 1925.
It seems to me that Landau has been trying to repeat this system
in the German Opposition: First crush the Well group organi-
zationally and then "justify" it politically. It was only to avoid a
repetition of such a state of affairs that I wrote you previously
in the sense of establishing the principled nature of the dis-
pute and not submerging it in organizational conflicts which
are either secondary or else should come after an ideological
clarification. Having this view I could naturally do nothing but
express my complete accord with the measures you proposed
at the end of your analysis.
^ A ^
114
You Bear Some Responsibility
for Landau's Course
Letter bv Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman266
23 May 1931
Trotsky wrote this letter shortly after Landau refused to comply with the
organizational proposals of the International Secretariat, signaling his
intention to split from the ILO.
1. As you suppose, I am really swamped with work and can hardly
imagine how I could write the foreword to the China book that
you request. It would have to be worked out very carefully. I do
not haYe a clear idea which manuscripts on China I should send
you. The larger work, "The Chinese Question After the Sixth
Congress," was sent to you in January. Did you intentionally dis-
regard the longer article from the Russian bulletin no. 15/16,
"Stalin and the Chinese Revolution"? The article is perhaps some-
what dry consisting primarily of quotations, but it represents a
rather comprehensive work and can serve to a certain extent as
the foreword you want, since it places the different stages in
context and, in addition, brings to light new. important docu-
ments. I would recommend that you include this article as the
first or the last. That, at any rate, would make the task of the
foreword much easier for me. Also. I do not see on your list my
most recent article, "The Strangled Revolution," on Malraux's
novel, printed in La Verite. In my opinion this article would fit
rather well into the framework of the book.
2. Along with comrade Frankel. we are very pleased that you
have partially come out of Your shell regarding Landau. Your
explanations— allow me to say— do not seem very convincing. You
write that you wanted to avoid a premature split. Do you think
then that I wanted to bring about or accelerate this split? And
if not, what practical steps have you proposed to achieve this
aim? For my part. I have done everything that seemed to me
possible and expedient. Moreover, it seemed to me that if the
You Bear Some Responsibility 115
leading comrades of the national sections had energetically put
pressure on Landau in time, it would perhaps— I say perhaps—
have been possible to save him. Unfortunately that is no longer
the case, and you bear a small part of the responsibility for that.
After Landau, to be sure, the lion's share is borne by Naville,
who filled Landau with false hopes, sent him equivocal infor-
mation, etc. And now Landau wants nothing more to do with
the International Secretariat and is assiduously in the process
of forming his own international with the Prometeo people,
with Gourget, with Overstraeten and, as I have been told,
with... Weisbord for America. What is more, while doing every-
thing to put off unification in Austria and to break it in Ger-
many, he accuses me of having split all the national sections,
particularly in America. So, my dear Shachtman, I bear the re-
sponsibility for your not being on good terms with Weisbord.
Naville, I fear, will be forced to embark on the same path. He
has been deserted by his closest friends, and not by accident.
Those whom he influences are hostile to us and they really mean
it. Naville, however, plays with ideas and is never serious
or honest. He is staying in the Ligue in order to sabotage it
from within and to help Landau set up the new international. I
have laid out the principles involved here in a letter my son will
send you.
It goes without saying that decisions must be reached on
the basis of the principled lines of the various tendencies, and
I understand very well your organization's caution in this area.
But this criterion may not be understood so formalistically and
pedantically. The Bordigists are one tendency and they must
be judged according to their basic principles. Gourget is a ten-
dency; Overstraeten is also a tendency— an unfortunate one, of
course. But what can one say about Mahnruf, which changes
its "tendency" seven times in the interest of cliquist self-
preservation and in so doing does not shrink from the foulest
means? Judgment must be based on the fact that it is entirely
an unprincipled clique, demoralized by the methods, splits, and
intrigues of the Comintern, never taking ideas seriously at all,
to be judged not by its theses but by what it does. It is not
Landau's theses of tomorrow that are decisive but the fact that
he approves of everything for China, also for America and all
the other countries, as long as it does not touch his position of
116 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
power. It is not these possible theses on the trade-union
question that are typical of Landau, but the fact that he main-
tained utter silence about the discussion of the trade-union
question in France because Naville is his friend. The programs,
the theses, the principles are of the utmost importance if they
represent a reality. But when they represent only window-
dressing and camouflage for clique warfare, one kicks them
aside in order to unmask the gentlemen in question and reveal
them in natura.
3. Of course I am pleased that you have gotten a little money
from the prepublication rights. As to the rights for the Ger-
man Volkszeitung, I had to send Fischer an airmail letter, and
not a telegram, to explain the matter to him more clearly.267 I
asked that he wire his decision to America. Unfortunately I am
not sure that he will comply, and in the case of a negative
response I would gladly reimburse the Militant.
But at present we are dealing with the prospect of stepping
in with a larger sum of money. I fear that Boni will also try to
deduct 5 percent from the Saturday Evening Post royalties.268 And
since first of all, the publishers have robbed and deceived me
enough, and secondly, because I urgently need the money, par-
ticularly to create a German theoretical journal, I am determined
not to pay the 5 percent under any circumstances, even at the
risk of completely breaking the contract. I have written Eastman
about this in more detail. I would like the 5 percent to go to the
Militant, from the book as well as from the prepublication
reprints. It would represent a significant amount. Now you must
influence our dear Eastman to deal more aggressively with Boni
and not to surrender our common interests as he has surren-
dered his own.
4. I have no idea what comments the bourgeois press has been
making and would like to see anything of interest that has
appeared.
5. I do not have to tell you how pleased I am at the prospect of
transforming the Militant into a weekly paper. The next step
will have to be a monthly theoretical journal. I am very inclined
to earmark my contribution to the Militant for this specific
purpose.
117
Naville Plays With Ideas
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman269
2 August 1931
Trotsky here takes issue with Shachtman's concern at the lack of response
to Naville's criticisms of the French Ligue's actions during a miners strike
in spring 1931. Under Molinier's leadership, La Verite published an
article that declared the strike unwinnable and advocated that miners
return to work. Many Ligue members protested; a small group around
Pierre Naville's brother, Claude, split and began publishing the Bulle-
tin de la Gauche communiste with Rosmer's collaboration.
The last two pamphlets gratefully received. I have no
objections to changing the title of the Spanish pamphlet.270 On
the contrary, it is much better than the original one. I am very
pleased that the pamphlets are selling so well.
Just briefly on Naville. You mention that his critical article
on the strike has not been answered. I must confess that I have
not read it. For a long time Naville ducked to avoid taking a
position on the most important questions, since he was always
and everywhere connected with the group that was on the
wrong track. He would always lie in wait and come out with a
critical article in order to exaggerate the real tactical mistakes
of the other side and thus camouflage himself. One ought not
exaggerate the quest for the principled line in every single case.
There are elements and grouplets who do not have one and
have no need for one. But they would like to ramble around
the revolution, fence with ideas, and play a role. That also has
a social basis: Capitalist society produces quite a lot of nuances
in the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia with purely formal charac-
teristics, lacking deeper social roots and a developed sense of
responsibility. Unfortunately we are forced to observe over and
over again that some have been impelled toward us not because
we are a Marxist opposition but because we are an opposition
per se and because they are incapable or not inclined to subor-
dinate their hollow abilities to the discipline of a serious cause.
118 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
For example, it is impossible to judge the Landau clique, the
Mahnruf, by its platform, because this clique shimmers with
platforms of the most variegated hues; it is not possible to com-
bat it on the basis of particular ideas but only on the basis of
its dearth of ideas. This also seems to be the case with Naville.
Together with his inner circle he treks nomadically from Com-
munism to Revolution surrealiste, from Revolution surrealiste to
the Opposition, he oscillates between the right and the left,
joins us without joining us fundamentally, remains in the Ligue
but with ties to Landau and Gourget, etc. He wins no one over;
on the contrary, he loses even his closer friends along the way.
Now Gourget is rebelling against him and wants to come back.271
You ask me about Rosmer's political position. He hardly
takes one. But he is tied to Naville and Landau and has be-
come enmeshed in a very nasty situation. He wrote an extremely
unpleasant letter to the Belgian Opposition in which he com-
plained of Zinovievist methods, etc. When the Belgian comrades
inquired, I had to answer directly, thus breaking my silence.
That of course exacerbates the situation, but, really, I cannot
do anything about it.
I am now giving the Militant only a very cursory reading,
for I am completely absorbed by my book. But in the last three
weeks I have been pleased to get my hands on a new issue each
week. The weekly Militant cuts a pretty good figure.
As soon as the second volume of the History is finished I
will tackle the problems of the international situation, and
I hope to be able to send you a piece on the United States.
119
Get the Secretariat's Cart Out of the Mud
Letter by Jan Frankel to Max Shachtman272
14 November 1931
Trotsky 's secretary wrote to Shachtman on the eve of his departure for
Europe. In Kadikoy at the time, Albert Glotzer was to meet Shachtman
in England to help evaluate supporters of the Left Opposition.
Thank you for your letter. Of course we await your reports
with much anticipation, both on your impressions of Paris and
on the results of your stay in London. Of course I will be glad
to compile and send the materials you want, but I cannot do
this without the help of our Russian stenographer and she is
sick at present. In any case I will do it as best as I can.
We believe it is absolutely necessary that during your stay
in Paris you get the secretariat's cart out of the mud, where it is
stuck fast. The situation of the secretariat in Paris is compro-
mised to the utmost degree. Instead of being an executive or-
gan of the national sections, it has become the victim of respec-
tive comrades' inclinations and impressions, degraded into a tool
of personal and circle fights, and thus has become counterposed
to the most important sections. Now it is rotating around its
own axis and not budging an inch. The practical work is done
very badly, and what does happen, as one comrade quite rightly
writes, has to be done almost exclusively malgre et contre le
secretariat [despite and against the secretariat].
Up to now the expansion of the secretariat has shown no
great practical results. The past weighs like lead on it, and the
main sickness is that the Parisian secretariat and above all com-
rade Mill— who is a very honest comrade sincerely dedicated to
the cause, that is beyond doubt at least for all comrades who
criticize him— do not grasp their role. The secretariat is above all
a working organ. Nevertheless, up to now it has not been able to
create its own, even very modest, working apparatus. Everything
depends on the Ligue (see minutes). C'est la ligne de la moindre
resistance et le resultat en est, que l'Opposition internationale
120 CLA 1931-33: Shachtrnan in the International
reste une somme de sections et de groupes isoles, au lieu d'avoir ete
entre dans la voie d'une organisation serree, plus ou moins
homogene et consolidee. [This is the path of least resistance,
with the result that the international Opposition remains a sum
of sections and isolated groups instead of having embarked upon
the path of a tight organization more or less homogeneous and
consolidated.] The political pretensions of the secretariat in no
way correspond to the results of its practical work and the au-
thority it has thereby acquired (i.e., lack of authority): They
correspond just as little to the composition of its personnel (the
political youth of most of its members) and, most importantly,
to the nature of its tasks. After having gotten itself into a very
bad situation, it proclaimed a "crisis of confidence" and, in keep-
ing with parliamentary custom, demanded precisely from those
sections against which it had fought for months an overnight
"vote of confidence," despite protests and the obvious abuse by
Mill and Souzo. While it accuses the national sections of a lack
of practical support and LD of a lack of political support, on
important questions facing the Opposition it proceeds completely
unilaterally, without obtaining the opinion of the sections.
In a word: If there is any hope at all of breathing some-
thing like life into the Parisian secretariat, it is only under the
condition that it replace the anticipated authority of individual
members with work (business tempo! not the old European
trot!), and that it not look to its own moods but rather to the
political opinion of the majority of the sections. Otherwise, it
is completely ridiculous, for example, to complain about LD's
"boycott" when, on the one hand, it systematically sabotages
and brushes aside his advice and protests, and, on the other,
simply places before him faits accomplis (and for the most part
they are fautes accomplies). That was the case in the correspon-
dence between LD and Mill, which was anything but sparse.
Thus it is quite understandable that LD must use other routes
in order to let the national sections know what he has to say.
Friend Glotzer made the best impression here both person-
ally as well as politically and won the undivided sympathy of
all members of the colony. The best evidence of this is that we
are holding him prisoner here, even if that is partially forced
by outside circumstances.
121
Molinier Is Far From Correct
Letter by Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky273
1 December 1931
Written from Paris, this letter of complaint about Raymond Molinier
and the lack of authority of the I.S. was published in CLA Internal
Bulletin no. 2 (July 1932) after it became a subject of dispute in
the CLA.
Molinier was the French section leader who supported Trotsky on
the trade-union question. Rather than fight Molinier on this question,
his opponents continually raised rumors of his shady business dealings.
Shachtman was well aware of this fact: In August Frankel wrote him
about Rosmer s "slanderous baiting" of Molinier, reporting that Rosmer
had traveled to Spain in an attempt to poison the Spanish Opposition.21*
Trotsky advocated the establishment of a control commission to investi-
gate the rumors, but the Ligue' s October 1931 national conference failed
to act because no one would file charges. Albert Treint, a Zinoviev sup-
porter, joined the Ligue at the conference and was elected to its execu-
tive. Molinier immediately formed an alliance with him, and as a result,
Molinier' s former supporters in the Paris Jewish Group broke with him.
Led by Felix and Mill, the I.S. secretary, they wrote to Rosmer suggesting
collaboration. In a December 22 circular letter to the national sections,
Trotsky noted:
The Jewish Group ought to become the Ligue's voice for propaganda
among the Jewish workers. But this one of its functions is scarcely filled
by the group, in which there undoubtedly are workers devoted to the
cause. On the contrary, it became a support for tioo or three comrades
who seek to give some kind of direction to the Ligue and the whole
international Opposition. Up to now, nobody knows anything about
this "direction, " for, apart from confusion, the authors of this "direc-
tion " have till now brought nothing into the life of the Opposition. They
were with Paz against us, they made their orientation in the Ligue
dependent on conditions of a subjective character, they supported
Molinier-Frank against Rosmer-Naville, they made a bloc with Naville
and afterward with Rosmer, they created confusion and confused
themselves, they derailed the Jewish Group, and brought nothing
but decomposition.215
122 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
In early January the Jewish Group withdrew its two representatives from
the Ligue's executive committee, cm act that Trotsky strongh condemned
as an attempt to "transform the Ligue into a federation of national
groups."27*
Shachtman's letter refers to the ostensible differences between the
Jewish Group and others in the Ligue on relations between the PCF-led
trade-union federation, the CGTU, and the main reformist trade-union
federation, the CGT. In his January 15 letter to the Jewish Group Trotsky
wrote: "Comrade Felix has misled the Jewish Group by greath exaggerat-
ing the differences, by seeking artificial pretexts for the differences, by
making a caricature of the differences. Because of their sterile and scho-
lastic character, these discussions have not been able to contribute any-
thing to the Ligue in an ideological sense."
I have just returned from a two weeks' sojourn in Spain,
equally divided between Madrid and Barcelona. From the point
of view of the Opposition, I find that its organizational strength
and influence are not only good, but actually increasing, despite
the fact that since the recent lost strikes led bv the anarchists
and the syndicalists, there has set in a certain depression in
the ranks of the workers. Together with comrade Lacroix, I took
a sort of a "census" of the state of the organization, which I
later verified by reading through all the correspondence which
the EC had received for the last three months or so. From the
report which I shall immediately draw up for the International
Secretariat, you will be able to get a more complete picture of
our Spanish section and the possibilities for growth which it
has before it.
The most unfortunate aspect of the situation there at the
present moment is the loss of the weekly periodical, El Soviet. I
made every attempt to convince the comrades of the urgency
of recommencing its publication, but I must confess that while
their willingness is as great as that of anybody else, they were
nevertheless able to draw up a financial statement of income
and expenditures which demonstrated that in order to issue the
weekly paper once more and to have a full-time paid secretary—
which is at least as important— it is necessary that they have
financial aid from abroad to the extent of some 1,300 pesetas
per month for the coming four, five, six months. It is true that
the secretariat, upon the basis of pledges made by comrade
Molinier. has assured them that this sum will be forthcoming
Mo tinier Is Far From Correct 123
for the weekly and for the secretary. But the comrades— both
in Madrid and in Barcelona— have gathered such a bad impres-
sion of the promises of comrade Molinier (even if half of them
were based upon promises made by you) and they have devel-
oped such a sharp antagonism against him, that they insisted
that they would not begin to issue the paper again if the pledges
for financial aid were based upon promises made by Molinier.
In such a case, it is of course very difficult to verify the impres-
sions made upon comrades. The atmosphere in the French
Ligue is so tainted today— and the French situation is now hav-
ing its repercussions in Spain— that it is almost impossible to
take the word of a comrade. No two comrades have the same
report to deliver about any single event or any single action.
The Spanish comrades recounted to me a whole series of ac-
tions taken by Molinier. The latter, in turn, presents the affair
in a totally different light. Since there are practically no "docu-
ments" on the matter, it is all reduced to a question of the word,
or the impression, of one comrade as against those of another.
On such a basis, it is impossible to form a judgment. In any
case, I am convinced that with all due credit and respect for
the good intentions that animated comrade Molinier while he
was at work in Spain, he conducted himself in such a manner
as succeeded in antagonizing all the comrades there. In this
sense, many of the arguments which you present in your recent
letter to comrade Nin (a copy of which was sent me) are not
entirely true.277 I have no doubt that, confronted with the bit-
terness of a retreat, the comrades may have the tendency to
seek somebody upon whom to fix the blame— and they find
Molinier. But their hostility toward him does not appear to me
to be founded upon that alone. I need hardly add that I do not
share the exaggerated emphasis that the Spanish comrades place
upon the "work of Molinier," and I am quite convinced that
whatever comrade Molinier did while in Spain was done with
the intention of giving whatever aid possible to the advance-
ment of our movement there.
Now, however, whatever damage has been done, is done.
The greatest need for the Spanish Opposition remains the
weekly paper and a secretary who can give all his time to the
mountain of work that is to be accomplished there. In this
direction, all the comrades must exert their efforts. I am sure
124 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
that if the Spanish comrades can be made to feel that the deficit
a weekly would involve will be covered— so that another retreat
in the immediate future is avoided— they will proceed with the
work speedily and successfully. The organization in Spain, with
all its weaknesses, is in relatively excellent condition. At the
head of it stands a group of really capable revolutionists. On
all the important political questions there is a gratifying soli-
darity among them; the differences on various questions which
existed between the executive committee and comrade Nin are
now eliminated to all intents and purposes. If this solidity of
the leading cadre can be preserved, the prospects for progress
are almost limitless. But I do not want to continue here upon a
subject which I will deal with more extensively in my report.
Now, a few words, the results of previous information which
I gained from afar— reading the documents in New York— and
the preliminary observations of the situation which I have made
on the spot, concerning questions other than the Spanish.
The International Secretariat: Comrade Frankel has written to me:
"Wir glauben, es ist unbedingt notig, daB Du bei Deinem Pariser
Aufenthalt den festgefahrenen Karren des Sekretariats wieder
flott machst" [We believe it is absolutely necessary that during
your stay in Paris you get the secretariat's cart out of the mud,
where it is stuck fast]. Unfortunately, this is now no longer
possible. Rather, it would be better— I say this after serious
reflection— to sink this "festgefahrenen Karren" [cart stuck in
the mud] formally, because it now has and can have little else
but a fictitious existence. Why should the present secretariat
be liquidated?
1. Because it no longer has any authority in the ranks of the
International Left Opposition. Regardless of any irony about
the parliamentarism of its "Vertrauensvotum" [vote of confi-
dence] request, the fact remains that for a series of reasons,
the principal European sections have withdrawn their
"Vertrauen" from the present secretariat, and its views and
deeds have no authority with them. I do not now argue about
the why, I merely present the fact. The Russian section has prac-
tically broken off its connections with the I.S. The German
section's Reichsleitung [national executive] has done practically
the same. The French EC conducts a campaign against the
Molinier Is Far From Correct 125
secretariat and dominates it in general. Through knowledge of
this situation, the Spanish section is now in a conflict with the
secretariat and evidently does not take much stock in its deci-
sions, feeling that it has little if any authority in these matters.
Under such conditions— regardless (for the moment) of what
brought them about— the secretariat is largely a fictitious
institution.
2. For its material existence, the secretariat depends almost
entirely upon the French Ligue, or, to put it less vaguely, upon
comrade Molinier. Between the latter and the secretary of the
I.S. (Mill), there is a violent and open struggle. It is all the sec-
tions which should furnish the material support which makes a
minimum of existence possible for an I.S.; unfortunately, the
sections do not fulfill this obligation. What comrade Frankel
correctly describes as the dependence of the I.S. on the Ligue
inevitably drags it and its personnel into the inner struggles of
the Ligue, making it difficult, if not impossible, for the I.S. to
intervene in the French situation in the name of the interna-
tional Opposition. The responsible leadership of the Ligue
speaks of the secretary of the I.S. as a Menshevik, a bureau-
crat, etc. (in general, terms of this sort are lightly hurled about
on all sides in the Ligue), which does not make matters any
better.
3. The proposal to confine the work of the I.S. to that of an
Arbeitsorgan [working body] is entirely correct if it is conceived
in the sense that the I.S. should conduct its current and gen-
eral work much better than up to now. I realize its weaknesses
very keenly, as a secretariat collectively and as individual mem-
bers of the secretariat. But if the proposal is conceived in the
sense of reducing the I.S. to a purely technical body, I am
opposed to it. Better to eliminate it entirely than to rob it of its
centralizing political character which the Bordigists have pro-
posed. Every leadership in the labor movement starts with a
certain amount of "authority" invested arbitrarily, so to speak,
in it in advance. If it fails to measure up to the authority invested
in it, it should be removed.
4. The proposal for a subsecretariat in Berlin, which will have
charge of the USSR, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, Greece, etc., is not a practical one, to my mind.
126 CLA 1931—33: Shachtman in the International
The CI never 'r.?.d good experiences with its § iats"
outside of Moscow, and :he CI possessed Ear greater resources
: . :entralizing its work than we. bi ad liti n I must :-: i
frankly that the Berlin comrades have not demonstrated in | i
in our German se q such a sup ganizing abil-
ity over the ability a:;:; ii is indeed feeble, as everybody must
noil manifested by the Paris comrades. We are aotyets gi
an organization that we :xo; a aivis: :: o: the secretariat into
• arts : r the : untries of Europe.
These are s : me : the reasons which animate me to beli
that the resentsc retariat should be dissolved [ha
this opinion with a :ei tain amount of regret, because I believe
that the secretariat, as if is, could be «ei ist Eul for the
ment. and that it has in the p asl Fs iich use. Despite the
riticisms the just ones and the unjust ; om-
le Mill, I beheve that he has ities which the interna-
tional Oppositi : d could well afford to utilize in his po-
siti q as secretary. Even with my casual knowledge :: the
ments in the situation. I have no doubt that he has :om-
mitte i mistakes. But the', are not worse than some mistakes :om-
mir Ibys mt : the les h are m sf sharply oj
to him, have not had much better results with the rgan-
isms ' bicb the-." guide than he has had with the _ :s:u he
ects I find him a h nest, and I yal comrade, and
the Op] sition -\ be making a mistake if il him out
of th- work he has een loing, iespite its sh rtc >mings and
efc ts Onl rtunately, many steps d taken
which it will be ven iifficult tc retrace. I admit readih that I
do not as yet have any proposal to make : : r the sut stitution of
>eui secretariat That requires further reflection and I
have not yet made up my niind on the matter. But this much
I Ic think: As at present constitute:- and in the present ir-
rumambieD e in the Opp sition, the present I.S is largeb afic-
titious instirution. We sh n I sup] urish :: ns
The Situation in the French Ligue: With a numbei bjecthre
ircumstances strongly in favoi :t :ur ment here, the
Ligue :ontinues I lecline. I cannot t sti ngb express mv
lissatisf; ti n with the situation in the Li sue The ir.terr.
struggle the juarrels, the whole arm sphere fthe internal life
siri r. in France are so poisoned that holeprob-
Molinier Is Far From Correct 127
lem of finding a way out becomes almost hopelessly obscured.
Unless there is a radical change in the situation, I believe that
one can have nothing but a pessimistic outlook for the imme-
diate future.
The personal relations between the various comrades do
not improve by a single iota; on the contrary, they become worse
every day. It is impossible to conduct any objective discussion.
No sooner does a discussion commence than it immediately de-
generates into a disgraceful personal quarrel during which the
most violent epithets, the most irresponsible and light-minded
accusations are hurled about the room. In the United States,
we have had a vast experience in factional struggles, good and
bad, principled and unprincipled, groups and cliques. But never,
for the more than ten years that I can remember, has there been
such an atmosphere in the American Party as there is today in
the French Ligue. I do not even know of a "French" precedent
for such an atmosphere. The closest analogy I can find for it
are the violent factional quarrels and fights in the postrevolu-
tionary Hungarian emigration, in the battles between Kun,
Landler, Pepper, Rudas, etc., etc. If I may borrow a term from
Smeral, the Ligue is being "osterreichisiert" [Austrianized].278 1
do not, moreover, see clearly a sufficiently principled or political
foundation for the internal struggles and for the alignment of
forces, and certainly not for the violence with which the dis-
putes are conducted.
Still further complicating the situation is the fact that the
present leadership of the Ligue (comrades Molinier and Frank)
have lost the bulk of their support in the ranks of the organiza-
tion. In the already greatly reduced ranks of the Paris region,
for example— and Paris is practically the only functioning unit
of the Ligue in all of France— we have the impossible situation
where a great majority of the membership is actively opposed
to the leadership. Even the most correct leadership cannot exist,
at least in the Left Opposition movement, when it has arrayed
against it the clear majority of the membership. And it is plain
to me that the present leadership is far from the most correct.
What must inevitably happen under such circumstances? Either
the leadership gains or regains for itself a majority (so that it
can function smoothly), or else the membership gains or regains
for itself a leadership. I can think of no other alternative.
128 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
I have deliberately refrained from intervening personally
in the Ligue, from speaking at a single one of the meetings, or
even from communicating my point of view wholly to anv of
the comrades. It is impossible to do this under the circum-
stances. I know that anything I say publicly in the Ligue at the
present moment would be the subject for immediate distortion
by one side or the other. It has reached a point here where the
essence of a question is rarely discussed; the thing that serves
as the axis for every dispute appears to be a word here or a
word there, a sentence here or a sentence there, more frequently
than not torn out of its context. Besides, I tell you frankly that
there is no possibility of settling the question— that is the point
it has already reached— without your direct intervention.
What "solution" do the comrades here present? At the last
meeting of the EC, a resolution was presented by comrades
Molinier, Treint, and Marc (supported with reservations by
Frank) that declared that following a discussion which is to be
opened immediately in the Ligue, a split should take place. As
the authors of the resolution explain, it is their intention to
split the Ligue into two parts: themselves and their adherents,
and the "liquidators," i.e., the supporters of the so-called Jewish
Group, which forms the majority of the Paris region. What does
this step signify? In practice, it means the expulsion from the
Ligue of a majority of its active effectives. Even such a radical
step might be taken under discussion if there were a serious
enough political basis for it, i.e., if the Jewish Group were really
composed of well-defined liquidators. But this has yet to be
proved: it has not been proved to my satisfaction, at least. Is it
true that among some of the Jewish comrades there is a ten-
dency to emphasize or even to exaggerate the revolutionary pos-
sibilities of centrism? I think it is true. I think also that the
Jewish comrades have committed more than one blunder (for
instance, their letter to Rosmer). But it is also true that even if
their position on this or that question is wrong, they are the
type of comrades whom a wise leadership should be able to con-
vince. At bottom, they are a splendid type of comrade, revolu-
tionists, devoted for a long time to the cause of the Opposi-
tion, and people who are capable of taking a position and
fighting for it intelligently. It is possible that under artificial
pressure, under incitement, under provocations, they may slowly
Molinier Is Far From Correct 1 29
and even unconsciously be driven to a liquidationist position.
The history of the post-Lenin period in the CI is replete with
such cases, where excellent revolutionists were driven out of
the movement and even into the camp of the enemy by con-
stant provocations. But we in the Marxian wing should be care-
ful that we do nothing that would start such a system in our
own ranks. That is not our system. It is the system of Zinoviev,
of Stalin. In France, it was the system of the Treint-Girault re-
gime.279 Consciously or not (that is not the important question
at the moment), Treint is transferring this system into the Ligue
in the fight against the Jewish Group. It is not by chance that
he is the inspirer of the "splitting declaration," that he and his
old-time supporter, Marc, are the majority of the signatories to
it. That is not astonishing. But why should a comrade like
Molinier become a party to such a step?
If it proves to be necessary, I am not at all against a split.
But, I repeat, it must be conducted upon clearly defined politi-
cal divergences, so that everybody understands the reason and
necessity for the split. Otherwise the present confusion will be
worse confounded. And if we proceed from this point of view,
I do not believe that it can be said that the divergences are
clearly enough defined or deep-going enough to warrant a split
in the sense envisaged by the "declaration" of Molinier-Treint-
Marc. What does it mean? The kernel of the leadership (com-
rade Molinier) is prepared to split with the Jewish Group and
to maintain a unity with comrade Treint? I do not understand
the political logic, the justification for such a step. Are the dif-
ferences with the Jewish Group deeper than the differences
which the whole international Opposition has with Treint? I
certainly do not think so. Are the complaints against the inac-
tivity of some of the Jewish comrades sufficient ground for
labeling them "liquidators" so lightly, a label applied originally
and principally by comrade Treint, whose political Anschauung
[point of view] would really liquidate the Opposition? (Apro-
pos, how does it happen that comrade Treint is elected to the
executive committee the same day that he gives his adhesion to
the Ligue?) Is the present leadership of the Ligue so correct in
its political estimations that it can afford to discard a whole
group of comrades? I am not at all sure that this is so. On some
points, it is even the contrary. For example: On the trade-union
130 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
question now, the comrades of the Jewish Group (resolution of
Felix) are, I find, much more correct with regard to the situa-
tion created by Jouhaux's resolution at Japy than the position
of Treint-Molinier, which envisages a speedy liquidation of the
CGTU and a "rentree en bloc" into the CGT, a position very
much analogous and— in France— less justified than the position
of the Lovestone group in the United States.280
My principal point in all these remarks is this: None of the
groups in the Ligue has such a preponderately superior politi-
cal position on the disputed questions, none of them is so free
from blunders, as to justify a scission or to justify an absolute
monopoly of the leadership by any single group. I appreciate
the capacities and value of comrade Molinier at their real worth,
without exaggerations. But I do not believe he has given a suf-
ficient display of knowing the art of leadership. Only a short
time ago, he had with him the clear majority of the Ligue mem-
bership. Now he has lost it, and lost it among those comrades
who made it possible to institute a new leadership in the Ligue.
That is no credit, I must say, to comrade Molinier's direction
[leadership]. The same may be said about the national confer-
ence of the Ligue, which was very, very bad. The conference
was a victory for the Bordigists, not for the Opposition. The
Bordigists monopolized the whole political part of the confer-
ence. The conference ended with an organizational victory for
the group of comrade Molinier, but the victory was gained at
the same time that the conference failed to adopt a single impor-
tant text: Neither the political theses nor the trade-union theses
were even discussed. In this respect, is there a real difference
between the French national conference and the national con-
ference organized in 1930 by Landau? You once wrote to me
that one must not always look at the progress and the platforms,
but one should "auf die Finger schauen" [look at what people
do]. You wrote this concerning Landau and co., and it proved
to be correct. Does a conference organized in France which
gives the same results as Landau's conference deserve greater
credit?
I have spoken about most of these questions personally with
comrades Molinier and Frank. I did not find agreement with
them on the matter. On the question of Treint, it is true, com-
rade Frank declared himself to be rather of my opinion. As I
Molinier Is Far From Correct 131
said above, I have not intervened in the French situation because
of the terrible atmosphere which makes an objective discussion
impossible at the moment. But I do have certain opinions, not
on all the questions, but on some of the most important ones.
The main problem, as I see it, is to constitute a leadership in
France which not only has a generally correct line, but which
has the confidence of the comrades, that is, which is in a posi-
tion to have its decisions carried out in the work and life of the
Ligue. At present, this is not so. I do not propose to turn the
leadership of the Ligue over into the hands of a "direction
Naville" [Naville leadership], or a "direction groupe juif" [Jew-
ish Group leadership], or a "direction Molinier" [Molinier lead-
ership]. I believe that the only practical solution under the
circumstances is a sort of "concentration." Not an artificial "par-
liamentary coalition," but a working committee in which no
group dominates the EC. From what I can gather of the sen-
timents of the membership (at least in the Paris region), this
represents what they feel is best for the Ligue. Allow me, fur-
ther, to say that this step would have been taken some time ago
by the regular channels of democratic procedure if it were not
for the fact that most of the comrades feel that you, comrade
Trotsky, are intransigently partisan of a "direction Molinier" and
the comrades do not want to engage in an open conflict with
you. These are the facts, and I feel that no leadership in the
Opposition can maintain itself successfully on such a basis.
This letter is already overlong. It is sketchy, an outline, and
could undoubtedly be reformulated or strengthened in many
respects. But the essential points are there. Comrade Molinier
is leaving for Kadikoy, and you will of course discuss the ques-
tion. I am anxious to learn the results; also your views on my
remarks above. I will deal with other matters (England— thanks
for the material you sent) in a letter to follow.
^ ^ 4>
132
Who Then Should Lead the Ligue?
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman281
11 December 1931
This letter was marked "purely personal."
At present it is not possible for me to answer your letter at
length. In any case I must say that once again you do not want
to express yourself clearly, because, as I fear, your political logic
cannot approve of the direction in which you are tending on
the basis of your personal sympathies. If I understand you cor-
rectly, you want me to declare a struggle against the present
French leadership. Who then should lead the Ligue? Please say
so openly. Perhaps Mill with Felix or our friend Naville with
Rosmer? I hope that you will answer this precise question with
an equally precise answer. Rosmer does not exist, and Naville
hardly so. Mill and Felix are negative quantities. They have com-
pletely disoriented the Jewish Group. Do you believe, by the
way, that a well-oriented Jewish Group could lead the French
Ligue? Felix belongs completely to the Landau category. He
needs an organization only to stir up trouble. He will yet go
through dozens of organizations with the same exalted mission.
I have no illusions about Molinier's negative sides and never
made my thoughts a secret, but one must be really blind to help
the negative elements overthrow the present French leadership.
That would be completely tantamount to participating in the
Hitler referendum.
Furthermore, I do not want to hide the fact that I am far from
delighted by your mission in Spain, because despite the one or
the other stupiditv which Molinier committed or could have com-
mitted, it was your duty to bring the dear Spanish comrades to
their senses a little and not be satisfied with polite excuses.
133
You Were Never on Our Side
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman282
25 December 1931
The following letter was evidently a response to a report on Shachtman's
work in England that we have not been able to locate. The first four
paragraphs were published in CLA Internal Bulletin no. 2 (July 1932).
In his December 22 circular letter to the ILO sections Trotsky stated:
The American League took less part in the life of the ILO than was
desirable. The explanation for this is surely the distance. At any rate, it
is desirable that the central committee of the League as a whole atten-
tively follow the internal questions of the ILO, since the excessive con-
centration of these questions in the hands of one comrade have up to
now not yielded the desired results.
This circular also contained Trotsky's proposal to restructure the IS. as
a delegated body with representatives from the most important sections.
It is good that at least a small beginning has been made in
England. Let us hope that you will have more luck than Naville,
who circled round and round the English question for more
than a year without accomplishing anything in the least, as is
also the case, by the way, in all fields.
Unfortunately, you have answered none of my objections
to your conduct in Europe. In the meantime, I had to openly
take a position against you in a circular to the sections, with-
out, in any case, naming you. I must regretfully note that you
have drawn absolutely no conclusions from the bad experience
beginning with the international conference of April 1930.
The difficult situation in the French Ligue is to a certain extent
also thanks to you because, directly or indirectly, you always
supported those elements who acted as a brake or as a disinte-
grating force, such as the Naville group. You now transfer your
support to Mill-Felix, who in no sense have proven themselves.
At one time you published in the Militant (as did La Veritel)
two scandalous reports by Mill from Spain that misled the entire
international Opposition.283 These reports demonstrated that
Mill is incapable of finding his way correctly in the most
134 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
fundamental political questions. After a year of struggle against
Rosmer and Naville he has suddenly begun to cling to them.
In your letter you semiaffectionately call this stupid. For a 15-
year-old boy that would still be acceptable. But for the perma-
nent secretary of the International Secretariat one must seek
sharper and more political characterizations.
Your conduct in Spain was also wrong, as is evident from
your own letter. The Spanish comrades, especially Nin, have
committed every mistake imaginable, wasted much time, and
would now like to find a scapegoat for their own weaknesses
and mistakes. Lacroix, who, as it is maintained, has very good
qualities, is absolutely undisciplined in his thoughts and actions,
and to support him in his outbursts is a crime.
What you say about the German Opposition sounds like an
echo of your old sympathies for Landau, which the German
comrades do not want to forget and rightly so. In the struggle
that we waged here against the accidental, used-up, or down-
right demoralized elements, you, dear Shachtman, were never
on our side, and those concerned (Rosmer, Naville, Landau,
and now Mill) always felt that they were backed in large mea-
sure by the American League. I by no means believe that the
League bears responsibility for this, but I do find it necessary
to send a copy of this letter to the American leadership, so that
at least in the future our European struggle will be less influ-
enced by your personal connections, sympathies, etc.
I somewhat regret the story about the interview for the
Manchester Guardian. The topic is hardly suitable for that paper,
and financially the matter is hardly worth the trouble. Let us
hope that the Liberals do not accept it after all. At any rate,
thank you for your good intentions.
I also cannot approve of the idea of the Stalin book.284 Such
a hodgepodge of different articles actually intended only for a
quite schooled Marxist audience would not be appropriate for
a broader audience, would mislead the publisher as well as the
readers, and would impair the success of the book on the his-
tory of the Revolution. Thus I ask that you completely aban-
don these plans. (That of course does not apply to a possible
Militant edition of a pamphlet on Stalin.)
On the use of the second volume of the History in the
Yiddish press in America: Since I hope that the American
Shachtman's Sympathies 135
League has already received the $1,000, I believe we could turn
over half the royalties to the German and Spanish oppositions.
As a "commission" the American League could keep 10 per-
cent in order to take the thing in hand wholly in the "Ameri-
can" style. If I am not mistaken, the Yiddish press paid $200
for the first volume. I want to draw your attention to the fact
that the second volume is one and a half times longer than the
first, and, in my estimation, is much more accessible and inter-
esting to a broad audience. Correspondingly, the payment
should be significantly higher, at any rate not less than $300,
so that the League would get $30, the Germans and Spanish
$135 each. These amounts could be sent directly to Madrid and
Berlin by bank transfers.285
> 4> 4>
Shachtman's Personal and
Journalistic Sympathies
Letter by Leon Trotsky to the
CLA National Committee286
25 December 1931
In a few days you will receive a circular from me to the national
sections that speaks of our successes and failures. This letter
also deals with an American comrade who gave a scandalous
presentation on Russia in the Paris section. This American is
Miller. It was reported to me as though he had a recommenda-
tion from an American Opposition comrade. I consider this to
be out of the question and would be very pleased if you would
dispel that misunderstanding.287
In my letter I also had to take a position against our friend
Shachtman. The reasons for this will be clear to you from
the enclosed copy of my letter to comrade Shachtman. My
efforts to find a common language with him in the most
disputed European questions were never crowned with success.
It always appeared to me that comrade Shachtman was and is
guided more by personal and journalistic sympathies than by
136 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
fundamental political considerations in these questions, which
are somewhat more remote from America.
I understand very well that from America it is not easv for
you to understand immediately the internal European struggles
in the Opposition and to take a precise position on them. Nor
can anyone demand this of you. HoweYer. you must understand
that it is very unpleasant here when comrade Shachtman at the
acutest moments takes a position that completely counteracts the
struggle which the progressive elements of the Opposition have
been conducting for a long time and upon the basis of which a
certain selection has taken place, and, in doing so, he appears to
have the backing of the American section. Naturally I would not
think of depriving comrade Shachtman of the right to intervene
in European affairs as he likes, according to his standpoint or his
moods. But it must be clear that we are dealing with only one of
the leading American comrades, not. however, with the Ameri-
can League as an organization.
^ 4> 4>
Too Much the Journalist
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman288
31 December 1931
This was a response to a report Shachtman icr<>te from London, where,
at Trotsky's suggestion, he had sought the assistance of Ivor Goldsmid
Montagu, seion of a family prominent in British hanking and Liberal
Party circles. A dabbler in the film business with ties to the Soviet film
establishment. Montagu had accompanied Sergei Eisenstein on trips to
Europe and Hollywood in 1929-30. He had written sympathetically to
Trotsky and performed some small commissions for him. Trotsky warned
Shachtman "to observe a certain discretion " with Montagu.286
Shachtman reported that Montagu laid joined the Communist Party
and was "less and less of an Oppositionist (he never was one, to be sure!). "
Shachtman also wrote that he had on /lis own initiative submitted
Trotsky's article, ''Germany, the Key to the International Situation. " to
the bourgeois liberal Manchester Guardian and that if it was rejected.
Too Much the Journalist 137
he planned to submit it to the Independent Labour Party's New
Leader.290 A powerful indictment of the Kremlin leadership 's paralysis
in the face of Hitler's rising power in Germany, Trotsky's article was
written for the Left Opposition, not the bourgeois press. 291 In a letter
to Montagu written the same day as this letter, Trotsky described
Shachtman 's approach to the Manchester Guardian as a "political faux
pas. One does not submit theses to a liberal newspaper that propagate
the socialist revolution." He was even more scathing about Shachtman 's
approach to the New Leader:
If this or that article of mine appears in the reactionary, imperialist,
capitalist press because the publisher has a special interest in it vis-a-
vis his readership, this poses absolutely no political danger at all,
because no one can or will want to confuse me with these gentlemen.
On the contrary, in such a situation I have an opportunity to exploit
this "special" interest to say what I consider desirable in the given
instance. But the matter takes on another character if an article deal-
ing directly with the question of proletarian revolution appears in the
left social-democratic press. Unfortunately, not many are able to weigh
the standpoints independently. But the fact that the article is published
in the left Menshevik press appears to be a certain fraternization, and
that contradicts the general interests of communism as well as the inter-
ests of the tendency I represent. 292
Trotsky requested that Montagu inform the Manchester Guardian edi-
tors that he "had absolutely nothing to do with the undertaking, was
informed of it ex post facto, and immediately protested. " Asking that a
similar message be communicated to the ILP, Trotsky wrote that he would
understand if Montagu's Communist Party membership prevented him
from doing so.
Your last letter was a very big and unpleasant surprise for
me. You will understand the reasons from the enclosed copy of
my letter to Ivor Montagu. I absolutely cannot understand how
the idea could have gotten into your head to hand over my article
to the English Mensheviks. In addition this seems to me to be
a really fatal example for the new English Opposition. I am
afraid that there must somehow be deep differences between
our views on important political questions, differences that are
manifesting themselves not in general theoretical or political
form, but rather in the most important acute political questions.
I will tell you my opinion quite openly: Since you, comrade
Shachtman, are a talented journalist— which can become of the
utmost significance for our cause— you have the tendency to see
138 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
things much too much from the journalistic or writer's stand-
point at the expense of the political and revolutionary. That
explains why we collide with you in all questions, and also why
you— with the best feelings toward me and with the best friendly
intentions— could have committed such mistakes as in England,
which are incomprehensible to me. I ask that you forward the
copy of my letter to Montagu to the central committee of the
League, since the question has unfortunately become public and
above all the American League must be informed.
Please do not misunderstand me. I am far from thinking
that this has damaged our political friendship. I hope we will
in fact reach an understanding. But since my attempts to achieve
this through an exchange of personal letters have come to
naught, I must now attempt to clarify all international ques-
tions through direct correspondence with the leadership of the
League.
I cannot avoid mentioning again that in your last letter you
did not devote a single word to my very precise questions with
regard to France. I therefore fear that instead of telling me clearly
and openly why you consider my opinions and methods in the
French, German, Spanish— and therefore also in the Russian— ques-
tions to be incorrect and what practical proposals you counterpose,
you will remain silent and in the event of a new intervention you
will again find yourself on the other side of the internal "barri-
cades." That is why I want to bring the copy of my letter to Montagu
to the attention of the leadership.
139
Why Did the Militant Print Felix's Article?
Letter by Leon Trotsky to the
CLA National Committee293
5 January 1932
This letter is a response to "The French CGTU Congress: Issue of Trade
Union Unity Confounded by Stalinists" by Paris Jewish Group leader
Felix, which appeared in the Militant (19 December 1931). Felix described
the recent congress of the Communist-led Confederation Generate du Tra-
vail Unitaire, where the Ligue-influenced Teachers Federation submitted
a resolution for unity with the Confederation Generate du Travail (CGT).
The article included an oblique criticism of the Molinier-Treint leader-
ship of the French Ligue:
From the point of view of numbers and strength, the activity of the Left
Opposition at the congress was very weak. The mistakes committed in
the past, the errors of the Opposition Unitaire, the absence of theses on
the trade-union question that should have been elaborated by our national
conference, all this contributed to the fact that the position of the Opposi-
tion was not defended with the necessary vigor at the congress.
At the congress itself certain mistakes were committed in the vote
on the political report. This mistake was later corrected by the Execu-
tive Commission. On the other hand, we did not seek any contact with
the federation and unions that defended the same point of view as our-
selves, which constituted a second grave mistake, so that our own
resolution received only one vote.
Trotsky's fears that Shachtman was responsible for the Militant '5 publi-
cation of Felix's articles turned out not to be the case. As Arne Swabeck
reported, "Comrade Shachtman had nothing whatever to do with the
publishing of the article. The article came through the mail and was
printed in routine form without the consciousness of the editorial board
of its indirect polemical character."294
In no. 36 of the Militant, which has just arrived, I find an
article from France on the CGTU congress signed by Felix. It
is quite possible that the article found its way into the paper
purely accidentally, without the editorial board having had an
opportunity to distinguish the fine points and allusions from a
great distance. I fear, however— I must say this quite openly—
140 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
that the article was published through the agencv of comrade
Shachtman. If I am wrong, all the better. If not. this compli-
cates the matter to the utmost. The article is directed against
the leading group of the French Ligue, not openly and clearly,
but bv insinuations and pinpricks. That is wholly in keeping
with the author's spirit. Insofar as I haye been able to observe
comrade Felix— first with Paz where he plaved a hothead against
us, then in the Ligue. where he changed positions but not his
method of fighting, which is unfortunately not the best— he ap-
pears to me to represent a variant of Weisbord, above all in the
complete barrenness of his criticism, its insincerity, its constant
personal edge. etc.
Comrade Felix has his own views on the trade-union ques-
tion in France, which contradict the official policy of the Ligue.
It goes without saving that the Militant, like every newspaper,
has the right to air the views of the minority as well. This must
be done completely openly and clearly, however. Accordingly,
Felix should have named completely openly, in the name of a
definite minority, the tendency in the Ligue he was polemicizing
against. I doubt this would have been appropriate. It would per-
haps have been better to pursue this polemic in the Interna-
tional Bullet Di. but then, as I have said, in completely clear, open,
unambiguous form. In that case the polemic could perhaps con-
tribute something to the education of our cadres. In this in-
sincere—I would almost say malicious— form, the polemic only
serves the purposes of international intrigue.
I will be verv happy if the entire matter is purely accidental
and has no connection with comrade Shachtman. for in the con-
trary case it would onlv exacerbate the great dissatisfaction that
comrade Shachtman has aroused against himself among those
elements of the Opposition in France, Germany, also here in
Kadikoy. whom I consider the best. My concern has been deep-
ened bv the fact that comrade Shachtman has not replied to
the letters and warnings from me and my closer friends, and
that comrade Glotzer, who promised me that he would call com-
rade Shachtman to order a bit, has not devoted a single word
to the matter. I had the impression that both Shachtman and
Glotzer are under the influence of the small Jewish Group in
Paris and that they completely overlook the perspectives of the
Opposition movement in Europe.
I Do Not Agree 141
In a word, clarification of the situation on your part is
absolutely necessary.
4> 4> ^
I Do Not Agree With Shachtman
Letter by Albert Glotzer to Leon Trotsky295
21 January 1932
Glotzer reports on a statement he submitted to the resident committee
at its January 13 meeting.
I am enclosing my letter with those of comrade Abern
regarding the Malamuth matter.296 They are self-explanatory and
there is no need of any additions from me. If it is possible for
you to do anything on that it possibly deserves it. Or perhaps
Lyova may be able to help.
I had intended to write you when your first letter came on
the question of Shachtman. But as an afterthought I decided
to wait until your lengthy statement to the national sections
arrived because that would complete or supplement what you
stated in your first letter. The letter came a few days ago but I
have been extremely busy working— typing the manuscript of
your book— and in addition your letter arrived which made com-
ment about myself and the question of the Jewish Group of the
French Ligue. I think that those comments deserve an expla-
nation from me.
I should say at the outset that the references you made to
me are not entirely justified and only create an unpleasant
situation for me because in a roundabout way it appears as if
I am in some measure identified with the views of comrade
Shachtman. This is absolutely not so and the minutes of
our National Committee will show that. I have entered the
following statement into those minutes which you ought to
receive soon:
In view of the letter of comrade Trotsky and in line with my report
to the National Committee I wish to declare that my views coin-
cide with those of the latter. I look upon the situation in the
142 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
French Ligue as the result of the former leadership of Rosmer-
Naville. The present difficulties arise directly from the former
situation and I regard as necessary a complete liquidation of the
former conditions as indispensable toward creating a healthy con-
dition in the French organization. In order to clarify my posi-
tion, particularly because I have returned almost at the same time
with comrade Shachtman, I want to state that my views on the
international are not in accord with his.
This statement of course is not a complete one but is entered
only with regard to the letters you sent. But even so, I am sure
that it clarifies my position entirely. I have not been and am not
at present in agreement with the views of comrade Shachtman,
neither on the French questions nor on international questions.
This should be clear to everyone.
I am ready to admit that when I arrived in Kadikoy I did
not fully understand the situation. This however can be
explained by the fact that I never had the opportunity as oth-
ers did to know what the situation was. In spite of that my po-
sition taken in the past was correct. Let me recall to you for a
moment what I felt when I arrived in Turkey. I reported then
that in the French Ligue a discussion was taking place on the
trade-union question. I also said, as far as I could tell I did not
agree with the position on this question— that is the position of
comrades Molinier and Frank. And I should add that even now
I am still of the opinion that the comrades are wrong on this
very important question. Certainly it does not agree with the
position of the American League with regard to the same. But
then I never considered this the axis around which the French
situation revolved. I don't think so today. It in no way influ-
ences the real question of the relations between the various
groups. You should recall what I told you of my attitude toward
Naville and his group. That I consider more important. I am
no more influenced by the Jewish Group than by the views of
comrade Shachtman. On the contrary— but I did say that I
thought they were more correct on the trade-union question
than the other comrades.
But supposing that I thought that the Jewish Group was
more correct on this question? It in no way decides the funda-
mental question of the leadership of the French Ligue. In my
report to the National Committee I told the comrades that in
my opinion a reestablishment of the former leadership or even
I Do Not Agree 143
an inclusion of those elements would be harmful to the further
development of the movement there.
I feel on the whole that my positions on the international
questions coincide with yours and are essentially correct. You
will find upon inquiry from the comrades in Germany that this
is so. But then I am sure that you know this to be the case.
Regarding Felix's article: This was published before I re-
turned from Europe. It was put into the paper in the same man-
ner that the articles of Ridley were put in.297 Just as foreign cor-
respondence, though it is clear that it is an error because it
involves in essence more than just the trade-union question—
the more important question of leadership is involved.
Now then one other point with regard to Shachtman: You
state that you have had no word from me with regard to my
discussions with Shachtman. That is true. I have not written to
you with regard to that for the following reasons: While I was
in Kadikoy I wrote a letter for you to him asking him what his
opinions are regarding the French Ligue. I left before he re-
plied but I nevertheless kept in mind the idea of discussing the
question with him. When I arrived in England I did discuss
these problems with Shachtman. It should be clear to you now
that we did not agree either on France, Germany, or Spain. That
was the only discussion that we held. I should also say that /
could not convince him in any way— and it seems harder now
that even you yourself were unable to convince him that he was
wrong. But he told me that he had written to you and given
you all his thoughts on the situation as he saw it. But we were
very busy in England and I did not get a chance to write you of
these discussions because of that and secondly because he had
already written you telling you of his views. Naturally when I
returned and found myself in a mire of work I did not write
any more of that and thought nothing more of his views until
your letter arrived which informed us of his work. That of course
changed things considerably.
I feel no need of diplomatizing. My views are clear. I only re-
acted to your letter which came today in which you referred to
me. And certainly I refuse to be put in the same category with
comrade Shachtman and his views. As I said above it makes my
position uncomfortable with the other comrades of the NC,
although from my report my position should have been clear to
144 CLA 1931-33: Shachtrnan in the International
them. I have a great deal more to say but will wait for the moment
hoping that you will reply to this letter and express yourself on
the points I made. To make myself clear: I am opposed to anyone
or anybody who wishes to foist the former leadership of the inter-
national onto the movement again or who in any way expresses
opinions in favor of them. I consider that as harmful to the move-
ment—further, that if the movement is to grow it will have to cut
itself from the last remnants of Rosmer-Naville-Landau (and you
can add Mill) type of leadership. I am as clear on this as I am
of anything.
^ + ^
Shachtrnan Acted on His Own Authority
Letter by Arne Swabeck to Leon Trotsky298
22 January 1932
This letter was sent to Trotsky with the minutes of the resident committee
meeting of January 13, where Shachtman's functioning in Europe was
discussed. The committee passed a motion authored by Cannon, which
read in part, "The said views of comrade Shachtrnan have been put for-
ward by himself as an individual without consulting the National Com-
mittee and on his own personal responsibility. They do not represent the
views of the National Committee and it takes no responsibility for them."
Abern counterposed his own more equivocal motion. At this meeting
Shachtrnan announced that he would not continue as editor of the Mili-
tant despite the committee's vote that he should resume this post. On a
temporary basis Cannon was drafted to oversee the Militant, with Sam
Gordon working as his assistant. The committee voted to investigate the
possibility of Maurice Spector moving to New York to be editor.
We have received your letter of December 25 and also the
copy of your letter to comrade Shachtrnan of the same date.
Both have been discussed by our National Committee— or more
correctly the New York resident section— in its recent meeting.
The minutes, which are attached herewith, are being submit-
ted also to the nonresident members, together with a copy of
your letters to the League and to Shachtrnan as well as a copy of
Shachtman Acted on His Own Authority 145
Shachtman's letter addressed to you from Paris in which he
expresses certain views on the situation in Spain, within the
French Ligue, and within the International Secretariat. The non-
resident members are also being asked to record their votes on
motions proposed.
In regard to these views expressed, comrade Shachtman pre-
ferred to report to our National Committee only insofar as already
contained in his letter addressed to you. We wish to state, how-
ever, that comrade Shachtman carried no authority from our
National Committee except that of a leave of absence for a visit
to Europe, to be at the service of the International Secretariat to
assist in the organization of a Left Opposition group in England,
to act as a correspondent to the Militant, and to interview the
Italian Left fraction (Bordigists) as to their exact position.
Any views expressed by, or authorized by, our National Com-
mittee in regard to problems of the International Left Opposi-
tion, or for that matter in regard to the League, have been only
those submitted to you and to the International Secretariat by
the League secretary or those in harmony therewith. We fully
recognize the right of any comrade to express and to submit
his personal views on all such questions, but they should be
regarded entirely as such.
Our resident committee feels deeply concerned about the
issues raised in your letters. We recognize them as issues of a
fundamental political character demanding an expression of
opinion of the whole committee and as soon as we have that
from all members it will be communicated to you. You will no-
tice in the attached minutes two motions made in reply to your
direct question, one submitted by comrade Abern and one sub-
mitted by comrade Cannon. The latter motion is supported by
myself. Comrade Glotzer supported both motions with comrade
Shachtman abstaining from voting. Personally I wish to add the
assurance that the National Committee as a whole will support
the motion of comrade Cannon which speaks unequivocally.
We expect to be able to return to a more complete discus-
sion and to a more complete expression of opinion on these
problems of the international movement in view of the latest
material received from you. In this respect I wish to also assure
you of our deep concern for the struggle carried on by the pro-
gressive elements of the Left Opposition.
146 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
In regard to your direct question as to the American Miller,
who delivered a scandalous report on Russia, we can answer only
on the assumption that this Miller is John Baker. You will recall
that several months ago we communicated an introduction to
you for this same Baker who was then in Russia and had
addressed a request to us for such an introduction as he wished
to visit you for the purpose of giving information of develop-
ments in the Soviet Union. Prior to his leaving America he was
a member of our League. We naturally took his request in good
faith. Upon his return to the United States we learned that he
had not made any attempt to make this visit and had no such
intentions. Moreover, as we then subsequently reported to you,
his views were completely out of harmony with those of the Left
Opposition. We severed relations with him. He is not a member
of the American League. WThen leaving again recently for Europe
he informed us of his knowing of comrade Markin being in Ber-
lin and that he intended to visit him to ask whether it would be
safe for him to make a visit to you without being spotted by Stalin
agents.299 We informed him that it was, of course, his privilege
to make such requests upon comrade Markin but that as far as
we were concerned he could get no introductions, recommenda-
tions, or contacts, that we had already informed you of his views
being entirely at variance with those of the Left Opposition. Thus
any claims made bv him to have the recommendation of any
American comrade could not be well founded.
We have in the past sent the records of our National Com-
mittee minutes to the International Secretariat only; however,
with copies of all special decisions and expressions of opinions
also forwarded to you. We shall as soon as technical arrange-
ments can possibly be made have transcripts of all the minutes
of past date, including those of our Second National Confer-
ence, also forwarded to you and in the future submit regularly
copies of all such minutes.
Please excuse this belated answer to the important questions
which you have raised; that part is due onlv to our technical
difficulties.
147
We Should Have Informed Trotsky
of American Problems
Letter by Albert Glotzer to Maurice Spector300
3 February 1932
This letter was written on the eve of Glotzer 's departure for a tour of
the U.S. and Canada on the topic "What Is Europe Heading For?"
You shouldn't have given up hope so easily. My intentions—
and they were good ones— were to write in detail concerning the
situation in the international Opposition and particularly with
regard to the more recent developments which hindered me from
writing momentarily, simply because I wanted some days to
reflect on them. Now, as the minutes of the National Commit-
tee will inform you, the NC decided on my tour. This will bring
me around to Toronto in about three weeks, I believe the date is
about the 25th.
I saw your letter regarding the secretariat and I agree with
your remarks.301 You will understand why when we discuss this
question. Max, of course, you know, is not in agreement on
international questions. He has always had some reservations
even during the early struggles against Landau-Naville. Now again
he finds himself at variance with the views of LD and most of
the leading comrades of the national sections on the same or
similar questions— that is, questions revolving around the leader-
ship of the international and the French organization. The prob-
lems are, to say the least, extremely delicate and at times obscure
ones. But behind a great deal of smoke screen one can easily see
that fundamentally it is still a problem of the development of
the genuine Opposition cadres and of our revolutionary ideol-
ogy. Personally, I am of the opinion that Max's views are shad-
owed by his pleasant relations with Naville and now Mill. But
you will read from Max's letter to LD, and you will find that he
has reasons— some good and some bad— for his position.302 You
understand, of course, that these remarks are personal ones and
148 CLA 1931-33: Shachtman in the International
do not at all attempt to deal completely with questions— some-
thing I will do when I see you.
However, Marty and myself, at least, are opposed in every
way to use this present uncomfortable situation in order to cover
up or even make pretensions regarding the American problems.
Although it must be clear that these developments do not lend
strength to us, because demagogues find the atmosphere
warmed by LD's letters. I have a great deal to say regarding the
above remarks. But we on the other hand find difficulties now,
and as for myself, I feel that on a whole we have been dealt a
blow— not a permanent one, to be sure— but nevertheless a
serious one. I feel in this respect that we have made a horrible
error in keeping from LD the situation in the North American
movement. All the more so since both Max and myself have
been to see him. I have a feeling that this will, sooner or later,
create a scandal— and that comrade LD will certainly spare no
words with us on this account. But this is what we get for pan-
handling political situations and I will never agree to such a
thing again. We postponed for fear of destroying the organiza-
tion only to find ourselves outwitted, unintentionally, so that it
in no way helps our movement. It would have been far better to
have settled the questions than allow it to eat on us like a cancer.
I dislike to assume the attitude of "I told you so." But I feel
a little bit embittered about it, precisely because there is noth-
ing that we can do about it now— except to allow things to
develop and act accordingly. I would suggest, therefore, that
you await my coming so that we can discuss at length. In the
meantime you will be asked to take a position on the minutes
of the National Committee. Whatever vou do on that will be of
no harm or consequence. I feel now that I may have been a bit
too categorical, but this was no time for horseplay on my part
because I was in an entirely different position from the other
comrades, having just returned with a knowledge of the inter-
national questions. But the others are falling over themselves
trying to place themselves first in line— "to agree without really
knowing or to await knowing."
Let me know what you desire in the way of literature— I refer
to the International Bulletin in German, Permanente Revolution,
and I shall try to procure these things for you. I think that it is
You Must Remain at Your Post 149
quite possible that I may be able to bring it all with me or mail
them to you personally. Specify just what numbers, etc.
In the meantime await my coming.
4* 4> O
You Must Remain at Your Post
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman303
10 February 1932
Although you have not answered my last letters, I feel obligated
to write you again. As I see from the documents that have been
sent me, you want to give up your post as editor of the Militant.
I hope the issue will already have been resolved before these
lines reach you. How could it be otherwise? Your resignation
would mean a blow not only to the American League but to
the international Opposition as well. The central committee re-
cently reconfirmed its confidence in you by its vote. As for me,
I certainly hope that our collaboration in struggle and our
friendship will remain unshakable despite our important dif-
ferences of opinion. In every respect it is absolutely necessary
that you remain at your post.
II.
The Fight
153
Uphold Our Revolutionary Classics!
by Arne Swabeck
Published 5 March 1932
This article, originally published in the Militant, is a response to Joseph
Carter's "Honor Bolshevik Leaders" (Young Spartacus, January 1932).
When young comrades, who are too much impressed with
their own importance, express it in supercilious scorn for the revo-
lutionary classics, it is time to issue a serious warning. There is
only one short step from such an attitude into either the camp of
the useless petty-bourgeois intelligentsia or else into the foul pol-
lution of the most abominable revisionism. This latter is precisely
what happened to one of our young comrades in an article entitled
"Honor Bolshevik Leaders" and appearing over his signature in
Young Spartacus no. 2. He stepped with both feet into that foul
pollution.
It is said in that article: "Rosa, in her inaugural address, again
investigated the new problems brought forth by the conditions of
the war and postwar period. She reexamined the teachings of Marx
and Engels on the questions of armed insurrection, guerrilla war-
fare, force and violence, and concluded that history had once again
placed on the agenda the tactic advocated by Marx and Engels in
the Communist Manifesto in 1847-48, but later proclaimed by Engels
as outlived." (Emphasis ours— A.S.)
In criticizing Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin once quoted two simple
lines from a Russian proverb: "It sometimes happens to eagles that
they descend lower than chickens, but chickens never succeed in
mounting as high as eagles," and he added, "she was and remains
an eagle." In its reversed form this would apply to our young com-
rade. The outrageous statement emphasized above looks too much
like the attempt of a chicken to mount even higher than the eagle.
In ascribing these views to Engels our young comrade cites in
parenthesis, evidently as his proof, the introduction to The Class
Struggles in France 1848 to 1850 by Marx. Perhaps he was unaware
of the fact that long ago evidence has been unearthed of how this
154 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
introduction, when appearing in print by the Berlin Vorwdrts, was
miserably garbled by the German social democrats of the
revisionist school, notably by Bernstein. The extent of this gar-
bling became clear when Ryazanov discovered the original Engels
manuscript, of which he has since produced photostats, showing
the important deletions which had been made. Some of the results
of his findings Ryazanov published in Unter dem Banner des
Marxismus (vol. 1, no. 1, German edition). In English these findings
were reproduced by Trachtenberg in the Workers Monthly for
November 1925.304
What Engels himself thought of the printing of the introduc-
tion and of the garbled version becomes quite clear in his letters
to Kautsky (then still fighting revisionism). First in his letter of 25
March 1895, he says: "My text has suffered somewhat because of
the scruples of our Berlin friends, due to timidity over the Anti-
Socialist Law which, under the circumstances, I had to consider."
Again in his letter to Kautsky dated 1 April 1895, Engels said:
"To my astonishment I saw today printed in the Vorwdrts, without
previous knowledge, an extract from my introduction so dressed
up that I appear as a peaceful worshiper of legality quand merae
(in spite of all). The more pleased I am that now the whole appears
in the Neue Zeit, so that this shameful impression is obliterated.
I shall tell Liebknecht very definitely what I think of this, and also
those, whoever they may be, that gave him the opportunity to
distort my meaning." 305
Engels spoke in a similar vein, of the "mean joke" played on
him, in his letter to Paul Lafargue, dated 5 April 1895.
It is perfectly true that Engels, in this introduction, draws a
sharp distinction between the conditions of 1848 and those of
1895. This is as it should be. And it is particularly in this respect
that the deleted parts assume their enormous significance. We shall
quote only one.
In drawing the sharp distinctions of difference in the two
periods Engels says:
Does this mean that the street battles will play no part in the future?
Not at all. It simply means that conditions have become far more
unfavorable for the civilian fighters since 1848, and far more favor-
able for the military forces. Street battles in the future may be
successful only if this unfavorable situation can be neutralized by
other factors. Such fights will therefore be far less usual in the earlier
stages of a great revolution, than in its further course, and will have
Statement on Uphold Classics 155
to be fought with greater resources of strength. Such battles will
rather resort— as in the great French revolution, and as on 4 Sep-
tember and 31 October 1870, in Paris— to open attack than to the
defensive tactics of the barricades.
Is there in this powerful testimony any evidence of Engels
having proclaimed the tactics of the Communist Manifesto as
outlived? None whatever. On the contrary, the letters quoted
contain the wrath of the revolutionary teacher against the mon-
strous falsifiers.
Such accusations made against Engels become a blot upon the
Communist movement which we must eradicate. With our modest
means we must hold aloft the banner of Marxism and particularly
so in the Left Opposition. We can well afford to be humble students
endeavoring to learn from our great teachers. We must guard
against this supercilious, know-it-all attitude which steps with both
feet into the foul pollution of social reformism. Comrades guilty
of such an attitude must be called to order sharply.
<- + 4-
Statement on "Uphold Our
Revolutionary Classics!"
by Max Shachtman
12 March 1932
This statement was submitted to the resident committee on March 15,
circulated to the National Committee, and published in CLA Internal
Bulletin no. 3 (July 1932). Shachtman demanded that the resident
committee ''repudiate the article of comrade Swabeck and the procedure
used in publishing it. " With Glotzer in attendance this motion passed,
but it was subject to review by the nonresident members of the National
Committee.
On March 7 the National Youth Committee had submitted a state-
ment to the resident committee protesting Swabeck 's "abusive, slander-
ous, and uncomradely language. " At that meeting the resident commit-
tee deadlocked on a motion to uphold Swabeck, with Cannon and Swabeck
voting for and Abern and Shachtman against (Glotzer, the fifth committee
156 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
member, was on tour). Carter submitted yet another statement, appended
to the minutes, labeling Swabeck's article "a shining example of an
illogical, stupid, and puerile and dishonest piece of writing." Defending
his original theses on Engels' 1895 introduction to The Class Struggles
in France 1848-1850, Carter referred favorably to the Socialist Labor
Party's "Who Are the Falsifiers?", which challenged the importance of
Ryazanov's revelations about the cuts in Engels' 1895 manuscript.
Shachtman expands on Carter's arguments here.
In their reply to Shachtman 's document, Cannon and Swabeck wrote:
Did the revisionists blue-pencil the original document, striking out these
and other vital, direct statements, or did Engels strike them out him-
self? Shachtman makes a great point of this, and so does Carter. The
SLP "proves" that Engels made the excisions: "from which," says the
SLP, "it is evident that if anything appears in a discovered manuscript
that did not appear in the Neue Zeit, it was at one time or another
expunged by Engels himself." Comrades Shachtman and Carter press
this deduction very insistently, as though they are scoring a point thereby
against comrade Swabeck, and without stopping for a moment to con-
sider who has an interest in this contention.
We do not have sufficient facts at hand to give a positive answer,
and we do not consider it decisive for a revolutionist. The SLP's "proof"
is full of loopholes and is convincing only to those who want to be
convinced. In either case the original manuscript gives the same indis-
putable proof of Engels' real thought and intent, and confounds the
legalists who misused his authority. If Engels agreed to the deletions
under the pressure of the exceptional conditions of the moment-the situ-
ation created by the drafting of the new Anti-Socialist Law-and the
insistence of the party leaders-it only means to a revolutionist that
Engels was betrayed and that his death soon after prevented his pun-
ishment of the betrayers. 30G
I want to register a formal protest against the article "Uphold
Our Revolutionary Classics!" which appeared in the Militant of
5 March 1932 over the signature of comrade Arne Swabeck,
printed without authorization or even the promised preliminary
consideration of the National or editorial committee. I will not
and cannot take the slightest responsibility for a document whose
contents, purpose, and all the proceedings surrounding its
appearance, are without precedent in our movement, outrageous,
and false through and through. It is annoying to have to waste
valuable time that could be profitably employed in more important
matters, on an elucidation of questions that should be elemen-
tary, particularly for leading comrades, but the attempt to put the
Statement on Uphold Classics 157
whole National Committee on record in favor of Swabeck's article
renders this statement only all the more unavoidable.
1. How did this unusual article come to be written, with its
"supercilious scorn," its "useless petty-bourgeois intelligentsia," and
its "foul pollution of the most abominable revisionism"? What was
the occasion for the adoption of such language against a young
comrade, a brutal and rude language, it should be said plainly,
that cannot be found in the dictionary of comradely discussion
or disputes in our ranks, but is borrowed from Stalin's vocabu-
lary in inner-party disputes? More than two months ago, an anni-
versary article appeared in the January Young Spartacus devoted
to Lenin, Liebknecht, and Luxemburg, written by Carter. In the
course of a discussion I initiated in the National Committee on
an article written in the Militant on Lassalle by a nonmember of
the League, where I protested against the boudoir method of writ-
ing about the great socialist leaders (a protest in which all con-
curred), Swabeck raised the question of Carter's article.307 Nobody
spoke on it. No decision was adopted on it. Swabeck announced
that he would reply to it. That was all. In no sense was Swabeck
"commissioned" to reply to Carter, nor was there any understand-
ing or decision that a reply was required.
Six weeks later, with the whole incident practically forgotten,
Swabeck drafted his article against Carter and handed it to the
linotype operator for the Militant. As Carter later explained, he
saw it and requested that the article be taken up by the National
Committee first, with himself present to defend his standpoint. A
most correct procedure and most elementary. Swabeck agreed.
He showed me the article on Tuesday, March 1 , and informed me
that in view of Carter's request it would be taken up at the regu-
lar NC meeting the next night (Wednesday). I said nothing about
the contents of the article, reserving my opinion for the meeting.
Abern later revealed that when the article was likewise shown to
him, he expressed disagreement with it, at least in part, and was
also prepared to discuss it at the meeting of the committee. The
meeting was never held because of the illness of comrade Can-
non, which would, it appears, cause the matter to be held up until
the next committee meeting.
The fact that Swabeck agreed to take the article up at an NC
meeting and had informed at least half of its members to that
effect would indicate that nobody else was in a position to sanction
158 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
the article. Nevertheless, when the Militant came off the press on
Thursday, the 5th, the article was there. By what right? Swabeck
now explains that Cannon had agreed, while in the office Thurs-
day, to the article, and that it therefore was published without the
"formality" of the committee meeting. Why all this haste with an
article already delayed six weeks or more? And since when does
Cannon's consent obviate the need of getting the consent of the
other members of the National Committee?
The whole procedure stands in a worse light when one con-
siders that this violent and abusive article is directed against a
responsible member of the National Youth Committee and a
member of the editorial board of Young Spartaciis. He and the
committee he belongs to, therefore, have, so to speak, some rights
in the matter. What should have been the procedure, that is, the
procedure that has always been followed in the movement in its
best days? Swabeck, assuming that Carter's article deserved the
strictures to which he submitted it, should first have taken the
matter up with the National Committee so that the committee's
views collectively, and not Swabeck's personal views, might be
expressed. Especially is this necessary because on our NC is our
representative to the National Youth Committee, Abern, who is
also therefore concerned in the matter. Through Abern then, or
through Swabeck if Abern was not qualified, the matter should
have been taken up with the body directly responsible for what
appears in Young Spartacus, the National Youth Committee and
its editorial board. There effort should have been made to argue
the matter out with the young comrades, and if possible to have
them put out a correction in the forthcoming number of the youth
paper or a repudiation of Carter, if necessary. Is this not elemen-
tary, indispensable procedure in a case like this, a procedure always
followed in a democratic party when an analogous case is involved,
let us say, a polcom and a subsidiary language paper's "deviation"?
Swabeck, however, completely ignored the representative to
the youth committee, Abern; completely ignored the writer of the
article in question, Carter; completely ignored the editorial board
and the National Youth Committee; and on top of that, completely
ignored the National Committee of the League itself. What we
have here, in a word, is a bureaucratic procedure from beginning
to end, not a loyal, comradely, democratic procedure, but one char-
acteristic of bureaucratism.
Statement on Uphold Classics 159
Why? There is only one explanation. Carter has in the past
been highly critical of the National Committee and of some of its
members: Cannon, Swabeck, and myself, for instance, most par-
ticularly against the first two. His criticism, frequently exagger-
ated and petty (he is a young comrade, without a decade of expe-
rience in the movement), has been rejected by all of us from time
to time, particularly when it was obviously unfounded. Comrades
Cannon and Swabeck, however, have felt themselves assailed spe-
cifically and personally by Carter and have conducted a particu-
larly sharp, and not always correct or justified, campaign against
him and against other young comrades. It should be added that
they have not always done it with the best results, i.e., of training
and bringing up the youth to the revolutionary, important posi-
tion they must occupy in our movement. More often than not they
have antagonized the youth. Instead of helping to remove some
of the irritating and bad aspects of the youth's work and conduct,
they have only made matters worse. In recent months especially,
they have sought to "put them in their place" by hammer blows
instead of by patient enlightenment of those elements who are (and
especially who can become) our most valuable asset in the future—
in other words, by a responsible attitude which takes into consid-
eration the immaturity, weakness, and possibilities of the youth
in our movement. We do not want to flatter (and thereby destroy)
the youth; neither should we flatten them out with bludgeons.
It is with this attitude that Swabeck, with Cannon's agreement,
wrote and published his article. In the NC Swabeck sought to
excuse the article on the ground that Carter represented a "dan-
gerous tendency" and was a "polished intriguer" generally. The
motivation is remarkable. Is it to mean that since Carter is a scoun-
drel anyway, in general, so to speak, any method to crush him is
permissible? I don't believe in such methods. Is it not significant
that only a couple of weeks or so after the NC added to the
National Youth Committee two more comrades supporting its
views as against the views of other National Youth Committee
members, the whole National Youth Committee, the two new youth
appointees included, voted unanimously against the tone of
Swabeck's article and the procedure he followed in printing it?
It is clear (and should have been all the time) that such only suc-
ceeded in unnecessarily creating hostilities between the young
comrades and the National Committee or sections of it.
160 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
But, it has been speciously argued, it is against Carter's "revi-
sionism" that you should direct your criticism and not against the
"secondary" and unimportant technical question (?) of procedure.
And further, it is against Carter's violent statement to the National
Youth Committee that vou should protest and not against
Swabeck's. Neither argument holds water. About Carter's alleged
revisionism we will speak further on. As to the question of proce-
dure, it is not a mere "digression" from "regular routine" required
by an "acute situation." No, it is a fundamentally bureaucratic
procedure, just as important as the theoretical dispute itself. On
the second point there is no analog}7. Carter made a statement for
the minutes inside the organization, on his own responsibility, with-
out attributing it to others, and onlv under the acute provocations
of Swabeck's article. The latter, on the contrary, had no provoca-
tion, or, if you will, such a provocation as should have been settled
in the manner indicated above by me; furthermore, Swabeck
jumped with "both feet" into the public press to attack a respon-
sible director of one of our brother papers. I do not, of course,
feel at all called upon, nor do I accept responsibility for Carter's
statement. But the issue cannot be befogged by an attempted
comparison of the two documents.
2. Now as to the contents of the two articles themselves, Carter's
and Swabeck's.
Here too I do not feel called upon to take responsibility for
the manner in which Carter formulated the point he makes. As a
more experienced journalist I would not have formulated the para-
graph so awkwardly. That is one thing. The essence of the matter
is another. And it is on the question of the essence of the matter
that comrade Swabeck shows in his article that he has not under-
stood the first thing about this historical dispute, the question
around which Marxists and revisionists have argued now for more
than three decades. He has not, as he acknowledged at the NC
meeting, even read Rosa's brilliant speech at the foundation
congress of the Spartakusbund in 1918, which did not apparently
prevent him from undertaking a furious polemic on the subject
of this speech. Further, I want to repeat here what I said at the
meeting, that Cannon, who authorized the publication of the
article, was in no position to give a categorically conclusive judg-
ment on the article, because, at least at the moment he sanctioned
Swabeck's article, I am certain that he had read neither Rosa's
Statement on Uphold Classics 161
speech, nor Engels' introduction, nor the polemics on the subject
in the prewar and postwar socialist movement. If I had the time
and space here, I could demonstrate that Swabeck actually poses
the question from opportunist (that is, Bernstein's) premises,
regardless of the ridiculously "rrrevolutionary" conclusions he
draws. However, a few points will suffice to indicate that he has
not grasped the essence of the question. What did Carter say, awk-
wardly, if you will, but in essence? He said that Engels, in his fore-
word to The Class Struggles in France by Marx, had proclaimed the
tactics advocated by both these scientific socialists in the middle
of the last century as "outlived." Swabeck calls anybody who makes
such a statement an individual who steps "with both feet" into "the
foul pollution of the most abominable revisionism." But if Swabeck
is right, then not only should Carter be characterized so elegantly,
but Rosa Luxemburg as well! For what Carter did was merely para-
phrase in a very condensed form what Rosa herself had said, but
which Swabeck did not find it necessary to read before writing.
Rosa said:
And here Engels appends a detailed criticism of the illusion that
under modern capitalist conditions the proletariat can possibly
achieve anything on the streets through revolution. I believe, how-
ever, seeing that we are today in the midst of the revolution, of a
street revolution with all that this entails, that it is time to break
away from the conception that has officially guided the German
Social Democracy down to our own day, of the conception which
shares responsibility for what happened on August 4, 1914.
—"Report of the Foundation Congress of the KPD, Spartakusbund"308
Further:
Here, party comrades, Engels demonstrates, with the expertness
which he had in the domain of military science too, that it is a pure
illusion to believe that the working people, with the existing devel-
opment of militarism, industry, and large towns, could make street
revolutions and triumph in them,
-ibid.
Thus, Rosa also declared that Engels had proclaimed the old
tactics "outlived" and thereby was "only short step" from "either
the camp of the useless petty-bourgeois intelligentsia or else into
the foul pollution of the most abominable revisionism." And not
only Rosa! All the really authentic, authoritative Marxists, before
the war, including Zinoviev, Lenin, Kautsky, and Trotsky, had the
same opinion, made the same declarations, and were not only
162 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
entirely correct, but did not, for that, cease to be Marxists! This
for the simple reason that they approached this particular prob-
lem of Marxism as Marxists, that is, as dialecticians.
But, Swabeck will argue, what about Ryazanov's revelations?
Rosa, Lenin, Trotsky, and the others were not aware of the "full
text" of Engels' foreword found seven or eight years ago by
Ryazanov. He even writes:
Perhaps he (that is, Carter) was unaware of the fact that long ago
evidence has been unearthed of how this introduction, when
appearing in print by the Berlin Vorwarts, was miserably garbled by
the German social democrats of the revisionist school, notably bv
Bernstein. The extent of this garbling became clear when Ryazanov
discovered the original Engels manuscript.
-Militant, 5 March 1932
In the first place, if Carter was "unaware" of all this, then a
responsible leading comrade who should be a teacher of the young
comrades ought to have made him "aware" before cracking upon
his skull in public and amid a shower of abuse. In the second place,
Ryazanov's revelations have nothing to do with the essence of the
matter. All of Swabeck's incoherent, disconnected quotations and
undifferentiated references to "garbling" only serve to confuse the
matter completely.
What is the actual status of Engels' foreword? At the moment
the Berlin party fathers were quaking with fear at the Junkers'
attempt to adopt more stringent provisions against the socialist
propaganda (1894-95), Engels wrote a foreword to a series of old
articles by Marx which were printed under the title The Class
Struggles in France 1848-1850. So as not to infuriate the Junkers
and drive them into sharp measures, the party fathers in Berlin,
including Liebknecht the elder and Bernstein, first printed Engels'
foreword in the party paper, Vorwarts, but in such a distorted,
chopped-up, bowdlerized form that the Marxian-revolutionary
essence of the document was violated and, to use Engels' com-
ment upon it later, "So dressed up that I appear as a peaceful wor-
shiper of legality at all costs." I have never seen the Vorwarts extract
from Engels' introduction, any more than Carter or Swabeck has
seen it. We can all get an idea of its distortion, however, by Engels'
indignant observations and from the subsequent revisionist use
which Bernstein sought to make of it. But it is not this printing of
it upon which Rosa (whom, it should be remembered, Carter
Statement on Uphold Classics 163
simply paraphrases), or Lenin, or Trotsky based their views. Not
at all! Because the whole introduction, ungarbled, uncut, un-
distorted, was printed by Kautsky. He had requested it of Engels
and Engels replied:
Your telegram answered at once: "With pleasure." Under separate
cover follow the proofs of the text with the title: Introduction to
the Reissue of Marx's The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850 by
RE. ...My text has suffered somewhat because of the scruples of our
Berlin friends, due to timidity over the Anti-Socialist Law which,
under the circumstances, I had to consider.
-25 March 1895
A week later he wrote Kautsky (1 April 1895):
To my astonishment I saw today printed in the Vorwdrts, without
previous knowledge, an extract from my introduction so dressed
up that I appear as a peaceful worshiper quand meme (at all costs).
The more pleased am I that now the whole appears in the Neue Zeit,
so that this shameful impression is obliterated. I shall tell Liebknecht
what I think of this, and also those, whoever they may be, that gave
him the opportunity to distort my meaning.
All Marxian commentaries on this document, therefore, have
been based, not upon the Vorwdrts distortion, but upon the
"whole" which Kautsky printed with Engels' authorization and
proof corrections. And Ryazanov's document? The deleted sec-
tions are obviously those which Engels himself had blue-penciled.
Neither Ryazanov nor Trachtenberg dares to say the contrary
openly, because Engels' letter to Kautsky is quite well-known. What
then are the deletions, one of which Swabeck quotes: They are
purely and simply a corroboration and confirmation of the other
sections, obviously deleted for one of two reasons by Engels him-
self: 1. In consideration of the timidity of "our Berlin friends";
2. Because the same things essentially are said, either directly, less
ambiguously, or inferentially, in those parts of the foreword not
deleted but printed by Kautsky.
In a word, Engels in his foreword (the one Kautsky printed,
which the SLP faithfully translated into English and very faithfully
misinterprets in a revisionist sense) did advocate a change of tactics
and nevertheless did remain a revolutionist. The foreword was not
a "deathbed repentance for youthful revolutionary sins"— but this
fact was known to Marxists before Ryazanov's discovery and known to
them on the basis of a dialectical understanding and interpretation of
the Neue Zeit publication.
164 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Swabeck valiantly contends: "Is there in this powerful testi-
mony any evidence of Engels having proclaimed the tactics of the
Communist Manifesto as outlived? None whatever." Is it possible that
comrade Swabeck has not even read the foreword, where the
change is advocated in just so many words, so clearly as not to be
upset bv one hair bv the deleted paragraphs? Onlv two davs after
his last letter to Kautskv. Engels wrote to Lafargue a letter to which
Swabeck refers but does not quote, evidentlv because it would upset
all his contentions:
(Engels refers to Bernstein) has just plaved me a fine trick. He took
from my introduction to Marx's articles on France 1848-50 all that
could be of use to him to support the tactic of peacefulness and
antiviolence at all costs which he likes to preach for some time now
especially at this moment when the coercive laws are being prepared
in Berlin. But 1 preach this tactic only for the Germany of today and even
then with substantial reservations. For France. Belgium. Italy, Aus-
tria, this tactic as a whole could not be followed, and for Germany.
it might become inapplicable tomorrow.
Further, in that part of the introduction (first 18 pages) which
Rvazanov declares were not in any way changed. Engels writes
categorically and simply enough for all to understand:
But history also proved us in the wrong and revealed our opinion
of that dav (that is. after 1850) as an illusion. History went even
further: not only did it destroy our former error, but also it trans-
formed completely the conditions under which the proletariat will
have to battle. The fighting methods of 1848 are today obsolete in
every respect, and that is a point which right here deserves closer
investigation.
—English edition
And: "The rebellion of the old stvle. the street fight behind barri-
cades, which up to 1848 gave the final decision, has become
antiquated" (ibid.). Did this mean that Engels became a revision-
ist a la Bernstein? Not at all. Like the master of dialectics he was
and unlike the pettv-bourgeois revolutionists of the anarchist
school, he knew that the social democrats (i.e.. communists)
do not advocate armed uprisings, barricade fighting, guerrilla
warfare, etc.. etc.. every dav in the week, every week in the vear,
and everv vear in the century— regardless of time, place, condi-
tions, relationship of forces, and other concrete factors. Did he
renounce revolution? That is what Bernstein tried to read into his
foreword, true enough, but he nevertheless stated that the social
democrats "have not abandoned the fight for revolution. The right
Statement on Uphold Classics 1 65
to revolution is, in the last analysis, the only real 'historic right'
upon which all modern states rest without exception" and "Do
not forget that the German Reich... is the product of a covenant;
first of a covenant among the rulers themselves, and second, of a
covenant of the ruler with the people. If one party breaks the agree-
ment, the whole of it falls, the other party being no longer bound
by it."
But the indisputable fact remains that he did advocate a radi-
cal change in the tactics of the working-class party because the situ-
ation has changed. In what respect and why? Lenin and the other
Marxists understood the change and the need for it, acknowledged
it (unlike Swabeck), explained it (unlike Swabeck, who seeks to
browbeat instead of enlighten), and showed why, with a new revi-
sion—yes, a revision— of Engels.
The situation is no longer the same as in the time of 1871 to 1914,
when Marx and Engels quite consciously compromised with the
incorrect, opportunist expression of "social democracy." For at that
time, after the defeat of the Paris Commune, history put upon the
order of the day the slow organization and enlightenment work.
There was no other work. The anarchists were (and remain) not only
theoretically but also economically and politically entirely incorrect.
The anarchists falsely judged the situation, they did not understand
the world situation: the worker corrupted by imperialist profits in
England, the crushed Paris Commune, the simultaneously (1871)
victorious bourgeois-national movement in Germany, the Russia of
semiserfdom sleeping its sleep of centuries. Marx and Engels cor-
rectly judged the situation; they recognized the tasks of the slow
maturing of the social revolution.
— Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution," 10 April
1917
And about two weeks later:
As for the renaming of the party: the word "social democrat" is not
correct, is scientifically false. Marx and Engels explained that
repeatedly. If they "tolerated" this word then only because after 1871
there was a special situation: a slow preparation of the masses of
the people was required, a revolution did not stand on the order of
the day.
— Lenin, "The Political Situation and the Attitude to the Provisional
Government," 27 April 1917
This is the dialectical method by which Marxists approach the
question of tactics, and not by superstition. One would gather from
Swabeck's argumentation that without the deleted passages
revealed by Ryazanov, Engels would appear to be a revisionist and
166 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
justify Bernstein on the one hand and the SLP blockheads on the
other. That is what I mean by saying that Swabeck approaches the
question with revisionist premises! But even without the benefit
of Ryazanov's discovery, Engels was just as much the proletarian
revolutionist on the eve of his death as he was in 1848. As I said,
not only did he revise the tactics of the communists, and call the
old ones "antiquated, outlived, obsolete," but he was correct in
doing it, as Lenin showed. And more than that, Lenin and Trotsky
were just as correct in saying later that the Engels of 1895 had
"now" (after 1905, let us say) also become "outlived" and had to
be submitted to "revision." But for that they did not become revi-
sionists or Bernsteinians. Let us hear again from Lenin:
Kautsky behaves differently. Little as is the factional material he has
on hand on the uprising (of 1905), he nevertheless endeavors to
grasp the military side of the question... "Both of them," says Kautsky
on the difference between the Paris June battle and the Moscow
December battle, "were barricade fights, but one was a catastrophe,
the termination of the old barricade tactic, the other the inaugura-
tion of a new barricade tactic. And to that extent we have to revise
the conception which Friedrich Engels set down in his foreword to
Marx's The Class Struggles in France, the conception that the time of
barricade struggles is finally passed. Only the time of the old barri-
cade tactic is passed. This was demonstrated by the battle of Mos-
cow..." Thus Kautsky. He reads no mass for the dead to the upris-
ing on the basis of the failure of the first attempt.
— Lenin, "The Russian Revolution and the Task of the Proletariat,"
20 March 1906
And again:
The third lesson that Moscow has given us relates to the tactic and
the organization of the forces for the uprising. War tactics depend
upon the level of war technique— this wisdom was predigested by
Engels and put into the mouth of the Marxists. War technique is
today different from what it was in the middle of the 19th century.
It would be stupid to lead a mass into the field against the artillery
and to defend the barricades with revolvers. Kautsky was right when
he wrote that after Moscow the time has come to revise Engels'
theses, that Moscow has shown a "new barricade tactic." This tactic
was the tactic of partisan war.
— Lenin, "The Lessons of the Moscow Uprising," 29 August 1906
All these writings published, it should be borne in mind, on
the basis not of Vorwarts distortions of Engels' foreword, but of
Kautsky's exposure of these distortions, i.e., on the basis of the
"whole" document. Ten years before Ryazanov, Lenin wrote:
Statement on Uphold Classics 167
When Engels' famous foreword to The Class Struggles in France
appeared, the attempt was made (among other places in the Vorwarts)
to interpret it in the sense of opportunism. But Engels was indignant
about it and protested against having it seem that he is a "pacifist
worshiper of legality at all costs."
— Lenin, "The Dead Chauvinism and the Living Socialism," 12
December 1914
Let us pass from Lenin to Zinoviev, writing directly under
Lenin's guidance:
In the lengthy "peaceful" epoch of western European socialism which
had its end on the eve of the present war, the factor of revolution-
ary force (Gewalt: force or violence, MS) stepped completely into
the background behind the purely parliamentary legal methods of
struggle. The opportunists rejected violence as a factor in the eman-
cipation of the oppressed class. "Force always played a reactionary
part in history"— this is the erroneous thesis of the opportunists and
social pacifists. The well-known foreword by Engels to The Class
Struggles in France was interpreted in the sense that Marx, a cof ighter,
had become, toward the end of his life, also a supporter in prin-
ciple of the legal struggle. Engels himself protested repeatedly against
such a construction. In the foreword itself Engels wrote: "The right
of revolution is the only genuinely historical right." But after Engels'
death the opportunists, spurred by Bernstein, began with particu-
lar zeal to develop this "interpretation." The lessons of the revolu-
tion remain a book with seven seals for the opportunists. When
Kautsky, after the Moscow armed uprising (he was still a Marxist
then), declared that Engels' conceptions on the question of the
possibility of a barricade fight in the streets must now be revised,
nobody in the German social democracy paid any attention to this
declaration.
— Zinoviev, "Adler's Shot and the Crisis in Socialism," October 1916
More than ten years after it was written, Trotsky even polemi-
cized against sections of Engels' foreword and showed (in essential
harmony with what Lenin stated above) how Engels' standpoint
was no longer applicable:
In his well-known introduction to Marx's The Class Struggles in France,
Engels created room for great misunderstandings, by counterposing
the military-technical difficulties of the uprising (speedy shifting of
the troops with the aid of railroads, destructive effect of modern arms
and ammunition, wide, long, and straight streets in the modern cit-
ies), to the new chances of victory resulting from the evolution of
the class composition of the army. On the one side, Engels shows
himself to be pretty one-sided in the appraisal of the role which is
due to modern techniques in revolutionary uprisings; on the other
side, he did not consider it necessary to present the facts that the
168 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
evolution in the class composition of the army can be brought out
only when people and army are "confronted".... The Russian revolu-
tion has brought more proof of the fact that it is not arms, cannon,
and armored ships which prevail over people, but, in the final analy-
sis, people who prevail over arms, cannon, and armored ships.
— Trotsky, "The Balance of the Revolution," 1905
And finally, to get back to Rosa, let us quote from her polemic,
written also long before she had the benefit of Ryazanov's purely
corroboratory passages, against Bernstein's revisionist book
of 1898:
When Engels revised the tactic of the modern labor movement in
his foreword to The Class Struggles in France and counter posed the
legal struggle to the barricades, he was dealing, as is clear from every
line of the foreword, not with the question of the final conquest of
political power, but with the question of the present daily struggles,
not the attitude of the proletariat toward the capitalist state at the
moment of the seizure of state power, but its attitude within the
framework of the capitalist state. In a word, Engels presents the line
of conduct to the dominated but not to the triumphant proletariat.
— Rosa Luxemburg, "Reform or Revolution"
These quotations could be multiplied almost indefinitely, but
I think enough have been cited to show that from every stand-
point—of theory, of organization, of comradeliness, of responsi-
bility in general and the specific responsibility that rests upon the
shoulders of a League secretary— the whole conduct and stand-
point of comrade Swabeck are not to be endorsed for an instant.
Not a single argument can be presented to uphold them and none
has been presented. The procedure is unprecedented and unwar-
ranted, the tone of the article is disgraceful, rude, and uncomi adely,
the contents of the article are ridiculous both from the historical
and theoretical points of view.
But now a word must be added in conclusion: Since it is mani-
festly impossible to defend either the procedure or the content,
and no serious attempt was made to do so after I had spoken at
the National Committee, another tack is being taken which leads
very conveniently away from the mess into which Sw^abeck sped
"with both feet," that is, from the article at issue. The sole answer
made to my exposition of the disputed points was:
1. From Swabeck, that Trotsky was correct in saying that I judge
from a "journalistic standpoint."
Statement on Uphold Classics 169
2. From Cannon, the charge that I have organized a faction against
the National Committee on the "worst possible basis," the youth.
3. From Cannon, a continuation of the underhanded insinuations
of "another Naville" or "another Landau."
The first answer is a ridiculous attempt, part of a petty
campaign, by the way, to cover up an embarrassed position by
dragging over it a quotation from one of comrade Trotsky's let-
ters to me, and has about as much to do with the actual question
under consideration as, let us say, Swabeck's article has to do with
real Marxism. The second "answer" is a patent falsehood which
nobody can prove for the simple reason that no proofs exist. It
too is invented to cover up a bad mess and as an "ideological prepa-
ration" for a factional campaign which Cannon announced at the
same meeting for the "purging" of the organization regardless of
the wreckage he strews about along the road of this campaign.
The third statement I called a frame-up and I repeat it here. Can-
non has disloyally taken advantage of views I have expressed in
letters to comrade Trotsky on certain international questions and
which aroused a difference of opinion between us on some points,
to continue a campaign against me started long ago, to which he,
so to speak, tacked on the "international questions," which reached
its height at the last conference with the insinuation-filled speech
to the effect that I was, after all, only a petty-bourgeois intellec-
tual, a writer, an American Naville, an American Landau.309 Now
the song becomes a little louder and even less attractive. It is very
clear what Cannon is aiming at: I know it but too well. To talk
constantly about "collaboration" and to do everything to render
it as difficult as possible, if not impossible; to solve every ques-
tion that is raised with the broad hint that Shachtman is only an-
other Naville or Landau (both in one)— these methods won't work,
except to the unmistakable disservice and enfeeblement of the or-
ganization. It is a course which is a warning against itself.
<► 4> 4>
170
A Bad Situation in the American League
Letter by Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky310
13 March 1932
On 23 January 1932 Shachtman finally responded to Trotsky: "I feel
absolutely speechless at the sharp tone of your last letters. " While defending
the views in his December 1 letter, he asserted, "I never questioned your
opinions or manner of action in the Russian question, or the Spanish
question, or the German question, or the French question!" He repeats
this denial here and reports on the situation in the American League.
1. I have your letter of February 10, in which you write that I have
not yet replied to your previous letter. By this time you should
have received this reply; it is evident that our letters crossed each
other in transit. I am very deeply cognizant and appreciative of
the confidence in me which your letter implies. Unfortunately, it
has become impossible for me to take up once more my position
as editor of the Militant, in spite of the fact that there is no work
at the present time which I am more anxious to do. So that there
should be no misunderstanding, I want to emphasize that I did
not in any sense refuse to take up my position again because of
any differences of opinion I may have with you, nor because of
the letters of criticism of my position which you wrote to me and
the League. These differences will, I feel sure, prove to be of a far
less fundamental character than they may have seemed to you—
my previous letter will indicate this. My resignation was deter-
mined, however, by the attitude shown and the position taken by
the other comrades here, particularly the two who occupy the most
responsible positions, comrades Swabeck, the secretary, and
Cannon, the editor, an attitude which makes my collaboration,
particularly in so vital a position as permanent editor, increasingly
difficult.
It is a very difficult and even painful subject to write about,
particularly because I feel mainly responsible for not having
informed you about the internal situation in the American League
before this time— especially when frictions first arose just prior to
Bad Situation in League 171
the time when I left for a visit to you in 1930. The only justifica-
tion I may have for my reticence all this time is that, first, I did
not want to alarm you unduly with reports about a bad situation
in the American League which I hoped would be straightened out
with our own forces, and secondly, I hesitated to present to you
my views of the situation without the other comrades having the
opportunity to be present and give their views. Besides, since 1930,
although we have had some bad periods, we have also had long
stretches when a very satisfactory collaboration among all the
leading comrades was established and the hope created that, by
yielding and compromising on both sides and dropping the smaller
mutual criticisms for the more important common work, the
difficulties would steadily diminish. Here too I emphasize for the
purpose of clarity that these differences, from their very origin,
had absolutely nothing to do with the differences on international
questions which, let us say, exist between us at the present moment.
Unfortunately, at the conference last fall, our internal conflicts
broke out once more. A bad situation was created, particularly
when Cannon insinuated in a speech that I was "another Naville"
or "another Landau." This outrageous accusation was not, of
course, based upon any political line I have pursued in the League
nor upon my conduct, but upon a sentence contained in one of
your last year's letters to me in which you speak of my so-called
"hesitations" concerning Naville or Landau, I do not recall off-
hand. Now, after my return from Europe, the situation has only
become worse. To the disputes we had had before in our leading
committee has now been "grafted on," so to speak, the "interna-
tional questions," in such a manner as to cover up entirely the
original source of our friction here. I must tell you frankly that it
is not so difficult for some comrades here to vote 100 percent sup-
port to the views of the Russian Opposition in any country in the
world without reflection— and in some cases while expressing
contrary views in private conversations— so long as it does not
obligate them to any particular steps at home. You have frequently
commented upon this phenomenon in your writings, this "radi-
calism for export purposes," this sort of "revolutionary dumping."
We have some of it here.
The outcome of this situation has been that at our last meet-
ing particularly (concerning an incident about which I have drawn
up a statement for the minutes, which will be sent to you), I was
172 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
suddenly denounced by Cannon for "organizing a faction of the
youth against the National Committee"— an absolutely false and
groundless statement— and once more called in "polite language"
an American Naville, or Landau, or both. Now, you are aware,
comrade Trotsky, that I have always tried to express my opinion
on both these questions frankly. Where I was hesitant in making
up my mind, I stated it. At no time— and certainly not now— have I
supported, politically or organizationally, either the Landau or
the Naville faction. I was, in fact, the comrade who delivered the
report against them at our national conference. If I were support-
ing them, I would say so and present my point of view openly. But
that has never been the case. At present, however, comrade Can-
non has further proclaimed the necessity of conducting an open
"campaign" against the so-called "alien elements" in the League,
in spite of his acknowledgment that the League will in the mean-
time be set back and weakened.
Naturally, when I am under so disgraceful an attack and
accusation as that I am another Naville or Landau, made by two
leading comrades, the basis for a fruitful collaboration is sharply
reduced. And the whole business is based upon what I consider a
disloyal tearing from their context of certain sentences contained
in your recent letters to America. It is unfortunate that certain
paragraphs from these letters have been made the foundation for
such factional attacks which can only result in counteracting the
few years of effective work which we conducted in this country
and to which I sought to contribute as much as I could, while oth-
ers who now accuse me so violently were in comfortable retire-
ment. I am a revolutionist (not since yesterday) whose main
capacities lie in speaking and writing, and I have never made
pretensions to any other title. But I am not a "journalistic revolu-
tionary" a la Naville and Landau, and those who start such a
campaign will not be believed by the comrades here with whom I
have worked for years since the Opposition was founded and for
years before that in the Party.
I repeat that it is not a pleasant subject to write about now,
but "the flask is uncorked, the wine must be drunk." I hope that
you will understand the position into which I have been forced
here against my will. I want also to repeat, so far as our relations
are concerned, that my greatest desire, to use your own words, is
"trotz der wichtigen Meinungsverschiedenheiten, daB unsere
Bad Situation in League 1 73
Kampfgemeinschaft und Freundschaft auch weiterhin unerschut-
terlich bleiben wird" ["that our collaboration in struggle and our
friendship will remain unshakable despite our important differ-
ences of opinion"]. I cannot possibly overestimate their value to
me and I want to do all I can to maintain them.
2. Enclosed is another letter to you about Radek and one for com-
rade Frankel.311 The "China book" is finally on the press and will
appear soon. It is a masterful collection and I am tremendously
proud of it. Allow me also to express my unlimited pleasure at
reading the first volume of The History of the Russian Revolution.
Like all the comrades who have been lucky enough to get and read
the book (it is expensive, and we are in a crisis!), we look forward
expectantly to the second volume. Eastman tells me that it is even
superior to the first. The publishers have put on a tremendous
advertising campaign for the book. I am sure it will easily outstrip
the autobiography in a very short time.
3. I have written an article for a bourgeois paper under a false
name, concerning you and your exile in Turkey. It is based upon
my own recollections of an unforgettable visit and the material
which you gave to comrade Glotzer. You will remember having
spoken to him about the article. It is written in a "demi-bon bour-
geois" manner so as to be acceptable to the capitalist journals.
Comrade Eastman, perhaps through your publishers, will try to
sell it. Perhaps the League will yet get a fair piece of money out of
the affair.
4. About the new book on Germany, I have written to comrade
Frankel. More details as soon as our committee acts on the ques-
tion.312
PS: Our Jewish and our youth comrades are still waiting expect-
antly for a few words of greeting from you to their respective
papers— which are both meeting with moderate success, especially
Unser Kamf.
4> 4> ^
174
Statement on the Situation in the
International Left Opposition
by James P. Cannon
15 March 1932
This statement was submitted to the resident committee on March 15. 31S
Glotzer and Abern voted against it and submitted their own statements;
Shachtman abstained. All three draft statements were submitted to the
nonresident members of the National Committee for a vote. After
Cannon's draft was approved by the NC majority, the April 18 meeting
of the resident committee voted to publish it. Shachtman voted against.
The statement was published in the Militant on 23 April 1932.
By the time the resident committee discussed the issue, the proposals
contained in Trotsky's December 1932 circular had been implemented.
Mill had been removed as I.S. secretary, and the reorganized I.S. had
moved to Berlin.314
The National Committee, having considered and discussed the
most important parts of the material bearing on the present situ-
ation in the International Left Opposition and the French section
in particular, has come to the following conclusions:
1. The most important feature in the internal life of the interna-
tional Opposition in the past two years has been the struggle to
free the movement from the influence of alien elements who para-
lyzed its activities by sterile intrigues, distorted its principles in
practical application, and hampered its development as the guid-
ing force of the proletarian vanguard. We are and have been fully
convinced of the progressive and revolutionary quality of the
struggle for these ends which has been led by comrade Trotsky. It
has been an unavoidable and necessary stage in the preparation
of the International Left Opposition to fulfill its great historic
tasks. The National Committee is in full solidarity with the esti-
mate of this struggle and the perspectives of the International Left
Opposition outlined in the circular letter of comrade Trotsky under
the date of 22 December 1931.
Cannon Statement on ILO 1 75
2. The correctness and necessity of this struggle to purge the move-
ment of alien elements is demonstrated, among other things, by
the positive results in the German section after the liquidation of
the worthless intrigues of Landau and the freeing of the section
for its actual revolutionary tasks. The leadership of the German
section, which has taken shape in the struggle against Landau and
his sterile factional regime, must be given all possible international
assistance and support in its tremendous responsibilities and
opportunities. The necessity of the struggle for internal renova-
tion is shown with no less force— although in a negative manner—
by the present state of affairs in France. The demoralization there
ensues directly from the fact that the two-year struggle has not
been brought to a conclusion.
3. In our opinion the present situation in the French Ligue— which
ought to be a matter of grave concern to the entire international
Opposition— is not a new one. We regard it rather as the rear end
of the struggle to clear the section of the influence of unassimilable
and careerist elements, which has been unduly prolonged. The
task there, as we see it, is not to seek a solution of the crisis from
the standpoint of the episodic questions and differences. This only
blurs the real issue. What is necessary is a decisive course toward
the liquidation of the crisis by a firm stand against the represen-
tatives of the disintegrating tendencies. Among these we count
the leaders of the Jewish Group, and we particularly condemn their
attempt to set up a nationality group as a faction within the Ligue
and their resignation from the National Committee in the name
of such a group. Such methods and practices are incompatible
with Communist organization. No less harmful in the drawn-out
internal crisis of the Ligue have been the ambiguous and diplo-
matic maneuvers of Naville, against which we have recorded our-
selves in our previous resolution.315 In our opinion it is most nec-
essary for the French Ligue to bring the internal controversy to a
conclusion, to draw clear and precise lines, and make a selection
on that basis.
4. The proposal of comrade Trotsky for the reorganization of the
International Secretariat by constituting it out of representatives
of the most important sections who will be responsible to their
sections is the most feasible plan under the circumstances. As
the experience of the past few years has shown, the international
176 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Opposition has not vet developed to the point where a secretariat
based on the selection of persons— free from accountabilitv to the
respective sections— could fulfill the office. The secretariat must
become a responsible body standing above the intrigues and help-
ing to liquidate them. We are of the opinion that comrade Mill
misused the office of international secretary and erred fatallv bv
identifying himself with the factional struggle in the French Ligue
against the leadership. Thereby he helped to negate the whole pro-
gressive struggle against Landau-Xaville-Rosmer and, at the same
time, undermined the authority and discredited the International
Secretariat. The reorganization of the secretariat as a responsible
bodv will help to shield it against such a fate bv rendering it less
susceptible to personal moods and vacillations.
5. The difficulties of distance, etc., make a timely and effective
participation of the American League in the internal questions
of the European sections extremely difficult and preclude alto-
gether any pretensions on our part to plav a leading role in their
solution. We must not undertake that. Nevertheless we consider it
desirable to participate more directly in the work of the Interna-
tional Secretariat through an elected representative and the
National Committee will propose to select such a representative
of the American League as soon as possible. It is necessary to
acknowledge a slackness in our international activities and duties,
the nature of which and its basic causes have been accurately
described in comrade Trotsky's circular letter. In order for our
League to be useful in the solution of the internal problems of
the European sections, and to educate itself in internationalism
in the process, it must firmly organize a collective participation.
The National Committee as a whole must familiarize itself with
the international questions and bring a collective judgment to bear
upon them. The most important material must be translated and
supplied to the League membership for information and discus-
sion. The progressive elements in all sections, which are struggling
for the liquidation of circle psychology, sterile intellectualism, and
worthless factional intrigues, and for the consolidation of genu-
inely revolutionary cadres, must be assured at every step that they
have a conscious and resolute ally in the American League.
177
Draft Statement on International Questions
by Albert Glotzer316
15 March 1932
When it was first submitted to the resident committee on February 3,
Cannon moved to accept this draft as the basis for a National Committee
statement, with some additional points that he would incorporate. The
motion passed, with Shachtman voting against and Abern abstaining.
But when the resident committee considered the question again on March
15, Glotzer refused to accept Cannon's edited statement and resubmitted
his original.
Glotzer condemns the action of the Spanish section, which, despite
Mill's removal as I.S. secretary, had nominated him to be their represen-
tative on the new I.S. At the resident committee meeting on February 3,
Shachtman voted against a motion to condemn the Spanish section for
this act.
1. The National Committee of the Communist League of America
endorses and accepts the general contents and perspectives for
the International Left Opposition contained in the letter of com-
rade Trotsky (dated 22 December 1931) addressed to all national
sections affiliated to the ILO.
2. The international situation, at the center of which stands Ger-
many, offers good prospects for growth of the Left Opposition.
Thus far the growth of the national sections has been a slow one.
The reasons for this are in part due to the objective conditions.
They were also due to the composition of the national sections
which have in great measure acted as forces standing in the way
of healthy development of the Left Opposition (Urbahns, Landau,
Naville, etc.).
3. This process of clarifying and purifying the ranks of the Inter-
national Left Opposition is by no means completed. There
continue to remain remnants of such elements in the LO,
particularly in France. We regard as absolutely essential a liquida-
tion of all remnants of the past and those arising now that stand
178 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
in the way of a healthy development. We consider the struggle of
the Jewish Group of the French Ligue against its leadership as a
false one that plays into the hands of the Landau-Naville-Rosmer
group. In this sense we reject the role played by the secretary of
the International Secretariat as one acting contrary to the inter-
ests of the ILO. Any attempt to consider small and nonprincipled
questions as the basis for the dispute in the French Ligue would
be totally incorrect. Such a conception overlooks one of the main
fundamental questions confronting the whole International Left
Opposition: the purging of its ranks of all alien elements and the
development of genuine Opposition cadres.
4. In this situation the International Secretariat could have played
an enormous role. It failed to do so. Instead it injected itself as a
factional instrument in the struggle against the leadership of the
French Ligue, thus negating the struggle that that leadership car-
ried on for two years against Landau-Naville-Rosmer and giving
the latter direct aid in their struggle against the line of the Inter-
national Left Opposition. We are in entire agreement with the pro-
posal of comrade Trotsky on the reorganization of the secretariat.
We consider that this is the best way possible to effect a stronger
center of the International Left Opposition. But to merely accept
this proposal is insufficient. Such a proposal must be carried out.
In this sense we consider the action of the Spanish section in
selecting a non-Spanish representative for their organization, after
formally accepting the proposal of comrade Trotsky, to be carry-
ing out their acceptance incorrectly and approaching the questions
confronting the Left Opposition from a factional viewpoint.
The reorganization of the secretariat and its strengthening there-
from will help toward a general strengthening of the entire Left
Opposition.
5. The National Committee considers it desirable to participate
in the work of the International Secretariat through an active rep-
resentative. We are in favor of the election of a representative of
the American League to the I.S. and the NC shall proceed to
realize this requirement at the earliest possible moment.
6. The National Committee considers the acceptance and carry-
ing out of the proposals of comrade Trotsky as a step in the right
direction toward building the International Left Opposition on a
more solid foundation.
179
Draft Statement on the ILO
by Martin Abern317
15 March 1932
This statement was submitted by Abern to the resident committee. In
subsequent voting by the National Committee it was endorsed by Maurice
Spector
The International Left Opposition, because of objective and
subjective circumstances, has not had a rapid growth and devel-
opment. The factors objectively are maturing more quickly, par-
ticularly in Germany, for a strengthening of the International Left
Opposition. Internally, the process of clarification and unification
is far from completed. In various countries there existed for years
Opposition groups which never had anything in common with
Bolshevism and only compromised the Left Opposition by sym-
pathy for it. The Paz group in France is outstanding in this respect.
Urbahns in Germany is another. Methods introduced by Landau
into the International Left Opposition were obstacles to its devel-
opment. It is necessary to dispose finally and in a principled
manner of the issues, basic or secondary, involved in the disputes
with Naville and others. For the most part, Naville's position is
unknown to the American comrades; of such as we are aware
ambiguity is noticeable.
Outstanding is the need of the formation of an International
Secretariat capable of disseminating information to the sections
of the International Left Opposition and to develop as a guide to
it. The existing International Secretariat has not served the desired
purpose. It would be most desirable to have an International Sec-
retariat which has been elected through the medium of another
international conference of the Left Opposition. Pending this and
the required preliminary measures, developments, discussions, and
clarification which are needed before the convening of such a
conference, an International Secretariat in which the leading
sections are represented by delegates elected by the specific national
sections should be constituted. The American League should take
180 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
steps to be represented at the earliest moment by such a represen-
tative. Any other form of contact for purposes of information or
participation in the life of the International Left Opposition is
obviously unsatisfactory and deprives the American League of a
need and duty.
^ 4> 4-
A Definite Conflict of Views
Letter by Arne Swabeck to the
International Secretariat and Leon Trotsky318
2 April 1932
With this letter Swabeck enclosed Shachtman 's statement on Swabeck 's
article "Uphold Our Revolutionary Classics!" as well as the reply he
and Cannon had drafted, dated 22 March 1932. The reply, "Internal
Problems of the CLA, " was submitted to the resident committee on April
4 and subsequently published in CLA Internal Bulletin no. 3 (July
1932).M9 In it, Cannon and Swabeck explained:
The strength of the American section of the Opposition, and its advan-
tages over a number of the European sections-as we have maintained
against many critics (Weisbord, Carter, and others) who saw the thing
upside down-consisted in the homogeneous group, trained and prepared
by years of struggle, as a single faction, in the Party. The leading group,
which had been assembled over a period of years in the Party struggles,
was united by a community of opinions on the concrete questions of
domestic policy as well as by an accord with the fundamental prin-
cipled line of the International Left Opposition. It was this experience
and this general homogeneity which gave the leadership an exceptional
authority and enabled it to guide the organization firmly; to reduce
capitulationism to insignificance and to liquidate oppositional attempts
without crises and without even serious internal disturbances (Fox,
Weisbord, Malkin).
But during this whole period, in which a general external unanim-
ity was displayed, the organization became aware, from time to time, of
alarming frictions luithin the National Committee which gave the
impression of personal quarrels. This state of off airs was signalized by
the disruption of the work of the committee for several months after the
first conference in 1929, by protracted abstentions on the part of
Conflict of Views 181
individual members, and especially by an open conflict at the second
conference over the selection of the new NC. 320
The facts which were known gave rise to uneasiness and dissatisfac-
tion among the members, and to demands for an explanation of the
political reasons for the friction. To all such demands the members of
the committee answered that there were no serious differences on ques-
tions of the League policy. And this answer was not a deception of the
organization, as some comrades charged. Episodic disputes, of course,
occurred quite frequently, and at times there were heated discussions,
but when it came to the actual formulation of the committee's position
on the important questions, we found a common language. This was
the case at the First National Conference in 1929; at the plenum in the
spring of 1930; and in the resolutions presented to the Second National
Conference in August 1931.
In spite of that, the delegates to the second conference witnessed a
struggle over the new NC, initiated by comrade Shachtman 's attempt
to change its composition, which they were obliged to decide. From the
acrimony of this dispute it became obvious there to the conference del-
egates, and especially to us, that the unity of the committee was by no
means as firm as the unanimous political resolutions seemed to indi-
cate. Nevertheless we assured the delegates of our confidence that the
conflicts would be overcome in the course of common work and com-
radely discussion without plunging into a crisis.
These hopes were not realized. We have not been able to construe the
conduct of comrade Shachtman since the conference otherwise than as
a series of blows to the organization. And finally, at the meeting of the
NC held on 15 March 1932, comrade Shachtman presented a docu-
ment couched in such terms and filled with such accusations against
us as to preclude the possibility of harmonious collaboration. Rejecting
our proposals for a prior discussion of the questions within the commit-
tee, comrade Shachtman had already gone outside the committee with
this attack. It has become the material for a factional campaign in the
New York branch on the part of comrades who have been at odds with
the NC right along. Comrades Abern and Glotzer have associated them-
selves with this document of comrade Shachtman. As a result of all this
it is obvious that the organization is placed, before a situation which
cannot be solved by the committee itself. Nothing remains but to submit
the disputes to the organization as a whole and, simultaneously, to trans-
mit the material to the other sections.*21
The document went on to insist, "No grown-up communist will
believe for a moment that a National Committee of more or less experi-
enced people can be disrupted overnight for the sake of a remote historical
dispute or an insult to a comrade. The situation can become comprehen-
sible only if the real causes are laid bare. " While thoroughly refuting
182 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Shachtman's obfuscations regarding the Engels introduction, Cannon
and Swabeck explained that the dispute centered on the following issues:
1. The position of our League on the struggle within the International
Left Opposition for the consolidation of revolutionary cadres and the
break with alien elements and tendencies which stood in the way of this
consolidation.
2. The conclusions and lessons to be drawn from this international
struggle of the past three years. And, organically connected with the
first two-
3. The attitude of the leadership of the League toward various
nonrevolutionary and intellectualistic tendencies in the New York
branch. 322
I am enclosing herewith several documents which as they stand
are self-explanatory, and I will therefore in this letter add only a
few comments as to the reason for their appearance.
There are two main documents, one signed by comrade
Shachtman and one signed by comrade Cannon and myself. We
beg you to excuse the fact that the latter, the document signed by
us, is so lengthy; but that was unavoidable, as we found it neces-
sary to discuss an accumulation of issues. One of these issues is
our difference of views with comrade Shachtman on the situation
within various sections of the International Left Opposition. From
our document you will notice that these differences are not merely
of today, but began over a year ago. However, these issues and
differences in the past were not so clear, hence we had hopes, kept
alive by many personal as well as formal discussions and conces-
sions made on our part, that the differences could be ironed out
in the normal course of development. These hopes had not entirely
vanished, even after comrade Shachtman's recently more outspo-
ken views on disputes within the European sections. But with the
presentation of comrade Shachtman's statement, to which ours is
an answer, the differences have assumed the form of a definite
conflict of views, which cannot be solved without a complete
political discussion and decision by our League membership.
I am also enclosing three drafts for resolution by our National
Committee on the international question. This is merely for the
purpose of further information, as the one marked "Draft by
Cannon" is the adopted resolution, the committee members not
residing in New York having since recorded their vote. It may seem
strange that responsible committee members can arrive at a point
Conflict of Views 183
where as many as three drafts need be submitted and voted upon
for a final resolution— all three, at least formally, endorsing the
views of comrade Trotsky's circular letter of 22 December 1931.
Comrade Cannon and myself were of the opinion that mere
endorsement of the views of the circular letter was not sufficient,
but that we should also endeavor to formulate a precise attitude to
the questions raised and to the principled issues of conflict within
the European sections. In that it appeared that we had the agree-
ment also of comrade Glotzer. He voted with us for a combination
of the two original drafts submitted by himself and by comrade
Cannon. Hence the resolution marked "Draft by Cannon," and now
adopted, was really this combination. But since the presentation
of the statement by comrade Shachtman, we noticed that comrade
Glotzer changed his views and reverted to his original draft. Com-
rade Shachtman voted against all three draft resolutions and,
strangely, although both comrades Glotzer and Abern at least for-
mally endorse the views of comrade Trotsky's circular letter, they
found it possible to associate themselves with comrade Shachtman's
statement.
Comrade Cannon and myself, in agreement with other com-
rades, have taken the initiative in proposing that these documents
be submitted to the membership for their discussion and decision
upon all of the issues raised. We also wish to assure you that we
will sincerely endeavor, while this discussion takes place, to keep
the League functioning normally in its external work, even though
it means for a number of comrades the assuming of double duties
and double burdens.
We shall keep you informed about all further developments
around the conflicting issues within our League, with the object
of presenting every step contemplated to our international move-
ment for its judgment.
^ ^ ^
184
On the Motion for a Plenary
Session of the NC
by Max Shachtman323
4 April 1932
Shachtman appended this statement to the minutes of the resident
committee meeting of April 4, where Cannon and Swabeck proposed that
Shachtman 's statement on Swabeck 's article, along with their reply, be
submitted to the membership for discussion with the perspective of holding
an early national conference. Shachtman insisted instead that a National
Committee plenum be held as soon as possible. With Glotzer and Abern *s
support, Shachtman 's motion carried. The committee agreed to distribute
the material immediately to the nonresident NC members and poll them
about holding a plenum.
The aim of the Cannon-Swabeck statement, tacitly avowed at
the resident committee meeting, is to split the League, as rapidly
as physically possible, and at that on a basis devoid of genuine
principles or true facts. This will be more than adequately proved
in the coming discussion.
A split in the League may be unavoidable— particularly in view
of the reckless determination of its initiators, but that remains for
others besides Cannon and Swabeck to decide. After three years
of deliberate concealment of the disputes in the National Com-
mittee and even the persistent denial of their existence, nothing
but the most conscientious preparation and guidance of the now-
more-than-ever necessary open discussion in the membership can
obviate the setback which Cannon and Swabeck are seeking to
impose upon the League.
A split is the most radical and sharpest method of resolving
the disputes. At the very least, therefore, it is the full National
Committee that should first discuss the problem exhaustively and
take the full responsibility for what is to happen. To attempt this
by correspondence and not by a full meeting of the whole com-
mittee is totally inadequate. It reduces the nonresident members
to the rank of ordinary League members, with no decisive direct-
Shachtman on Plenum 185
ing voice and vote. Three years ago, in 1929, when the committee's
internal disputes were of a much milder and embryonic nature, a
plenary committee meeting was called in New York.324 By the same
token, such a meeting is even more necessary today. More, at the
last conference Cannon pointed to comrades Dunne, Skoglund,
and Oehler as those who were not directly involved in the disputes
and whose objectivity would be invaluable for the committee and
the League in the event of internal friction. That being so, their
presence and decisive (not letter-writing) participation in this vital
and fundamental question is required now more than ever. Else
they must become more or less passive onlookers to the speedy
splitting of the League by C-S.
It is objected that the "differences are so irreconcilable" that
a plenum cannot solve them. In that sense, neither will the planned
conference "solve them," for Cannon and Swabeck construe this
conference as the consecration of the split, as the place where
the organization will virtually be confronted with a fait accompli.
The full NC is the responsible leader of the organization— not the
bare 50 percent of it which the resident committee constitutes. It
must take full responsibility, therefore, for so serious a step as a
split, if that is how it decides. It must issue or try to issue the basic
document upon which the discussion should be organized. It must
organize and regulate the discussion. Otherwise, it should acknowl-
edge its fictitious and decorative character or its purely consultative
function and no more.
A plenum will "cost money" and the expense will be "dupli-
cated" by the subsequent conference. The argument is worthless.
Such considerations might have weight if some "routine matter"
were involved. What is involved, it should be emphasized, is the
splitting of the League.
Let others talk loftily about "formalities." But the best inter-
ests of the Opposition will be subserved by this procedure: The
plenum must meet immediately. It must seek to draw up the basic
documents. It must arrange for the discussion in a responsible
manner. It must allow adequate time not only for the League to
discuss, but for the intervention of all the national sections and
particularly comrade Trotsky. To act otherwise shows either light-
mindedness or significant, impatient haste— the attempt to make
good, at a convenient "conjuncture," for the neglect and conceal-
ment of the past.
186
Statement on Holding Plenum
by James P. Cannon325
4 April 1932
Cannon appended the following statement to the April 4 resident
committee minutes. In a letter to Dunne penned a few days later. Cannon
argued that Dunne and Skoglund should agree to a plenum, despite the
financial hardship involved:
Since the committee meeting we have talked with a few of the most
responsible members of the branch here and they seem to favor the idea
of a plenum before the conference on the ground that it may give the
others a final opportunity to retreat a bit before it is too late. We have
no reason to be opposed to this, as long as it does not convey the idea of
leaving things where they are now.526
Dunne. Skoghuid, and Oehler voted for a plenum. In a subsequent
letter to Dunne. Cannon wrote:
We want the plenum to express itself definitely and firmly on every
question that has been raised in the documents already presented, and
others which will no doubt supplement them. We cannot promise that
the plenum will solve the crisis, but it will take the first and most neces-
sary step toward that solution by letting the organization know who's
who and what's what.STi
The holding of a plenum prior to the opening of the discus-
sion would, of course, be the normal procedure and would present
certain advantages. The question remains whether the out-of-town
members can overcome the phvsical and material difficulties in-
volved in view of the fact that another journev will be necessitated
soon afterward for the conference. The nonresident members
themselves must sav the deciding word on the question.
It is quite obvious that the disputes are of such a nature that
they must be handed over to the organization for decision. For
this a conference, preceded by a thorough discussion in the
branches, is necessary. To delay the discussion and the conference
very long would condemn the League to demoralization. These
disputes cannot be left undecided. The protracted crisis in the
French Ligue is a warning example in this respect.
Real Basis of Differences 187
If the nonresident members of the committee can see their
way clear to attend both a plenum and a conference, then they
should decide to hold the plenum at an early date.
<► 4> ^
The Real Basis of Our Differences
Letter by Albert Glotzer to Leon Trotsky328
5 April 1932
This is excerpted from a letter that also dealt with Glotzer 's recent national
tour and the financial problems of Unser Kamf, the CLA's Yiddish paper
launched in January.
I come now to the more important question of our internal
situation. It is without hesitation that I write because what trans-
pired at last night's meeting of the National Committee demands
that I write this to you. Comrades Cannon and Swabeck introduced
a lengthy statement on the situation in the League that without
equivocation proposes a split in the organization. Comrade
Shachtman charged them with deliberately fostering such an
action— to which neither comrade Cannon nor Swabeck made any
denial.
What are the circumstances that brought this about? And since
when has the American League an internal situation? I am pre-
pared now to write at length on this question. Before I do this,
however, I want to make an apology for my part. I refer to my
deliberate failure to report such a situation during my stay in
Kadikoy. I recognize that no greater error or crime was commit-
ted on my part either to the organization or yourself. I am pre-
pared to suffer any consequences because of this— reflecting upon
it I am ready to admit that this was a gross error. Even more so,
since you twice directed questions to me revolving around this
question and both times I denied that we had any internal situa-
tion in the American League. The reasons for my actions in
Kadikoy find their basis in America. You recall that I left for
Europe immediately after the conference. Before my departure the
entire National Committee discussed the matter. An agreement
I - - CLA 1931-33: The Fight
was reached that I was not to bring these problems before vou for
two reasons: one. not to cause vou any undue alarm: secondly I and
this is the reason for the first >, because we felt that it was possible
to render a solution to the questions here in the States without
carrying it out further. It was with this understanding; that I left
and it appeal's that I abided bv this decision onlv too well. There
is no question in my mind, however, that this was an error— not
onlv because the situation is what it is now. I assure vou that I felt
extremely uncomfortable since the conference because of this, and
now that it is quite clear that we are unable to find a solution to
our internal problem among ourselves, it is necessarv that the
whole matter be opened up and a solution found in that manner.
Our efforts to cover up the situation onlv acted as a cancer upon
our movement.
The situation opened anew with the now famous "Carter
issue." The minutes of the National Committee and comrade
Shachtman's statement undoubtedly acquainted you with this. In
answer to comrade Shachtman's statement Cannon and Swab
iiuroduced last night a statement that pretends to discuss the whole
situation: its history, past, and present. The document, over 5
pages typewritten double-spaced, revolves around two points:
C arter and the international questions. Around these two points
die two comrades propose to discuss the : U situation. Both of
them arc false. And why? Because the differences date back
not to the fust international conference, not to the Landau and
Naville struggles, but even before comrade Shachtman made his
first trip to Europe: vc>. even prior to our first conference which
launched the International Left Opposition hi the States.
We do not regard the Carter incident in the light that Cannon
and Swabeck do. We proposed to settle that problem in itself. The
two comrades refused— and have made it a central issue charging
that comrades Shachtman. Abern. and myself have organized or
support a faction against the NC on the "worst possible basis, the
vouth." I regard this as a false and dishonest argument. On the
question of the international "differences." how do these comra
account for the following: Neither comrades Spector. Abern. nor
myself are in agreement with Shachtman on the French question
we do not regard that Shachtman has fundamental differences
on international questions I, yet we find ourselves in agreement
on everything else confronting the American League. What
Real Basis of Differences 189
comrade Cannon and, along with him, comrade Swabeck contend
is the following: that our differences began on international ques-
tions, and that these are the decisive questions and govern the
whole situation. We reject this position as a dishonest attempt at
an examination of our differences and a purely factional misuse
of the letter that you sent comrade Shachtman in criticism of his
views on the French situation. It was on the basis of this letter
that comrade Swabeck told me following my return that it would
have been best to inform you about the situation here! Why so?
Because they thought that because of this letter they would be able
to make false use of it against us. What their intentions really are
is the following: to divert attention from the real questions to those
of secondary, third- and fourth-rate importance or bearing on the
American questions. Even if it were true that international ques-
tions were the decisive ones in preventing a collaboration, would
that then be the basis for a split, as their statement indicates? I
don't believe so. But in order to sketch briefly the real basis of
our differences, I will in the following pages give you a brief resume
of the history of our internal situation from the period of our
existence as an organization of the Left Opposition.
Our expulsion and first conference gave a mighty impulse to
the American Opposition. The conference established the left on
an organized plane, laid the plans for the building of a print shop
and the issuance of a weekly Militant, and generally began to broaden
our activities in an organized manner. Comrade Cannon was elected
national secretary of the Left Opposition in America. Following
the conference there was a lapse in the administrative work of the
League. Communications remained unanswered; connections were
lost because of a failure in the central directive organ. There was a
general retrogression in our ranks. I was then living in Chicago and
a member of the National Committee. After a period of months we
learned that comrade Shachtman was the new editor of the Mili-
tant and comrade Abern secretary of the League. I should add that
comrade Cannon was not only secretary but elected editor as well.
With this change I protested to the New York committee, because
these changes were made without consultation with the full com-
mittee, and confronted them with a demand for an explanation not
only of these changes but also with regard to the poor functioning
of the center— the lack of directives, communications, and a weak-
ening of the drive for the weekly Militant.
190 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
It was on the basis of my protests that I was able to learn that
the situation in the center was a precarious one. I should add that
during this period Cannon was experiencing personal difficulties
which did have an effect on him. But this in no way excuses his
position at the time. He was advancing prior to the conference
reasons why the conference should not be held. He was literally
forced by the other comrades to come to Chicago for the confer-
ence which was to initiate the Left Opposition as an organization
in the States. He came to the conference unprepared for the great
tasks that confronted it. Following the conference he failed to carry
through the work assigned him— which resulted in a definite decline
of the organization after its splendid start at the first conference.
Upon the protests of comrades Spector, Abern, and Shachtman
for his failure to commit his duties in a proper fashion, Cannon
reacted personally to their comradely protests and requests, charg-
ing them at the same time with factional aims! He broke with com-
rade Spector, whom we consider our leading theoretician, calling
him a "Pepper." This situation was overcome and the work pro-
ceeded without much aid from comrade Cannon, who, it must be
remembered, was considered the leader of the movement. And it
should be borne in mind that during this period the drive for the
printing plant and the weekly Militant was in progress.
The situation remained unchanged. Comrades Abern and
Shachtman continued to carry through the drive for the weekly.
Spector in the meantime returned to Canada primarily because of
the internal difficulties and the economic pressure confronting him
in Xew York. The weeklv was finallv launched. Comrade Cannon
was conspicuous bv absence. He was not to be seen when the first
issue of the weeklv appeared. We considered this the greatest
achievement of the American Opposition. For a period of two months,
during the most trying days of the weekly, comrade Cannon was absent.
We tried during all this time to obtain an explanation from Cannon,
since on political questions there was apparent unanimitv. Com-
rade Swabeck, who was acquainted with the situation, tried to
explain it away by declaring that this was just one of comrade
Cannon's moods. But even comrade Swabeck, who remained
Cannon's staunchest supporter since the inception of the Opposi-
tion in this country, declared in the presence of comrade Shachtman
and two Chicago comrades that it might be necessary to expel
Cannon unless he turned about-face. It is not necessary for me to
Real Basis of Differences 191
add that this was not our position. Toward the end of the year 1929
comrade Shachtman and comrade Abern made the following pro-
posal to the full committee: that comrade Shachtman shall go to
see comrade Trotsky with the aim of establishing direct contact
with him, establishing also contact with the European Oppositions,
and obtain aid from the former for the weekly which was then
experiencing its first difficulties. Comrade Cannon opposed this
question entirely. He explained his position as follows: We could
not carry on with the weekly and it was necessary to retreat. And
that he, Cannon, was opposed to any financial aid because that
was a form of subsidy and subsidies were the basis for the bureau-
cratic degeneration in the Comintern— we must not become a party
to such methods. If we cannot carry the weekly without help from
comrade Trotsky, then we should retrench and go back to a semi-
monthly or a monthly. Not one member of the committee con-
curred in the position of Cannon. Swabeck alone had reservations
and wavered, but even he voted for Shachtman to go across. Every
other member of the committee voted likewise. Why? Because it
was apparent that the weekly Militant was our big arm in the
struggle and must be maintained, if possible; that we should not
give it up so quickly if there are possibilities of saving it.
When the full committee decided that comrade Shachtman
should go across, I was called to New York to replace Shachtman
in the national office. Upon my arrival in New York, I had occa-
sion to speak to comrade Cannon even prior to speaking to the
other comrades. He asked me why I supported the position that
comrade Shachtman shall go to Europe. I told him then that the
main question for us was the maintenance of the weekly Militant
and secondly that in this manner we would be able to establish
for the first time connections with both comrade Trotsky and the
international sections of the Opposition. Comrade Cannon then
raised once more the question of subsidy— and declared that he
could not subscribe to such an act. He was opposed to subsidy—
that it was necessary that we retreat and give up the weekly. Upon
my reply to his question as to who would be left in charge of the
national office during Shachtman's absence, that Abern would
handle it, Cannon replied that this was impossible since comrade
Abern, not having a political stable opinion from one day to the
next, could not do this. I should add that during this whole period
Cannon still stood aloof from the organization and did not give it
192 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
the benefit of his aid. I should also add that in the period that
Abern was in charge of the national office, it enjoyed one of its
best periods. Comrade Abern is an old revolutionist of high stand-
ing in the movement for his extreme devotion and abilities. That
was the first intimation directly that I had with regard to what
comrade Cannon thought during this time. At the next meeting
of the National Committee at which we made the final decision
for Max to leave, Cannon made a statement of the following char-
acter: By the decision for Shachtman to go across you make
it impossible for me to collaborate! And during Shachtman's
absence, Cannon made good this declaration. He refused to
collaborate in this period when we were in need of help and facing
great difficulties.
The period following comrade Shachtman's return from
Europe was one in which all our efforts were spent in trying to
maintain the weekly Militant— efforts made without support from
comrade Cannon. We failed to do this with the result that we
returned for a time to the semimonthly, although not one of us
gave up the thought of returning at the first opportunity to the
weekly. Matters internally did not improve. Spector, who came to
New York to function as editor while Shachtman went on tour,
was forced once more because of economic difficulties to return
to Canada. We found it impossible to bring about meetings of the
National Committee. In search of a temporary aid to this situa-
tion, comrade Shachtman proposed to co-opt three comrades of
the New York branch to serve as members of the committee and
in that way perhaps build a functioning center. This carried
through with the vote of every member of the National Commit-
tee with the exception of comrade Cannon. But it should be added
that this act helped to prevent a complete collapse of the organi-
zation. Upon our insistence a full plenary meeting of the National
Committee was called (May 1930) to discuss one question: the
problem of the relationships between comrade Cannon on the
one hand and Shachtman, Abern, Spector, and myself on the
other.329 WTe were of the opinion that perhaps a full meeting would
help to solve the problem. It failed to do so! Comrade Cannon
acknowledged that he was in some respects wrong, but that he was
misunderstood', the comrades did not take into consideration his
personal conditions; that we were too violent; summing up in all
his remarks the need of a retreat. All our efforts at this plenum
Real Basis of Differences 193
were directed at trying to create a situation in which collabora-
tion was possible. We succeeded for a few weeks after the plenum
in reaching such a condition. But it did not last. Cannon reverted
once more to his old antics. The whole period following the ple-
num was the lowest reached by the organization. I am ready to
say that if it were not for the lone, individual efforts of comrade
Shachtman, who in that period acted as secretary, editor, office
manager, and whatnot, the center would never have existed. Our
financial conditions were such that we could not keep more than
one comrade in the office. But the lack of collaboration was even
more responsible. Cannon felt that he was treated rudely, his toes
were stepped on, that the comrades did not appreciate his long
service to the movement, etc., etc. With the co-optation of the
three members of the New York branch (among them comrade
Lewit), we managed to pull through this period.
Toward the close of the year 1930, comrade Swabeck notified
us of his intentions to come to New York. We greeted this action
because all of us felt that comrade Swabeck, because of his expe-
rience in the movement and because what we thought at the time
was a certain impartiality, would really be the factor to bring about
a healthy collaboration of the center. But we were sadly disap-
pointed. The first two months of his stay in New York Swabeck
spent trying to convince us all that Cannon was the logical leader
of the American proletariat and we should make allowances, step
back, forget the past, and accept him as the "chief" of the Ameri-
can Opposition. There is no need to add that we had nothing in
common with such a point of view. We did not consider this to be
the problem of the American Opposition. We were more con-
cerned with establishing a functioning center, preparing once more
the ground for the weekly Militant, and expanding our activities.
We did manage to build again a functioning center. Upon our
motion the drive was again made for the weekly Militant. We suc-
ceeded in reestablishing it. Up until the conference there was
apparent collaboration. I should also add that in that year the New
York comrades, up until the eve of the second conference, func-
tioned on the National Committee. Of these comrades, Lewit in
particular distinguished himself by his work on the committee.
He is an old comrade, even though young in years, extremely
capable, and whom we regarded at all times as one of the leading
comrades in our organization.
194 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
The preparations for the conference were made without diffi-
culties. On political questions there was unity. Comrade Shachtman
prepared the political thesis, made the main report of the confer-
ence. The conference went along without much participation from
comrade Cannon. However, under the international report, he
spoke at length. And what was the essence of his remarks: We were
Navilles, Landaus, etc. A purely factional speech, which, we later
learned from Swabeck, was purposely planned. This came very sud-
denly and certainly unexpectedly. But we said nothing about it.
However, in the elections for the incoming National Committee
deep differences arose. In the meeting of the National Committee
where we discussed the membership of the new committee a split
vote occurred. Over what question? Comrade Shachtman nomi-
nated Lewit to be added as a new member to the committee.
Comrades Swabeck and Cannon refused to agree and the confer-
ence stood still while we were trying to arrive at a solution to this
question. What were the arguments against the nomination of
Lewit? From Cannon and Swabeck: In the event of differences on the
committee, Lewit would not vote for Cannon. They stated that they
were unaware of such a proposal from comrade Shachtman,
although in discussing the question of a new committee, I person-
ally mentioned to Swabeck some two months before the confer-
ence of my intentions to propose Lewit, and Shachtman did likewise
to comrade Cannon. The opposition to Lewit was governed purely
by factional considerations by Cannon and Swabeck. We brought
the question into the conference and were defeated.
Since the conference, the situation has not changed. The com-
mittee finds itself at odds. The two comrades are trying to avert a
discussion on the real differences and to falsely turn them onto
the international questions, about which comrade Cannon knows
little. What comrade Cannon originally developed was the theory
of continuity of leadership , which in essence means the exclusion of
new blood on the National Committee. This theory is the
outgrowth of another one: that the Opposition in this country is the
outgrowth, and the logical and necessary outgrowth at that, of the old
Cannon group in the Party. We reject this theory and even fought
over it. We are not the "logical," "historical," nor "necessary" out-
growth of the old Party group. On the contrary— we broke decisively
with the past. We are a Left Opposition today! The birth of the
Cannon group in the Party came about in a split with Foster over
Real Basis of Differences 195
what question? Over the question of the support of the Comintern
decision to institute the right-wing Lovestone group into the lead-
ership of the Party! Yes, and the Cannon group broke on the basis:
that we must support the CI decision. The Cannon group made
unity with Lovestone— !— against the Foster group in the Party, in
order to win the Party to the support of the Comintern decision
which instituted the right wing into leadership! That is our gen-
esis in the Party. We refuse to perpetuate our past. We broke with
it completely— we started anew as a Left Opposition. Then Cannon
developed the question as follows: In the American Opposition
there is a difference between the old, experienced, and tried
comrades and the young, inexperienced comrades who are try-
ing to run away with themselves! This is really an argument that
is supposed to support conservatism. Further, he developed the
argument that in reality our differences are between the proletarian
elements, Cannon and Swabeck, as against the intellectuals,
Spector, Abern, and Shachtman. All of these are disloyal, dishon-
est, and false arguments. But these are the basis for both Cannon
and Swabeck' s conservatism with regard to the weekly Militant,
their hesitancy on the issuance of the Jewish paper which they
regard as a drain upon the organization and not as one of its
strongest features, and their opposition to the issuance of the youth
paper.
These are the questions that always confronted the organiza-
tion: whether or not we should go forward or "retrench," as com-
rade Cannon puts it. And last night they introduced their state-
ment, forgetting the whole past, its difference, and attempting to
discuss the situation in the American Opposition around what:
the Carter article and international questions!
It is with all the foregoing in mind that I have decided to write
you at length. A solution to our problems must take place, but
they will not take place on the basis of the statement of Cannon
and Swabeck, who attempt to forget the history of the American
Opposition, to divert it upon extraneous questions, and who
in essence propose a split. We will fight with all our determina-
tion against such a step and to prevent it. I hope that we shall
be successful.
I have not written with the aim of alarming you. I try to write
soberly about these matters, bearing in mind all the time the
responsibilities to our movement. That I failed to inform you is
196 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
certainly inexcusable and I stand ready to bear responsibility for
it. But I wish now to acquaint you brief lv with the above resume.
There is a great deal more to be said and material likewise that
you should have.
What were the proposals of Cannon and Swabeck at last night's
meeting of the committee? They proposed that we immediately
begin the discussion of the internal situation in the ranks of the
League. This discussion should begin with the publication of an
internal bulletin; the first number to contain their statement, com-
rade Shachtman's statement, the statements of Carter! That then
shall be the basis for a discussion of the internal situation in the
League. We proposed a different method. First that we shall hold
a full plenum meeting in a short few weeks, that the plenum of
the National Committee shall decide how the discussion shall
begin, that the full plenary session shall have a statement on the
situation— so that a proper basis can be given to the discussion.
They would not agree to this proper procedure. It remains now
for the other members of the committee to decide how this dis-
cussion shall proceed: either bv first holding a plenum of the full
committee or to begin the discussion immediately without such a
plenary session.
I do not here take up a number of problems. This letter is
already overlong. I have written this in order to acquaint vou in a
brief manner with some of the more pertinent problems that con-
fronted the organization. There is a great deal more to be said
and I hope that it will not be long before vou can have all the
material before vou— which is extremely necessary in order to
understand how matters stand here.
There is only one other question I wish to take up with vou.
In one of vour interviews vou state in your conclusions on America
that ;ia labor partv is inevitable."3 " This came as a complete
surprise to us since at our last conference we were of the opinion
that this was not so. Our position was based on the first discus-
sions that comrade Shachtman held with vou in Prinkipo and in
line with the position of some of the comrades in the American
League. I should like more information with regard to this ques-
tion, because already the Lovestoneites and Weisbordites are greet-
Report on National Tour 197
ing this change on the part of Trotsky and saying that the Ameri-
can League was caught with its pants down. I would appreciate it
very much if you were to clear this very important question up.
I shall write again in a few days.
^
Report on National Tour
by Albert Glotzer331
11 April 1932
This report on Glotzer's national tour, February 19 through March 13,
was circulated within the CLA and the international.
The tour allowed for a firsthand observation of the situation
in the American Left Opposition, its external political influence,
and its organizational position. What is outstanding is the growth
of the political influence of the Left Opposition everywhere. My
meetings, even those held under adverse conditions, were above
expectation. There is a general growth of sympathy for our move-
ment and it is possible to say that we are slowly breaking through
the crust of isolation from the Communist and revolutionary work-
ers. In a short while, we should be able to count upon a definite
corps of sympathizers and new members for our organization.
Simultaneously with this growth in the political influence of
the Left Opposition, there are weaknesses organizationally that
hinder somewhat the utilization of the improved conditions for
work and transforming them into positive gains. The economic
crisis has played no little role in causing some demoralization in
certain sections of the League. The younger comrades in other
branches are carrying the brunt of the work on their shoulders,
while some of the older comrades play a minor role and others
dropped out of activity entirely.
One of the chief weaknesses of the organization is the absence
of an inner-Party fraction. Nowhere do we have such a function-
ing organ. In addition our connections with the Party are extremely
meager and in many cities we have no connection with it. Our
198 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
contacts are few, with the result that the Left Opposition reflects
little of the Party life and also knows little of what is taking place
in its ranks. It will become all the more necessary in the coming
months to direct a great deal of effort in the creation of such frac-
tions and drawing closer to the Party and its life.
Our press remains the most important activity in the present
stage of our existence. While some improvements are noticeable
generally, the organization has a long way to go toward an
improvement in the circulation of the Militant, Unser Kamf,
Communistes, and Young Spartacus. In consideration of its impor-
tance, the Militant does not enjoy the circulation that it should
and the branches generally do not make sufficient efforts toward
an increase of its subscriptions or bundle sales. While on tour I
found that not one branch was engaged in a planned and concen-
trated drive for the Militant. The bright spot in our publication is
held by Unser Kamf, which demonstrated that it has a definite place
among our publications. Its circulation is increasing constantly and
its growing circle of readers helped to build up our meetings. The
Jewish paper is highly thought of and we will be able to count upon
positive returns in a short time as a result of its publication.
Communistes has a limited field and the majority of the branches
have been unable to participate in its distribution. However, it is
possible that they can help in its circulation in Greek localities.
Young Spartacus likewise does not enjoy the circulation it could
have. A great deal of this is due to the failure of the branches to
give it the necessary attention. But there are good possibilities for
a further extension of its circulation in connection with the devel-
opment of our youth work. On the whole it is necessary to begin
a concerted and uniform drive nationally for our press; perhaps
initiate a drive for the period of one month to build up all of
our publications.
One thing noticeable during the tour was the absence of any
special internal or external campaigns. I held meetings with the
branch executive committees in Boston, Toronto, Chicago, St.
Louis, Minneapolis, and Youngstown. I reported on the tasks of
the branches, taking up with them concrete activities, especially
stressing the need of developing our press activities. We must strive
to narrow the gap between our growing influence and our organi-
zational strength. There is still too great a disparity between them.
It is clear that from the center it will be necessary to strengthen
Report on National Tour 199
the administrative and directive functions. The leadership from
the national office must be multiplied many times through con-
stant communications, direction, and aid to the comrades in
Canada and the United States.
Bostoni The branch is composed of five comrades. Two of the
comrades are extremely active in the Needle Trades Workers
Industrial Union. Almost all of their activity is confined there.
They play a leading role in spite of the efforts of the Party bureau-
crats to isolate and sidetrack them. The two comrades enjoy a good
following among the workers because of the soundness of their
position in their union activity. Our press is sold in the union and
the comrades are able to make our position known to these work-
ers. One other comrade is a shoe worker and also active in her
union. Because of this, the actual branch work and the daily activity
of building the League suffers. It would be well if a comrade could
be sent to Boston who would spend his time in carrying out the
daily tasks of the Opposition in building up a stronger unit and
organizing the general activities of the left. I have in mind comrade
Clarke, who would be able to aid the Boston comrades and
accomplish there, where the base is present, that which he is unable
to do in Kansas City.
My meeting in Boston was a good one. Forty-five were present
in spite of the efforts of the Party to prevent a successful meeting
by calling a "mass banquet" across the street from our meeting.
This naturally acted as a barrier to many sympathizers who might
possibly attend our meeting. The sales of our press are fair. Unser
Kamf, because of the contacts of the comrades, sells better than
the Militant. The sending of a comrade to Boston who is willing
to go there and carry out the daily tasks would make possible an
expansion of our activity in all directions and provide a better
balance in the work.
Montreal: Here we have one comrade who carries the brunt of the
work in representing the Left Opposition. Comrade Geretsky acts
as the literature agent for all our publications and is virtually the
only active comrade for the Opposition in Montreal. He arranged
for the meeting at which over 30 were present, half of them mem-
bers of the Party and Young Communist League. The Party and
the league members participated in the discussion, which helped
to bring about a better clarification of our views. It should be added
200
OLA 1931-33: The Figi I
that the campaign oi the Canadian government to illegalize the
revolutionary movement, while thus far being concentrated in the
Ontario province, is spreading to the other provinces. - This pre-
vented the possibility oi a public meeting and forced the comrade
to organize it semilegallv. Our literature, especially Unser Kamf.
sells well. I do not hold the possibility of the organization of a
branch of the Left Opposition to be an immediate one. Our com-
rade will need help, for example, of the Toronto branch. Alone, in
my opinion, he lacks the necessary experience to do this. But we
can be assured of a representative of the Left Opposition func-
tioning actively in Montreal, a comrade who thus far continues to
enjoy access to Party circles and who is an active member of the
Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union.
Toronto-. My arrival coincided with the sentencing of the leader-
ship of the Party to jail terms and the illegalization of the
movement There is an extreme terror against the working class
and its organizations; the chances for legal activity are few. Our
meeting, organized illegally, nevertheless managed to get an
attendance oi over 50. In my opinion this was an excellent show-
in-, considering the circumstances under which it was held.
However, the drive against the Party and the revolutionary move-
ment in general is a big blow to the working class. It did serve to
draw our movement closer to the Party. The illegalization of the
Party made possible the active participation of the Toronto branch
in its defense and in the defense oi the Party leaders. The willing-
ness of the comrades to aid the Party brought good results. It went
a long wa\ in dispelling false notions of Party members and sym-
pathizers regarding the Left Opposition and helped to an extent
to break down the antagonisms between Party members and sym-
pathizers regarding the Lett Opposition and our comrades. The
presence of comrade Spector at the trial oi the Party leaders, an
act which signified his sohdarity with them and also endangered
himself, plus the participation of the branch in the defense work,
made possible a better relationship. For the first time since our
expulsion, it was possible for our comrades to speak to Party
members and to an extent fraternize with them. It will be neces-
sary now for the branch to organize its activities with the view
of breaking through and functioning under the new underground
conditi >ns.
Report on National Tour 201
The branch, however, showed a number of weaknesses. There
are at present between 12 and 15 members in the branch. The
branch as a whole is not active. They were virtually driven into
participation in the defense of the Party as a unit by comrade
Spector. The failure of a unified activity dates back to the
postconference period. The branch rejected the political theses
of the conference as well as its decisions. This created a condi-
tion where the possibilities of common work between them and
comrade Spector was impossible. They are overcoming this diffi-
culty slowly. Our literature sales, in consideration of the possibili-
ties, are weak. The Militant could be pushed much harder. Unser
Kamf, however, is making good progress. But the youth paper is
given little attention. Generally a real expansion of work is pos-
sible here. Their activity in the defense has brought good results.
They should proceed now with the organization of a youth club
and a Jewish club. They must increase their activities many times.
For Toronto especially, closer direction from the center is needed.
Buffalo: The Proletarian Party Opposition organized our meeting.
Over 50 were present.333 The meeting was excellent. But, since we
have no Opposition branch in this city and no bonafide sympa-
thizer or member, further oppositional activity is questionable.
The Proletarian Opposition members are still a dubious group.
It is my opinion that we can expect little from this quarter.
Chicago: The best meeting of the tour (including New York) was
held here. There were over 150 present at the meeting, which was
marked by its enthusiasm. A banquet was also held at which 35
were present. At a meeting of the executive and the leading com-
rades of the branch, the discussion following my report disclosed
good possibilities for the further extension of work. Chicago is
the only city where we have contacts in the Party. The expulsion
of the three Young Communist League members, who are now
members of the Left Opposition, found the Party carrying out a
strong campaign against us. Instructions were sent to all Party units
to the effect that any Party member found at my meeting would
face expulsion. These and other means were employed to prevent
a successful meeting. The branch is now working on the organi-
zation of its Party fractional activities and the organization
generally enjoys good prospects for development. The internal
situation is not good. A number of old comrades have either
202 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
absented themselves from the branch for some time or else do
not participate in its activities. In addition the terrific effect of
the crisis has deep reflections in our movement. A number of our
comrades are going through a deep poverty that naturally reflects
upon their activity. Literature sales are fair with Unser Kamf, far
below its possibilities. The same can be said for Young Spartacus.
The possibilities are present for building a youth club and a Jewish
club and steps are being taken for it already. One of the best aspects
of the Chicago branch is the fact that it has its own headquarters.
This enables it to create a center for our movement in Chicago.
There is room for further expansion, but basically the organiza-
tion is a solid one with perhaps the best prospects of any unit of
the League.
While in Chicago, efforts were made to obtain admission to
sit in the conference of the Proletarian Party Opposition as
fraternal delegates, if this were possible, or as observers. As a last
resort, we applied for admission to address this body and com-
rade Oehler and myself presented our credentials and personally
made the request. All of them wrere rejected. In discussing this
question, I have the following opinions: It may be possible for us
to win individual supporters to us in the course of our fight. But
we can in no way maintain optimism for this group, in consider-
ation of their past ten years of sectarian policy and their present
national outlook. It appears that years of life in the political atmo-
sphere are not so easily cast aside and these elements represent,
in the panorama of the revolutionary movement in this country,
not an altogether progressive element. We should seek to win what-
ever workers are in this movement— but we cannot expect to either
w in or change the political physiognomy of this group. This was
particularly observed in their refusal to allow us to be present in
the conference under any conditions or any circumstances.
Springfield: I managed to spend a few hours with comrade Angelo
and discussed the situation and the possibilities of the organiza-
tion of a branch. This appears remote for the present. The min-
ers who came to our support are for the most part inactive either
in the Party or the miners' movement. Comrade Angelo was active
for a period of months in the Unemployed Council, which he
helped the Party to organize. He was chairman of the council and
also a member of its executive committee. During the time he was
Report on National Tour 203
active in this movement he played the leading role in activating
the movement. The decline of the unemployed movement dates
to the time of the expulsion of Angelo from this movement by
the Party. He distributes all the copies of the Militant sent, as well
as other literature, and continues his agitation for our movement.
At the present moment he is working and agitating among a few
young workers with the aim of drawing them closer to our move-
ment. For the present Springfield must be considered a question
mark.
West Frankfort: The scheduled meeting was not held for the
reason that comrade Allard was away at a scale commission meet-
ing and could not carry through the preparations for it. Added to
this is the extreme terrorism that prevailed in this territory against
the Party and the miners. Our meeting came on top of the arrest
and trial of the Party organizers and the organizers of the National
Miners Union, plus a drive taking place against the foreign-born
miners with the aim of deportations.334 We discussed the ques-
tions of the Opposition with a few individual miners. Comrade
Allard thinks it is possible for him to arrange a study circle of
perhaps five young miners and through this bring about an organ-
ization of the Left Opposition. I advised him that this procedure
was a good one and that he should proceed with it. It will be
necessary to send comrade Allard both instruction and advice from
the center.
The situation in this coal area is extremely complicated. There
is a wide movement of insurgency against the Lewis machine and
also the Walker state machine. The movement is hampered by the
total lack of leadership in the mine struggles and the lack of per-
spective. At the time I was there, there was talk of strike upon the
expiration of the agreement. The rank and file want to struggle.
But it is clear that a struggle confined to the "little Egypt" terri-
tory in Illinois will be doomed to disaster. My advice to comrade
Allard was to propagate for a united-front fight. Whether this is
possible is extremely dubious. The Party is bent on carrying on a
lone fight with the result that it isolates itself and commands no
following. The whole situation is full of explosives.
St. Louis: I arrived on the evening of the meeting. By far the best
public meeting that St. Louis has ever had. Over 100 were present.
A few Party members and some sympathizers were also there.
204 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Following the meeting we held a session with the branch mem-
bers. I reported on the various phases of work, stressing, of course,
the need of bolstering up our press work. There are especially good
prospects for our Jewish work and Unser Kamf. The effects of the
crisis in St. Louis had had disastrous effects upon our comrades.
All of them are unemployed and suffering severe poverty and mis-
ery. But in spite of their personal conditions they are making good
efforts to push the work. At present they are the only Communist
force that carries out public activity and which fights for Commu-
nism in St. Louis. Their forum is attracting a good attendance,
they make a good distribution of our press, and are now working
on the creation of a youth club and a Jewish club. Comrade
Goldberg is at present a member of a Workmen's Circle branch
in which he is carrying on good work for our movement.335 He
hopes that we may be able to reap good results soon. There are
good prospects in this city for the revolutionary movement and
our comrades are doing all they can under the most adverse con-
ditions imaginable. The membership of this branch is six.
Kansas City: There is no branch in Kansas City. In addition to
comrades Buehler and Kassan, comrade Clarke is working there
as a colonizer. The two Kansas City comrades do very little for
the Opposition and that is the main reason why we have no move-
ment there. Thus far, while comrade Clarke has been able to do
some good work externally, we were not able to make any organi-
zational gains. His forum meetings were well attended and his
activity in the Unemployed Councils resulted in political gains for
the Opposition. My meeting was organized under bad conditions.
The comrades were unable to obtain a public hall and had to make
use of a private house of a Negro comrade. In addition, the leaf-
let advertising the meeting contained the wrong address. We man-
aged nevertheless to have an attendance of 45, which under other
circumstances would have easily been doubled. Our literature is
pushed slowly for the reason that its sales are not organized— what
is sold is mainly disposed of through comrade Buehler's bookstore.
We must bear in mind that comrade Clarke will not be able to
remain in Kansas City indefinitely. He lives and works under
abnormal conditions and will be forced to leave Kansas City soon.
Comrade Clarke is able to organize a study class of several work-
ers, but has failed to do this because he fears that the moment
Report on National Tour 205
this is organized he will be forced to leave. My advice to him was
to organize the class under any circumstances and then turn it
over to the comrades who are there, should he have to leave. It is
my opinion that the National Committee should inform Clarke
that in the event he must leave Kansas City, he return to New York,
stopping over in Cleveland for a few days or perhaps a few weeks,
if this can be arranged, and that then preparations and arrange-
ments be made to send him to Boston where he would be able to
do a great deal more than in Kansas City, in spite of his efforts.
Minneapolis: I was able to spend three days in Minneapolis, dur-
ing which six meetings were arranged, including a banquet. On
the first day, the banquet was held, with an attendance of 45. On
the second day, I spoke on Germany at the regular afternoon
forum, and in the evening in the discussion on the crisis with A.C.
Townley.336 The forum had an attendance of 75 and the evening
meeting of 150. The forum brought out a heated discussion
between ourselves and Walter Frank, left-wing leader in the
Minneapolis trade-union movement. Contrary to what was
reported, Frank not only failed to show his sympathy for the Left
Opposition, but made a vile and dastardly speech against it gen-
erally and against comrade Trotsky personally. We were able to
dispose of him easily, but it proved that he has maintained close
relations with the Party during all this time. This is borne out by
the fact that he is to head the Minneapolis delegation to the Soviet
Union. The evening discussion resulted in good gains for the
Opposition. We were able to present a correct Communist posi-
tion against the reformist position of Townley. This was under-
stood by all. On the last day, a public meeting was held in Burton
Hall of the University of Minnesota, attended by over 100 students,
where the viewpoint of the Left Opposition was presented. All of
these meetings were handicapped by the severe storms raging and
the subzero weather that prevailed during the whole period of
my stay. In addition to these meetings, a gathering of youth was
held on the afternoon of the first day, where the question of the
organization of a youth club was taken up and plans made accord-
ingly. In the evening of the last day, a branch meeting was held
where I reported on the international situation and also on the
tasks of the branch in the immediate future.
It appears that for some time prior to my arrival in Minne-
apolis, the older comrades had not been playing the role that falls
206 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
upon their shoulders; instead, the burden of the work fell to the
younger comrades and to an extent upon new comrades. Both
comrades Dunne and Skoglund are working at present on a job
that allows little time for activity. In addition, neither of the two
comrades are well physically. These are circumstances that must
be taken into account. But in spite of that, better efforts could
have been made by them to help in the direction of the work, if
not in its actual execution. I had occasion to speak to comrade
Dunne once, the only time that I saw him, and likewise with com-
rade Skoglund, and impressed upon them the need for giving more
direction to the work. I believe that we should have little diffi-
culty on that score. The branch as a whole is working along as
usual, with steady persistent activity under the direction of com-
rade Cowl and the executive committee. They push the press very
well, and make good use of the opportunities present. At the time
I was present, comrades Dunne and Skoglund were organizing a
movement of the coal drivers. I call attention to this fact in the
report because the National Committee has not vet received a
report on the matter, and the Minneapolis branch discussed it for
the first time when I was present. What is the situation? Comrades
Skoglund and Dunne went ahead with the organization of a griev-
ance committee in the coal yards made up of the truck drivers.
Thev managed to form a committee and held meetings of these
drivers, as well as making application to the union for admission.
In the course of this work a number of acts were committed that
do not speak well for our movement, nor the comrades initiating
the work. First of all it must be borne in mind that the drivers
own the trucks delivering the coal and hire themselves out to the
coal dealers. The helpers are in realitv the more exploited of the
yard workers. Yet apparentlv they are not part of the movement,
nor were real efforts made to draw them into it. The group of
drivers organized a stag partv to celebrate their organization, an
affair that was attended by the bosses. One of them spoke at the
affair. Comrade Brinda, who was present and tried to sell tickets
for the Townley debate, was refused the floor by the chairman.
Helpers were present at this gathering mainly because the bosses
gave them tickets to come, having bought these tickets in blocks
of ten from the comrades and those selling them. The argument
made for the sale of tickets to the bosses was on the grounds that
money was needed. Their presence and speaking at the affair was
Report on National Tour 207
explained away as unavoidable. Comrade Skoglund, in answer to
my question as to perspective, replied that he thought the move-
ment would disappear with the close of the coal season. Never-
theless, the character of the organization, its exclusion of the help-
ers, and what cannot be otherwise termed as a fraternization with
the bosses, stamps this movement and its activity as a gross error
against which the National Committee must make answer.
Generally we can count on the Minneapolis branch as one of
our mainstays. It is easily one of our best branches and is also one
of our most active units.
Cleveland-. I arrived here shortly after the branch was organized.
The branch has a membership of seven. The comrades arranged
a meeting hurriedly without public advertising. We managed in
spite of that to have an attendance of 65, including Party mem-
bers and sympathizers, as well as a number of members of the
Unemployed Councils. A good discussion was held. The prospects
in Cleveland are good, though it is yet too early to say definitely
just what the branch is able to do. The comrades also arranged a
banquet for the second night. I stayed for this upon the informa-
tion that no meeting was arranged for Youngstown. There were
20 present at the banquet. Unser Kamf is selling well there and
before leaving the comrades agreed to proceed with the organi-
zation of a Jewish club. We should be able to count on good devel-
opments from Cleveland.
Youngstown: Because of the banquet in Cleveland and the infor-
mation that no meeting had been arranged, I arrived here on the
day following my schedule. I learned then that it was possible for
us to have a meeting. I met with the comrades (there are three of
them) and discussed the possibilities for work and expansion of
the organization. Following this discussion I proposed that the
comrades immediately initiate a class in fundamentals, around
which they would be able to draw in others and begin to spread
and expand their literature sales. They plan holding open-air meet-
ings in the summer— in the event that such arrangements could
be made. It is hardly likely that this group will grow fast or win
many new supporters. Its tasks consist of beginning from the
bottom and building up the Left Opposition in this highly indus-
trial city.
Pittsburgh: A meeting of six was held here. The meeting took place
208 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
in comrade Sifakis" home. We can count only upon comrade
Sifakis. who is an extremely active comrade and works hard for
our movement. Comrade Basin will help in the work. He is a close
sympathizer and expressed willingness to do something for our
movement— particularly in the Jewish field. There too we can expect
only small achievement and slow developments. But we do have a
comrade here whom we can count upon as a real fighter and
worker for our cause and who in a decisive moment will prove
his worth.
<>
Cannon and Swabeck Have
Rightist Tendencies
Letter bv John Edwards to Max Shachtman337
16 April 1932
I have received your letter and resolution. I had already read a
copy of your resolution together with the long document of
Cannon and Swabeck, and after reading them, I must say I had a
feeling of disgust.
At the Fifth Congress of the CI. which I was fortunate enough
to attend. I heard a report made by the old Bolshevik professor
who had just returned from a studv of the archives of the Second
International. I saw photostatic copies of Engels' original docu-
ment and also his letters to Bernstein and I thought this had ended
this discussion once and for all. But I see it is being put forth
again not as a question of claritv but for some other purpose.
I also read Carter's article and the replv bv Swabeck. I agreed
theoreticallv with the replv of Swabeck and still do. However. I do
not agree with the method of presentation. On the other hand. I
had the privilege of meeting Carter and will state right here and
now that I was not favorably impressed with him. although he has
a fair scholastic knowledge of Marx. I might state to you that all
his time here he spent with the opposition forces to the League,
one political and moral degenerate bv the name of Tom
Rightist Tendencies 209
O'Flaherty. I also want to inform you that he is in communication
with Tom, telling him what is going on in the League, and Tom is
peddling this to the Stalinites for revenge against the central com-
mittee of the League. I want to say further that Carter kept away
from both Oehler and myself all the time he was here. He does
not seem to be at home among proletarian revolutionists. He is
suffering under what we would say in good American slang, a swell
head. I have no sympathy for him nor his ego.
Now I would like to direct some questions to you. First of all,
how is it that a young revolutionist like you can see fit to take a
stand on the French Ligue opposite to comrade Trotsky? I have
just seen the late bulletin, the first real information I have had on
the question. The attitude of Felix and Mill is absolutely reaction-
ary and it will not take long in the future to prove it to be so. I do
not know whether you have any sympathy for these two individu-
als or not, but if you do, I must say at the outset that I cannot
sympathize with you. I read the resolutions presented by Swabeck,
Glotzer, and Abern. I cannot imagine what is behind Abern's and
Glotzer's resolutions.
Another question, Max— how the hell is it that you went to
Europe when you knew it would be used against you? Just what
was your purpose? Was it to get support from the secretariat for
yourself? People do not spend hundreds of dollars on vacations
without there being some political purpose. Apparently you did
not go there to strengthen the hand of Trotsky.
Now perhaps after reading this, you will think that I am totally
out of sympathy with you. Such is not the case, however, I think it
is absolutely necessary for you to be in the leadership of the League.
I think that you, Abern, and Glotzer have greater potentialities as
future leaders than either Swabeck or Cannon. I know that both
of them have rightist tendencies.
The labor party and the Negro question, as discussed at our
First National Conference, were not mere incidents.338 It is hard
for the old to change their opinions, but there is a chance for the
young. You backed them up on these two questions 100 percent
at the time, but I figured you had a chance to change your opinion.
Max, I have formed my opinion years ago of Cannon, also of
Swabeck. Cannon comes forward mainly in factional strife. Per-
sonally he is revengeful and subjective. I knew (his years ago, but
you did not. You and Marty followed him like a couple of blind
210 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
men. And when you found out his character, it has reacted upon
you in a subjective way.
The problem of the future leadership of our League cannot
be determined at the present time. I have always maintained that
our main duty at the present is to propagate our position; to get
Trotsky's writings before as wide a mass in the U.S. as possible.
Our group is only in its propaganda stage; numerically it is a little
sect. A split in this organization at this time would play directly
into the hands of the Stalinites and it could not occur at a worse
time, due to the coming events in Germany. Anyone can see the
Stalin apparatus in Russia is cracking. Just the one fact of their
having to raise party salaries 300 percent to hold the bureaucracy
intact is an indication of that. There is developing a wide gap
between them and the mass of workers in Russia, and any split or
factional struggle in our ranks at this time can only consolidate
them and prolong their existence on top.
Now, my advice to you is the following: In order to defend
yourself, you are making a series of political errors. And Cannon,
the clever politician, is seizing these errors to use against you. Your
alliance with Carter could only hurt you. The time is not oppor-
tune now for you to make a struggle. The tactic would be much
better for you to postpone any immediate struggle in the group, if
it is possible, even though it goes against the grain. The class
struggle in the near future in America is going to be very sharp
and it is my opinion that rightist errors will develop in the League.
Then there would be a chance to really carry on a constructive
political struggle, even if it did result in a small split; but now the
opposite is the case. So be big enough as a revolutionist and
political enough to bide your time.
In discussions with Al, I could see that the struggle so far in
the committee has been almost purely subjective. I expected when
Arne went to NY he would play a conciliatory role between you
two, but Arne is naive in politics. I consider him a good revolu-
tionist who is willing to sacrifice for the movement, but Arne's
very nature keeps him from ever being a working-class politician.
However, I would like to have you inform me of events that
take place and your views more thoroughly. I will keep such things
purely confidential, but I wish to say now that I feel that the worker
membership of our League should not definitely take sides at the
Rightist Tendencies 211
present, but should strive for unity of the committee, and if the
central committee, through a factional struggle, jeopardizes the
League, the membership should appeal to comrade Trotsky to
assist them in putting the leadership in their places or removing
them as leaders.
One thing the struggle so far has proven, looking at it objec-
tively, is that it is a carryover from our lives and activities in the
Party. In other words, we have not freed ourselves from the
methods of the Stalin bureaucracy. Now another criticism I have
to make of you. Why the hell did you pull out from the editorship
of the Militant— allowing this also to be used against you, which
on the surface looks as if you yourself are taking a purely subjec-
tive stand. Max, you are still a novice in political maneuvering.
This is to your credit. This applies also to Al. He is still in his
swaddling clothes. All one has to do is to read his resolutions.
Now, I think the tactic of the present is for you fellows to make
a howl for unity. You will head Jim off. This is just what he will
do. I think, on the other hand, this discussion must come forth,
but it must be a preconvention discussion. We must, in other words,
have a convention— the membership must be able to decide. Let
us say it takes place this fall with a 60-day discussion period in
which the two groups can tear the hides clear off one another. In
this manner the membership would understand something of the
men that it has chosen for its leaders and would be able to select
for the immediate future a national committee.
Well, I will bring this long letter to a close, Max, and hope
that you will see this thing in the correct light. Then give me a
good answer right away, and make it just as damn critical as you
wish. I have a tough skin.
You may show this letter to Al and Marty. Otherwise it should
be kept strictly confidential.
PS: Since writing this, have read the last minutes of the NC. I see
that you speak of split. You had better forget this. You don't want
to become another Weisbord, do you? Under no consideration
should a split take place. After the convention the membership
should decide. I think that outside of the few intellectuals in New
York, the membership will take a strong stand against any form of
split. Don't forget they are assimilating the ideas of the Old Man
and that they would accept his decisions 100 percent.
212
The Organizational Status of the CLA
by Arne Swabeck339
18 April 1932
Submitted to the resident committee on April 11, Glotzer's tour report
engendered strong objections from Swabeck and Cannon. This reply was
appended to the resident committee minutes of April 18.
The report of comrade Glotzer on his national tour, submit-
ted 11 April 1932, is obviously not so much a report as an attempt
to show that the Left Opposition in America is stagnating and
actually at its lowest point of organizational decline. In fact it did
say in so many words: "The League is smaller today than at any
other time in its history." (That sentence was eliminated only after
being seriously challenged at the National Committee meeting on
the basis of actual membership figures.) Has such a presentation
anything to do with objective reality? None whatever.
What is the purpose behind this attempt? That can become
clear only when viewed in connection with the accusations against
comrades Cannon and Swabeck, contained in the document
submitted by comrade Shachtman at the National Committee
meeting of 15 March 1932, which was supported also by comrades
Glotzer and Abern. This report by comrade Glotzer, fully sup-
ported by comrade Shachtman in statements made by him at the
April 1 1 meeting, by giving a false picture of the developments
of the League, aims to furnish a basis in organization questions
for the accusations contained in the Shachtman document.
At the outset this gives one the impression that the attitude
which characterizes these comrades is not one of responsible col-
laborators in the leadership of the League. It is rather one which
could be assumed by abstentionists who, from a leisure position,
criticize comrades who carry the main burden of responsible func-
tions. In looking back we find we do not miss the point very much
as far as the maker of the report is concerned. During the period
of over a year prior to his departure for Europe, the function of
comrade Glotzer as a collaborator in the leadership as well as a
Status of CLA 213
member of the League was largely limited to perfunctory atten-
dance at committee meetings. Perhaps this gives him special quali-
fications to judge the developments in the organization during
that extended time.
While the report attempts to convey the impression of stag-
nation and of a low ebb in the League, at the same time it takes
cognizance of the fact that the meetings held on the tour were
above expectations. It says: "There is a general growth of sympa-
thy for our movement and it is possible to say that we are slowly
breaking through the crust of isolation from the Communist and
revolutionary workers." This is true. The report mentions our new
and additional publications, Unser Kamf, Young Spartacus, and
Communistes. It mentions formation of youth clubs and Jewish work-
ers clubs, or steps taken in that direction. What are these? Are
they manifestations of stagnation and decline, or have they acci-
dentally fallen from heaven? On the contrary, these factors are
manifestations of slow but persistent growth and of a fairly healthy
organizational and political life of the League.
In order to throw light on the organizational and political life
in the League I present the following actual and concrete facts.
The end of 1930 represented the end of the lowest ebb of our
organization. Retrenchment had cut down everything to the very
bone. Abstentionism from active function had become a habit
among leading comrades. The whole of the functioning center
was practically reduced to two comrades, Cannon and Shachtman,
functioning with the comrades who had been co-opted from the
New York branch. Comrade Swabeck was then only preparing to
come to New York. This could hardly be considered a center able
to keep in intimate touch with the units and give them the neces-
sary direction. Hence the branches existing were merely going
along primarily on their own momentum. The entire membership
numbered only very slightly above 100 (only approximate figures
are available). Where formerly some semblance of a branch existed,
for example, in Boston, Philadelphia, and St. Louis, they were out
of existence. The Militant, from a weekly, had become a semi-
monthly and more often a mere monthly publication. That marked
the end of the greatest slump for our League. This depression in
the organization escaped the attention of comrade Glotzer and
makes his present observation ridiculous.
The beginning of the year 1931 marks the beginning of our
214 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
serious efforts to pull the League out of its depressed conditions.
The very first step became the strengthening of the center, the
establishment of a functioning, though yet limited National
Committee, limited by abstentiomsm then still prevailing. Other
organizational steps followed in consecutive succession. The
defunct branches in Boston. Philadelphia, and St. Louis were
reorganized. At our Second National Conference we could record
a membership of 155. Since then the new branches of Cleveland.
Ybungstown, and Newark have been added and most of the other
branches have been strengthened, so that we today have an actual
membership of 173. While several of our branches still remain
numerically small and some of our members still function as lone
Left Oppositionists in one city, we can. however, with the general
growth of organization also record a corresponding growth of sym-
pathizing workers keeping in close organic contact with us.
This is only the purely organizational side of the question.
Politically we were able also in a growing measure to formulate
our views upon strategic and tactical questions and in that sense
to intervene more actively in issues of the class struggle, in the
unemployment situation, in the workers movement and its
problems, by propaganda, through publicity and meetings. It
coincided with a corresponding elevation of the political life of
our branches. We began our Expansion Program: we established
the Pioneer Publishers and added to the two pamphlets formerly
published a whole series of new pamphlets and books from the
Left Opposition arsenal. The Militant again became a weekly
publication in July and has since maintained itself, although with
great difficulties.
A comparison of the Militant circulation of the first three
months of 1931. the verv beginning of our upward curve, and the
first three months of 1932 will further substantiate all that has
been said above. The comparison shows the following figures.
Remittances to the national office:
1931 (semimonthly) Subscriptions
Bundle Orders
Totals
January - 5.50
532.47
S37.97
February 16.40
16.38
32.78
March 48.75
46.73
95.48
1932 (weekly publication)
January 67.75
(53.46
133.21
February 30.50
87.25
117.75
March 59.22
61.70
120.92
Status of CL A 215
After the weekly Militant came the appearance of Young
Spartacus, of Communistes, and now the latest addition to our press,
that of Unser Kamf. We were able, even under the adverse con-
ditions of the economic crisis, to hold our Second National
Conference. We have succeeded in completing two national tours
conducted by comrade Swabeck and comrade Glotzer, each bring-
ing gratifying results. While, all in all, these are only modest
achievements slowly accomplished, they nevertheless record a
period not of stagnation and decline, but a period of growth.
It should be remembered that this expansion was carried on
under the extremely difficult conditions of a growing and deep-
ening economic crisis, which in many respects served to impose
financial restrictions upon our activities. And this crisis has not
yet to any measurable extent produced the otherwise compensat-
ing feature of a growing class movement of the American work-
ers. The Communist Party is yet at a very low ebb, and it must be
admitted that these conditions react with double force upon the
Left Opposition. They particularly account for the fact that our
direct and intimate contacts with the Party and with the Party mem-
bership still are meager and have been so ever since our inception,
excluding the very early period prior to the "left" turn of the Party
when the question was new.
Comrade Glotzer's reports speak of organizational weaknesses
still obtaining in the League. Only fools would fail to acknowl-
edge that there are such. He speaks of a gap between our grow-
ing influence and our organizational strength. This is true. But
that such is the case is largely due to the fact that the general
situation still imposes upon us the limitations of a revolutionary
opposition functioning mainly as a propaganda organization, with
all the barriers erected by the Party bureaucracy. Our general
course is in the direction of narrowing that gap. The report says:
"The leadership from the national office must be multiplied many
times through constant communications, direction, and aid to the
comrades in Canada and in the United States." This is also true.
But it is true only when accompanied by a recognition that the
whole trend of development has been definitely in that direction.
Furthermore, it should first of all presuppose that all leading
comrades who make criticism from the sidelines fully assume the
responsibilities and duties of revolutionists, of Left Oppositionists.
216 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
One additional remark regarding the strictures on the inac-
tivity of the Minneapolis comrades. Our general observation, since
the inception of the Left Opposition in America, has been that
these comrades have been in the forefront of the activities and
sacrifices and have by no means shirked their responsibilities. This
fact, which is well-known and clearly established, leads one to ques-
tion the objectivity of this phase of comrade Glotzer's report also
and to ask what purpose motivates it. No doubt the Minneapolis
comrades will speak for themselves on this matter.
4> 4> 4>
The Coal Drivers in Minneapolis
Letter by Carl Skoglund to the National Committee340
18 April 1932
This reply to Glotzer's tour report was appended to the resident committee
minutes of 25 April 1932.
As per your request I herewith submit the following report in
regard to the coal drivers' situation in Minneapolis.
I regret very much that this question has been brought up in
this manner and elevated into a national issue in the League. I
hope that the following report will be considered without being
connected with other controversies in the committee. I do not say
this in the sense of evading mistakes if such were committed. First
and foremost, in judging a question of this character we must not
have preconceived notions and act according to them when deal-
ing with American workers.
The coal drivers had many grievances among them, such as
decent quarters to eat and help loading the trucks. We utilized
these questions for calling meetings of drivers with the idea of
laying the basis for organizing these workers into unions. Know-
ing as we do the leadership of the local trade-union movement,
our plan was to organize these workers under our leadership and
to apply in a body for membership. As was explained in a League
meeting in comrade Glotzer's presence, the delivering of coal is a
seasonal work and any attempt at the end of the season to organ-
Coal Drivers in Minneapolis 217
ize will be hard at the best of circumstances. To say that we did
not want to bring in the helpers who are the most exploited: What
is meant by this statement— the workers that work by the hour or
men that work with the drivers on the trucks? The last named get
25 percent of the gross earnings of the trucks, while the drivers
get 75 percent and have to furnish the truck oil and gasoline. At
every one of our meetings these workers were present and partici-
pated in the deliberations and deciding of all questions. We wanted
more men to be employed steady in the yard. This was as much
the interest of the hourly men as of the drivers. About 20 or 25
workers come around every morning looking for an opportunity
to work. The boss put one worker to work for possibly an hour
and then he was laid off to again wait in line for another hour's
work. We, the drivers who occupy the most powerful position,
decided to change this condition and demand that these workers
be employed more steadily and also that the drivers refuse to load
their trucks without more help. In the meeting that was held
between workers and the bosses, these questions were brought up
and an agreement was reached. More men are to be employed. At
no time were the bosses invited to our meeting, except that we
sold them tickets to a stag party arranged by the drivers. This affair
was arranged to bring not only drivers from one company, but
from practically all of them, for contact for future work. The
program at the stag consisted of amusement exclusively. Comrade
Miles Dunne, in a satirical reading that he made up for that occa-
sion, pictured the conditions of the workers. The bosses that were
present demanded the floor to speak to counteract what had been
said. The chairman of this gathering was a typical American worker
who had been put in this position to draw him closer to our move-
ment. He did not know whether it was wrong or right for bosses
to be allowed the floor to speak.
If John Brinda under the conditions existing had been
mechanically forced on the platform to advertise our Glotzer meet-
ing, most of the workers would have been unable to understand,
and it also would have meant discharge of some of our comrades.
To prove that we are not, in our relations with these workers, hiding
the fact that we are Communists, I want to point to the fact that
about ten of these workers have subscribed to the Militant and
others might in the near future.
Right now there are hardly any drivers left. They have gone
218 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
to other work. Xo more talk about organizing these workers until
next fall. What work was done this year will then be borne in mind
by these workers, thereby making it easier to talk organization
next year.
We members of the National Committee here have discussed
the holding of a plenum in May. It will be a very big burden on
our movement here because of economic conditions. We propose
that the Chicago branch be responsible for $25 and that we fur-
nish the transportation for comrade Oehler for this amount. With
this arrangement we will do our best to attend a plenum in the
middle or later part of May.
^ <► ^
Personal Combinations vs.
Revolutionary Politics
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Albert Glotzer341
1 May 1932
Unfortunately, it has still not been possible for me to study in detail
the documents I was sent on the American dispute. In any case I
will catch up on this in the next few weeks. However, I would
like to first make one observation: The programmatic, tactical
documents are of course of great importance, but in my eyes
actions, tested by the facts, are much more important. Comrade
Shachtman's behavior is extremely disturbing to me, and I cannot
easily separate the American struggle from the international
questions.
While everywhere supporting those tendencies I consider
wrong and harmful, comrade Shachtman thinks he can pacify me
with cliches. For two years he supports Naville and Landau quite
decidedly and stubbornly, although not openlv as befits a revolu-
tionary in political questions. In his last letter he contests that he
supported Naville and Landau, which makes the most embarrassing
Personal Combinations 219
impression. Simultaneously, he remains completely silent about his
attitude toward the German Opposition and the French Ligue,
just as he remains silent about his alliance with Mill, Felix, and
Lacroix. As far as I know, the unbelievable letters of comrade
Lacroix, who, not for the first time, invokes comrade Shachtman,
are known to comrade Shachtman. But he is silent about them.
What is more, people wrote me (this is in any case the only fact I
have secondhand; the rest I know from personal experience) that
comrade Nin declared that I contrived a campaign against
Shachtman. But I wrote about Shachtman's behavior only to
Shachtman himself, and then to the National Committee of the
American League. Who could have reported this completely false
information to Nin? If comrade Shachtman applies the same
methods in American affairs, some of his theses may be good,
but his politics are bad. The Brandlerites maintain that Stalin errs
only on international questions but that he is right on the Russian
ones. I refuse to apply this double bookkeeping to Shachtman. For
over two years I contented myself with persuasion and personal
letters. Then I turned to the leadership of the American League
to force Shachtman to show his colors. He always prefers to hide
and to substitute questionable personal combinations for revolu-
tionary politics. Thus I must tell myself that, against my best
intentions, an open fight with Shachtman and his international
allies is becoming unavoidable.
Comrade Shachtman writes me that a phrase in my interview
about the inevitability of a labor party in America has created
confusion. I have already noticed that in the Lovestone paper. This
is a striking misunderstanding. I spoke about the inevitable
Europeanization of American politics, i.e., primarily about the
crystallization of a party of the working class. It goes without say-
ing that in doing so I did not concretize the conception of this
party at all: whether it would be a labor party, a social-democratic
party, or a Communist party. Of course there was no reason for
me to go into this in an interview with a capitalist newspaper. The
Russian text of my statement reads "workers party" and not "labor
party." Every attentive reader should be able to understand this.
That the American Brandlerites want to capitalize on this only
proves that they, like their German mentors, are on their last legs.
+ ^ ^
220
You Must Take Us Into Your Confidence
Letter by Maurice Spector to Max Shachtman342
10 May 1932
Spector makes clear here that his support for Shachtman in the internal
dispute was wholly independent of Shachtman 's position on international
political questions. Cannon was at the time ignorant of Spector s position,
as he reported in a 30 April 1932 letter to Oehler. Spector 's letter confirms
Cannon 's judgment of the Shachtman forces:
We, and those comrades who support us, are a unit on all the impor-
tant questions, both with regard to internal and external policy. The
others are united completely on only one point, and that has nothing to
do with communist politics: a common antagonism to us.M3
Cannon was grappling at the time with putting the CLA's factional
divide in the context of other disputes within the ILO, as is evident in
an unfinished letter to Bernard Morgenstern:
As we see the situation, the American League is now beginning to mani-
fest some of those internal contradictions which have disrupted the in-
ternal life of the European sections for the past few years. You know it
has become a legend with us that the issues and struggles in the Euro-
pean communist movement have always repeated themselves on Ameri-
can soil-two or three years later. This, in a way, is the measure of our
backwardness. I once wrote on this theme in the Militant and expressed
the idea that, profiting by the experience of the European sections of the
Opposition, we would skip over the crises that beset them. This expecta-
tion also proved too optimistic. At bottom the present conflict in our
League signifies the American reproduction-it is to be hoped in a mod-
erated form-of the internal crisis of the International Left.344
You will forgive this Ubei schuss [plethora] of correspondence.
I want to supplement my last postscriptum. In a word or two, I
repeat my perhaps now monotonous refrain that you should think
through all the implications of the coming struggle at the plenum
clearly. Divided, we may go "boop-adoop-adoop." You must take
us— Abern, Glotzer, and myself— into your complete confidence. If
you fear betrayal— by no means an impossibility, the etiquette of
the Comintern being what it is today, and its influence extending
Take Us Into Your Confidence 221
to the cadres of the Opposition itself— safeguard yourself by for-
mulations that can stand the cold light of publicity— but mutual
confidence is indispensable. You have indicated that it is very dif-
ficult to explain by mail all your views on the European question.
But I expect a requisite minimum of this political intelligence, if I
am to be prepared and to formulate my own thoughts. On you
devolves the greatest responsibility, resulting from your work at
the center, your European observations, and exchanges with LD.
In saying this I do not seek to flatter you— I have no interest in
that. But in view of the present relation of forces and the geo-
graphical distribution of the National Committee, having regard
also to the point (with which Marty would fully agree) that of the
members of the former Cannon grouping, you have indubitably
evidenced the greatest political development in the past three
years. A triumph for Cannon, masquerading in the borrowed
plumes of LD's criticism of the Naville-Mill, groupe-juif [Jewish
Group] tendency, would be a lamentable retrogression of a move-
ment that would have faded out completely if he had got his way.
In my view, you should discuss every step of the next stage with
colleagues you must assume the risk of trusting, and if there is a
failure to reach a common agreement, who will be entitled to be
deemed as having arrived at their final conclusions objectively. I
take the liberty of writing in this strain because I feel you will not
misunderstand my motives. They are exactly what they purport to
be on the surface. Also dabei ein wenig Kritik iiben [thus to exer-
cise a bit of criticism in this] for the sake of the future. I do not
accept facts from C's resolutions. But I know that not only C for
his own peculiar reasons, but Abern and Glotzer and— my own
self— would have appreciated greater information of what was go-
ing on in your mind, and what was going on between yourself and
LD and the European leaders. In the end, it is made to appear by
C-Sw that you have acted like an individualist and secretively "con-
cealed information." I am aware that your retort is "personal
correspondence"— but surely there must have been more than the
personal. Abern, whom I esteem as a most loyal colleague, should
have been kept in touch step by step, instead of being caught off
his guard, more or less having to write resolutions on accomplished
facts. Now, if you are one of those who like the pleasure of the tu
quoque [you too] argument (which I doubt) you can find more
than enough to criticize in the Toronto member of the NC. But
222 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
that is neither here nor there. There is no occasion to think for a
moment of what I have suggested in the Et tu Brute! spirit. Nor
will you.
I cannot understand the failure of Swabeck to receive Mac's
statement.345 It was return-addressed too— unless somebody is
intercepting mail at the office.
<- 4> ^
On Weisbord and International Questions
Letter by Leon Trotsky to the
CLA National Committee346
19 May 1932
A different translation of this letter was appended to the resident
committee minutes of 25 June 1932. The last paragraph was published
in CLA Internal Bulletin no. 2 (July 1932).
In a letter to comrade Glotzer I have already briefly clarified
the amusing misunderstanding regarding the labor party in my
New York Times interview. Comrade Glotzer has hopefully com-
municated the necessary points to you. I am enclosing a more
detailed treatment of this question.347 The document came into
being as follows: Comrade Weisbord, who came here on behalf of
his group and, of course, at their initiative, and who has now been
with us a number of days, laid out to us (besides Weisbord, three
other foreign comrades are here) the views of his group on the
labor party question. This naturally led to a discussion, and at the
conclusion of this part of the discussion I dictated the enclosed
lines to comrade Weisbord. In a literary sense they are highly
unfinished, because Weisbord wrote down my ostensible English
version almost word for word. If you want to print it you must
provide the polish yourselves.
Further discussions with Weisbord are pending. I must admit
that Weisbord makes a much more favorable impression on me in
person than he does through his articles and letters. Naturally I
refrain from taking any organizational position, i.e., I am point-
ing out to him that the American League is our only organization
Weisbord and International Questions 223
in America and that the questions in dispute must be decided in
America. As you will see from the enclosed document, I defend
the leadership of the League against Weisbord's criticism quite
energetically (of course, not for the sake of diplomacy, but out of
conviction). It seems to me, however, that Weisbord's group would
now be prepared to join the League if the conditions are not too
"degrading." Don't you think that after my sharp rejection of the
theoretical and tactical errors of this group, you could open a
bridge to the League for Weisbord and his followers? That is only
a suggestion. I am in no way intervening in your name, which would
be impossible in any case, nor even in my own. I must say, however,
that comrade Glotzer's report about the complete stagnation of
the League's local groups has disturbed me. Perhaps something
in Weisbord's criticism regarding "mass actions" is not as incor-
rect as the other parts of his criticism.
I am very glad that you have taken a firm position on the
international questions. I am enclosing a letter from Gourov on
the question of the international conference.348 You will under-
stand why the author of this letter signs it as he does. This letter
too is a rejection of the Weisbord group's fantastic idea of a
conference at which not only the national sections but also all the
splinter groups and refractory elements should be represented.
You surely know that some Spanish comrades are flirting with this
idea? In the Czechoslovakian group as well, which is rather new
to our ranks, no clarity reigns yet in international questions. It is
therefore all the more important to take a firm position in advance
on the composition of the conference and to put a stop to any
confusion and to all combinationist intrigues.
On the internal dispute in the American League I am not
taking a position for the moment because I have not yet been able
to study the issues with sufficient attention. In taking a position I
will attempt not to be influenced in advance by the incorrect and
harmful attitude of comrade Shachtman in all international
questions almost without exception. On the other hand, it is not
easy to assume that one is right on the most important national
questions if one is always wrong on the most important interna-
tional ones.
4- 4> 4
224
I Prefer Weisbord's Methods to Shachtman's
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Albert Glotzer349
3 June 1932
Glotzer wrote to Trotsky on May 1 7, insisting that while Shachtman did
not support Landau, Naville, Mill, or Felix, "He does not have any con-
fidence in the leadership ofMolinier and Treint. " Separating Shachtman 's
views on international questions from what he described as the ongoing
struggle of himself, Spector, Abern, and Shachtman against Cannon and
Swabeck in the American League, Glotzer wrote, "A word on Cannon ys
'internationalism. ' I wouldn 't give a fig leaf for it. He is no more con-
cerned about it than the man in the moon and what is more, knows even
less about it."350
Many thanks for the materials you sent. As to your last letter,
I can only very much regret that you, on bad counsel, want to re-
duce the issues separating Shachtman from the most important
European Oppositional organizations to the question of whether
Molinier or Treint is to be regarded as a good leader. That is how
the question is posed by Rosmer, Naville, and other philistines,
for whom Marxism and the revolutionary organization are intol-
erable things, but who do not have the courage to defend their
anarchist-like politics openly. To reduce two years of internal
struggle to whether Molinier is fit to be a leader or not is really
wretched and inexorably compromises those who hold such a view.
Weisbord spent several weeks at our house. We discussed a
great deal. With complete candor and sharpness I told him my
opinion of his group's views and actions. But the fight was about
principled questions, and I must tell you in all candor in this per-
sonal letter that I prefer Weisbord's method to Shachtman's a hun-
dred times over, because Shachtman toys with ideas and makes
combinations, whereas Weisbord is very serious about things.
Shachtman has never explained openly and seriously what he
thinks, what he is fighting for and with whom. He gave the Jewish
Group in Paris the right to invoke his authority, as he did with
Lacroix and Nin. In so doing he helped them stray even further
downhill, for they all thought the American League was behind
Not an American Naville 225
Shachtman. After two years of Shachtman's maneuvering, after
dozens of admonishing letters from me and ever evasive, petty,
diplomatizing letters that bordered on intrigues from him, I asked
your leadership whether they supported Shachtman's international
policy. In so doing I knew nothing of your internal differences.
My question was meant exactly as it was written. Shachtman
assured me of his solidarity in a cloying letter, and simultaneously
he reported to Barcelona that I had begun an international cam-
paign against him. In the meantime, without knowing anything
about this, I wrote to Shachtman and the leadership of the Ameri-
can League that Shachtman should withdraw his resignation; his
work at one of the leading posts was necessary, etc. I said to myself
that perhaps my letter had given Shachtman the impetus to resign
and immediately set out to counteract it. Where, then, is a
campaign and, in particular, an international campaign against
Shachtman? What does all of this have to do with the question of
Molinier's qualities? It is a matter of Shachtman's "qualities," and
after all that has transpired I unfortunately cannot trust them. I
feel obligated to tell you this without prettifying it in the least, so
that there shall be no illusions between us.
O O
I Am Not an American Naville
Letter by Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky351
4 June 1932
The enclosed document, signed by three of the members of our
National Committee, is a reply to the statement of comrades
Cannon and Swabeck, both of which are to be considered by the
plenum of the committee next week. You have already received
their document, and ours will be of additional aid to you in ori-
enting yourself on our internal disputes. From the document, as
well as from a personal statement which I am preparing for our
plenum, you will gather a clearer idea of how matters have stood
with us in the past, in "domestic" disputes as well as on the inter-
nal struggles in the European Opposition.
226 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Now on a matter which concerns not the group of comrades
with whom I am associated, but myself.
I have not yet received a reply from you to the recent letters I
sent. At the same time, it is clear from the letters you have sent
comrade Glotzer and the recent letter (on the labor party) to the
National Committee that your opinion about my position has not
changed. In spite of this, I feel compelled once more to raise the
question before you in an effort to reestablish the Kampfge-
meinschaft und Freundschaft [collaboration in struggle and friend-
ship] about which you wrote in an earlier letter.
In your recent letters you continue to speak about my con-
duct in Europe and my past or present support of Landau, Naville,
Mill, or Lacroix. It would be much easier for me to deal with this
question if I knew precisely to what acts or words during the past
or right now you refer. I do not know of any, for the simple rea-
son that / do not support any of the individuals or groups you men-
tion. I know only of acts to the contrary.
1. In the United States: There is not a single document in exist-
ence, a single resolution, a single proposal, that can be pointed
to, which would indicate that I gave the support to which you refer.
On the contrary, I made the first motion in our committee to
endorse the removal of Naville from the International Secretariat
and his replacement by Frank. I made the first motion (both of
them were adopted) to condemn Landau. I reported several times
(to the National Committee, to the New York branch, to the Sec-
ond National Conference) on the international situation of the
Opposition, in which my opposition to the standpoint of Naville
and Landau was quite clearly stated beyond the possibility of mis-
take. I reported to the committee and made the motion to repudi-
ate the proposal of the Bordigists on the political liquidation of
the secretariat. I reported to the committee and made the motion
of disagreement with the standpoint of some Spanish comrades
to join in a "unity convention" with Maurin, thus rejecting the
analysis made of the Maurin group by Mill or Nin. Thus the "offi-
cial" position. "Unofficially," it stands as follows: When I returned
from my first trip to Europe, I wrote perhaps one or two letters of
a general nature to Landau; but when the struggle broke out in
the German Opposition, I broke off all correspondence with
Landau demonstratively. Landau cannot show a single word from
my pen to indicate that I had the slightest sympathy with his point
Not an American Naville 227
of view or conduct, not one. How can the German comrades,
therefore, have the idea that I showed sympathies for Landau? If I
wrote to Naville at that time— as my letter will prove— it was to tell
him that under no circumstances would I support his stand, and
in particular was I unalterably opposed to his alliance with Landau.
As for Naville himself, the same thing applies as to Landau: Let
anybody show a single word I ever wrote him or anyone else giv-
ing the faintest indication of any support to him or his faction.
As you know, I did hesitate for some time before taking a final
position on the European disputes. But this hesitation— the com-
mittee as a whole hesitated on the matter— was in no way a support
to Landau or Naville, but an anxiety to have the situation before
us as completely as possible before taking a definite stand. I tried
to explain these hesitations (I am not "defending them in prin-
ciple") in my letters to you of about a year ago or more. If by your
accusation of my support to these elements you refer to my hesi-
tations, I must acknowledge that you are right; if you mean actual
support, I cannot accept your conclusions. At the very height of
the disputes in France and Germany, there was not one single com-
rade here who understood my conduct or opinion as any kind of
support to Landau or Naville; nor was it possible for Landau and
Naville to understand it in this light, for they received not the slight-
est encouragement from my side.
2. In Europe: Your references to my conduct during the recent
trip to Europe still remain entirely obscure to me. As to France,
there is not one single comrade who can say that I expressed any
opinion on the internal situation in the Ligue at a single one of
the meetings I attended. Comrades Frank and Molinier can tell
you that I expressed to them plainly my opinion that I do not sup-
port either Naville or the Jewish Group or Mill. What I did tell
them was that they were making a mistake in basing themselves
so heavily upon Treint and his group, thereby alienating the work-
ers in the Jewish Group instead of winning them over to mutual
work and confidence. Comrade Frank would further be able to
inform you that he told me, in reply to my statements to him, that
he disagreed with Raymond's collaboration with Treint and an-
tagonizing of the Jewish comrades, and instead of that agreed with
me. I did not speak publicly at any meeting because I feared that
whatever I said would be distorted factionally by one or another
228 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
and interpreted as the stand of the American League. I made it
clear to all the comrades that I had asked for no mandate, and
had no mandate, to speak in the name of our League. No com-
rade can point to a single "act" or "word" while I was in France to
justify what you say about my conduct. As for Spain: I was sent
there by the secretariat on the proposal of comrade Molinier. I
tried in vain to convince the comrades to start publishing El So-
viet again. I argued with them against their tendency to blame
Molinier for everything that ever happened in Spain. I argued a
number of times with Lacroix and Andrade against their tendency
to live an "isolated national" existence by not informing the mem-
bership of the situation in the international so that the OCE
[Opposicion Communiste de Espaha] as a whole would take a
position. With some of the criticisms made of Molinier by Lacroix,
I was compelled, it is true, to agree; but my agreement did not go
very much further than the criticism you make of comrade
Molinier in one of your letters to Nin. As for Lacroix's outbursts
against the Ligue, I do not agree with them. Since I returned to
the United States, I have written two letters to Spain: one techni-
cal request in the name of the League, asking for correspondence
to our theoretical organ; another letter to Lacroix telling him that
I could not permit him to use my name in any way for his struggle
against the leadership of the French Ligue. You imply, I think, in
one of your letters to Glotzer that I have written to Nin about
"Trotsky starting a campaign against Shachtman"; I have never
written to Nin in my life; I have never written such a letter as you
suggest to any comrade in any part of the world. This suspicion
is absolutely unjustified, just as unjustified as your fear that I
had something to do with the Felix article which appeared in
the Militant.
The only "conduct" to which I can possibly think you refer is
my letter to you from Paris. It was a personal letter, which I did
not for a moment pretend to be the viewpoint of anybody but my-
self. Many things I say there may have been wrong. But when I
reread it I cannot find any real grounds for your view that I sup-
port Naville or the Jewish Group. You may be sure that if I did,
I should say so in those words. It is true that I expressed myself
about Mill in such a way as might lead you to think that I support
his tendency; this was not my intention. I can only repeat here
what I have tried to emphasize in my recent letters to you: I do
Not an American Naville 229
not support Mill's tendency; I do not support the Jewish Group,
and especially not its action in withdrawing representatives from
the executive committee. I do believe that it was more correct on
the trade-union question than the other comrades, and I said so
to Molinier and Frank, just as I told them that they were not act-
ing in a manner calculated to win over the Jewish comrades. I
expressed my disagreement with the attitude of Treint, my con-
viction that the "experiment of collaboration" with Treint would
not prove successful. The latest events, I think, show that Treint
(as comrade Frank now writes to me) did not live up in any way to
the hopes placed in him.
One last word on Germany. I spoke somewhat critically about
the German comrades in my Paris letter to you. My views were
based on reports I received from Andrade and from Frank and
Molinier; also, on the sharp letters you wrote to the Leipzig organ-
ization on "workers control" and the "Gourov letter." 352 You
interpret my remarks as "an echo of my sympathies for Landau."
I cannot add anything to what I have tried to say in a number of
recent letters about this, except that the activities developed
recently by our German comrades have shown that the impression
I gained in Paris was unfounded; I am glad to revise an opinion
I held for the moment.
I express again the hope that the foregoing may help to clarify
matters between us. I want to add another word about the results
of your recent letters and their effects on our internal American
dispute. You write that you are unwilling to consider Shachtman's
American position separate from his international position. In the
first place, I do not believe that I have such a sharply different
position on international questions as you write. In the second
place, it is far from a question of "Shachtman's position." Com-
rades Glotzer, Abern, and Spector have been together with me
for a long time in our internal disputes here. We have taken a
position for a long time in the League on a number of important
points, which we are convinced affect the present and future of
the League to a tremendous extent. Our opponents in the League,
comrades Cannon and Swabeck, avoid an answer to all the
important problems we pose by declaring that I am a Landau, a
Naville, and whatnot. Be sure that we do not have to be told (like
Naville) to roll up our sleeves and work for the organization. We
have been doing that from the first day, when others went into
230 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
retirement. But how effective can our collaboration be when the
accusation is hurled that Shachtman is an American Naville?
Naville was removed from the editorial board of Lutte for his petty-
bourgeois, anti-organizational conduct, and rightly so. Why should
not the American Naville suffer the same fate? To cry for collabo-
ration and to make it impossible in reality is not the way to achieve
it. and that is what we want comrade Cannon to understand. When
you continue to refer to my conduct in Europe without specifving
what you refer to concretely, it is difficult for me to express my
viewpoint and defend it. When you charge me with supporting
tendencies which I do not support and refuse to support, you are
making it difficult for my part at least to establish a position clearly
in the League.
I hope you will soon have the opportunity to reply to this letter.
PS: Your article on the "labor party" established the necessary
clarity.
^ <► <►
The Situation in the American Opposition:
Prospect and Retrospect
by Martin Abern. Albert Glotzer.
and Max Shachtman-33
4 June 1932
Submitted on the eve of the National Committee plenum, this document
was written as a reply to Cannon and Swabeck's "Internal Problems oj
the CLA." : It was withdrawn during the plenum proceedings, but when
the fight flared up again following the plenum, the Shachtman group
resubmitted it for publication in the CLA Internal Bulletin. On July 14
the resident committee adopted Cannon's motion to publish "Prospect
and Retrospect" in the projected IB series, along with a comprehensive
response that he would write. Cannon's draft reply dealt centrally with
international questions, although he characterized "Prospect and
Retrospect" as "from first to last" "a personal attack against Cannon"
and promised to deal with the purely personal accusations in an appen-
Prospect and Retrospect 231
dix.355 Cannon never completed the draft or the appendix. Thus "Prospect
and Retrospect " was never published in the IB, although it circulated
extensively through private channels in the CLA.
The three and a half years of propaganda activity which we
have carried through in this country makes it necessary for us to
draw up a balance of where we stand today so that we shall better
be able to outline our tasks for the coming period and proceed to
meet them. For a whole series of reasons, the casting of this bal-
ance has been avoided and neglected by us. Now it cannot be post-
poned any longer because the situation which has developed in
our National Committee and the organization as a whole makes
it impossible to gloss over the past and to live the future from
hand to mouth. That the existing differences in our ranks have
forced their way through and even appeared in a sharp form is
not an accident but the inevitable result of two facts: 1. In the
past these differences, in one form or another, have been pushed
down into the subsoil of the organization, which did not elimi-
nate them but only made their appearance seem abrupt; 2. The
League is approaching a certain turning point in its progress which
inevitably brings with it a reconsideration of what has gone before.
This makes an open and frank discussion of our internal prob-
lems necessary at the present juncture, and we need not be
deterred from it by the fact that our enemies will attempt to capi-
talize on our difficulties or that our organization will be to an
extent temporarily diverted from its day-to-day activities. We will
be able to reduce these disadvantages to an absolute minimum
and make the maximum gains in the coming days provided that
we present our position as it actually is, discuss our real differ-
ences without distortions, avoid an atmosphere of panic and threat,
and seek at all times to draw positive lessons for the future.
The Possibilities Before the League
All considerations of the objective situation lead to the conclu-
sion that the League now has good possibilities for progress. The
bankruptcy of Stalinism on the international arena is beginning
to penetrate the consciousness of the Communist workers. Our
course is being verified with almost mathematical precision and
most strikingly in the Soviet Union, in Germany, and in Spain.
The international events are working for us night and day. In
conformity with our predictions, the right-wing "international" is
232 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
undergoing a process of disintegration which will inevitably bring
more of its ranks to our side. The breakup of the Brandler group;
the highly significant letter of Neurath of Czechoslovakia to
Brandler; the passage of MacDonald of Canada into our camp;
the inexorable breakdown of the barriers of antagonism toward
us on the part of the Lovestone ranks in this country; and, what is
most gratifying, the growth of sympathy for our views, in full or
in part, within the official Party— all these speak eloquently of the
tendency in our direction which can be considerably accelerated
if we are alert and strike systematically. In the United States, despite
the fact that the official Party still embraces the bulk of the Com-
munist workers, it continues to lose ground organizationally,
especially in comparison with the magnificent objective possibili-
ties afforded it. The terrific (100 percent) turnover in its mem-
bership shows that the Party has been unable to consolidate
organizationally the huge growth of Communist sympathy among
the workers in the past three years. Had we now at our disposal
the internal Party faction about which we write so frequently, there
is no doubt that we could move far more swiftly toward establish-
ing a deeper unity with the official Party ranks.
If the League now measures up to the increased possibilities
put before it, it will be able to realize excellent prospects. Our
backwardness, conditioned by a whole series of past events, will
give way to a faster pace. "The slowness of the growth of the
League," writes comrade Trotsky, "is to be accounted for primar-
ily by the lack of great shifts in the American working class in
recent years. As I have already mentioned elsewhere, it may be
presumed that the crisis in America creates for the first time prem-
ises for revolutionary work on a broader scale. It is to be hoped
that, thanks to the preceding systematic education of cadres, the
American League will enter into the new period more or less pre-
pared. Although," he adds, "it should not be concealed that the
real testing of the cadres is still ahead."
How should the League arm itself for the coming period? It
must undertake a general tightening of its ranks. It must not only
engage in greater activities in general, but above all the League
must turn its eyes and efforts toward an increased direct partici-
pation in the class struggle. Our small numbers put definite limits
to this work, but we have conducted a sufficient propaganda train-
ing in our ranks to enable us to make a serious beginning in
Prospect and Retrospect 233
initiating movements on our own responsibility. (We have in mind
particularly the movement in Minneapolis, in the Illinois coalfields,
and in New York.) Our perspective has no similarity with the
fantastic notions of Weisbord, nor is it calculated upon turning
our backs to the Party. Quite the contrary. We have talked inter-
minably about creating a faction in the Party, but we have taken
no steps toward it in actuality; we have not even worked out a plan
to realize this goal, so that our agitation for it— to say nothing of
our action, which barely exists— has borne an entirely haphazard
character.
Before all, the National Committee must be transformed into
a genuine working body, alive and energetic, which takes up the
problems of the movement and really leads it, instead of, as has
too often been the case, being dragged along by the events them-
selves. Allowing for all the natural and at present unavoidable limi-
tations, one vital question after another has had to lie for months
on our agenda because the time of our committee has been occu-
pied by comparative trivialities and secondary questions. Even the
systematization of our work has had an occasional character. A
radical improvement must therefore be made in this connection.
Not only should the National Committee change its manner of
work, but, like the League as a whole, it must be broadened. Its
narrow, exclusive base must be extended considerably to embrace
the collaboration of new elements, drawing in new forces particu-
larly from those outside the ranks of the old Cannon group in
the Party. It has always been indisputable for us that one of the
great advantages that the American National Committee had over
the leaderships of some of the other sections of the Opposition
was its common Party origin, its long habit of collaboration, its
united entry into the ranks of the Left Opposition. But this also
has its weak sides and has become a source of ingrowing conserva-
tism which can only be overcome by refreshing the ranks of the
leadership with new forces. To overlook this need, to minimize it,
or to resist it (as was done at our last national conference, which
endorsed this resistance without realizing what was involved) can
only have harmful effects for our movement. In general, our com-
mittee must make itself aware of its own great shortcomings and
defects, and not merely of its positive sides and achievements, for
this is the first prerequisite to overcoming defects, not only in its
ranks but throughout the organization.
234 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
We have already made progress in many fields. The Militant
has been reestablished as a weekly. We have issued the first few
numbers of a monthly Greek paper, Communistes. We have made
a big stride forward in gaining the ear of a couple of thousand
Jewish workers with the aid of Unser Kamf, laying the basis for or-
ganizational growth in this field, and not least of our advances
has been our ability to maintain Young Spartacus, which reaches
hundreds of young workers throughout the country. Our litera-
ture, more varied than that of any other section, has met with a
wide response. There can be no doubt that we have greatly in-
creased the circle of our sympathizers in the last three years.
Equally indubitable is the fact that our organizational growth has
in no way corresponded to this increase of prestige and sympathy,
as well as the general possibilities. The six-months organizational
report made almost a year ago (Swabeck, 17 July 1931) showed a
total of 156 members. With all the literary and political progress
we have made since, our membership today is barely greater. The
fact that the League's membership for virtually the whole past
period has continued to hover around 150 to 170 members is not
a good sign of organizational progress and does not reflect our
growth in other spheres. We must bridge the wide gap that exists,
first by recognizing the fact and not sinking into a priggish self-
complacency, and secondly by setting our perspectives and organ-
izing our activities in harmony with the possibilities.
This means, in the first place, an orientation of our work in
the direction we have indicated above; secondly, a sharp improve-
ment in the functioning of the leading committee. It cannot be
done by setting up remote perspectives with which we are to wait
for the "inevitable smashup of centrism." Neither can our tasks
be met by the preparations being made for a drastic "retrench-
ment" in the League's work. Against our judgment the committee
has already decided to give up the theoretical review. In view of
the "French period" which we must allegedly go through now, com-
rade Cannon has already announced that he is prepared to give
up the Greek and youth papers entirely, reduce Unser Kamf to a
monthly, and if necessary retreat to a semimonthly Militant. We
are totally opposed to these measures and find no real need of taking
them. It has been proven that we have the possibilities for main-
taining all these activities, and even for going forward (especially
Prospect and Retrospect 235
among the youth and the Jewish workers). Such steps in no way
correspond with the real situation and our prospects, and they
must be rejected forthwith.
But we shall be compelled to take even these steps and the
prospects we have will vanish quicker than they arose, if we do
not eliminate the threat of a split which hangs over the head of
the organization. We do not ground our opposition to a split on
sentiment. A split is inevitable and sometimes even desirable if
there exist irreconcilable differences on fundamental questions
of principle or if, in general, one of the conflicting tendencies
represents an alien current in the movement. We do not believe
this to be the case in the present disputes.
At the same time, an organization of our kind, separated from
the main current of the class struggle by the powerful Stalinist
apparatus and other factors, constantly threatened with isolation,
ingrowth, and circle spirit, tends to have its inevitable frictions de-
velop on various questions and to become increasingly acute. There
is no particular cause for pessimism in this, for such developments
have always attended the early years of every small, isolated revo-
lutionary group. But while this may be one of the explanations of
them, it is not a justification for their continuance. The League
will experience only their corroding effects if the disputes are not
brought into the open and discussed so that a solution may be ar-
rived at. But the only way to achieve a real solution in the discus-
sion is to put the disputed points as they are in truth, against their
proper background and traced to their actual origins. Further, it
is the real difference that should be emphasized, none should be
invented or exaggerated, nothing should be covered up, remote
and individual issues should not be magnified all out of their real
proportions. For years the Russian Opposition had to conduct a
bitter fight to have its views presented as they were in actuality, to
resist having other views ascribed to them, and to refuse to defend
views which they did not entertain. In their platform our Russian
comrades posed the question of "Real and Alleged Differences."
That is the way we want to put the questions: as they really were
and are. The document of comrades Cannon and Swabeck serves
precisely the contrary purpose, and not out of accident or igno-
rance, for both comrades are just as well aware as we are of the
real origin and nature of the disputes in the committee.
236 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Differences— Real and Otherwise
Their principal contention, around which their whole docu-
ment revolves, is put as follows: "Our disputes with him (Shachtman)
began with the international questions, especially on the way of
approaching and dealing with them" (emphasis in the original).
For the past year or so, within the resident National Committee,
and particularly between comrade Shachtman on the one side and
the present writers on the other... there have been slowly but steadily
developing divergences over questions which we consider decisive
for the future of our movement.
This simply does not explain the nature of our disputes. It seeks
however to rewrite our brief internal history arbitrarily by conven-
iently wiping out two and a half years of it. If their assertion that the
disputes began on the international questions only a year ago is
true, then how is one to explain the fact that sharp differences
existed in the committee three years ago and lasted to the present
time, that the differences go back prior to our First National Con-
ference, became increasingly acute, to the point where the work
of the League was paralyzed and the organization brought to a
virtual standstill, that we were compelled to call a special plenum
of the National Committee two years ago (May 1930) for the sole
purpose of discussing our internal disputes, etc., etc. The way in
which this is "explained" is that it is not even mentioned in their
document! This is no doubt a convenient and "simplified" method
of conducting the dispute, only it has the disadvantage of not being
an honest presentation of the facts.
Further: If their assertion is true (that is, the disputes began
with Shachtman on international questions), how is one to explain
the fact that the other signatories to the present document, who
have been in solidarity with comrade Shachtman for three years,
but against whom nobody claims to have any "disputes on the in-
ternational questions"— that these comrades have been in conflict
with comrades Cannon and Swabeck, particularly the former, dur-
ing the whole past period? If the international disputes are to
explain the differences with comrade Shachtman, then what is to
explain the differences with comrades Abern, Glotzer, and Spector
(to mention only members of our committee)? Once more, the
"explanation" is made by completely ignoring the question.
The mere posing of the above two questions already indicates
how false, from beginning to end, is the presentation of Cannon
Prospect and Retrospect 237
and Swabeck, how little calculated it is to make possible a genuine
and fruitful discussion, to attain a clarification and solution of
the difficult situation in which the League, especially its National
Committee, now finds itself. In order, therefore, to put the ques-
tions aright and to make it possible to view the situation from its
proper perspective, it is necessary to start at the beginning. This
will involve a brief sketch of our development in the past three or
more years. It will show what were the real disputes, exactly how
serious or important they were, to what extent they are involved
today. It will show further that their assertions of the origin of
the disputes are false, that the differences on international ques-
tions which do not indeed exist, but which have been deliberately
magnified and distorted, were tacked on artificially to the other
issues and were converted into a factional football, which only ren-
ders it increasingly difficult for the League to have an objective
discussion of the problems of our international and to draw the
positive lessons from the internal struggle of European sections.
It will show finally that a disloyal use has been made of the sharp
criticism which comrade Trotsky has made of comrade Shachtman
in order to obliterate everything that has happened before in the
League, thus offering comrade Cannon an oversimple way out of
his own recent past.
This will be done by documents which cannot be contested.
An absolute minimum of other references, not documentary but
equally indisputable, will be made in order to complete the pic-
ture of the past. We have not the slightest intention of avoiding an
answer to any of the points raised in the C-S document, and all of
them, including the question of the disputes in our international,
will be dealt with adequately.
The manner of expulsion from the Party in October 1928 put
the immediate direction of the Opposition's work in the hands of
comrades Abern, Cannon, and Shachtman. Excellent relations
existed at the outset inside the Action Committee and between the
committee and the ranks. Friction and the disputes existing before
the Sixth Congress of the Comintern were eliminated or forgotten
in the enthusiasm and activity which marked our first few months.
In many respects model internal conditions were established for
the advancement of our movement. All the comrades collaborated
intimately, amicably, and, above all, energetically. Unfortunately,
this condition lasted only for the first few months. After this first
238 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
wave of expulsions, the committee began to droop due to the
steady reduction of activity of the outstanding leader of the
Opposition, Cannon. Not for the first time, not for the last, com-
rade Cannon began to lean back in his chair and leave others to
do all the work which had been entrusted to him. We began at
that time to hear incessantly about our work being a "protracted
uphill struggle," an entirely sound warning for calling off over-
zealous hotheads and for preventing overexpectant optimists,
who looked for quick results and victories, from being crushed
under inevitable disappointments and temporary setbacks— but
behind which we soon detected a justification for conservatism,
inactivity, a tendency to let things drift, which became worse in the
succeeding period.
On the very eve of the First National Conference (May 1929)
comrade Cannon, who at that time had certain personal difficul-
ties, proposed to put off the conference entirely and tell the del-
egates to cancel their preparations to attend. This proposal came
together with another which stupefied us completely: Cannon pro-
posed to quit the center entirely, retire to the West (Missouri) for
the next period, send an occasional letter of advice from afar, and
"leave the leadership in the hands of the younger comrades." In
view of the place he occupied in the leadership of our young move-
ment at that time, such a departure (argued because of the "pro-
tracted nature") would have demoralized the movement com-
pletely, particularly at that time when we were under the heaviest
attacks of the Stalinist press. Under our strongest pressure and
pledges to facilitate matters here as much as possible, Cannon was
finally dissuaded from his idea (which was not, by the way, the
first time it was advanced by him, and further, not by him alone)
and prevailed upon at the last minute to attend the conference.
At the conference in Chicago a considerable enthusiasm was
aroused by our main proposal to launch the Opposition as an
organization (Communist League of America) and to transform
the Militant into a weekly. In addition, despite the discouraging
experience we had already had in the center, we reserved our opin-
ions completely, and together with the other leading delegates
urged upon Cannon the need of his remaining actively in the
center. Decisions were made to provide special support for the
maintenance of comrade Cannon in the office, and he was selected
as both secretary of the League and editor of the Militant. Every
Prospect and Retrospect 239
possible measure was taken to facilitate his task, including the
establishment of a small staff of coworkers in New York: Abern,
Shachtman, and Spector, who was brought down from Canada
to strengthen the center. Once more we expected the desirable
change.
But it did not take many weeks for our expectations to be
exploded. Right after the conference, we were given a more strik-
ing illustration of how comrade Cannon interpreted in practice
the otherwise general phrase about the "protracted" character of
our fight. Without the slightest reason, the administrative work
of the League was grossly neglected. The Militant came out
through the efforts of comrade Shachtman and without anything
but the most formal assistance of comrade Cannon. Letters from
all over the country continued to accumulate on the secretarial
desk— unanswered. Only those letters were answered which comrade
Abern was able to take care of. Letters of inquiry and complaint
about the collapse and nonfunctioning of the center— and com-
rade Swabeck, then in Chicago, wrote not a few of them— met with
the same fate: the unanswered file. Cannon's attendance at the
office began to assume minimum, haphazard proportions.
Finally, when matters had reached a point where we were threat-
ened with a complete rupture of the bonds holding the organiza-
tion together, tying the branches to the center— where not only had
the campaign for the weekly Militant been allowed to die, together
with the enthusiasm for it generated at the national conference,
but even the semimonthly began to look more like a monthly— com-
rades Abern, Shachtman, and Spector threw all other consider-
ations to the winds and suggested in the most comradely manner
that Cannon devote himself to his administrative duties. Comrade
Cannon received this suggestion in the most hostile manner imag-
inable. He considered it an affront and listened sulkily to all our
suggestions. His only reply was that there was no money coming
in to maintain him and the paper and that there wasn't much use
in writing for money which could not be obtained.
As was proven after Cannon left the office, when we entered
into a vigorous drive for the weekly, financial support was avail-
able in the League, providing only the center functioned in a
responsible manner and not by perfunctory and sporadic dabbling
in the administrative work or even by complete neglect of it.
Our proposal that he give a minimum attention to his work,
240 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
too obviously justified, could not be entirely rejected. But the "im-
provement" lasted little more than a week. Comrade Cannon once
more fell back into his previous torpor. The grudgingly given prom-
ises simply did not materialize and the League continued to spi-
ral downward, passing by every opportunity (and there were many)
with a speed directly the reverse of Cannon's. When we were again
compelled to point out to Cannon what should have been obvi-
ous to him, Cannon replied to this "presumptuousness" by launch-
ing a slanderous assault upon Spector, denouncing him as another
intellectual, another Pepper, another Weinstone. In this field he
revealed a fierce energy that would have been far better applied
to the work assigned to him by the conference. (It might be added
here that Cannon is "turning the tables" on his opponents today
in a very similar manner, only more than one comrade now
appears where Spector before was alone.)
With collaboration reduced to a minimum in this period, we
nevertheless continued with our attempt to maintain Cannon in
the office, even though as secretary he did no secretarial work
and as editor no editorial work. We were actuated by our anxiety
to avoid an open crisis in the organization as long as possible and
hoped that, sharp as the conflicts were, they might nevertheless
be smoothed over in time. Because of the financial impossibility
of remaining in New York and the creation by Cannon of this
venomous atmosphere, Spector was compelled to return to
Canada. Abern and Shachtman (as well as Spector before he left
New York) had withdrawn from the payroll and contributed their
work in free time, so as to make Cannon's continuance in the of-
fice easier. The difficulties were "settled" in the end by comrade
Cannon getting a job outside and proposing Abern and Shachtman
to take over the immediate direction of the work "in his place."
This was done.
It would not be entirely correct to say that Cannon made no
contribution at all during this period. But those he made were
aimed exclusively at further "retrenchments" in accordance with
the, by that time, well-known "protracted" struggle. The National
Committee in those days, crumbling before our very eyes, occu-
pied itself week after week with one long, unceasing argument
against Cannon's stubborn proposals to reduce the Militant to a
monthly, when we had decided on a campaign to make it a weekly!
Prospect and Retrospect 241
The minutes of that period reveal that we would take up nothing
but this question for whole sessions:
Motion by Cannon to revert to monthly during summer
months and use funds on hand to rent and equip an
office-Lost 3-1
— Minutes, 13 June 1929, the only point on agenda
Financial report and proposals of JPC.
Motion JPC— to revert to monthly for summer months.
For: JPC. Against: MA, MS, Spector.
- Minutes, 25 June 1929
Had we not resisted this "long-term perspective" of comrade
Cannon, with its accompaniment of folding our hands and wait-
ing for better days, we might today be stewing obscurely in the
juices of a semimonthly publication. As will be seen later, every
time a similar situation arose, the same battle had to be fought to
a greater or lesser degree.
It was only with Cannon's departure from the office that we
began to slowly and laboriously pick up the threads again and
reassemble the branches into an organization. The enthusiasm for
the weekly Militant, which had been frittered away for months,
was aroused by us once more. Cannon, who had been strongly
opposed to the weekly while he was in the office, became even
more actively opposed afterward. He resisted it on the grounds
that to start the weekly Militant would be adventurism (!), that it
would be to build upon a speculative basis (!). His main contri-
bution to the campaign can be summed up in his repeated pro-
posals to "stabilize the Militant as a semimonthly" or else to re-
vert to a monthly. The campaign was conducted without much
assistance from Cannon, to put it moderately.
When in spite of this, the excellent response throughout the
country convinced us of the possibility of starting the weekly, we
finally decided to launch it and did toward the end of 1929. Com-
rade Cannon, evidently under the impression that the absence of
one comrade would not affect our work in a period of "protracted
uphill struggle," thereupon simply and literally deserted the
League entirely. For more than two months from the time we
actually got the first issue of the weekly, Cannon was not to be
seen near the League. With no experience in running a printing
plant, with a staff cut down to two National Committee members,
242 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Abern and Shachtman, and the multiplicity of difficulties atten-
dant upon such a situation, we had to cope in addition with the
passive sabotage of Cannon. He did not attend a single commit-
tee meeting during this whole period; he did not attend a single
branch meeting (not even the affair to celebrate the advent of the
weekly) during that period; he did not write a single line for us
during this period. A glance through the Militant for this time
shows that between the first issue of the weekly (30 November
1929) and 25 January 1930, there is not a word contributed by
comrade Cannon; thereafter, there was an article once every three
or four numbers, with another absence between 22 February 1930
and 19 April 1930, on which date he devoted himself to a review
of Liebknecht's memoirs of Marx!
Comrade Swabeck has just set the new fashion of denounc-
ing us as "abstentionists" who "criticize from the sidelines";
together with comrade Cannon, they write of Shachtman's con-
duct as a "series of blows to the organization." But nowhere in
any of their documents will there be found the faintest reference
to the real (and not manufactured) abstentionist, or to the series
of real and not fancied blows which Cannon himself delivered and
from the effects of which we have not yet completely recovered.
But the fact cannot be eradicated that these actions, which are
now lightly dismissed as "insignificant personal incidents," were
blows struck in the dark at the League, without explanation or
justification, and moreover not a single active comrade at that time
construed comrade Cannon's conduct in anything but the most
serious manner, as will be shown.
Abstentionism and Conservatism During the "Weekly Period"
Cannon's unexplained and demonstrative absence made the
New York branch members uneasy. The passage of weeks without
even a glimpse of him sent a rumble of disturbance and inquiry
through the comrades. One after another asked privately concern-
ing "what was up." Out of an exaggerated and ridiculous sense of
loyalty to Cannon we deliberately put off the questioners. Many
comrades can testify to how we sought to cover up Cannon, told
them that "he was just here before you came in"— all with the hope
of finding a solution eventually without throwing the organiza-
tion into a crisis that was maturing before our very eyes. Our
"explanations" did not, however, give much satisfaction to the
Prospect and Retrospect 243
comrades. As for Cannon, he never gave an explanation of his
conduct. He did, however, succeed in sowing demoralization
throughout the League, particularly in New York, and in virtually
destroying the committee at that time, which became reduced to
Abern and Shachtman, who could not manifestly function as a
committee in the real sense of the word.
Not only in New York was this uneasiness felt by the comrades,
but elsewhere too. Many finally gave expression to it. At the present
moment, when the theory is advanced that the disputes began on
international questions, it is interesting to quote a letter to Abern
from Glotzer, who was then in Chicago with Swabeck, not yet fully
aware of all that was happening in the center. "Arne is not satis-
fied with the relations. ...He thinks that there is a difference in
perspective and what we could expect in the way of development
for the League in the coming period. To be somewhat more spe-
cific, he thinks that either you or Max has illusions as to our
growth, or if not illusions, at least a wrong perspective" (23 Sep-
tember 1929). Our "illusions" and "wrong perspective," accord-
ing to comrade Cannon, consisted in our insistence on starting
the weekly and our belief in its vitality.
But this did not prevent Cannon's warmest defender today,
Swabeck, who now writes about us with such gusto as "absten-
tionists" criticizing from the sidelines, from feeling the general
alarm about Cannon's deliberate withdrawal from the League.
He felt compelled finally to write to Cannon from Chicago on
5 December 1929, that is, even weeks before Cannon finally decided
to bring his retirement to a close (our emphasis throughout):
Your complete absence from all activities in our movement for a long time
has become noticeable not only to such comrades as myself, who
are able to keep our finger fairly close to the pulse, but by com-
rades in general. Personally I have received several inquiries from
several comrades in regard to it. I am speaking of complete absence
because this is what it practically amounts to when one compares
the past with the present.... The reason for this complete absence of
yours has not been explained to me or to any other comrade that
I know of. Nor do I believe a satisfactory explanation could be given.... \
thought shortly after the change of staff had taken place and you
retired so far to the background, a short relief for adjustments of
personal difficulties is quite in order. I found it reasonable as a mat-
ter of temporary— that is, very temporary— arrangement. I realized,
of course, that you would have to devote some time to relieve your
mind of responsibilities of a personal character. Now, however, I
244 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
feel quite alarmed noting that this retirement or absence of yours
has become so complete and of such a permanent character. I am
not asking you to make any answer to me as a personal matter, but
rather to the movement (our emphasis).
This letter was written, we repeat, even before Cannon made
his retirement so complete that he was not to be seen in the office
at all.
This calculated absence was not without its effect. Enthusiasm
began to fall off because the comrades were perturbed and uneasy
and uncertain about what tomorrow might bring— some shock,
some unlooked-for blow. Only as a last resort— when Cannon had
even failed to reply to polite notes sent to him to attend commit-
tee meetings— did we feel compelled to write to two or three lead-
ing comrades, committee members, so that they would know what
the situation was and not be taken unawares by anything that might
happen subsequently. The effect of this state of affairs was soon
translated into a fall in the financial income, and, deprived of
direct assistance as we were, it became increasingly difficult to
handle the growing tasks. We were determined to leave no stone
unturned to maintain the weekly which had quickly cut a place for
itself in the movement and had been warmly received by our com-
rades and sympathizers.
We therefore decided, especially because, in addition, the
discussions in favor of establishing an international center of the
Opposition had been favorably received in Europe following the
debacle of Urbahns and Paz, to send comrade Shachtman to
Europe for the threefold purpose: of establishing direct contact
with the European sections of the Opposition and with comrade
Trotsky; of initiating an international conference and establishing
an authoritative Opposition center; of requesting financial assis-
tance from the Russian Opposition. We got a first indication of
Cannon's concern over internationalism by his reaction to this.
If Cannon had opposed the launching of the weekly, he was
even more violently opposed to this proposal. Toward the latter
part of the existence of the weekly, he had returned to the office
as abruptly as he had left it, without a word of explanation, and
only, as we learned, after a peremptory letter from Swabeck.
Cannon countered our proposal with one to sink the weekly with-
out a trace, to return to a semimonthly, print pamphlets instead,
and pay off our old debts! It is interesting to note that more than
Prospect and Retrospect 245
a year later, when we decided for the second time to launch the
weekly, Cannon was compelled to use all our arguments against
him in 1930 in order to reply to the opponents of the weekly in
1931, who opposed it with the same arguments that he himself
used a year before! His arguments on the floor would have
sounded more convincing to us (who had no need of being con-
vinced) did we not realize that Cannon was merely echoing our
arguments in reply to some comrades in the New York branch
who were merely echoing his arguments.
Carried away by his zeal in opposing the weekly Militant,
Cannon went so far as to advance the most absurd and even reac-
tionary and philistine arguments against the trip to Europe, which
was intended primarily to get aid for its preservation. He asserted
that the establishment of the weekly was not a real but a fictitious
advance; that we were maintaining it on a speculative basis; that
to continue it was adventurism; and not only that, but he argued
that in the past in this and other countries the movement had been cor-
rupted by subsidies, that we must avoid the same thing now, etc., etc. If
this had any meaning at all it signified that Cannon interpreted
the assistance which the Russian Opposition was at that time ren-
dering to the national sections in various countries (and had been
rendering for years back) as a source of corruption for the move-
ment similar to that which had taken place under the Stalinist
regime. It is not we alone who construed comrade Cannon's ob-
jections in this reactionary, insulting sense, but the other commit-
tee members as well, Swabeck included, as will be seen further
on. (It might be added that later, under "different" conditions,
Cannon forgot all his objections to "corrupting subsidy.")
Cannon was absolutely alone in his obstinate opposition. All
the nonresident committee members voted for our proposal to
send Shachtman to Europe as our representative in spite of
Cannon's "warnings." On 11 February 1930, at a meeting in Chi-
cago which was made possible by the attendance of comrade
Skoglund of Minneapolis, Glotzer and Swabeck of Chicago, and
Shachtman, who had come there in connection with personal
matters arising out of a death in his family, the whole situation
was discussed thoroughly. All the comrades present (including
some leading Chicago members) expressed their deep concern
over Cannon's past conduct. When the state of affairs in the resi-
dent committee had been discussed, it was Swabeck who finally
246 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
declared that he believed it might be necessary for us to expel
Cannon publicly from the League so that— to use his words-
Cannon would be unable to sneak out of the movement quietly!
The other comrades present, notably comrade Skoglund, expressed
themselves in a similar sense. Here again, we can see by this single
fact how perfectly absurd, but very convenient (for its authors) is
the contention in the C-S document that our disputes "began on
international questions."
While Shachtman was in Chicago, Cannon sent a lengthy let-
ter to Swabeck, presenting his standpoint on the question of the
trip to comrade Trotsky and repeating the same reactionary argu-
ments he had given in New York. But this had no effect upon the
decision of the other comrades. The vote was unanimous for our
proposal to maintain the Militant and establish relations with the
European Opposition. Cannon's letter did not succeed in the
slightest in allaying the perturbations in anyone's mind, least of
all in the mind of Swabeck, who, as we see, had lost confidence in
Cannon and even contemplated the necessity of his public expul-
sion. After Glotzer had come to the center to aid in the work while
Shachtman was absent; after Glotzer had been able to observe on
the spot that all the criticisms of Cannon and his conduct were
justified a thousand times over (from Chicago, both Glotzer and
Swabeck had thought that Shachtman and Abern might be exag-
gerating somewhat)— Swabeck wrote him:
I shall not attempt even now to enter into any discussion on the
questions you have raised in your letters.... I am inclined to believe,
however, that your estimation of the present relationship among com-
rades in the center is quite correct— sad to say.... Sometime and hope-
fully soon, I feel we shall be able to establish an actual functioning
center, not merely two comrades carrying the burden, but all of us
working together. Then, I feel quite confident, we will be able to
iron things out and start on a new basis. If worse should come to
worse, and nothing else but a little operation will do, then that has to
be performed. I am enclosing a copy of the letter I sent Jim in an-
swer to his received at the time when Max was here. Be judicious. /
am sending it to you only because 1 fear that Jim will not fully discuss
these points with you more than just perhaps in a formal manner.
— 30 March 1930; our emphasis
To Cannon himself Swabeck, who was already speaking about
him in connection with "little operations," wrote in a very restrained
manner, but quite definitely so that Cannon's position at that time
may be plainly seen:
Prospect and Retrospect 247
I am certain that the disastrous effects of a subsidized movement in
this country and for that matter elsewhere have been sufficiently
demonstrated to convince all of us. That is, on the basis of subsi-
dizing which has been established by the Stalin regime. But I am of
the opinion that what was proposed and now carried out by the
departure of Max could not in any way be considered a matter of estab-
lishing that practice and certainly not in the Stalinist sense. If that should
be so then we were even wrong in accepting the small sum which
was so generously made available toward helping initiate the Mili-
tant. Also, any financial speculative basis is an insecure one for any
revolutionary movement at best and should be avoided. But in that
respect, our very start with a publication was to a degree a specula-
tive one, the arrival of the weekly naturally increasing our obliga-
tions and therewith our financial difficulties, if, then, however, this
special measure can help us over the immediate difficulty, and give
us a breathing space to endeavor to build a more secure basis, it
should by all means be tried.... Now as to our advance made to the
weekly, you say it was not well grounded and therefore not a real advance.
This I am surprised to hear from you at this time.
— March 1930; our emphasis
Unsuccessful in having the National Committee join him to
sink the weekly so as to "confirm" ex post facto this repeated con-
tention that the advance to the weekly was not real, well grounded,
but speculative, Cannon transferred his activity to another field
during the absence of Shachtman. He engaged in agitating mem-
bers of the New York branch against the National Committee and
particularly against Abern and Shachtman. The same comrade who
is now so insistent upon the membership acknowledging and
increasing the authority of the National Committee sat by quietly
while Abern and Shachtman were denounced from the floor as
"bureaucrats." He had already declared at the committee meet-
ing following Shachtman's return from Chicago, after the decision
on the European trip had been unanimously endorsed with the
exception of his vote: "By this decision you comrades make fur-
ther collaboration impossible." He was as good as his word. Upon
Shachtman's return from Europe, the two or three New York
branch members who had been fed by Cannon's opposition
launched an attack upon the report made by Shachtman on his
visit with comrade Trotsky and the international conference. When
they demanded that a referendum of the organization should have
been taken before sending a delegate to an international gather-
ing, Cannon again demonstrated his "solidarity" with the com-
mittee by maintaining a demonstrative silence and abstaining on
248 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
the vote in the branch. Furthest from his mind at that time was
an interest in "international questions," in the international con-
ference, in the situation in the European sections, or in "main-
taining the authority of the leadership." He was dominated by the
single thought of continuing a factional war against Abern and
Shachtman and any stick he could pick up was good enough for
him to throw. When the subsequent plenum succeeded in estab-
lishing a measure of peace in the committee, and Cannon was
compelled to take a different attitude in the New York branch,
one of the comrades he had incensed against us in the preceding
period quite justly remarked that Cannon had left him "holding
the bag"!
In short, our disputes with comrade Cannon over this whole
period regarding his activities and the perspectives of the Oppo-
sition can be summed up in a letter written to comrade Swabeck
by Abern, a letter which shows that our real differences were not
invented in order to cover up something else, but existed long
before they are alleged by Cannon and Swabeck to have "begun."
For a period of a year since the conference (and indeed one could
say even before) there has been a definite difference of perspective
before our movement and it has reflected itself in the activities and
attitude of the comrades. Whether this difference of perspective
on the tasks of the Opposition in this period that has been and the
immediate period to come has ramifications and meaning of an even
more important character, I will not at this time undertake to
discuss. ...Of the period before the conference, the period immedi-
ately following the conference, and preceding the establishment of
the weekly Militant, and since the establishment of the weekly, up
to literally now, we can say, without in any way removing such
responsibility and share of errors that may be felt also to the rest of
us, Cannon has played a role that, speaking for myself, has indelibly
impressed itself in my mind, and not on the positive side for him.
To use blunt words for rough facts, the way I see it, JPC deserted
the work here, for the period after the conference and virtually the
entire period since. ..the Opposition is not merely that which was
before in the Communist Party. It is not merely an added growth,
as some, it appears, would think. It is a development of, and also a
break with, some things and conceptions of the past. We have elimi-
nated but we have also taken much that is new, and that much is
clear to all. Our Opposition receives its strength primarily not by a
national group evolution, but by its entry into the period and field
of international thought and organization; our adhesion to the
international Opposition led by Trotsky.
- Abern, 4 April 1932
Prospect and Retrospect 249
The New York comrades were not alone in their views on
Cannon's status at that time; these views were shared generally to
a greater or lesser extent. What comrade Swabeck thought of the
situation has already been indicated from his letters. In that same
period comrade Dunne of Minneapolis wrote us, after referring
to his "considering Jim out of the picture for a time at least," as
follows:
I am at a loss when it comes to speak about Jim. What indeed can
be said? Unless there is something that I do not know, we have only
to grieve over the loss of a powerful figure from the movement,
and as you suggest, hope for a turn or a change that will send him
back into the fight. As to the conduct of the affairs of the League
and the Militant, I for one am not at all apprehensive. Marty and
Max can and will carry on until more forces come to us and they
will act as they have in the past, as the true revolutionaries, sharing
the responsibilities with others so far as that is possible.
-4 January 1930
Other comrades expressed even deeper feelings about the situ-
ation. From Canada, comrade Spector wrote to Abern:
In these circumstances, one must ponder the political basis for C's
attitude of hostility and passivity. What game is he playing? At this
distance, it seems to me that we shall have to confront the question
whether the American Opposition is a Trotsky group or a Cannon
group.... But C will be making the biggest mistake of his political
career if he entertains the visions of reconstituting himself as leader
of a group of his own on the basis of the old Lovestone-Foster-
Cannon triangle.
-26 March 1930
It is clear that such a situation could not be permitted to
endure. Finding it impossible to arrive at a solution in the resi-
dent committee, we decided to call a plenum of the National Com-
mittee. We assiduously sought to avert an open struggle in the
organization as long as possible, hoping that the attainment of
some solution would enable us to avoid throwing the League into
an acute and painful crisis. We believe this to be one of the primary
obligations of a Communist leadership: not to throw every single
disputed point into the organization as a whole for premature and
distorted discussion, except as a last resort; to seek first to arrive
at an agreement in the leading bodies of the organization so that
the solidity and mobility of the leadership may be preserved and
not disrupted on every occasion when a difference of opinion pre-
vails; and only when it appears insoluble there, to transmit the
250 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
disputes to the organization as a whole, which is the only body
left to solve a dispute. A contrary procedure would tend to throw
the organization into a frenzy of internal discussion and dispute
each time its leading committee is confronted with a difference
of opinion. At the same time, however, it is also clear to us that a
grave error was made in that period by not plainly informing the
membership of the League of the facts of the disputes and the
nature of them. Had they been informed, it is more than possible
that the plenum which was called in the summer of 1930 would
have yielded more positive results. Even worse than that was our
failure at any time to inform comrade Trotsky and the Interna-
tional Secretariat.
The plenum made no really fundamental decisions on the dis-
putes. No document was adopted, no clear line was set out to guide
us in the future. The days were spent in an exhaustive discussion
of the state of affairs in the committee, but what came out of them
was less a clear-cut solution than it was a tacit understanding of
the need of continuing the collaboration of the leading comrades
on an improved basis. Once again, despite our discouraging
experiences, we agreed to make the effort in the interests of
advancing the organization. It is true that not one single comrade
attending the plenum supported comrade Cannon or condoned
his past conduct. Nevertheless, it was the consensus of opinion
that another start had to be made, particularly in order to pre-
serve the weekly, that a large measure of collaboration had to be
assured, etc., etc.
At this point let it be emphasized that during this whole period
there was no question of the Naville tendency, no question of
Landau, and no other question of international dispute before us;
there was no question about what is today alleged to be our false
attitude toward the New York branch (the only such question was
that in which Cannon was concerned through his incitement of
branch members against the National Committee); there was no
question of "Carterism" or of our "false attitude" toward the youth.
In a word, the questions literally did not exist which Cannon, for
interested reasons, now pushes to the fore to the obliteration of
everything that has happened in the past, which he inflates from
tiny balloons into his zeppelins of factional war against the
undersigned. As has been said, the convenience of this method
for those who make use of it cannot be questioned; but its harmony
Prospect and Retrospect 251
with loyal procedure in the proletarian movement is more than
dubious.
The Theory of the "Gestation" of the Cannon Group
Following the plenum, the work of the committee and conse-
quently of the organization as a whole was considerably improved.
Comrade Spector was once more brought from Canada, making
a resident committee of five members which immediately proved
its advantages over the previous committee of two and three mem-
bers. But our past disputes had barely been laid aside when com-
rade Cannon began to put forward with considerable insistence
his theory of the "gestation" of our Left Opposition inside the
womb of the old Cannon Party group. Notwithstanding the fact
that all the undersigned were also members of the former Can-
non group, we together with comrade Spector categorically re-
jected the ridiculous theory advanced by Cannon which is another
one of the axes around which his present position revolved and
which sticks out of every sentence in the document presented
jointly with comrade Swabeck. This theory has been advanced in-
numerable times by comrade Cannon in speeches, was stated by
him twice in writing, and finally had to be formally rejected by
the Second National Conference, only to reappear in the docu-
ment to which the undersigned are replying. It is stated by Can-
non as follows:
We were one of the latest detachments of the International Com-
munist Opposition to take definite shape in the open just as the
Lovestone group is somewhat belated reinforcement in the rear of
the international right wing. Neither of these American factions, how-
ever, found its international connection by accident. We were "pre-
pared by the past" for our place under the banner of the Interna-
tional Left Opposition. Lovestone and co. served their apprenticeship
and became journeymen opportunists, qualified for union with
Brandler in the American Party struggles. The protracted period of
our gestation as a faction on the line of the Bolshevik-Leninists has
not been without compensating advantages. The rich experiences of
the international struggle were realized for us, as it were, in advance,
and we have been able to build on their foundation.
-Militant, 10 May 1930356
And again, in the document against Weisbord:
Formally speaking, the American section of the International Left
Opposition was formed a little more than two years ago. It began
its public formal existence with the declaration read to the Political
252 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Committee by Abern, Shachtman, and Cannon in October 1928.
But neither the ideas of the Opposition nor we who represent them
fell from the sky on that date. The whole situation is an outgrowth
of the evolution and development of the Party and the Comintern.
The founders of the American section of the Opposition were "pre-
pared by the past" for their present stand. This is equally true of
the Lovestone and Foster factions, that is, of the right wing and the
centrists of our Party. Anyone who denies this has to ground his
position on the theory that political groupings and political devel-
opments are accidental and arbitrary. Such methods of analysis never
had any standing among Marxists.
-23 December 1930357
The dispute over this standpoint, which makes a caricature of
the origin of the American Opposition and sets up an absolutely
untenable "theory of leadership" in this country, would have a
purely historical and abstract interest, were it not for the fact that
comrade Cannon, joined now by comrade Swabeck, has persis-
tently put forward this idea for over two years, indicating that there
is something more "actual" concealed behind this "historical ques-
tion," something very practical, which, as will be seen further on,
affects the present life of the Opposition.
Theoretically, the contention does not rest upon a shred of
real evidence. The old Cannon group in the Party was not "devel-
oping logically," was not "gestating" toward the Left Opposition.
It never had a firm programmatic foundation during its separate
existence. It was never considered by anyone, least of all by itself,
as situated at the left wing of the Party. It came into existence in-
dependently (following its break with the Foster faction, out of
which it came in 1925), at the time when the Zinoviev-Stalin-
Bukharin group was consummating its organizational-political
victory in the United States by arbitrarily overthrowing the Foster
regime and establishing the Lovestone-Pepper regime. The Cannon
group united with the right wing (Lovestone, etc.) against the
Foster group. When it finally broke its alliance with the right wing,
it again maintained an independent existence for a wiiile, essen-
tially as a buffer between Foster and Lovestone. Prior to the Sixth
Congress it formed an opposition bloc with Foster-Bittelman which
it maintained virtually till the eve of our expulsion.
An objective estimation of the contending groups at that time
would undoubtedly establish the fact that the Cannon group had
many positive qualities, outstanding among them being its gener-
Prospect and Retrospect 253
ally correct views on trade-union politics and its criticisms of the
prevailing policies. But this by itself does not identify a group with
the Left Opposition. We have pointed out on numerous occasions
that even right-wing groups frequently make very just criticisms
of the official line on such questions as trade-union policy. But it
would further be established that on every fundamental question
of principle, the Cannon group stood upon the platform of inter-
national Stalinism, sometimes a little to the right of it, sometimes
a little to the left of it. While very few of its leaders— to their credit-
ever engaged actively in the campaign against "Trotskyism," the
group nevertheless had no political affinity with the Left Opposi-
tion. If anything, it was the least "international" of all the Party
groups and concerned itself less than any others with such ques-
tions as the British general strike and the Anglo-Russian Com-
mittee, the Chinese revolution, or the struggles within the Rus-
sian party, although the interest of the other groups was purely
factional. It spent more time upon secondary tactical questions in
this country than upon a discussion of the theory of socialism in
one country, upon which it did indeed spend no time at all. It is
true that the bureaucratic suppression of the Opposition's stand-
point had its effect upon the Cannon group, but the principal
material was available in the U.S. and in Moscow for those of the
group representatives who visited it periodically and were inter-
ested in these fundamental disputes. Not only on the basic ques-
tions of international principled connotation did the Cannon
group have not the slightest relationship with the views of the Left
Opposition, but even on the basic analysis of the position of Ameri-
can imperialism in the world economy and politics, its stand was
the direct opposite. The Cannon group stood on the platform of
Bittelman (the "apex theory"), against which the Russian Opposi-
tion had been contending since 1925.358
Still more: To the extent that we have developed toward the
full and basic views of the Left Opposition, we have had to break
both politically and organizationally with the old Cannon group.
In order to come to the Opposition, we had to break organiza-
tionally with the overwhelming majority of the members and lead-
ers of the Cannon group, so that there are today in the Opposi-
tion a bare 24 or so members who formerly were supporters of
the faction in the Party, i.e., an insignificant section of it. In order
to develop our present position on so important a question as the
254 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
labor party, for example, we have had to relinquish entirely the
standpoint of the Cannon group on this point, which constituted
the core of its platform even after the formation of the Left
Opposition, its basic premise and perspectives from which its
tactical conclusions were derived. The theory of the "gestation"
serves to make the past of the Cannon group, with which we have
had to break in order to go forward, serve as a brake on our further
development.
The Cannon group (or more accurately, a section of it) came
to the Left Opposition by quite a different path than by a logical
and consistent development of its own struggle in the American
Party. If it was "prepared by the past," then it is not in the sense
that comrade Cannon makes use of this phrase from Trotsky—
which is quoted as meaning that the Cannon group was prepared
by its own past— but by the past of the Russian Opposition, in which
our old Party group had absolutely no part, except insofar as we
stood essentially on the platform of the right-center bloc. As com-
rade Trotsky himself wrote: "After five years of the struggle against
the Russian Opposition, it required a journey of members of the
Central Committee of the American Party, and even of its Politi-
cal Bureau, to a congress in Moscow in order for the first time to
find out what so-called 'Trotskyism' is." What actually happened
was that the impasse into which the Cannon group had been driven
by the unprincipled faction struggle in the American Party, in
which the Lovestone group attached itself to Bukharin and the
Foster group to Stalin, began to make it clear to many of the com-
rades that the "American fight" was of second- and tenth-rate im-
portance compared with the fundamental struggle going on in the
international. We realized this very belatedly, only after the Sixth
Congress, our realization being accelerated by the decomposition
of the ruling right-center bloc, and it is incontestably to the credit
of a section of the Cannon group that it took its stand unequivo-
cally for the Russian Opposition, however tardily.
But this has nothing in common with comrade Cannon's
theory of the "gestation" or the implications contained in his
assertion that the American Opposition was constituted "formally
speaking" in October 1928, i.e., that it had really been moving in
just that direction long before 1928. The reference to "accidents"
and "arbitrariness" in the formation of political groups, and what
"standing among Marxists" such methods of analysis may have,
Prospect and Retrospect 255
simply does not fit into the picture at all and has nothing to do
with the case. Paz always contended that his group had developed
"logically" into the Left Opposition. Frey demands to this day that
we recognize the "legitimacy" of his "gestation" from the early
years of the corrupt Austrian faction fights to his present-day "ad-
herence" to the Left Opposition. The Maslowists and Urbahns to
a degree assiduously cultivate the legend of the "historic left." Or
to take a group which is far closer to us than any of those men-
tioned: What would we say if the comrades of the New Italian
Opposition were to make the following claim (which of course they
do not make):
Formally speaking, we joined the Left Opposition in 1930. But nei-
ther the ideas of the Opposition nor we who represent them fell
from the sky on that date. We founders of the NOI were "prepared
by the past." Our whole struggle in the Party— our fight against the
Bordigists included— led us logically and formally into the ranks of
the International Left Opposition. There are no accidents in poli-
tics, as all Marxists know.
We would say in reply to this absurd play of words what the
undersigned comrades have said to comrade Cannon for the past
two years— without the slightest results. Through the pen of com-
rade Spector, we wrote more than two years ago:
None of the former Party groupings are any longer what they once
were. Never was the Lovestone group such an undisguised and out-
spoken right wing. Never was there the clear and outspoken con-
scious left wing that the American Opposition constitutes today. The
limits of the old unprincipled factionalism and intrigue had their
rise in the Zinoviev-Bukharin and Stalin regimes. The American
Opposition has in the short time of its existence achieved a great
educational work for the movement that will sooner or later bear
its fruit. For this the American Opposition recognizes its historic
debt to the Russian Opposition.
-Militant, 26 April 1930
Finally, even at the Second National Conference, we were
obliged to reject the Cannon theory by inserting a clause in our
thesis which referred to the fact that "The Left Opposition, at its
formative stage, leaned in the direction of this reformist perspec-
tive (i.e., the inevitability of a labor party), which constituted to a
certain extent an uncritical carryover of the preceding struggle in
the Party, prior to the time when the left wing took shape and
was established as a political grouping distinct from all the others in
the movement" (conference thesis, our emphasis).359 This moderate
256 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
formulation was finally adopted after the strong objections raised
by comrade Cannon to the original formulation, which was even
sharper and plainer.
We have not been unaware of the advantage accruing to the
development of the American Left Opposition from the fact that
it was founded by a compact group of leading comrades who had
shared common views in the past, whose experience in the revo-
lutionary movement and in the internal struggles proved to be of
great value, and whose "habit of collaboration" for anywhere from
five to eight years in the Party made for a certain stability in the
organization. Indeed, we have pointed out these positive features
on many occasions to various hypercritical critics who played no
role at all in the Party, or else an abominable one.
Nor do we entertain the notion that the League is at present
obliged to engage in a review of the history of the Party and an
estimation of the contending factions in it in order to condemn
or in general to make any particular appraisal of the Cannon
group. That may safely be left to the coming historians of the move-
ment and to a time when the past may be examined with greater
objectivity.
At the same time, however, we have not been unmindful of
the negative and dangerous aspects of the "gestation" theory and
especially of its practical consequences. It had served to establish
an atmosphere of "hereditary succession," so to speak, in the or-
ganization, to attach in the minds of the comrades a special privi-
leged significance to those who once formed a part of the Cannon
group in the Party. It was on the basis of the same theory that
comrade Swabeck, when he came to the center early in 1931 as an
"objective comrade who would help establish harmony in the com-
mittee," informed Glotzer that the basis for the establishment of
unity in the committee was an acknowledgment of "Cannon as
the leader of the League." However little we were concerned with
Swabeck's ridiculous preoccupation as to who (if anybody!) should
be "the" leader (and by "acknowledgment" at that!), we neverthe-
less respectfully declined comrade Swabeck's ingenious proposal.
The refusal of many of the New York branch members to swal-
low this theory and the critical attitude they have adopted toward
comrade Cannon's unceasing references to the qualifications of
the Cannon group is not the last reason for the antagonism which he
holds toward so many of the New York comrades.
Prospect and Retrospect 257
This theory, furthermore, has served as a distinct obstacle to
the broadening of the National Committee. The idea of introduc-
ing new blood into the committee, of drawing in fresh elements
and active workers particularly at the center, has never been
approved by comrades Cannon and Swabeck— especially the
former. When the committee (in 1930) was functioning only in
the most desultory manner, not holding meetings for weeks, we
proposed the co-optation (with voice but no vote) of three of the
most active New York members: Basky, Hansen, and Lewit. Cannon
opposed it bitterly. It was only done when the full National Com-
mittee voted unanimously for our proposal, all of them, that is,
except Cannon. He continued to look with contempt upon these
three active workers whom we sought to draw into the national
work.
At the Second National Conference we witnessed another
instance of the astounding situation— almost unprecedented in the his-
tory of the revolutionary movement!— -where, after three whole years
of our existence we finally took the "revolutionary step" of add-
ing one solitary new member, Oehler, to the National Committee
and advancing one alternate, Dunne, to the same rank. The com-
mittee remains composed to this day (with the exception, of course,
of its members from Canada, where the Cannon group had no
ramifications) only of former Cannon group members. Our pro-
posal to enlarge the committee of seven (of whom only the resi-
dent handful ever really functioned as committee members) to the
number of nine was only accepted grudgingly. Our further pro-
posal to add one or two active militants to the committee resulted
in that "open conflict at the Second National Conference over
the election of the new NC" about which the C-S document
becomes so indignant. This "incident" requires some elucidation
since its real meaning has been distorted beyond recognition.
The Dispute at the Conference
Even prior to the conference we had already noted the ten-
dencies to narrow still further the basis of the leadership. On the
very eve of the conference, Cannon made an open threat about
his intention to oppose Glotzer's reelection to the committee. Dur-
ing the conference itself, Basky and then Swabeck presented us
with a list of seven nominations which provided for the removal
of another "recalcitrant" who does not have the "proper opinion"
258 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
of comrade Cannon; we refer to comrade Abern. We not only
insisted upon including these two former members in the new com-
mittee and adding comrade Oehler (which was finally done), but
also on adding another comrade, who, during his period of co-
optation on the committee and as organizer of the New York
branch, had given adequate proof of his fitness, which nobody
challenged. That we had not the slightest intention of "strength-
ening our faction" on the committee as against "theirs" by this
proposal is conclusively demonstrated by our added proposal that
we were quite willing to increase the committee's size to eleven or
13 and fill out the positions with any available nominees proposed
by comrade Cannon. That Lewit's fitness was never questioned is
shown also by the fact that shortly after the conference he was
put in charge of work among the Jewish workers and made editor
of Unser Kamf. But at the conference, his nomination met with
the most furious resistance, although it had been generally agreed
months before then that he was a suitable candidate for the new
committee! Why? Because, as we learn from their document, he
was "one of those comrades who had not been able to distinguish
between the tendency of the XC and the tendency of Carter and
who, at the critical moment, concentrated his attacks on us."
Is this true? In no way whatsoever!
Comrade Cannon here refers to the incident which took place
in the New York branch on the eve of the conference. The branch
had already signified its attitude toward Carter by voting against
him as a delegate to the national conference. Not satisfied with
this, comrade Cannon thereupon introduced a motion of his own.
without previously consulting a single member of the XC, con-
demning Carter. "Comrade Shachtman sat silent during this
discussion and did not vote on either of the resolutions." Cannon's
indignation would sound less shallow if we did not recall how silent
he sat when, in 1930, the National Committee was being violentlv
attacked by the comrades he had incited.
However that may be, Cannon carefullv refrains from quot-
ing his motion which is hardlv consistent with his present conten-
tions. In it he proposed that the branch "likewise condemn the
campaign against the National Committee conducted by comrade
Friedman (Carter), his attempts to discredit it and undermine its
authority and to create rivalries among its members who have
defended a common political line." In his document of 22 March
Prospect and Retrospect 259
1932, Cannon writes that "for the past year or so. ..between com-
rade Shachtman on the one side and the present writer on the
other— there has been a slowly but steadily developing divergence
over questions which we consider decisive for the future of the
movement." In other words, there has been in the National Com-
mittee a divergence over questions decisive for our future for more
than a year. But six months ago, comrade Cannon proposed that
we join him to condemn Carter for having announced that there
were differences in the National Committee! We sat silent not out
of support to Carter but because we did not want to precipitate a
struggle by attacking Cannon's motion as it deserved. The branch,
together with us, separated itself politically with sufficient clear-
ness by voting against Carter as a delegate; the same branch voted
overwhelmingly against Cannon's motion because the comrades
felt that it was not only unjustified persecution of Carter but that
it was hypocritical and untrue. Nobody was unaware of differences
in the committee (although nobody had the faintest idea that it
was over "international questions" until Cannon discovered it!) and
nobody was therefore willing to condemn Carter for saying that
there were differences.
For failing to support this arbitrary, untenable motion (which
even comrade Swabeck swallowed very hard when he rose to speak
of it), comrade Lewit was opposed as a member of the new com-
mittee. Perhaps an even greater "mistake" on his part was his fail-
ure not only to have been a member of the old Cannon group but
in not recompensing for that by agreeing with the Swabeck for-
mula for establishing the basis for unity in the NC.
The charge repeated now that Lewit was an opponent of the
committee appears even more ridiculous in view of the elections
to the branch executive committee (New York) following the con-
ference, when Cannon made a speech in favor of Lewit being put
onto the local committee so as to strengthen the hand and influ-
ence of the National Committee!
We would go still further and say that even had all the charges
made by Cannon against Lewit, or any other comrade who was
generally qualified for membership on the committee, held true,
even if such a comrade held differing views on certain questions
and was critical of any member of the committee or of the com-
mittee as a whole— even if this were so, we find in it no reason for
opposing him as a member. The Opposition has no need of such a
260 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
spurious and strangulating "monolithism"; it will concur in it only to
its own detriment. While it is true that the conference did not real-
ize all that was involved, it nevertheless made a serious error in
giving a majority vote against our proposal.
The National Committee, individually and as a whole,
undoubtedly has a great deal to its credit for which it has no rea-
son to apologize; but it has great and serious shortcomings which
cannot be overcome merely by insisting that the membership "rec-
ognize and increase its authority"— this cannot and should not be
done by resolutions and, in the first place, it cannot be done by
the membership; that task devolves primarily upon the leadership
itself, which cannot ask the membership to take anything for
granted for tomorrow. The committee, the League as a whole,
must make every effort to broaden the base of its leading com-
mittee, seek out and draw into its ranks additional forces. Such
an extension of the ranks of the committee, the infiltration of
new blood, will be an added assurance against any unnecessary
exaggerations and magnifying of small disputes and an easier
solution of large ones.
To sum up on this point: the "gestation" theory has no basis
in objective facts. Its adoption by the League and continuous
propagation can only result in the worst ideological confusion and
mixing up of the history and ideas of the Left Opposition with
those of a Party faction which stood on a different platform. It
can only produce a distortion of our whole outlook. It can only
become an increasingly large obstacle to the growth and expan-
sion of the League and its leadership.
Hesitation to Advance— Proposals for Retreat
The characteristics of comrade Cannon's policy during the
past period were not confined to him alone. Immediately upon
his arrival in New York, comrade Swabeck associated himself with
comrade Cannon on virtually every single question and action.
For this unity in action there is no accidental political foundation.
Our differences over the prospects and perspectives of the League
with Cannon, prior to the arrival of Swabeck, were accentuated
by the similarly conservative views advanced by the latter. Most of
the forward steps that the League took in the past year at first
encountered the reluctance, hesitation, or downright opposition
of comrade Swabeck. We were compelled to resist this tendency
Prospect and Retrospect 261
with the same vigor that marked our resistance to the tendency of
Cannon previously. The launching of the Jewish semimonthly
organ of the League was opposed by Swabeck, who kept urging
that its appearance be postponed, that this was not yet the time
for it, that the organization could not carry such "heavy burdens,"
etc., etc. The Greek paper of the League met with the same oppo-
sition on his part and to a certain extent on Cannon's part, the
motivation for the objections being the same ones that had been
dinned into our ears in the past period, in connection with every
advance that came before the committee for discussion. When the
proposal was placed before the committee to vote for the launch-
ing of Young Spartacus at an earlier date than that foreseen by the
Second National Conference, comrade Swabeck opposed it so vio-
lently that in the heat of the dispute on the question in the com-
mittee, he even threatened to resign his post as secretary and "have
someone else carry out the work" if the motion was carried. And
finally, as is fairly well-known, while Glotzer and Shachtman were
in Europe, a certain letdown in the organization produced such a
pessimistic and hopeless feeling in comrade Swabeck that Cannon
proposed to him and to other comrades in the office that he return
to Chicago, find work there, and have the direction of the work at
the center be undertaken by other leading comrades.
In a word, the committee functioned in a relatively normal
manner, relatively free from friction and disagreements whenever
there was no difficulty encountered in pushing the League forward. We
had no quarrel with comrades Swabeck and Cannon when they
concurred in any move that would extend the activity, influence,
and ramifications of the Opposition in this country. But whenever
they hung back, wherever they hesitated or resisted a forward step, wher-
ever they manifested their conservatism, sluggishness, and their inter-
pretation of our "protracted perspective," we clashed in the lead-
ing committee. This unmistakable, fundamental fact stands out
clearly from all the records of the whole past period. It cannot be
dismissed with a wave of the hand or by "explanatory" speeches.
The League is threatened at the present time with a renewal
of the clashes that have marked the past period, only they are now
more acute and menacing. With the claim that it is now inevitable
(or is it also desirable?) that the League pass through a so-called
"French period," comrade Cannon has announced in the commit-
tee his readiness to "retrench" all along the line so that we may be
262 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
stripped for action in an internal factional struggle. Some of these
"retrenchments" have already been made and others are forecast
for the immediate period. The theoretical journal which we
planned, against which nobody raised any objections at the outset
and the financial feasibility of which was not seriously called into
question, had already been dropped indefinitely. On the grounds
that the organization will be crippled during this "French period"
(in which the "hard oppositionists" are to form under the banner
of comrade Cannon), these comrades have announced their readiness
to push back Unser Kamf to monthly frequency or to suspension, to give
up "if necessary" altogether the youth and the Greek-language paper, and
reduce the Militant to a semimonthly. We have no doubt that "argu-
ments" will be advanced for these proposals, even more strongly
than the arguments— of the same type and with the same "valid-
ity"—which were first advanced against launching the Militant and
every other publication we now possess. But we do not believe these
measures to be at all necessary or commanded by the situation.
We have found in the past that our resources had not yet been
tapped, at a time when we thought wre had taken the "maximum."
W7e still have resources today which can be tapped to make unnec-
essary these "retrenchments," particularly if the organization is not
thrown into a demoralizing frenzy of distorted factional war.
The break in the continuity of the weekly publication of the
Militant, that is, its suspension for a long period of time, was never
really necessitated by reality. The organization has proved capable
of maintaining even more than a weekly English paper, provided
that the proper situation prevails in the leading body of the League.
We challenged the need to suspend the weekly before and we deny
any need to do it today, except a factional need, i.e., one that arose
out of a factional struggle imposed upon the organization.
We do not share the perspective of comrades Cannon and
Swabeck as manifested in the past and repeated in their present
document and we cannot withdraw our criticism of it. Neverthe-
less, we believe that the possibilities for the unification of the
League and its advancement still exist and we must not allow them
to be destroyed for factional reasons. We cannot hope to change
the personal relations of comrades involved by the adoption of a
decree. But there still exists sufficient community of basic politi-
cal views to make possible the collaboration required to continue
the work of the Opposition. The task to be accomplished imme-
Prospect and Retrospect 263
diately is to reestablish the unity of the committee and the League
as a whole on this "minimum basis." The joint work in the future,
the consideration of broad political problems that we must take
up in increasing measure, the events themselves will reveal in time
what is not yet fully ascertainable at the present moment: Either
the present conflict is the result of personal antagonisms, petty
frictions magnified by the circle atmosphere under which we still
live in part, or inevitable secondary differences on questions of
policy which have no fundamental importance or significance and
can be straightened out in the course of the work. Or the present
conflict bears concealed within itself half-formed, still unclear, but
nevertheless fundamental differences which only await further develop-
ments, a collision with an important political problem or problems,
to appear in their full light and magnitude. It cannot yet be said
definitely and conclusively which of these alternatives is correct.
Time will offer the test and the test can best be made under the condi-
tions of unity.
Let us now take up the other points raised in the C-S docu-
ment one by one and put them as they should be put, not on the
basis of assertions which cannot be proved because no proof exists,
but on the basis of facts and documents, that is, as they were and
are in reality.
The International Questions
We have spoken of the attempt, impossible of success, to
explain the conflict that has existed for years in our leading com-
mittee by a reference to "international questions" exclusively. In
the first place, they do not even begin to explain the differences
which have existed between Cannon and Swabeck on the one side,
and at least two of the present signatories (Abern and Glotzer),
for the document of C-S refers to the difference on international
questions only with Shachtman. As for Shachtman's position on
the present dispute in the French Ligue, he will make that fully
clear in a separate statement devoted to that question. Suffice it
to say here that Cannon has distorted this aspect of the dispute
in the committee beyond recognition and exaggerated the differ-
ences all out of proportion to their real magnitude. That there
have been differences in the committee is undeniable; we aim to
put them as they really were, from the first day to the present.
It is no secret that comrade Cannon's interest in international
264 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
questions in general and in internal disputes of the Opposition
abroad in particular has never been a deep or ardent one, except
for the last few months when such an "interest" was required in
the pursuit of factional aims. In reality, however, it was at no time
more than very casual, formal, and superficial. One has but to
read the complete files of the Militant to convince himself of the
insignificant percentage of the sum total of all his literary contri-
butions to our press that is devoted to or concerned with interna-
tional problems in general. This too has its roots in the more dis-
tant past.
One has but to remember the spread-eagle speech made by
him at the Second National Conference, when, in order to leave
the impression that Shachtman was "concealing" some material
on the Italian situation from the membership, he urged the com-
rades "to burn a fire" under the National Committee, if it fails to
produce immediately after the conference all the documents of
the Bordigist group, and its correspondence back and forth with
comrade Trotsky, so that the comrades might know "what it is all
about." This speech, the documents, the correspondence, as well
as the motion made on the basis of the speech, were promptly
forgotten by Cannon right after the conference and have not been
heard of since.
When the first dispute arose in the French Ligue, Cannon
showed his usual interest in the matter, that is, practically none at
all. He was afforded the opportunity to express himself on the
disputed issues when he wrote the foreword to "Communism and
Syndicalism," in which we included comrade Trotsky's article
against the right-wing leadership of the Ligue, an introduction to
which comrade Trotsky looked forward. Comrade Shachtman,
who, we learn, "did not even find it necessary to make the infor-
mation about the development of struggles in the European sec-
tions available to the committee," nevertheless furnished comrade
Cannon with detailed information about the then situation in the
French trade unions, the various tendencies and groups, and par-
ticularly the internal situation in the Ligue, which had evoked the
criticism of comrade Trotsky. He made this information available
to comrade Cannon for the specific purpose of having it included
in the introduction so that the readers of the pamphlet would
understand what was involved and where we stood. The introduc-
tion, however, does not contain anything but the most formal
Prospect and Retrospect 265
reference to the Trotsky article.360 We have no doubt that precisely
in this matter did Cannon allow political considerations to be out-
weighed by "personal considerations" in the case of Rosmer—
whose fate in the French Ligue Cannon continued to bemoan to
Shachtman for months afterward as one of those "old revolution-
ists" whose place was being taken, shall we use one of comrade
Cannon's phrases?. ..by young upstarts.
During the whole course of the French (Naville) and German
(Landau) disputes, there was not a shadow of difference of opinion in
the National Committee, in any action we took or failed to take. In the
whole arraignment of Shachtman, Cannon and Swabeck do not
produce a single document, do not refer to a single record to sub-
stantiate their charges! And that simply because none exist! Private
conversations were undoubtedly held during a certain period— only
if their subject matter and tenor were accurately reported, they
would not resemble the insinuations made by Cannon but some-
thing quite different!
We say: Let a single document, a single motion, a single resolution,
a single private letter-either to Naville, Landau, or to comrade Trotsky,
or to anyone else-be produced to show when, where, and how Shachtman
or any other committee member supported those elements (specifically
Rosmer, Naville, Landau) against whom the international Opposition
was conducting a struggle.
No such thing can be produced; but other documents can be
produced to show the contrary.
On 16 March 1931, our minutes read: "Motion by Shachtman
that we endorse the co-optation of Frank in Naville's place in the
secretariat."
On 27 April 1931, our minutes read:
Motion by Shachtman that we reject the proposal of the Italian left
Prometeo group and its conception that the International Secretariat
should be a mere "liaison" center between the national sections, and
propose in its place that up until the time when the coming Euro-
pean conference will elect an even more authoritative executive body
that we fully recognize the authority of the International Secretariat
politically and organizationally.
The minutes continue:
In regard to the controversy in the German section and the letters
on hand from comrade Trotsky as well as from Kurt Landau: Motion
by Shachtman that we endorse the practical proposals of comrade
266 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Trotsky contained in his letter entitled "The Crisis in the German
Left Opposition" as a basis to approach a solution of this crisis. Fur-
ther that we reserve a formulation of our opinion on the political
and principled issues involved in the controversy until such time as
we have had further opportunity for study. That we further protest
against the organizational measures taken by the Berlin executive
committee which are calculated not to bring closer the solution on
the basis of a political discussion but artificially to anticipate the
decision through what is at best premature organizational measures.
Both of these motions were carried unanimously without the
slightest disagreement. This was the first motion ever presented
in the committee to condemn the Landau group. Comrade
Shachtman needed no enlightenment from comrades Cannon and
Swabeck in order to present it. We were probably late in our actions
on this point, as we undoubtedly were on virtually all the other
international questions, and comrade Trotsky's criticism was quite
valid on this score, even though distance did not make for prompt-
ness. But it was not Shachtman who was late; it was the committee
as a whole, and the attempt now being made to crawl out of re-
sponsibility and leave it resting on the shoulders of one comrade
is cheap and ridiculous. No other comrade made the proposals
before Shachtman did, either on Naville or Landau or any other
question. Not because of lack of material which was allegedly
"monopolized" and not communicated by Shachtman, for especially
on the Landau affair did the whole committee have at its direct
disposal a tremendous number of documents in German (which
Swabeck reads fluently), which were sent us directly from Turkey
and Germany.
In their document, they write: "Even without comrade
Trotsky's illuminating open letters it was sufficient for us to read
a couple of the translated polemics of Landau and to take note of
the ambiguous and shifty tactics of Naville in his struggle against
the leadership of the French Ligue to get a definite impression of
these people." Granted they were deeply solicitous and "did not
wish to injure his (Shachtman's) standing with comrade Trotsky
by the implication of a lack of confidence in him," and that for
this touching reason they would not adopt motions against
Shachtman on the international questions. Yet even this concern
should not have prevented them, since they already had a "defi-
nite impression of these people," from at least once introducing a
motion on the international disputes before Shachtman did, so that
Prospect and Retrospect 267
the procrastination and sabotage now imputed to him might thus
have been overcome.
Was there not sufficient material available for this to the whole
committee? All the mail, the reports of the secretariat, the docu-
ments, were turned over to the League secretary. From the addi-
tional material available to Shachtman (press, letters, etc.), reports
were adequately made to the committee and not a single comrade
took exception to the views expressed in these reports. Not a single
comrade even intimated that different views prevailed among us
on the international disputes. On the contrary, without a single
word of special instruction at any time, every single document we
ever wrote was assigned to Shachtman to draw up and not one
was ever revised. Nobody intimated (except long after the fact)
that Shachtman was giving half-support or any other support to
Naville or Landau. Thus the committee minutes of 12 June 1931
read as follows:
Complete report made by Shachtman of the developments of the
International Left Opposition, including the present discussion and
disputes within the sections of Germany and France.
Motion by Shachtman: 1. That an elaborate and extensive in-
formation and political bulletin on the situation in the Interna-
tional Left Opposition, embodying our conclusions, be prepared
and sent to the membership as well as to the International Sec-
retariat; 2. That an unsigned article on this question be pub-
lished in the Militant. Both motions lost.
Motion by Glotzer: That a statement on the international situa-
tion embodying our conclusions be published in the Militant
to be signed by the NC. Motion carried.
Motion by Swabeck: 1. That a letter be sent immediately to the
International Secretariat on the situation in the international
Opposition which is to give the line that our resolution will
take; 2. That comrade Shachtman be commissioned to draft
the resolution and that a subcommittee of three, including
Shachtman, go over the draft prior to its being submitted to the
NC. Both motions carried. Committee: Shachtman, Swabeck, and
Cannon.361
But the letters to Shachtman from comrade Trotsky which the
former "regarded as a purely personal correspondence"? It is pre-
cisely at the committee meeting just mentioned that this matter
was first raised. Shachtman had read to Swabeck and other com-
mittee members a letter from Trotsky in which he criticized
Shachtman for his delay in taking a full position on the European
disputes. Shachtman gave Swabeck the letter (as he had given most
268 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
of the other letters from Trotsky), but Swabeck proceeded to claim
that it was an official communication to the League. To avoid such
petty quarrels in the future, Shachtman moved: "That all letters
to and from comrade Trotsky be handled by the secretary." The
motion lost. It was only then that comrade Abern made the motion
which Cannon and Swabeck now distort completely:
Motion by Abern: 1. That all letters from Trotsky or the Interna-
tional Secretariat addressed officially to the League be translated
for all NC members; 2. That the secretary inform comrade Trotsky
that he acts officially for the NC and ask him to address official
communications to the League in care of the secretary; 3. That all
members have the right to correspond personally with comrade
Trotsky or any other comrade. All carried.
In moving that Trotsky be informed that official letters be ad-
dressed to the secretary and that all members have the right to
correspond personally with comrade Trotsky or any other com-
rade, Abern was directing his proposal not against Shachtman but
against Swabeck!
It is true that comrade Shachtman considered the letters ad-
dressed to him from Trotsky as personal letters (comrade Trotsky
addressed his official letters specifically to the National Commit-
tee and they were immediately turned over as such). In one of his
earliest letters on the dispute in the French Ligue, comrade Trotsky
wrote to Shachtman: "This letter is intended for you personally,
not because I have anything to conceal here but because the com-
rades who are not acquainted with the personal actors may not
interpret the letter in the spirit in which it is written." In spite of
this— and other references in other letters written later to the
obviously personal character of these letters— comrade Shachtman
without in any way feeling that "any confidences were being
violated," communicated the essence and most frequently the text of
virtually every letter he received from comrade Trotsky to the members of
the committee, including those letters in which comrade Trotsky criticized
him explicitly, as is shown by the meeting of 12 June 1931. Any other
presentation of what happened on this point is detective-story
writing, calculated to create an air of mystery and dark dealings
on Shachtman's part and to provoke demagogic recriminations
against him.
We reiterate that "Shachtman delayed in taking a position on
the disputes in the European Opposition" is just as true as is the
statement that the committee as a whole delayed. Until the conference,
Prospect and Retrospect 269
nobody had the slightest word to say— either in the committee or
in private conversations— concerning any "support" Shachtman was
giving to Naville, Landau, or similar elements. Nobody proposed
a single measure or a single motion before Shachtman did. In the
June 1931 internal information bulletin of the German Opposi-
tion will be found Shachtman's statement condemning Landau,
written even before the official NC resolution to the same effect
(adopted on Shachtman's motion), which appears in the same num-
ber of the bulletin. Comrade Shachtman was unanimously charged
with drawing up the resolution on the international question for
the Second National Conference. When it was finished, not a single
revision was made in it by anybody. Cannon did, it is true, pro-
pose the insertion of Naville's name next to the part which con-
demns his tendency. He did not, as he so romantically describes
it, write Naville's name into the resolution on the linotype box,
but while looking over the resolutions, he proposed to comrade
Shachtman that Naville's name be specifically mentioned.
Shachtman replied that even though no national section had yet
made a public condemnation of Naville— although all had of course
taken a stand against him and his tendency— and even though he
did not think that the American section should be the first one
to take such a step, he had no particular objection to inserting
Naville's name, especially since it is quite obvious from the text of the
resolution that it was Naville who was being condemned. This was all
that took place around this incident which is now recounted with
broad hints about its tremendous significance.
Comrade Shachtman, with whom differences "began" on
international questions more than a year ago (!), was given the
conference report on precisely that subject, as well as the instruc-
tion to make the preconference discussion report on this subject
before the New York branch. Comrade Cannon now denounces
the report somewhat more openly than he did in his muddy in-
sinuations during the conference itself. In the first place, Cannon
never heard the conference report of Shachtman. He was absent
from the conference while it was delivered, just as he abstained
from participation in any other phase of the conference. In the
second place, if the conference report required the peculiar attack
delivered against it by comrade Cannon, why had not a similar
attack been made on the preconference report given before the
New York branch by Shachtman, in the presence of all the
270 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
committee members, including Cannon and Swabeck? The report
to the branch was made from exactly the same outline, exactly the same
notes, as the report to the conference, and delivered virtually in an iden-
tical time allotment and language, that is, they were almost word
for word alike! Nobody even hinted to Shachtman that his branch
report had something wrong with it! How was it possible to pass
over in tacit agreement a report delivered to the branch and to
launch into a furious assault upon the identical report delivered
to the conference, to attack it, not so much to dispose of Naville
and Landau, but in order to make a violent attack upon Shachtman
in the form of hints, insinuations, obscure references, and the like?
The answer does not lie in any "differences" that Cannon
actually had with Shachtman over international questions; these
were discovered after the fact. And what fact? The fact that
Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer remained silent at the last
preconference New York branch meeting when comrade Cannon
introduced his amendment to condemn Carter. If any mistake was
made on this occasion, it lay in not speaking to repudiate the
amendment expressly. In any case, it is clear to us that the "inter-
national differences," which created such a depressing feeling
among the conference delegates after Cannon's speech, were dis-
covered only after we had refused to be a party to an amendment
on Carter which was hypocritical and vindictive and which aimed
to condemn a comrade for declaring that there were differences
when there actually were differences. The present document of
comrade Cannon is a crushing repudiation of his own amendment
at that branch meeting.
The Question of the Youth in the League
We need not here take any "defense of Carterism," which is
ascribed to us in the C-S document. In branch meeting after
branch meeting in New York we have made clear our views of com-
rade Carter and anybody who may share his outlook. We required
no instruction from comrades Cannon and Swabeck to make clear
our position on this point, and we certainly did not require the
approach and manner of dealing with this question which these
two comrades introduced. What we have criticized in the attitude
of Carter is his academic approach to questions, his hypercritical
attitude toward the work of the League and the National Com-
mittee, his intellectualistic tendencies, as well as the tendency to
Prospect and Retrospect <2,hI\
set up the younger and very inexperienced comrades as a sort of
"control commission" over the National Committee.
We have not, however, at any time demanded of him or any
other member that worshipful and uncritical attitude toward the
National Committee which can only distort the relations between
the leadership and the membership. We have exercised and will
try to continue to exercise the greatest patience— not so much
toward Carter but the youth in the Opposition as a whole, not
seeking to command them (for we are only too well aware of our
own deficiencies) but to enlighten them and assimilate them into
the movement as a whole. We prefer a thousand times to lean back-
ward when it is a question of the young members of the League,
because, few as they are, they are our most precious capital. Not
to yield to the youth— or any other opponent for that matter— on
questions of principle, not to flatter the youth, but at the same
time not to club the youth, particularly those who are carrying
out their organizational work in the day-to-day activities. It is by
such an attitude that we shall prevent the creation of artificial
divisions between young and old.
The attitude of comrades Cannon and Swabeck has not served
the purpose at all. They have no real understanding of the youth
problem in the Communist movement. In the first place they have
entertained the greatest doubts on the need of any special organi-
zational forms for the youth, referring, as comrade Cannon did,
to the absence of any special youth groups, branches, or sections
in such movements as the I WW. They look down upon the youth
with contempt and show no comradely attitude. They dismiss all
the younger comrades who do not fall in line with their views with
the designation of "young upstarts." Instead of working patiently
together with the youth comrades, of enlightening them on their
shortcomings and errors, their guildmaster's attitude only serves
to provoke the youth into a worse position. Our refusal to endorse
this ruinous policy toward the youth— not Carter alone, but the
youth as a whole!— is immediately distorted into the ridiculous
assertion that we are "forming a bloc" with the youth against the
National Committee (we leave aside the gratuitous assumption that
the NC is the same thing as Cannon and Swabeck). Our attitude
toward the young comrades subjects us to the charge by Cannon
and Swabeck that we are setting up the young against the old,
that we want to replace the "older comrades" with the "younger
979
CLA 1931-33: The Fight
comrades"— a charge which does not improve with age and for
which due credit should be given at least to its original propound-
ed in the socialist movement.
The attitude of a Communist leadership toward the vouth is
one of the best criteria by which to judge it. The attitude of com-
rades Cannon and Swabeck is wrong and must be rejected. It is
not based upon the realities of the situation, just as little as are
the charges made against us. We have no "alliance" with the Carter
"faction." At the same time, we are not at all impressed by com-
rade Cannon's fulminations against Carter in New York, particu-
larlv when we recall that Cannon and Swabeck worked together
with precisely the same and far worse elements in the Toronto
branch, drawing up "protocols" with them right after the second
conference on their own initiative, directed against comrade
Spector, and reported to the committee after the fact and without
consultation with Spector or any other National Committee mem-
ber. Cannon's negotiations with irresponsible Krehms. who rep-
resent nobodv and never did. which has its reverse side in the
support of Cannon bv the Krehms, who would richly and reallv
deserve all the strictures Cannon directs against Carter, does not
harmonize very well with a consistent, sincere aim to rid the
League of so-called "Carterism."362
The Question of the New York Branch
The question is directly connected with the problem of the
New York branch. The uninterrupted series of attacks that Cannon
and Swabeck have leveled upon the New York branch, the fantas-
tic charges that it cannot do anything and does not do anything,
have at their foundation mainly the fact that a great number
of the most active New York militants do not show the "proper
respect" for Cannon and Swabeck. The continuation of these base-
less attacks can result only in demoralization and the widening of
the gap between the branch and the committee, a particularly dan-
gerous eventuality in view of the key significance of the Xew York
branch.
The defects of the branch are undoubtedly numerous, and we
have pointed them out no later and no less vigorously than anyone
else. But at the same time it is evident that these defects have
been wildly exaggerated and made to cover up the numerous
positive sides of the branch. It will be impossible to remedy the
Prospect and Retrospect 273
shortcomings unless the other aspects of the branch are under-
stood and acknowledged and unless the rude attacks made upon
it are brought to a halt, so that the shortcomings may be discussed
objectively among the comrades and not in an atmosphere of
provocation and recriminations.
The New York branch is our largest branch— larger than any
other four branches in the country. Its social composition is over-
whelmingly proletarian, although its contact with the trade unions
and the mass organizations is considerably limited, as is the case
almost everywhere in the League. It has the additional advantage
of having a goodly percentage of young comrades in it and also a
good percentage of female comrades. On the whole the branch is
a sound organism which can yet be made far more productive than
it is at the present moment, particularly when some windbags and
do-nothings are prevented from hampering its work.
The political level of the branch is at least as high as that of
any other branch of the League. Nowhere else has a branch been
confronted with so many acute political problems and come out
of the discussion so invariably correct in its overwhelming major-
ity, an achievement in which the committee gave signal aid, to be
sure. In the fights around Weisbord, Malkin, Rose, Field, in the
preconference discussions, the branch had internal problems to
solve which no other branch has yet had to meet. The branch is
the financial mainstay of the organization. Out of its ranks came
the editorial boards of all four of our journals, and particularly of
Unser Kamf, Young Spartacus, and Communistes. It has the task of
preparing these papers, of mailing them, and of doing— in gen-
eral—practically all the technical work which devolves upon the
branch at the center. The forums, mass meetings, street meetings,
debates, etc., which are conducted by the branch exceed those of
any other organ of the League. The branch, it is true, has the
great advantage of the presence of most of the leading comrades
in New York, and this has indubitably contributed to the progress
that has been made. It is also true that considerably more and
better activities could be organized by the branch. But one of the
most effective methods that should and must be used to develop
this activity of the branch, to make it more effective and efficient,
is to cease carping, unjustified criticism of it which we condemn
in those local comrades who direct it at the National Committee.
Another method is to look first to the doorstep of the National
274 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Committee itself before we proceed to launch into wild accusa-
tions and denunciations of the shortcomings of the branch. The
local comrades will always, quite naturally, demand of the lead-
ing comrades who criticize them that they should first examine,
frankly describe and acknowledge, and then set about remedying
the defects of the National Committee itself. This is now one of
the most important tasks of the League.
The National Committee must really review itself, study its
shortcomings, set about seriously to eliminate them, and develop
some of that necessary self-objectivity which has been so lacking,
particularly in recent times. It will not adopt the ridiculous
Molotovist philosophy implied in the Cannon-Swabeck document
that because our relations with certain branches in the past have
been correct, therefore our relations now and in the future are
correct; because our actions on various individuals (e.g., Malkin,
Carlson, etc.) have been correct in the past, therefore our actions
now on other individuals and our actions in the future are guar-
anteed to be correct; because we are fighting bureaucratism in
the Party, therefore there cannot develop any bureaucratism in
our own ranks. By breaking down furthermore its own narrow-
ness and limitedness, by broadening its own basis, by a more
patient attitude toward its critics in the League, particularly those
who have no principled differences with the Opposition, by tak-
ing care not to exaggerate differences or to inflate small disputes
into large "principled" disputes, the NC will be in a far better
position to overcome its own false tendencies and shortcomings
and to proceed against such as exist in the League as a whole.
The National Committee cannot, must not, set up an abstract
and false conception of the relations of the leadership to the mem-
bership, for this can only serve to the detriment of the really
Bolshevik idea of the signal importance of the role and function
of leadership in the movement. Leadership is not established by
appointment or decree, by "acknowledgment," but in the course
of the struggle which alone makes possible the definitive selec-
tion of the cadres. "Anti-leadership" tendencies frequently arise
when the attempt is made to set up an erroneous conception of
leadership, and this is what should be guarded against. We have
in our midst a tendency which seeks to have the "authority and
prestige" of the NC "recognized" by resolutions and motions. Com-
rades Cannon and Swabeck never weary of repeating the need
Prospect and Retrospect 275
for such actions. On every occasion, resolutions "acknowledging"
the authority and prestige are put forward, as if without these
motions the committee's authority and prestige would in some
way be injured or else would not be sufficiently impressed upon
the minds of the membership. What is even more detrimental to
the League is the fact that these motions are rarely, if ever (we
strive to recall an instance), accompanied by a critical examina-
tion of the work and activities of the committee itself. While it is
true that some of the criticism has been baseless or exaggerated,
nevertheless criticism of the committee in general has encoun-
tered a hostile rebuff or else been met with the type of motions
we speak of above. If an error has been made, it has not been on
the side of accepting criticism or making it ourselves; the error
has been almost entirely on the side of resisting criticism and fail-
ing to make it ourselves, although nobody can fail to see the short-
comings and defects in our work.
The strength of the Opposition must lie in an independent
and critical attitude of its membership, which selects, checks, and
controls its leadership, which educates its leaders and by the
confidence it gains from their activities and the successful results
of their policies and conduct— not by the confidence it acknowl-
edges in resolutions presented to it— slowly raises these leaders to
the position they occupy. Only the absurdly self-contented can
assert that this has been the case in our League. We have no
grounds for entertaining any illusions concerning the present
relations between the committee and the ranks. These relations
leave much room for improvement. So does the condition of the
committee itself, as a whole and individually. Above all, it must
still be borne in mind that "the real testing of the cadres is still
ahead." The League will meet this real test and pass it if its
National Committee understands that the responsibility for the
problems sketched above devolves primarily and predominantly
upon the leading cadre.
The Controversy Over Engels' Introduction
We shall not venture here to argue questions of Marxism and
dialectics with comrade Cannon, whose mastery in these fields is
fairly well-known. What is essential in the dispute has already been
set out by comrade Shachtman in his statement to the committee.
The reply of Cannon and Swabeck carefully walks around the
276 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
whole question and falsifies the dispute. Quotations are smeared
around profusely. Carter, Shachtman, Bernstein, Kautsky, the
Socialist Labor Party, and the social democracy in general are buf-
feted about and finally thrown into one pot. The kernel of the
dispute remains untouched at bottom. Let us recapitulate a few of
the essential points of the dispute:
1. Engels says explicitly, so that those who read may understand,
that certain tactics advocated by Marx and himself in the Commu-
nist Manifesto are antiquated, obsolete, outlived. He refers to bar-
ricade fighting, the changed relations between legal and illegal
action, etc., etc. He specifically advocates a change in the tactics
of the social democracy. Swabeck specifically denied that he
advocated this change.
2. The revisionists falsified Engels' views to make it appear that
he was "a peaceful worshiper of legality at all costs." This falsifica-
tion was known to the Marxists long before Ryazanov's revelations. The
SLP "interprets" Engels' introduction in their own specifically re-
visionist manner. The Marxists also "interpreted" Engels in the
sense Engels meant to be understood, that is, in a revolutionary
sense. Cannon's belabored sarcasm about "interpretation" simply
misses the point entirely. Marx once wrote that hatred of the Rus-
sians was and is the first revolutionary passion of the Germans,
that the revolution could be guaranteed only by the most deter-
mined terrorism against the Slavic peoples. The German social
patriots "interpreted" this to justify the vote for the Kaiser's war
credits just as they "interpreted" scores of other sentences from
Marx's works. The genuine Marxists never found this a great
obstacle in their ranks. As has been shown by several quotations
from Lenin, Zinoviev, Kautsky before the war, Luxemburg, and
Trotsky, they did not require the Ryazanov article in order to com-
bat Bernsteinism and SLPism.
3. How does Swabeck proceed from revisionist premises? His view
in essence is that it is the Ryazanov revelations which first show
that the Bei nsteinian SLPist conceptions of Engels' introduction
is false. If his arguments mean anything, they mean that without
the deleted passages in the introduction the revisionists would be justi-
fied in making their interpretation. We contend that the Ryazanov
discovery is only corroboratory and does not change the essence of
what Engels writes. Whose view harmonizes with that of Ryazanov—
Prospect and Retrospect 277
Cannon's and Swabeck's or the one we present? Let the editorial
board of Unter dem Banner des Marxismus speak, as they do in the
footnotes to the article by comrade Ryazanov in which he prints
his discoveries:
Even without a knowledge of the deleted passages adduced here for the first
time by comrade Ryazanov, it was still sufficiently well-known that
the Engels introduction was made public by Bernstein in a chopped-
up, falsified form. Even without the "philological" discovery of the
falsification it was clear that the Engels introduction aimed at no
"elimination of the Marxian tactic," for it dealt— as Rosa Luxemburg
wrote— "not with the question of the final conquest of the political
power but of the present daily struggle, not of the attitude of the
proletariat toward the capitalist state at the moment of the seizure
of the state power, but of its attitude within the framework of the
capitalist state," which is clear from every line of the foreword. (Com-
pare Rosa Luxemburg, "Sozialreform oder Revolution?", Leipzig,
Vulkan-Verlag, 1919)-The Editorial Board
It was clear from every line of the foreword, even without
knowing the deleted passages, even without the philological dis-
covery. In making this observation, the editorial board could never
have had Swabeck or Cannon in mind, who deal with precisely
this point by means of sophistries; of scoring points in the court-
room style, by comparing the shades of opinions that existed
among the Marxists on this question; of doing anything but tak-
ing up the core of the dispute.
Marx declared at one time that the proletariat might take
power in England, Holland, and America by peaceful and legal
means, even though there would be a slaveholders' counterrevolu-
tion. Were there grounds for this belief at that time? Yes. The SLP
and revisionists generally say it still holds good today. We Marx-
ists "interpret" this belief differently today. Today there are no
grounds whatsoever for this belief. Engels declared that the barri-
cade and other tactics of the revolution of 1848 no longer applied
to Germany in 1895. Was he right then? We believe he was. He
advocated a change in the tactics of the proletarian party, only
for Germany, with reservations, but nevertheless a change. To deny
this as Swabeck tries to do is only to play into the hands of the
revisionists. "There are only too many," wrote Engels to Victor
Adler on 30 August 1895, "who for the sake of convenience and
to avoid worrying their brains, would like to adopt for all eternity
the tactics that are suitable for the moment. We do not make our
tactics out of nothing, but out of the changing circumstances; in
278 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
our present situation we must only too frequently let our oppo-
nents dictate our tactics." The revisionists want to apply the Marx-
ian tactic of 1895 to 1932, and that in a falsified, emasculated,
anti-Marxian sense. Swabeck argued that the tactics of 1848 and
1895 were conceived by Engels as the same thing, that there was
no change in them. That is the point.
Are barricade tactics and other tactics advocated in the Mani-
festo applicable today? They are, not in the same form as in 1848,
but in a different form, the possibility for the development of which
Engels did not exclude. Is it necessary to change the view held by
Engels in 1895? Quite necessary. Both Kautsky and Lenin under-
took to make this change more than 20 years ago. This is the only
way to approach the philosophy of Marxism, just as Marx
approached other political and economic problems: dialectically.
We are ready to take lessons in the dialectic from Cannon, but
not many.
4. The method pursued by Swabeck in attacking Carter, the tone
of his article, remain unpardonable. It is on a par with his whole
approach to the youth. Let us assume for the moment that all the
defects which Carter is accused of having actually exist. This could
not be a reason, to our mind, to proceed against him in the man-
ner used by Swabeck. The latter's procedure followed the general
theory that since Carter is what he is, then it doesn't matter how
he is answered: rudely, with a club, by violation of agreements
made on the matter, etc., etc. We cannot share the slightest
responsibility for such a procedure.
How should the discussion on this question have proceeded?
In the manner we have repeatedly advocated. Presented with a
historico-theoretical dispute, the main concern of all the comrades
should have been to put the issue in such a manner as to extract
the maximum educational value from a discussion of it. Swabeck
and Cannon, however, were far too concerned with smashing an
opponent in the League to adopt this course. Instead of a discus-
sion which should concern itself with the question of what Engels'
views in 1895 actually were, they wanted and still want this his-
torical question to be discussed in direct connection with
"Carterism" and with the disputes in the National Committee on
all the questions that have been raised. In this manner, no educa-
tional value can be extracted from the discussion. The form of
the dispute should have been divorced from the content. They pro-
Prospect and Retrospect 279
pose not only to combine the two but to add to them every other
conceivable dispute in the organization.
In conclusion, some observations on how the present discus-
sion was precipitated. It is quite correct that so sharp a dispute in
the National Committee could not have been produced by a dif-
ference of opinion on the Engels introduction. Nor was it pro-
duced thereby. The facts are as follows:
The publication of the two articles which involved the edito-
rial board of Young Spartacus made necessary a discussion at the
NC with the representatives of the youth present (Carter and Ray).
Cannon made the unprecedented proposal (unique in the move-
ment to our knowledge) that these comrades be excluded from
the committee meeting which was to discuss a question in which
they and their views were directly involved. We insisted on their
being present, particularly since they were members of a subcom-
mittee of the National Committee. Had we excluded them during
the discussion of their "case" we should have acted like bureau-
crats. The committee members expressed their varying opinions.
In the course of the discussion, comrade Cannon repeated in a
more definite form the insinuations and accusations which had
been gossiped about in hallways and cafes by him and his friends
for the past few months: Shachtman is another Landau, another
Naville, etc., etc. The writing down of his view on the Engels dis-
pute, necessitated by the discussion in the committee, was there-
fore concluded by comrade Shachtman with his remarks on these
repeated insinuations, remarks provoked by Cannon and Swabeck,
and appended to the statement of comrade Shachtman with the
expectation that this would finally compel both Cannon and
Swabeck to put down their innuendoes, hints, and covert accusa-
tions in black and white, where some responsibility might be taken
for them formally instead of continuing with a whispering cam-
paign. The statement of comrade Shachtman was intended as his
point of view for the National Committee and not for the pur-
pose of opening up a discussion in the League on the basis of it.
The "reply" of comrades Swabeck and Cannon, on the con-
trary, using the Shachtman statement as an awaited pretext, was
intended as a platform on which the League was to be thrown
immediately into a factional war. So impatient were these two com-
rades to launch their offensive with a split as their objective, that
they even set themselves against first calling a plenary session of
280 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
the full National Committee to discuss the situation before a gen-
eral discussion. They voted against Shachtman's motion for a ple-
num and the present document is being submitted for the consid-
eration of the full National Committee gathered at this plenum
because Cannon's and Swabeck's views on the need of holding
such a meeting were rejected by all the out-of-town members of
the committee.
To all the members of the committee we wish to express our
conviction openly, bluntly, without diplomatizing or mincing words.
We are not at all unaware of Cannon's intentions in the present
internal struggle. His actions in the New York branch and in the
National Committee during the few weeks prior to the holding of
the plenum have revealed them plainly, if they ever were obscure.
Cannon aims at ridding himself of embarrassing criticism and crit-
ics, primarily of the undersigned and those who may in any way
share their views in the organization as a whole. Cannon is not
now deeply concerned with the "international questions," any more
than he was in the past, except to the extent that they may serve a
factional end. His "plan of campaign," too, is quite obvious. As it
unfolds, it will look very much like the following scheme:
Shachtman is a Naville or a Navillist. Abern, Glotzer, and
Spector pretend to be against Naville, Landau, Felix, etc., but the
fact that they are associated with Shachtman shows how unprin-
cipled they are: In reality, they are in a bloc with this Navillist
against the revolutionary elements in the League (i.e., against Can-
non, Swabeck, Stamm, and Gordon). To strengthen this structure,
these four will be accused of being "abstentionists criticizing from
the sidelines," for has not comrade Trotsky criticized Naville in
the same manner and demanded that he roll up his sleeves and
get to work instead of playing petty politics? Then, to complete
the picture and make the analogy with France even more perfect,
he will add to this unprincipled alliance a "Jewish Group" (Can-
non has already hinted more than once about his "differences"
with the comrades who are working on Unser Kamf, about "fed-
eration tendencies" and the "Jewish Group," etc.). Then we shall
have all the ingredients prepared for serving up to the American
League and the international Opposition a "French period" in the
United States, garnished with all sorts of "retrenchments," faction-
alism, confusion, and the like.
This, in outline, is the plan of Cannon and Swabeck. We have
Prospect and Retrospect 281
encountered such construction before, but not in the Left Oppo-
sition. In the course of the Russian Party struggle, such affairs
were known as "amalgams" and we shall, it goes without saying,
resist them in the League with all our strength.
We put the issue sharply but accurately, because there is no
other way of arriving at a good solution. Soft words, rounded cor-
ners, diplomatic language, mental reservations, all these will only
make matters worse in reality, particularly in the long run. We
want our position to be stated as we really believe it to be, as we
express it among ourselves, with as little circumlocution and eva-
sion as possible.
At the present time we want to underline our belief that meas-
ures can still be taken to prevent a destructive factional struggle.
What we have said above concerning the possibilities of a "mini-
mum collaboration and unity," and our desire to allow the passage
of time and events to test out clearly and to the end any deeper political
and principled differences that may exist in embryonic form today should
be borne in mind.
An effective functioning of the League, as recent experiences
show us, cannot be accomplished by concealing differences, by
hushing them up, by prohibiting discussion. The League and its
leadership will in reality function best and on the soundest foun-
dation, if disputes and differences are discussed with the utmost
frankness, with the least amount of worry as to the temporary
advantages that our enemies may seek to gain from them, and
above all, by discussing the differences loyally, i.e., by presenting
only differences that actually exist and not manufactured differ-
ences, and furthermore by presenting the differences as they
actually exist and not in a distorted form.
It is manifest that our organization cannot escape from those
crises which inevitably confront the Communist movement, par-
ticularly when it is tiny and isolated from the masses. The crisis
can be minimized if we act in a responsible, sober manner, so that
when the discussion has come to a conclusion, the League shall
be in a position to advance with greater clarity concerning its prob-
lems, with greater knowledge of how to solve them, and with a
firmer determination to reach the solution.
^ > ^
282
Minutes of the Plenum
CLA National Committee
10-13 June 1932
These minutes were published in CLA Internal Bulletin no. 1 (undated).
Resolutions on the Toronto and New York branches, written by the
resident committee after the plenum on the basis of the plenum discussion,
are omitted here.
Secretary called plenum to order, proposing the following
agenda:
1 . Organization of the plenum
2. Consideration of the controversy within the
resident committee
3. Consideration of resolutions and organization question
4. The situation in the Toronto branch
Agenda accepted as proposed and comrade Skoglund elected
chairman. Swabeck reported proposal by resident committee to
invite one representative of the Jewish fraction committee, one of
the Greek fraction committee, and one of the youth, together with
comrade Gordon, managing editor of the Militant, to participate
in the plenum. Swabeck moved that in addition the following
comrades be invited: Tom Stamm, business manager of the
Militant; George Clarke, field organizer; Louis Baskv, formerly
co-opted member of the National Committee; Herbert Capelis,
secretary of the New York branch; and Carl Cowl, secretary of
the Minneapolis branch. —Motion carried unanimously
Motion by Swabeck: That the comrades who are invited participate
in the plenum with the right to speak only when called upon by
the committee.
Amendment by Shachtman: That the invited comrades shall have
the right to speak on such questions as concern their particular
position.
Substitute motion by Cannon: That onlv members and alternates of
the National Committee participate in the discussion of the main
Minutes of June Plenum 283
questions, that after that is disposed of, if any of the invited com-
rades desire the floor, the matter be taken up for decision.
—Substitute motion carried 5 to 4, disposing
of the motion and amendment
Swabeck reported request by the New York branch executive
committee that it be permitted to be present at the plenum if the
New York branch is a special point on the agenda. (In view of the
fact that the New York branch was not a special point on the
agenda, that was accepted as disposing of the request.)
Motion by Swabeck: That the second point on the agenda be opened
by a report by the secretary on the organization, the origin, and
status of the controversy. —Motion carried unanimously
Motion by Cannon: That following the report of the secretary there
be a report by the comrades who have been abroad, comrades
Shachtman and Glotzer. —Motion carried unanimously
Report made by the secretary on the main question on the
agenda, the organization status and a review of the controversy
within the resident committee, after which adjournment was taken
until the next morning.
Upon convening on Saturday morning, reports were made by
comrades Glotzer and Shachtman on their visit to the European
sections and comrade Glotzer's visit to comrade Trotsky.
After these three reports, discussion opened, embracing the
general issues of controversy within the resident committee, the
situation within the International Left Opposition, and the atti-
tude toward the Carter group tendency.
During the close of the discussion, comrade Spector explained
the reasons for not having voted on the drafts presented for reso-
lution on the international question of the National Committee
because of not having considered either draft fully adequate. He
thereupon introduced the following resolution:
Resolution on the International Question
1. The second plenary session of the National Committee of
the Communist League of America completely endorses the
284 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
analysis, the proposals, and perspectives for the International Left
Opposition contained in the letter of comrade Trotsky (dated
22 December 1931) addressed to all national sections.
2. The world crisis, which has been developing in intensity for
the past three years, has created most favorable objective condi-
tions for the conquest of the decisive masses for Communism. Nev-
ertheless it has become increasingly manifest that the Comintern
under the Stalin regime is incapable of utilizing the crisis for the
realization of the historical tasks of the proletariat. Stalinism con-
tinues to be an organizer only of defeats. In Spain the devastating
effects of the centrist policy were manifested by the absence of a
real Communist party in the revolutionary crisis, in the failure to
give a Marxist appraisal of the class relations, and the consequent
stabilization for a certain time of a Kerenskiad. In Germany, the
key to the international situation, the great social and political
contradictions create the basis for a successful struggle for power
by the Communist Party, but the centrist regime, by a false theory
of social fascism, its suppression of Bolshevik party democracy,
the negation of the united-front policy, succeeds only in frustrat-
ing itself. In France, despite the economic crisis which has set
in, the Communist Party failed to register any substantial gains
in the last election and the membership of the CGTU continues
to decline.
3. The mistakes, setbacks, and defeats of the Communist move-
ment in general react unfavorably for the growth of the Left
Opposition itself. The defeat of the Opposition in the first place
was due to the defeats of the revolutionary proletariat and the
stabilization of capitalism. The strengthening of the Opposition
and the victory of its international platform is bound up with the
development of a new wave of revolutionary struggle. But in order
to take advantage of such a situation it is necessary for the Oppo-
sition itself to measure up to its gigantic historical mission. It must
be completely recognized that in addition to the general and
objective reasons for the slow growth of the Opposition, there
remain the extremely important subjective and specific reasons.
These are to be sought in the fact that there have existed in the
Left Opposition alien tendencies which covered themselves with
its banner, only to compromise and discredit it and to delay the
formation of the genuine revolutionary cadres of the Opposition
Minutes of June Plenum 285
which the crisis in the Communist International has brought
forward as the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat. The work
of purging the Left Opposition of these alien tendencies (Landau,
Naville, Rosmer, and similar elements) was correct and fruitful;
the completion of this task in the shortest possible time is an im-
perative need of the moment and can be accomplished not merely
by the efforts of each national section by itself but by the joint
efforts and contributions of the whole international Left. This
imposes upon the American Opposition the need for greater
attention than ever to the problems of the international Opposi-
tion for a more alert and active participation in their solution.
4. The recent progress, growth of influence, and strength of the
German Opposition was made possible not merely by the accen-
tuation of the revolutionary crisis, but specifically by the libera-
tion of the movement from the paralyzing effects of the regime
of Landau, which substituted for the revolutionary principles of
the Left Opposition a course of intrigue, clique politics, combina-
tionism, and sterility.
In France, however, the process of clarification which was suc-
cessfully completed in Germany assumes an unnecessarily pro-
tracted character. The circle spirit and syndicalistic course pursued
under the Rosmer leadership were not liquidated with due rapid-
ity and intransigence, owing to the confusion produced by the
vacillations of the Jewish Group and comrade Mill, arising from
their proposal for a bloc with Rosmer in struggle against the lead-
ership of the French Ligue. This fed the petty-bourgeois tendency
of the Naville group with fuel for continuation of the ambiguous
and diplomatic maneuvers with which Naville covers up his com-
munity of interest with those who are openly fighting the Interna-
tional Left Opposition (Rosmer, Landau). We do not mean to
identify the traditions and position of the Jewish Group with that
of Naville, with which they have nothing in common. The attempt
to do this, made by comrade Treint, stands in the way of a solu-
tion of the relations between the revolutionary proletarians in the
Jewish Group and the leading kernel of the Ligue. Stripped of
extraneous and secondary considerations, the essence of the
struggle that has been going on inside both the French and Ger-
man Opposition has been one of the revolutionary selection of
the genuine Opposition cadre.
286 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
5. An obstacle in this struggle was the utilization of the Interna-
tional Secretariat by its former secretary, comrade Mill, in the in-
terests of a faction fight against the leadership, not only of the
French Ligue, but also of the other decisive national sections which
supported it. The International Secretariat in Paris failed to give
the necessary political or administrative guidance to our move-
ment. The chief reason for the failure of the Paris secretariat lay
in the fact that it was not responsible to sections of the Opposi-
tion. We fully endorse the proposals made by comrade Trotsky in
his letter to the national sections for the reconstruction of the
International Secretariat based upon the direct participation of
representatives from the most important sections and responsible
to them. The interests of such a secretariat would not be subserved
by the proposal of the Spanish section to delegate to it comrade
Mill, whose previous course unfits him for such representation
and is moreover a blow at those national sections who have repu-
diated him.
6. We reject the proposal made to hold an international confer-
ence of the Left Opposition to which shall be admitted all and
sundry grouplets merely upon the basis of their claims of adher-
ence to the views of the Communist left. We are in full accord
with the three proposals made on this question by comrade Gourov
in his letter of 22 May 1932.363
7. This plenum of the National Committee of the Communist
League considers it necessary to recognize the defects and short-
comings of the character of its previous collaboration with and
participation in the collective life of the international Opposition.
For this lag in its prompt reaction to the questions in dispute in
the European sections, the difficulties of distance are responsible
in no small measure. Nevertheless we must strive to overcome this
handicap by the closest and most prompt collaboration and by
making available as quickly as possible a thorough selection of
material, primarily by the systematic and undelayed publication
of the International Bulletin in English.
— Spector
At the conclusion of Saturday's discussion, Swabeck introduced
the following motions:
Minutes of June Plenum 287
1. The plenum reaffirms the National Committee resolution on
the situation in the International Left Opposition.
2. The plenum requests comrades Abern and Glotzer to withdraw
their resolution drafts from further discussion or consideration
by the membership.
3. The plenum accepts the resolution on the international ques-
tion presented by comrade Spector as a supplementary and fur-
ther elaboration of the National Committee resolution already
adopted.
4. The plenum requests comrade Shachtman to affirm that the
misunderstandings which arose in regard to our attitude to the
international questions were created by him and due to his posi-
tion held at the time, a position which he has now changed.
Voting on motions:
No. 1: The National Committee resolution reaffirmed unani-
mously.
No. 2: Comrade Abern stated that, "Since in my opinion the origi-
nal resolution drafts were basically alike, and since I am in full
accord with comrade Spector's resolution and also accept the
National Committee resolution, I am willing to withdraw my own
draft." Comrade Glotzer stated that, "My view agrees with those
of comrade Abern and I am also ready to withdraw my own draft."
No. 3: To accept comrade Spector's resolution as supplementary-
carried unanimously.
No. 4: Comrade Shachtman stated in reply: "I am not ready to
make such a statement, since I do not believe the misunderstand-
ings were due to my position. I do agree, however, that my failure,
since my return, to make myself clear, did give rise to misunder-
standings."
Comrade Shachtman submitted the following statement of his
position:
Statement on the International Question to the NC Plenum
Since my views on the disputes within the international
Opposition, particularly in Europe, have been called into question
and been the subject of misunderstanding and misrepresental ion,
it is necessary that in addition to what I have already recorded
in motions in the National Committee, resolutions, and oral
288 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
presentation, I add the following supplementary summary of my
standpoint.
1. The Left Opposition gained its greatest impetus in the past
period by dissociating itself drastically from Urbahns, Paz,
Souvarine, Van Overstraeten, Pollak, and their similars, who had
nothing in common with the Left Opposition and served but to
its discredit, but the process of a revolutionary selection did not
end thereby; it has not yet come to an end.
2. The struggle which the revolutionary elements conducted
against the sterile clique of Landau in Germany and Austria made
possible the liberation of the German Opposition in its orienta-
tion toward the effective establishment of a genuine section of the
international Left. It was only after ridding the German Opposi-
tion of the paralyzing influence of Landau's intrigues, unprin-
cipled organizational machinations, and combinations that it was
able to make the forward steps our brother section has now taken
in Germany.
3. This purging of the Opposition had something of its counter-
part in France, where it has been less effective because the process
has been unduly protracted and impeded by the introduction of
questions of second order. Here the initial demarcation from the
semisyndicalists (Rosmer), intellectualist (old Lutte des classes group)
elements, failed to deal conclusively with the remnants of the old
petty-bourgeois circle spirit represented by Naville, the dabblers
in revolutionary politics who sabotaged the insistent struggle con-
ducted by the progressive kernel of the Opposition in France and
Germany against the worn-out, conservative, paralyzing elements.
The effective liquidation of this problem in France was impeded
by the complications created by the oscillations and separatist
tendencies of the Jewish Group, and by the transformation of the
International Secretariat by its leading officer, Mill, from a guid-
ing organ subordinate to the national sections and serving as an
instrument to strengthen the revolutionary tendency into an
obstacle to the accomplishment of these objects. Within this newly
complicated situation, the Naville group was able to float on the
surface for a longer period. The solution was further protracted
by the "experiment in collaboration" of the leading kernel of the
Ligue with the Treint group, which proved to be fruitless and
increased the difficulties in achieving the desirable aim of drawing
Minutes of June Plenum 289
into the work the best revolutionary proletarian forces among the
Jewish and French comrades.
The proposals made by me in my Paris letter to comrade
Trotsky looking toward a solution of the sharp situation in the
Ligue were not based on fundamental considerations. I regard
them as a casual, episodic opinion, which I now view as incorrect
and superseded by what is said in the present statement.
4. The internal difficulties in our Spanish section are due in large
measure to its delay in clearly defining itself from the right wing
and a failure to participate as attentively as it should in the life of
the European Opposition. The personal opinions entertained on
this or that comrade cannot replace a political estimate of the se-
lective process through which most of the European sections have
passed in the recent period and which has resulted in a consider-
able clearing of the ground, particularly in France and Germany.
The persistent support for Mill even after he had been repudiated
by virtually all the other sections and the provocative nomination
of Mill to the secretariat has compromised the Spanish section.
The substitution of a personal campaign against Molinier instead
of a political estimation of the Ligue's situation has had the same
effect. I repudiate of course any association of my name with such
a campaign.
5. The proposal of comrade Trotsky on the reconstitution of the
secretariat must be endorsed. I need scarcely add that I have never
and do not now support the absurd and sterile idea of the convo-
cation of the international conference on a "broad basis" which
would include "all groups" "claiming" to support the international
Opposition and compel the Opposition to start all over again what
it has already partially finished.
6. The laxity and delay shown in the past by the American Oppo-
sition in international questions can and should be overcome as
much as possible, despite the difficulties of distance and language.
These shortcomings, however, will not be effectively eliminated if
the problems of the international, particularly the European
Opposition, become a factional football in the League, utilized
in such a manner as to prevent the genuine enlightenment of the
membership.
— Shachtman
290 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
During the continuation of the discussion comrade Shachtman
submitted the following resolution on the Carter group tendency:
Resolution on the Carter Group
1. Our attitude on comrade Carter and his "group" has been set
forth briefly in our statement on the situation in the American
Opposition. We reiterate it because of the extensive discussion
which has taken place in the plenum on this point: The negative
and harmful characteristics of these three or four comrades in
question are their pedantic and academic approach to the prob-
lems of the League, a supercritical attitude toward the work of
the organization and its leadership, intellectualist tendencies, and
the tendency to set up the younger and less experienced comrades
as a sort of control commission over the National Committee. They
have a perniciously superior attitude toward the other youth com-
rades in the League and on the National Youth Committee and a
decided underestimation of the leading cadres of the organiza-
tion. Their persistent carping on numerous shortcomings and petty
errors made in the League work and in its leading committee fre-
quently causes them to overlook entirely the progress the organi-
zation has made in the past period. Against this bad influence
exerted by these comrades, particularly upon the younger elements
in the New York branch, we have always conducted sharp but com-
radely polemics so as to win over to maximum collaboration all
those at first under their sway, without attempting to persecute
them for their views or leave that impression. We believe that in
so far as these comrades maintain their attitude, it is necessary to
continue this enlightenment of the New York branch members in
the future until such a tendency is eliminated.
2. At the same time, it is indisputable that these comrades have
been loyal to the organization and in the very forefront of its
activity. We do not attempt to challenge the fact that they have
engaged in the Jimmy Higgins work of the branch, refusing no
responsibilities, defending the organization, its line, and leader-
ship before the workers. This makes it both possible and desirable
that we continue to afford them all the opportunities for continu-
ing this activity. Our attitude toward these comrades is defined in
large measure— although we are far from drawing a strict analogy—
by what comrades Trotsky writes in his recent remarks on the
French Ligue:
Minutes of June Plenum 291
With regard to certain "doubtful" groups or groups of an alien origin,
no sufficiently consistent policy has been adopted which would begin
by attempts of loyal collaboration to put the doubtful elements to
the test and under the control of everybody's eyes, give them the pos-
sibility of correcting themselves or of discrediting themselves, and
in the latter case conclude by eliminating them from the organization.
The Carter "group" is not of course to be identified with the
Naville group, and we do not consider that, in spite of their atti-
tude up to now, these comrades need in any way be submitted to
such a campaign as artificially inflates their importance and sig-
nificance—in any direction in the branch, in which they consti-
tute an insignificant handful of the comrades.
We do not believe that such comrades should be pushed com-
pletely to the background and isolated from the work and activity
they have been conducting up to now, by an arbitrary faction com-
bination which eliminates them from committees on a faction
basis. Members of the branch executive should be selected, in our
opinion, on the basis of their qualifications and activities, since
our political differences are not of so clearly defined and deep a
nature as to require the choosing of lower committees along faction
lines, particularly where the National Committee, being in New
York, has the opportunity of intervening directly for the political
line of the League. The New York committee should be selected
on the basis of drawing into it new elements, more representa-
tive, so that the disproportionate influence exerted in it by the
Carter "group" may be reduced to a minimum.
The National Committee does not wish to create the impres-
sion among the New York members that it is exaggerating this
"group" of three or four people, inflating its importance, or
persecuting it. At the same time it will jointly carry on a firm cam-
paign against its harmful and sterile tendencies in order all the
more easily to succeed in eliminating the influences exerted by
these comrades upon the New York branch and in tightening its
ranks for the line of the League.
— Shachtman, Abern, Glotzer
Declaration made by Cannon in agreement with Swabeck:
"While we do not consider this resolution as meeting in every par-
ticular respect with our proposals in regard to the Carter group
tendency, it nevertheless provides a basis for unanimity."
292 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Comrade Swabeck reported that on behalf of comrade Can-
non and himself, he had personally asked comrade Shachtman if
he wished to withdraw the latest document introduced to the
National Committee by himself, Abern, and Glotzer, entitled, "The
Situation in the American Opposition: Prospect and Retrospect."
This question was put in view of the fact that the contents of this
document, the charges made, and the issue raised, had not at all
been discussed or dealt with at the plenum. Comrade Swabeck
requested an answer from comrade Shachtman in regard to this,
to which the reply was given that the comrades signing the docu-
ment are not willing to withdraw it.
Comrade Cannon declared to the plenum:
I have not yet at all answered a single personal accusation made in
this document. I refer particularly to the charges against myself and
the issues raised in connection therewith. I am ready to make such
an answer to every paragraph and every line and will expect the
plenum to take a position on the document and that it also go to
the membership for discussion. I propose that we now take a recess
for the comrades to discuss the advisability of withdrawing the docu-
ment and give a final answer.
After recess, comrade Shachtman announced the withdrawal
of the document in the following statement:
Our original understanding of the proposal was that the first two
documents were to be sent out to the membership without the pre-
sentation of our joint reply, signed by Abern, Glotzer, and myself.
From the clarification made by comrades Cannon and Swabeck, we
see that this impression was entirely unfounded.
Since comrades Cannon and Swabeck assert that if our document
remains in the records, it will require a polemical reply and involve
a struggle in the League, we have decided to withdraw our docu-
ment from the records, without changing the opinions we expressed
in it, but in the interests of unity and collaboration.
—Shachtman, Abern, Glotzer
Motion by Cannon: That the comrades who have varying opinions
on the question of Engels' introduction shall, for the coming dis-
cussion, draw up in an objective manner statements of their views
on the political aspects of this question.
—Motion carried unanimously
Considering arrangements for a coming conference, the
following views were expressed: Comrade Shachtman favored the
Minutes of June Plenum 293
idea of not having a conference in the immediate future, believ-
ing that the plenum had already partly served to obviate this
necessity. Cannon expressed agreement, provided steps could be
taken now to reconstitute the resident committee in such a way
that its majority reflects the views of the full committee, the op-
posite of which is now the case. He declared that it is self-evident
that organizational provisions must be made to guarantee the ex-
ecution of the views, sentiments, and shadings represented by the
majority in the daily work. This could be accomplished by the
method of co-optation to broaden the committee, such co-optation
to be affirmed by the membership through a referendum. The
only alternative, if this is not agreed to, would be the establish-
ment of a smaller political committee out of the present resident
committee membership. Cannon suggested the following: The
majority propose to the minority of the plenum that, by agree-
ment, a co-optation to the resident committee take place, for the
reasons of broadening the committee, drawing in new elements
and youth elements, as well as to bring the resident committee
majority in harmony with the majority view of the plenum.
Shachtman on behalf of the minority expressed disagreement with
this proposal in the following statement:
Statement on the Proposal for Co-optation to the NC
We are against the proposal to add comrades Gordon and
Basky to the National Committee with full voice and vote, and
comrade Clarke as candidate, for the following reasons:
1. The plenum revealed that no fundamental political differences
exist in the National Committee. On those questions which became
a subject of dispute in the committee (international question and
the "Carter group"), we were able to adopt a unanimous resolu-
tion and arrive at a virtually united standpoint. Such a situation
does not warrant the artificial introduction of three comrades into
the committee for the purpose of giving one side a factional
organizational predominance over the other.
2. The selections are not made for the purpose of broadening
the committee in general and drawing new elements into its work—
a step which we have advocated and which the next national
conference must certainly accomplish— but in order to guarantee
an automatic and arbitrary factional majority in spite of the
294 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
nonexistence of any clear political differences in the committee
and regardless of what questions may arise.
3. The introduction of the proposed comrades for the express pur-
pose of guaranteeing a sure voting majority for one side under all
circumstances will not serve to eliminate the friction in the Na-
tional Committee, but only to perpetuate artificially a rigid line
of faction division inside the leading committee.
4. The selections are not made upon the basis of merit, thus help-
ing to enhance the authority and effectiveness of the committee,
but along the lines of factional support, in one case requiring the
suspension of the constitutional provision so seriously and cor-
rectly adopted by the last national conference.
5. Without making this proposal a subject for sharp factional dis-
pute in the League, which is equally unwarranted by the substan-
tial unity on questions on which the plenum adopted resolutions,
we nevertheless wish to register our categorical opposition to it.
— Shachtman, Abern, Glotzer
Motion by Cannon:
1. That for the reasons already given and after an exchange of
opinion of the comrades, the plenum decides to co-opt onto the
National Committee comrades Basky and Gordon as voting mem-
bers and comrade Clarke as a candidate. This to be submitted to
the membership for ratification; meanwhile, however, the com-
rades to function in this capacity immediately.
2. That we inform the membership of comrade Gordon's limita-
tions on the constitutional requirement and ask for their ratifica-
tion with full knowledge of this fact. (The constitutional require-
ment is "Article 9. Section 3— Members of the National Committee
must have been active members of the Communist political move-
ment for at least four years, at least two years of which have been
in the Communist League at the time of election." Comrade
Gordon's limitations in regard to the Constitution refer to the first
part of this requirement. He has been only two years a member
of the Communist League.)
Comrade Spector recorded himself as opposed to disregarding
the constitutional provisions which we adopted after such serious
reflections.
Minutes of June Plenum 295
Voting on the motion for co-optation: In favor: Skoglund, Cannon,
Swabeck, Dunne, Oehler. Voting against: Shachtman, Abern,
Glotzer. Abstaining: Spector.
Voting on Gordon: In favor: Skoglund, Cannon, Swabeck, Dunne,
Oehler. Against: Shachtman, Abern, Glotzer. Abstaining: Spector
(referring to statement above).
Voting on members proposed for the committee: In favor of Basky:
Cannon, Swabeck, Dunne, Skoglund, Oehler. Against: Shachtman,
Abern, Glotzer. Abstaining: Spector.
Voting on Clarke: In favor: Skoglund, Cannon, Swabeck, Dunne,
Oehler. Against: Shachtman, Abern, Glotzer. Abstaining: Spector.
Motion by Abern: That comrade Shachtman take up the post for-
merly occupied by him as editor of the Militant.
Motion by Swabeck: That the present arrangement stand. That
comrade Cannon remain the politically responsible editor, that com-
rade Shachtman as a member of the editorial board collaborate
fully in the editorial work of the Militant and the editorial board
take charge more directly and assume more complete responsibility
for the editorial work and the makeup of the Militant.
Voting on the motion: In favor of Abern's motion: Abern, Glotzer,
Shachtman, Spector. In favor of Swabeck's motion: Cannon,
Swabeck, Dunne, Skoglund, Oehler.
Statement by comrade Spector:
Does comrade Cannon still hold as valid his statement (at the com-
mittee meeting, January 13) when proposing comrade Shachtman
that nobody has advanced any personal or political objections to
Shachtman as editor of the Militant and comrade Trotsky's proposal
that comrade Shachtman resume his post?
Reply by Cannon:
Yes, in general, I think it is still valid. After the agreement we have
arrived at here, I would not raise any political or personal objec-
tions to comrade Shachtman. However, I am under the impression
that all the circumstances are not exactly the same as they were five
months ago. Since then we have organized the staff on a more
collective basis, we have entrusted the responsibility of actually get-
ting out the paper to comrade Gordon, and in my opinion he has
carried out his responsibility very satisfactorily. I do not think we
should return to the old method but rather should go forward toward
a further development of the collective principle. I also think it
296 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
unwise to establish the idea that we call in comrades in responsible
functions when we need them in an emergency and then dismiss
them when the emergency is over.
Motion by Swabeck: 1. That the resident committee be authorized
to finally elaborate the resolutions for which we have here drafts
accepted as a basis, together with a resolution summarizing the
work of the plenum as well as to prepare the material for the com-
ing membership discussion. 2. That the secretary prepare a report
of the plenum with the approval of the resident committee for
the International Secretariat and comrade Trotsky.
—Motions carried unanimously
At the conclusion of this discussion the following statement
was submitted to the plenum by comrade Carter:
We the undersigned, recognizing that one of the most important
disputed questions in the National Committee and the plenum is
the problem of the New York branch and the purported domina-
tion of its executive committee by the so-called Carter group, while
decisively rejecting any charge of the existence of a political ten-
dency called "Carterism," understand that the dissension on the
question interferes with harmonious collaboration in the National
Committee. We firmly believe that the utmost collaboration and
collective leadership is a dire need in the National Committee and
the League.
We believe that rather than permit the question of our reelec-
tions to the NY branch executive committee hinder the necessary
collaboration in our National Committee and harmonious and com-
radely relations in the New York branch, we will, and at the present
time wish to state so, not accept nominations for the coming elec-
tions to the New York executive committee.
We take this step for one reason— a sincere attempt to secure as
much as possible united functioning of the entire organization and
particularly its leading body, the National Committee. This does not
mean that we will decrease our activity in the New York branch. On
the contrary, we intend to continue our active functioning in the
branch and the League as a whole.
—Stone, Ray, Carter
The Situation in the Toronto Branch
Comrade Spector reported on MacDonald's adherence to the
Left Opposition and on the controversy within the branch and
Minutes of June Plenum 297
on proposals for the future. Comrade Krehm, who had been
invited to the plenum for this particular discussion, presented the
views of the other side of the controversy. Krehm proposed the
following conditions to heal the breach with Spector and comrades
who agreed with him: 1. A clear explanation from Spector on his
position on the delegation to Premier Henry.364 2. Repudiation
by Spector on his position of his act in splitting the Toronto
group.365 3. Spector to enter a mass organization. 4. Spector to
substantiate his accusations against other comrades by actual facts
or else withdraw them.
Comrade Spector made the following proposals: 1. That the
Canadian organization be established as an autonomous section
of the Left Opposition, with a provisional center to be created.
2. That it establish direct relations with the International Secre-
tariat and function under the name of Marxian-Leninist League
of Canada (Opposition). 3. That it publish a monthly organ.
4. That it prepare a national platform. 5. That it share responsi-
bility for the American League theoretical organ. 6. That for the
time being the Toronto membership function in two branches on
the basis of the present division.
After a discussion on the controversy and the various propos-
als Swabeck made the following motions:
1. That we make another effort for comradely collaboration with-
out recrimination of the Toronto membership within one branch,
including all of those who are now members.
2. That the National Committee supports fully the political
tendency represented by comrade Spector and considers it as the
basis for united collaboration.
3. The National Committee demands from the Toronto member-
ship that this be adhered to on penalty of measures to be taken
against those who fail.
4. That we accept as a perspective the proposals made by com-
rade Spector for an autonomous Canadian section of the Left
Opposition in the sense that the first practical steps in that direc-
tion, such as the launching of a paper, establishment of an edito-
rial board, etc., be taken as soon as the branch has reached a
sufficient degree of collaboration and stability.
298 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Motion by Cannon: That the resident committee be instructed to
draw up a resolution which will elaborate on this basis.366
—Motions by Swabeck and Cannon carried unanimously,
Spector adding that an elaborated resolution
should include a characterization of the group.
Motion by Cannon: In view of further consideration by the com-
rades, the plenum decides that comrade Shachtman return to his
post as editor of the Militant, with comrade Gordon remaining in
his present position on the editorial staff.
—Motion carried unanimously
Motion by Glotzer: That consideration of the unemployment reso-
lutions, together with organizational questions, and the question
of Weisbord (since added to the agenda) be referred to the resi-
dent committee and plenum now adjourns.
—Motion unanimously carried
<- 4> +
Some Considerations on the Results of the
National Committee Plenum
[by the Shachtman Group]367
16 June 1932
This document was drafted as a factional statement for supporters of
Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer. It may have remained uncirculated. 368
Our aim: to bring into the open and then put a stop to the
whispered campaign to discredit us, started at the last national
conference, on the international disputes. At the same time, to
record for the first time the manner in which the real disputes
have been developing in the National Committee for the past three
years and to state our position on them formally. The embryonic
state of the differences would make an open struggle in the
organization harmful. Only the future, the test of events and big
questions, can reveal the import and depth of these differences
and reveal where each comrade actually stands. Not sufficient has
Considerations on Plenum 299
yet happened for us to be able to establish the tendencies with
conclusiveness, but only to indicate and warn against them.
The calling of the plenum: We insisted on the plenum so that
the National Committee as a whole might act before a struggle is
artificially precipitated in the organization as a whole on a false
or an as yet unclear foundation. The responsible way is to attempt
a solution in the leading organism before it is thrown into the
ranks. That is what leaders are for. Cannon and Swabeck wanted
to throw the discussion into the ranks forthwith, without a ple-
num, and with an immediate convention in which they wanted to
gain a victory on the basis of their analysis of the questions at
issue, i.e., international questions and "Carterism." Our fight for
the plenum was completely successful and justified, and proved
good for the organization.
We do not come out of the plenum weakened; the morale of
our friends in the League is excellent. Their uncertainties are re-
moved, they know what we are fighting for. Our opponents do
not feel strengthened, but apologetic, at least on the reconstitu-
tion of the committee. Their campaign concerning the wide gap
that separated them from us (particularly from Shachtman) on
the international questions was revealed to be wildly exaggerated.
The acceptance of the international resolution proposed by
Spector and the resolution on Carter proposed by Shachtman (at
least as an acceptable draft) proves our contention concerning their
magnifying of differences on this score and their utilization of
them to minimize or cover up other issues.
We withdrew our document from the records: 1. under the
threat of a violent struggle in the League if we did not withdraw,
which would not conform with our aim of averting a fight in the
League under the circumstances; 2. because none of the docu-
ments are to be sent out to the membership anyway; 3. because it
was a purely formal act: The /acta on which our document is based
cannot be "withdrawn" from the records. Our document replied
to all their charges; they have not replied to our criticisms. They
did not reply by one word in the discussions; they did not avail
themselves of the opportunity to reply in any sort of written state-
ment. Our withdrawal did, it is true, relieve C-S of the need of
making a reply, which was impossible for them, at least a satisfac-
tory reply.
300 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
For the first time, we put down in writing the history of the
internal development of the American Opposition, as it actually
happened, without exaggeration. Even in withdrawing it from the
formal archives, we reasserted our agreement with every word in
it. There are numerous precedents for similar actions, and we
yielded nothing in principle when we acted as we did.
For the first time in a long period we acted and worked col-
lectively, consulting not only with ourselves (the committee mem-
bers), but also the active leading comrades from New York and
out of town who were present. If the committee as a whole did
this more frequently, it would not only function better but would
have infinitely better relations with the ranks.
The greatest weakness of our position was our failure to act
collectively for the whole period prior to the plenum. While all
our leading comrades had a fundamentally similar position on
the international questions, this was not reflected in their con-
duct. Shachtman's failure to establish his position clearly to the
committee on this point when it first rose there, and later the
separate resolutions of Abern and Glotzer, did great harm to our
stand. It is particularly because C and S were working to mis-
represent Shachtman's actual position that it was imperatively in-
cumbent upon the latter to record himself immediately for what
he advocated and to communicate his position internationally. The
failure to do this created great confusion not only in our own ranks
but in the organization, and enabled Cannon and Swabeck to
utilize it to more than the maximum in distorting the dispute.
Without overcoming this difficulty we shall not advance very far
in the future.
This is one of the reasons for the superior preparation of our
opponents and the fact that we improvised to such a large extent
during the plenum. On the other hand, we did not have full com-
mand of our resources and were far from bringing them into fully
effective play.
In spite of this, we all spoke and presented a fairly consistent
common line, based on joint participation. Their faction was com-
posed essentially of Cannon. Despite the presence of so many rank-
and-file comrades, neither Dunne nor Skoglund spoke on a single
question during the whole plenum called to settle the severest crisis
in the League. Whatever they did in private consultations, they
made not the slightest contribution to the problem in the plenum
Considerations on Plenum 301
itself. Oehler did not do much better. His remarks never touched
the problems at any deeper point than their circumference. Their
uncritical support inevitably produced their superficiality and ste-
rility on the questions raised. Further, far from being objective and
impartial, as they are said to be, they acted as agents for one fac-
tion. If there was any doubt on this score, it was set aside by their
action on the editorship of the Militant, when they changed their
position 180 degrees at the simple command of Cannon, after
having argued "objectively" against it and without motivating their
change by a word of explanation. These obvious facts cannot be
washed away by the flattery and encomiums poured over them by
Cannon, who does not present them as his faction comrades, but
as the revolutionary cadre which came objectively to judge the situ-
ation and did judge it in his favor. With the exception of Oehler, it
is clear that their views were entirely predetermined.
The presence of the Minneapolis comrades, with whom we
consulted openly, was of great value to us. They were present, were
able to see for themselves, and made it possible for an objective
and not one-sided report to be presented in Chicago and Minne-
apolis. They showed that our resources are not confined to a few
"malcontents" in New York. Their support for our views was "not
accidental," for they have confronted on a local scale some of the
identical problems which have necessitated that we take a posi-
tion on a national scale. In a small way they showed that we have
political grounds for our fight, that it is not some petty, base
struggle of cliques for personal power, as some philistines and
interested faction agents whisper it about.
On the international question: The greatest damage to the
organization on this score was caused by C-S. Had they merely
been interested in "correcting Shachtman," that would have been
comparatively easy. They were interested in it for the factional capi-
tal it contained for use against us, and they worked it to the bot-
tom. Damage of another sort was created by Shachtman's silence,
but in no way warranted the falsified, factional struggle they had
opened up long before that. We were thus compelled, in a sense,
to fight on grounds laid by them, and not on the grounds laid by
the whole situation in the past. In spite of this, the discussions
proved how they had distorted, magnified, and falsified the dis-
pute. They were compelled to deny the existence of a "Naville or
Landau faction" or of an "American Naville-Landau." With the
302 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
presentation of Shachtman's statement of position and the adop-
tion of Spector's resolution, the ground is laid for the complete
elimination of this vital question from the realm of factional
warfare, so that nobody can play with it any longer. We withdrew
all the other international drafts and voted for Spector's resolu-
tion. We also voted for their resolution so as to eliminate to the
maximum any grounds for the continuation of this false fight and
relieve them of artificially manufactured weapons.
On Carter: Here, too, we burst a big bubble blown by them.
It is we who had all along conducted the fight against Carter's
unhealthy aspects, both in the branch and in the National Youth
Committee. We conducted it properly, without exaggerations or
persecutions. Cannon and Swabeck were guilty of both and in
actuality only emphasized the bad sides of the Carter group, pro-
voking them into wrong positions, actions, and supercritical atti-
tudes. The facts were too overwhelming in this case (as well as in
the case of the New York branch as a whole) to enable Cannon to
justify his wild assertions about an "opposition bloc." We justly
refused the purely factional and arbitrary proposal of Cannon to
unite to crush Carter organizationally, instead of allowing Carter
the opportunity to find the right road in the process of the
organization's work and policies. Carter took a step forward with
his statement. We should help him along on this road and not allow
Cannon's provocations and extreme exaggerations— based upon
his subjective reaction to many of Carter's criticisms— to impede
the work of clarifying the situation in the New York branch. Our
resolution to the plenum lays the right basis for this work. Its
acceptance was forced upon Cannon-Swabeck by the unanswer-
able array of facts and our arguments and by our refusal to be
bulldozed into magnifying "Carterism" into some terrific bogey
to the League. One of the most positive phases of our fight on
this question, and more than that on the question of the youth as
a whole, was the quite obvious fact that such articles as Swabeck's
against Carter will henceforth be pondered over a hundred times
before they see the light of day. Swabeck and Cannon received a
lesson on how to deal with the younger comrades. We are sure
that our stubborn fight against their utterly false, journeyman's
attitude toward the youth will check them in their haughty antago-
nism to the younger comrades, their open contempt toward them,
their factional attitude of warm endorsement for those young com-
Considerations on Plenum 303
rades who (like Clarke) swallow their criticisms without great
conviction and become their faction supporters.
On the co-optations: This was one of the biggest blunders
made by Cannon during the plenum. We were justified a thou-
sand times in refusing the unheard-of proposal that we join them
in taking this step, that we voluntarily collaborate in "minoritizing"
ourselves. 1. The co-optations show the level of their strength in
the New York branch. 2. The co-optations serve to dilute the level
of the committee as a whole, and dilute it unnecessarily. 3. The
co-optations are an entirely factional step, motivated that way, and
baseless on political grounds. If there are no deep political differ-
ences, there is no ground for giving one tendency an organiza-
tional faction predominance over the other. 4. It is not only a
breach of the unified views on fundamental questions reached by
the plenum, but will serve to perpetuate the faction lines now
drawn in the committee, being public notice served that their fac-
tion must have a caucus majority regardless of the question at
issue. If this step is taken under such circumstances, what organiza-
tional measures would they take if the differences were really deep
and acute? 5. The co-optations were a factional payoff. 6. They were
a caricature of the thoroughly correct idea advanced in our "rub-
bishy" document that the committee must be broadened and new
blood drawn into it. We meant it to help solve the sharp internal
situation, not to perpetuate it. We did not mean it for Gordons.
7. The individuals qualify for such a position only by a wide stretch
of the imagination. In putting on Gordon, Cannon even violates
the Constitution. We do not raise mere formal objections, which
would not be valid were the situation to call for violating the form.
But form has a tremendous importance and exists to be observed.
The "four years in the Communist movement" provision was
inserted quite solemnly. If it is to have "exceptions" whenever fac-
tional exigencies require them, then the provision is a sham and
should be repealed. The National Committee is the leader in the
organization. We were accused of wanting to tamper lightly with
the leadership. Cannon proved by his own actions who is tamper-
ing, and doing it light-mindedly and factionally. 8. They fought
violently against Lewit being put on the committee, but they put
on Basky, Clarke, and Gordon. It is hard to imagine a more
factional farce. Cannon has not yet understood the fight we made
for Lewit at the conference; he still regards it as a personal incident.
304 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
For us it always had a purely political significance, which is revealed
by the co-optations approved by the plenum. We refused to vote
for these co-optations at the plenum. We do not propose to make
a fight in the League against them, for it is not upon such ques-
tions that the already sufficiently tense situation can be precipi-
tated into a factional war. At the same time, we cannot vote for
the co-optations in the branches, any more than we did at the ple-
num. In a quiet, not sharp, not violent, not factional, but clear
way, we shall record ourselves in the branches on this point.
The Engels controversy: The ridiculous suggestion that the
committee register itself on the theoretico-historical dispute was
not carried, following our protest. We will present our views on
this controversy in an objective manner in debate with Swabeck, a
debate freed of the other issues injected into the dispute by
Swabeck and Cannon.
The Toronto branch: The outstanding result of this discussion
was the motion proposed by Swabeck that the plenum inform the
Toronto comrades that the National Committee endorses the
political tendency of Spector, and that this is the basis for the
reunification of the Toronto branch. But Spector shares the views
of the rest of our comrades on every single important point. We
are part and parcel of the "political tendency of Spector"; it is our
political tendency. Spector spoke for us, in the name of our group,
at the plenum, associating himself with us in the most unmistak-
able manner. How can they endorse "Spector's political tendency"
and denounce ours, which is identical with it?
The gestation theory: For the first time this question was taken
up openly and discussed objectively, at least on our side. Cannon
and Swabeck continued their stubborn defense of it, indicating once
more that behind their insistence is something deeper than a mere
difference of view on a past historical question. Morgenstern
showed some of the absurder aspects of this theory ("Wasn't the
Cannon group right on the La Follette question and on the labor
party?")369 and in his person revealed some of the patent dangers
(confusion, total misunderstanding of the changes that have taken
place in the position of the Left Opposition, faction-fetishism) con-
tained in this false theory. The plenum has done everything but
give us greater reason for changing our quite correct stand on
this question. What we say about it in our document was never
Considerations on Plenum 305
even discussed by our opponents, and every word in our state-
ment on this point retains its full validity.
Our task now: We have yielded nothing on our views; we have
reaffirmed them. Much that happened even formally at the ple-
num confirmed our stand. We do not want a faction fight now.
We prevented it by our whole recent conduct. The differences we
have with Cannon-Swabeck are, it must be emphasized, quite clear
in their purport and nature, but still embryonic in form. We are
willing and desirous of letting the passage of time and the test of
events tell how deep are the roots of the differences. In the com-
ing days, we will do nothing to exaggerate these differences, to
magnify them, to perpetuate them. If they persist in their course,
they will only make a clarification inevitable, accompanied by the
necessary struggle to have the League take a position one way or
the other. At all times, however, we must not slacken our activities
in the least, nor can our friends do anything of the sort. On the
contrary, we must show (and not merely for the record) that we
are the most energetic, consistent, and willing militants in the
League, doing the maximum amount of work for the organiza-
tion. Maximum collaboration to advance the League, minimum
artificial friction, no yielding of our point of view. The stand we
have taken and defended in the past makes us confident of
the future.
The question of the editor of the Militant: The skirmish over
this question was a revelation. In itself it presented a condensed
picture of the whole fight and its meaning, in virtually all its
aspects. After having made Shachtman's collaboration in such a
vital post as difficult as they could, if not impossible, they con-
ducted a violent campaign against him for refusing to resume the
editorship. They protested their anxiety to have him take the post.
They argued that they had neither personal nor political objec-
tions to him. But what happened at the plenum showed that their
whole concern with this issue was factional and nothing else. They
were quite prepared (after all they had campaigned about previ-
ously) to let the plenum go by without even raising the question!
We finally raised it in a quiet but emphatic manner. They voted it
down and presented the most demagogic arguments against it,
but presented them very solemnly and "objectively"— not only
Cannon and Swabeck, but Skoglund, Dunne, and Oehler. Only
306 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
after a short while, when the full realization of their indefensible
and self-revelatory position dawned upon him, did Cannon take
the position to reconsider. He did not motivate his reconsidera-
tion by a single word; he did not even attempt to give a reason for
his change of front. A few minutes after having given very solemn
arguments against Shachtman as editor, they turned about and
voted just as solidly for Shachtman, also without giving the least
reason for the change and only because Cannon gave the signal.
On this whole point was shown the quite factional standpoint and
conduct of all five comrades concerned.
^ ^ ^
Draft Statement to the Membership on the
National Committee Plenum
by James P. Cannon370
25 June 1932
On June 25 the resident committee adopted this draft over the opposition
of Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer, who submitted their own statement
on the plenum at a subsequent meeting on July 7. Cannon wrote a new
statement to the membership in response to the Shachtman group,
presenting the plenum events in much starker factional terms.TiX This
draft was attached to the resident committee minutes of June 25, but it
was never published in a CLA bulletin.
In a previous circular from the national office the branches
were informed that disputes had arisen within the resident com-
mittee which would be considered by a full plenum of the National
Committee and then referred to the membership. The plenum
was held on June 10-13. The two important concrete questions
of dispute, which required definite decisions in the form of reso-
lutions, were the following:
1. The situation in the International Left Opposition
2. The situation in the New York branch
The resolutions on those questions were finally adopted by
unanimous vote. There have been no disputes in the committee
Draft Statement on NC Plenum 307
over general questions of the League policy; the entire NC stands
as before on the basis of the Second National Conference thesis
and resolutions.
In view of this fundamental political solidarity and the agree-
ment now arrived at on the disputed questions referred to above,
it is clear that a factional struggle in the League can in no way be
justified or tolerated. The plenum adjourned with this precise un-
derstanding, with organizational measures to reinforce it, and with
an agreement on both sides to reestablish a collaboration of all
forces for united work on the basis of the plenum decisions. It
was then decided, in lieu of a conference, to arrange an objective
discussion of the plenum results in the branches, to submit the
decisions to a referendum vote of the membership, and to con-
centrate the activity of the entire organization on a new program
of expanded activities.
The i ^establishment of the unity of the National Committee,
with organizational guarantees for its firm maintenance in the near
future, was accomplished only after a protracted struggle in the
NC which had been extended into the membership in the New
York branch and which developed sharp factional manifestations
and tendencies toward group formation. This struggle came to a
climax at the plenum. The disputed questions were discussed there
for four days with complete frankness, without concealing any dif-
ferences and without attempting to reconcile differences in a false
unity. It is thanks to the approach to the problem that the danger
of a destructive factional struggle in the League could be arrested,
the disputes liquidated on a principled basis, and the misunder-
standings eliminated. On the basis of the plenum results, the
League membership can and must now demand a real collabora-
tion in the National Committee and the immediate cessation of
factional struggle because there is no foundation for any other course.
In addition to the really important and concrete questions of
dispute that necessitated the adoption of definite resolutions, the
plenum heard arguments on a number of secondary matters, some
of which related to the past, others to future possibilities which
need not, and indeed cannot, be concretely decided now— and
accusations of a personal nature. Comrades Shachtman, Abern,
and Glotzer presented a long document which dealt primarily with
matters of this kind. On the concluding day of the plenum, after
the resolutions on the international question and the question of
308 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
the New York branch had been agreed upon, and the political
foundation for the unity of the committee thus clearly laid, the
question was squarely put to comrades Shachtman, Abern, and
Glotzer: Do you now wish the plenum to reply to your document
in the form of a resolution, or do you wish to withdraw it? There-
upon the three comrades, after a recess to give the matter and its
consequences due consideration, announced their decision to with-
draw the document from the records of the organization, and
stated they were doing so in the interest of unity and collaboration,
while retaining the opinions expressed in the document.
The International Question
In order to make clear the full significance of the plenum
decisions on this point, it is necessary to explain briefly the chron-
ological development of the dispute. Tangible and really concrete
differences on these questions only manifested themselves in recent
months after the return of comrade Shachtman from Europe.
Prior to that there were only intimations of possible differences,
shadings of emphasis, and some dissatisfaction with comrade
Shachtman's method of conducting the office of international rep-
resentative. At the second conference the National Committee
members defended a common resolution on the international
question which represents the same basic position on the interna-
tional questions as that of the plenum. On the other hand, com-
rade Cannon's speech at the conference differed in emphasis from
the report of comrade Shachtman.
No political objection was raised against comrade Shachtman's
visit to Europe after the conference and no suspicions of factional
designs on his part were entertained by other members of the
committee. A few days after his return, however, the committee
received a protest from comrade Trotsky against the attitude taken
by comrade Shachtman while in Europe toward the internal dis-
putes of the other national sections, an attitude which comrade
Trotsky maintained had been harmful to the struggle of the
progressive elements to cleanse the International Left Opposition
of the influence of alien, demoralized, and careerist elements.
Comrade Trotsky demanded— and rightly so— that the NC clarify
its stand before the international Opposition and say plainly
whether it took responsibility for comrade Shachtman's views
or not.
Draft Statement on NC Plenum 309
At the National Committee meeting where the matter was first
considered (13 January 1932), the committee heard the report of
comrade Glotzer, who had only recently returned from Europe.
He informed the committee of comrade Trotsky's conversation
with him about the disputes in the French Ligue and his own
observations in France and stated that he agreed with the position
of comrade Trotsky and was not in accord with the views of com-
rade Shachtman. Comrade Shachtman refrained from speaking
at the meeting.
Without in any way challenging comrade Shachtman's right
to an independent opinion on the questions and without passing
a hasty judgment on the specific criticism brought against him by
comrade Trotsky, the committee merely put on record the follow-
ing motion:
The NC takes note of the letter of comrade Trotsky and the copy of
his letter to comrade Shachtman regarding the opinions of the lat-
ter on the situation in the international Opposition.
1. The reply thereto the NC declares: The said views of comrade
Shachtman have been put forward by himself as an individual with-
out consulting the NC and on his own personal responsibility. They
do not represent the views of the NC and it takes no responsibility
for them.
It was at this meeting, following the adoption of the above
motion, that comrade Shachtman resigned his post as editor of
the Militant, notwithstanding the unanimous vote of all the other
members in favor of his continuance.
Following this, translations were made of all the important
material bearing on the disputes in the French Ligue and studied
by the committee members.
At the meeting of February 17, two projects for resolution-
one by comrade Glotzer and one by comrade Cannon— were con-
sidered. A motion was carried that a combination of the two
projects, which did not differ in essence, be made into a single
resolution as the viewpoint of the committee. The motion was car-
ried with the votes of Glotzer, Cannon, and Swabeck. Comrade
Shachtman voted against the motion without explaining his own
position. Comrade Abern, who had not yet had the opportunity
to study the translated material, refrained from voting on that
account and later submitted a draft of his own.
On March 15, after the return of comrade Glotzer from his
tour, the resolution on the international questions was again
310 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
considered. At this meeting, comrade Glotzer expressed his
dissatisfaction with the combination which had been made of
the two projects and voted for his own original draft. Comrades
Cannon and Swabeck voted for the combined resolution. Com-
rade Abern submitted and voted for a draft of his own. Com-
rade Shachtman abstained from voting on all of them and
presented no resolution of his own. Thus, with all drafts failing of
a majority in the resident committee, the three resolutions were
submitted by referendum to the nonresident members of the
committee.
It was not until the middle of April, when the votes of the
nonresident members were received, that the committee could
record a majority for the resolution on the international questions
and inform the organization and the International Secretariat of
its position. Even then, comrade Shachtman withheld his support
from the resolution. Comrades Abern and Glotzer did likewise.
Their own resolutions at their request were sent out to the
branches together with the official resolution. This contributed
to the confusion and weakened the force of the attempt of the
majority of the committee to rally the membership for a clear and
definite stand on the question.
The adoption of the international resolution by a majority of
the committee and its publication in the Militant of April 23 was
undoubtedly a service to the international Opposition insofar as
it again definitely recorded the official support of the American
League on the side of the progressive and revolutionary tendency
in the internal struggles of the European sections. The unanimous
vote for this resolution, which has now finally been recorded at
the plenum, is another step forward along the same line, and cuts
away the ground for speculation by the elements of disintegra-
tion in the European sections on any possible support from our
League or any part of its leadership. It now remains to mobilize
the entire membership of the League in support of this resolu-
tion and put an end to all uncertainty or ambiguity as to the atti-
tude of our organization toward the vital conflicts within the
European sections.
The NC can only welcome the fact that comrades Abern and
Glotzer withdrew their resolutions in favor of the official resolu-
tion which had been adopted previously and published in the Mili-
tant. The vote of comrade Shachtman for the resolution and his
Draft Statement on NC Plenum 311
statement dissociating himself entirely from all those persons and
groups in the European sections who have counted to a certain
extent on his direct or indirect support can likewise be welcomed.
But the implications in comrade Shachtman's statement that his
position has been "misrepresented" and that "a factional football"
has been made of the issue are categorically condemned and
rejected. Comrade Shachtman's recognition that the "misunder-
standings" were partly caused by his failure to make his position
clear is by no means a completely correct statement of the matter.
The conflict arose over an erroneous position taken by him and
the misunderstandings were due entirely to him. The conflict can
be liquidated now because the question has been completely
clarified at the plenum and agreement has been reached on a
political basis.
The Question of the New York Branch
The factional situation which developed on the resident com-
mittee was complicated and sharpened by differences in approach
to the problems of the New York branch, the largest branch in
the organization and the one coming under most direct and im-
mediate influence of the NC. Within the NY branch there has
crystallized over a period of time an intellectualistic tendency com-
posed primarily of student/ youth elements who began to take on
a group formation under the leadership of comrade Carter. This
grouping became an obstruction to the political education and
development of the branch as a whole, all the more so since it
acquired a predominating position in the leading organ of the
branch and used this position as a base of opposition to the NC.
The majority of the plenum put forward as a condition for
agreement a common struggle for the political isolation of this
harmful grouping and its elimination from the present leadership
of the branch. In the course of the discussion it became evident
that the differences within the committee in the estimation of this
grouping were not of a fundamental character. On that ground it
became possible to work out a unanimous resolution which will
guide the committee as a whole in its future course in the NY
branch.
Comrades Carter, Ray, and Stone on their part regarded the
discussion and the decision of the plenum in regard to them
with sufficient seriousness to take a step forward to facilitate the
312 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
carrying out of the line of the NC. On their own initiative they
introduced a statement in which they declared their readiness to
support the unification of the NC. To that end they offered to
withdraw as candidates for election to the new branch executive
committee in order to eliminate any controversy on this point.
While such an undertaking need not be insisted upon with com-
plete literalness, the reasons given by these comrades to motivate
their action must be noted in their favor. The fact that they now
acknowledged the value of unity in the NC and show a willing-
ness, if necessary, to sacrifice some of their own position in order
to help in maintaining it is a step forward from their previous
attitude toward the NC and toward the responsibilities to the
organization devolving upon them. It should be added that these
comrades stated their intention to continue and even to increase
their activities as members of the branch.
Organization Decisions
Following the adoption of the unanimous resolutions and the
agreement to enter upon a new period of united work and col-
laboration, the plenum majority raised the question of the neces-
sary organizational measures to guarantee the firm execution of
the decisions and agreements in the daily work of the resident
committee.
The situation in the resident committee prior to the plenum
presented an anomaly. On the one hand the majority in the resi-
dent committee represented a minority in the committee as a whole
and vice versa. On the other hand the main responsibilities of the
daily administration of the League devolved upon the minority
of the resident committee, which could not conduct its responsi-
bilities, even in small practical questions, without agreement of
the majority or an appeal by referendum to the full committee.
Such a state of affairs must be ended one way or another. More-
over it must be recognized that the resident committee of five had
come to a stalemate and that personal relations within it had served
to accentuate the general difficulties.
As the best way to solve the contradiction and at the same
time to refute the accusation of a conservative organizational
policy on the part of the old Party group which up till now has
monopolized the leadership, the plenum decided to co-opt two
new members to the committee with full rights and one candi-
Draft Statement on NC Plenum 313
date with voice but no vote, none of whom were identified with
the old Party group which has led the League since its inception.
This decision is submitted by referendum to the entire mem-
bership for its approval along with the other important decisions
of the plenum.
The Dispute in the Toronto Branch
In addition to the other questions noted above, the plenum
considered a serious dispute which had arisen in the Toronto
branch, resulting in its disruption a short time before the plenum
convened. A number of documents were submitted. In addition,
the conflicting groups were represented at the plenum by com-
rade Spector on the one side and Krehm on the other. Comrade
Roth, who was not able to remain for the discussion on this point,
submitted a written statement. The decision of the plenum on the
question is embodied in a self-explanatory resolution which goes
out to all the branches together with this statement and the other
plenum material. Here it is only necessary to add that both com-
rades, Spector and Krehm, pledged themselves to support the
decision and to work for the reconsolidation of the Toronto branch
on that basis.
The Dispute over Engels' Introduction
The ostensible but not the real cause of the sharp factional
situation which developed in the resident committee was the
dispute which arose in regard to comrade Swabeck's article in the
Militant of March 5 attacking a previous article by comrade Carter
in Young Spartacus of January. Comrade Shachtman took issue with
comrade Swabeck's conclusions and defended the position of com-
rade Carter.
The superficiality of this issue was demonstrated by the fact
that the plenum did not find it necessary to adopt a resolution on
the point one way or another. After the important disputes had
been settled, as noted above, it was unanimously agreed that the
matter of the Engels introduction be referred for an objective dis-
cussion in the membership, the comrades having different view-
points being free to present them. The question is to be discussed
on its political and theoretical merits without connection with the
other disputes.
314 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
The Discussion in the Membership
The plenum was unanimously of the opinion that the adop-
tion of the unanimous resolutions on the most important ques-
tions removes all ground for a factional struggle in the organiza-
tion, which would have to be concluded within one month, and
represents a preparation of the organization for a new expansion
of its activities on the basis of a firm internal unity. The resident
committee has been charged with the task of working out a new
program of work in this light, which is to include practical pro-
posals for a serious and planned class-struggle activity, in addi-
tion to our propagandistic and critical activity directed to the Party
but not in contradiction to it.
Comrades! The fundamental political unity of the leadership
of the League as a whole and its capacity to overcome a threat-
ened crisis on a principled basis has once again been demonstrated
by the results of our second plenum. It is for the rank-and-file mem-
bership now to weigh and discuss all the material and to pronounce
their decision. If the membership now will rally firmly around the
decisions of the plenum, speak out clearly for unity and against
every manifestation of a frivolous faction spirit, our League can
go forward to a new series of second accomplishments for which
the solid work of the past three and a half years had prepared us.
All the conditions of the class struggle are preparing the way
for the great future of Communism. All the events prove over and
over again the Left Opposition alone is the genuine representa-
tive of the Communist doctrines of Marx and Lenin. We are firmly
convinced that the development of the class struggle on an inter-
national scale and in America are rapidly creating the conditions
for a great expansion of the influence and strength of the Left
Opposition. This will surely be the case if we prove equal to our
responsibilities and our tasks.
We should regard our second plenum as a memorable event
in the consolidation and preparation of the League for its future,
as the starting point for a great new period of united struggle and
achievement.
315
Statement of the National Committee (Minority):
The Results of the Plenum
of the National Committee
by Martin Abern, Albert Glotzer, and Max Shachtman
29 June 1932
Submitted to the resident committee at a June 30 meeting, this statement
engendered a lengthy discussion and a motion by Cannon characterizing
it as "a factional document that falsifies the decisions of the plenum,
attempts to incite the membership to overturn them, directly contradicts
the action of the said comrades in withdrawing their document from the
records of the plenum, and attempts to smuggle it back in politer form. "
The statement was published in CLA Internal Bulletin no. 2 (July
1932).
In a statement to the membership on the plenum, written after the
Shachtman group submitted this document, and subsequently published
in CLA Internal Bulletin no. 1, Cannon wrote:
We deem it now necessary to hand over to the membership all the essen-
tial documents which have accumulated in the records of the committee
in the course of the conflict. With this material before them the mem-
bers of the League will be able to gain a clear understanding of the
disputes which disrupted the resident committee and to form a decisive
judgment.
This is the only course open now. The National Committee has
endeavored up to the last moment of the plenum to maintain peace in
the organization as long as it could be done without compromising any
essential policy. It held the door open to the minority, passed no resolu-
tions against them, and approached them in good faith on the basis of
unity and collaboration the moment they complied with the minimum
political demands. The minority members are trying to frustrate these
designs with a double-dealing maneuver. They retreated from their
positions and spoke for peace at the plenum, and a week later they wrote
a factional appeal against the plenum. They are trying to play hide-
and-seek with the National Committee. They are trifling with the unity
and stability of the National Committee, which is especially necessary
316 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
now and which they have no principled ground to attack. The member-
ship of the League must call a halt to this unprincipled faction game*12
1. The plenum of the National Committee of the League held on
10-13 June 1932 was called together to discuss the disputes which
had arisen in the resident committee in New York. It established
the following facts:
a. On the essential questions of principle and policy of the
League, there exist at present no fundamental differences
of opinion among the members of the National Committee.
b. On the situation in and development of the International
Left Opposition, particularly in Europe, it was shown that
in spite of contrary assertions, a unanimous line exists in the
committee, enabling the plenum to present for discussion
a single viewpoint.
c. On the situation in the New York branch, the discussions
at the plenum revealed that the charge of an "opposition
bloc" between the undersigned and the Carter "group"
was unfounded.
The last two points were the ones raised in the resident com-
mittee during the preplenum discussion as questions requiring
decision. The fact that the plenum was able to adopt unanimous
resolutions on both questions, on the one hand, makes possible a
calm and objective discussion of the situation in the League, with-
out exaggerations or factional polemics, and on the other hand,
eliminates the danger which threatened us of a sharp factional
struggle in the absence of any clearly defined or fundamental dif-
ferences of opinion.
2. The friction and lack of collective and efficient collabora-
tion in the resident committee did not originate with the disputes
over the international questions or the New York branch situation.
They have their origin in differences and antagonisms existing
in the committee for a long period of time over questions relating
to the tempo of the Opposition's development in the United States,
the manner of administration at the center, the relations between
the committee and the membership, and the interpretation
over the character of the American Opposition. At times in the
past, these differences assumed an extremely acute form; some-
times they appeared only as shadings of opinions or emphasis. The
first plenum of the National Committee in 1930, without adopt-
Minority Statement on Plenum 317
ing any resolutions on the disputes, nevertheless laid the basis for
eliminating them as a hindrance to the work of the leading
committee. They were further eliminated from an active place on
the order of the day by the harmonious collaboration established
in the committee from that time until the convocation of the
Second National Conference last fall. The appearance of the whole
National Committee with unanimous resolutions was an indication
of the progress made toward overcoming the difficulties of the past
and promised an even closer coordination of efforts and sounder
political unity in the future.
3. The previously unannounced intervention of comrade Cannon
against the report on the international situation in the Left
Opposition, unanimously assigned to comrade Shachtman and
against which no criticism had been leveled when it was delivered
at the New York branch, as well as the strenuous opposition offered
to the proposal that comrade Lewit be added to the incoming
National Committee, created a breach in the collaboration which
had existed up to then. In face of this situation, all the members
of the National Committee agreed to grant comrade Shachtman's
request for a leave of absence. In addition to other reasons that
had no relation to the situation in the committee, he asked to be
given the leave in order that the difficult conditions engendered
toward the end of the conference might meanwhile be eliminated
or moderated and a more effective collaboration be resumed in
the committee.
4. Toward the end of his stay in Europe, comrade Shachtman
replied to a request from comrade Trotsky for his personal views
on the situation in the French Ligue with a letter from Paris on
1 December 1931. The views expressed in this letter caused com-
rade Trotsky to request, upon Shachtman's return to New York,
that the National Committee declare whether or not it shared these
opinions. The committee of course replied that these views repre-
sented comrade Shachtman's personal opinions. Comrade
Shachtman at that time considered that the situation which was
being created in the committee made it impossible for him to con-
tinue in the responsible post of editor which he had occupied up
to then.
5. In spite of the assertions and rumors concerning the existence
in the League of a Navillist or semi-Navillist or Landauist tendency,
318 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
which were current at that time in New York, comrade Shachtman
refused to make a statement of his position in the committee in
order that it might not become the object of misconstruction or
dispute in the League. This erroneous silence, however, did not
clear up the situation and made it possible for a false interpreta-
tion to be put upon his position. His mistake, his actual position
with regard to the international Opposition, as well as the ques-
tion of the letter of December 1, were completely clarified in the
statement made by comrade Shachtman to the plenum on 12 June
1932. Comrades Abern and Glotzer had already made their posi-
tions clear some time before then, when the National Committee
was engaged in drafting a resolution on the international ques-
tion. They submitted their drafts of a resolution because they
found themselves unable to agree with the motivation contained
in the draft of comrade Cannon.
6. The immediate cause for the precipitation of the dispute in the
committee was the discussion which arose within it over the article
written in the Militant by comrade Swabeck in reply to that of
comrade Carter in Young Spartacus. At the end of a statement on
the historical controversy over the Engels foreword of 1895, com-
rade Shachtman also replied briefly to accusations that had been
made against him by comrades Cannon and Swabeck in a previ-
ous committee meeting where the Engels dispute was discussed,
regarding his alleged attitude toward Naville and Landau. This in
turn brought forth a lengthy document by comrades Cannon and
Swabeck, which dealt not only with the Engels controversy, but
primarily with other points: the international question and the
New York branch. The dispute over Engels was thereby enlarged
to embrace other, more serious and pertinent questions and
charges. In their statement, the comrades declared that their dis-
putes with comrade Shachtman began a year or more ago on
international questions and that there has been a "steadily devel-
oping divergence over questions which we consider decisive for
the future of our movement." The statement was also made that
the undersigned had been supporting or encouraging the Carter
group in the New York branch. At the same time, comrade Cannon
advanced the idea that a sharp factional struggle would now break
out in the League, requiring a definitive solution and endangering
the existence of the various undertakings (Militant, Unser Kamf,
etc.) to which the League had progressed.
Minority Statement on Plenum 319
7. The undersigned were therefore compelled to reply to the
assertions contained in the document of comrades Cannon and
Swabeck which we did not and do not consider correct in any
respect. In a reply to it, therefore, we outlined that internal devel-
opment and disputes in the League for the past period in order
to show that the contentions of comrades Cannon and Swabeck
did not correspond to the real situation. While pointing out where
the differences had originated and bringing forward a number of
criticisms of the work and conduct of the National Committee,
we pointed out that whatever divergences exist on a number of
questions today are of an embryonic and not clearly defined
nature, which must not be exaggerated or forced; consequently,
we concluded, a factional struggle in the League must be avoided
so that the organization shall not be torn by an internal dispute
in the absence of any political or principled differences of major
importance.
8. On the ground that the differences were so irreconcilable that
a plenum of the National Committee could not solve them, com-
rades Cannon and Swabeck proposed an immediate discussion in
the League and conference to follow directly after it. We proposed
an immediate plenum so that the full membership of the National
Committee should first have the opportunity to discuss and decide
the disputed questions. The affirmative vote of all the out-of-town
members finally made possible the holding of such a plenum.
9. At the plenum, the committee engaged in a thorough and open
discussion of the internal situation, which could not avoid an
extreme sharpness at times. At the end of these discussions, it was
clear that every possible measure had to be taken to avoid a fac-
tional struggle in the organization, which would unwai rantedly
render it ineffective for the coming period. In view of the dis-
putes, however, it was also decided that the membership shall have
adequate opportunity to discuss the situation for a fixed period,
at the end of which the resolutions presented by the plenum should
be voted upon and the organization as a whole mobilized for the
urgent tasks that confront it. That this is desirable and possible is
shown by the fact that the elimination of the sharpest points of
contention and the acknowledged absence of deep political dif-
ferences have laid the basis for a reestablishment of a functioning
collaboration in the leading committee, with the positive results
for the League as a whole which this implies.
320 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
10. The international question at the plenum. After a lengthy dis-
cussion on the subject, comrade Spector introduced a complete
resolution on the international question which represented our
point of view. Comrade Shachtman, in order to clarify his posi-
tion on the question and bring all misunderstandings to an end,
introduced a statement of his views. Comrade Glotzer regarded
the resolution of comrade Spector as more adequate and there-
fore withdrew his original draft in support of the former. Com-
rade Abern's draft, which comrade Spector had originally consid-
ered more objective but insufficiently motivated and rounded, was
also withdrawn. Both of these withdrawals were made with the aim
especially in mind to take the international questions out of the
realm of any possible factional conflict and to present the mem-
bership and the international Opposition with a single document
which would actually reflect the fact that a unanimous view really
exists on the fundamental questions of the Left Opposition in the
National Committee. For the same reason, all the comrades con-
sented to vote for comrade Spector's resolution, which was then
unanimously adopted at the plenum. This makes it more than ever
possible to discuss the international questions and to draw the valu-
able lessons from the internal developments in the European
Opposition in an entirely objective manner, free from factional con-
siderations and distortions. In this respect, therefore, the plenum
had a most positive value for the coming period of the League.
11. The Carter question. On this question too there was a lengthy
discussion, participated in not only by committee members, but
also by comrade Carter, who made a statement of his position.
The discussion revealed that the assertions originally made con-
cerning the views on this point held by the undersigned did not
correspond with their actual standpoint. At the end of the discus-
sion, comrade Shachtman introduced a resolution on the Carter
"group," which, while it did not agree entirely with every aspect
of the views held on the matter by comrades Cannon and Swabeck,
was nevertheless accepted by the latter as a draft basis for a unani-
mous resolution. The statement made by comrades Carter, Stone,
and Ray also served to help clarify this disputed question and made
possible its speedy solution in the coming period.
12. Toward the end of the sessions, comrades Cannon and
Swabeck demanded of the undersigned the formal withdrawal of
Minority Statement on Plenum 321
the document we had drawn up in reply to their statement of
22 March 1932. During the plenum, the statements made in our
document were not taken up or replied to by the other comrades.
In view of the situation, the comrades declared that unless the
document were withdrawn it would involve such a reply on their
part and consequent discussion in the League as could throw the
organization into a factional struggle. The points raised in our
document were presented to the plenum chiefly as a reply to the
erroneous assertions made in the first document of comrades
Cannon and Swabeck. In view of the practical agreement that had
been reached on such issues as the international question and the
New York branch, making possible the elimination of unfounded
charges previously made; because of the indications that such a
discussion as would follow on the document and the proposed
reply would involve a factional battle in the League; and in view
of the understanding that the original document of comrades
Cannon and Swabeck would not be presented to the membership
as a basis for discussion— the undersigned announced their deci-
sion to withdraw the document formally from the committee's
records, without however renouncing any of the views expressed
in it. This action also, we believe, will have the effect of averting
an acute struggle in the League and making the coming discus-
sion an objective one.
13. The co-optations. We have already expressed our viewpoint
on this action of the plenum in a statement presented to the com-
mittee. The addition of two new members and one candidate to
the committee at the present time is an action which we cannot
support. The additions are not made upon the basis of merit pri-
marily, for there are half a dozen other comrades in the New York
branch who take precedence in this respect. It is not in accordance
with the resolutions adopted by the plenum, which showed a
political harmony and do not warrant a tendentious changing of
the composition of the committee for the purpose of gaining an
automatic majority for one side in the committee against another.
It can tend only to perpetuate a division in the committee instead
of breaking it down. While opposing these additions, we at the
same time announced our decision not to make this question,
regardless of the vote cast on it, an issue for sharp factional dis-
pute in the League. However, we cannot support it any more than
we could support it in the session of the plenum.
322 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
14. The editorship of the Militant. In view of the liquidation of
disputed issues at the plenum, comrade Abern thereupon pro-
posed toward the end of the sessions that comrade Shachtman
resume the post of editor of the Militant, which he formerly held.
All the comrades of the committee, as well as comrade Trotsky in
his letters here, had previously declared that there were no politi-
cal objections to comrade Shachtman's continuation in the edito-
rial post. Although comrade Abern's motion failed to carry at the
plenum on its first presentation, comrade Cannon announced at
the same session that, having reconsidered the question, he would
also propose that comrade Shachtman resume his former posi-
tion. The plenum as a whole thereupon voted favorably upon the
proposal. This action, like the resolutions on the international
question and the New York branch, helps to remove another source
of difference in the committee and makes possible the consolida-
tion and functioning of the committee on a collective basis.
15. The Toronto branch dispute. In the discussion which followed
the reports of comrades Krehm and Spector on the situation in
the Toronto branch, the plenum decided to support the political
tendency represented by comrade Spector and to reject the stand-
point of the other section of the Toronto branch. The resolution
on this question will make it possible to cement and strengthen
the Opposition in Toronto and throughout Canada, laying the basis
for a reunification of the branch and the development toward an
increasingly autonomous and eventually independent Opposition
section, such as was originally visualized in the Constitution of
the League.
16. The Engels controversy. The plenum took no position on the
controversy over Engels' foreword of 1895. It did, however, make
provisions for an objective discussion of the historical and theo-
retical aspects of the dispute, unmarred by polemical, internal
sharpness such as has prevented the League from deriving the
maximum of educational value from the controversy.
The unavoidable preoccupation of the plenum with internal
disputes did not make it possible to take up a number of impor-
tant questions of our work in general. This defect can be over-
come most speedily and effectively if the discussion which is to
What Position Will You Take? 323
follow in the branches is organized in an objective manner, calmly,
and without acrimoniousness or sharpening of the situation, and
if it is dominated by the desire, expressed by all comrades, to pre-
vent the crisis with which we were threatened and which the ple-
num took the first important steps to liquidate. Such a discussion
will be of benefit to the League, particularly if it comes out of it
with serried ranks and a conviction that the basis exists and must
be broadened for a rapid progress of our movement in this coun-
try. All developments point to increased possibilities for the growth
of the Opposition, for more energetic intervention in the class
struggle for which the past propagandistic work has prepared us.
If we act in accordance with the responsibilities that confront us,
we will be able to utilize these possibilities to their maximum for
the furtherance of our cause.
4- > ^
What Position Will You Take?
Letter by Max Shachtman to John Edwards373
3 July 1932
On the same day Shachtman wrote similar letters to Carl Cowl in
Minneapolis and Maurice Spector in Toronto. On July 4 Glotzer wrote
a report to Trotsky, enclosing the plenum statements of both groups. 374
Despite the promising results of the plenum, matters have
now taken a distinct turn to the worse. At the plenum we man-
aged to liquidate— to all intents and purposes— a number of the
most pressing questions, and in order to avoid the onus of a fac-
tional struggle which Cannon threatened, we withdrew our prin-
cipal document from the records and retreated on some other
questions. Cowl must have informed you of the details on this
phase of the discussions. However, on June 25, Cannon proposed
a statement on the plenum's results to be sent out to the mem-
bership, with which we could not, of course, agree. It was the same
old stuff in politer form. They granted us the right to send out a
statement of our own and on June 30, when we handed in the
enclosed document (which I send you confidentially), we were
324 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
subjected to one of the most violent attacks conceivable. You can
read it and see how moderately its language is couched. Never-
theless, justified as we still believe we are in its contents as well,
they demanded that we withdraw it from the records, under threat
of a factional fight. We refused; we have withdrawn and retreated
sufficiently in the interests of League unity, but we have now
reached a point where it has become impossible for us to retreat
any further merely on Cannon's threats without wiping ourselves
off the face of the organization. What Cannon is concerned with
is the crushing of any opponent whose head comes above water,
and that is why his motion (which I also enclose) was presented,
which will in all likelihood be carried by the rest of the commit-
tee. We voted against it, of course, since we oppose a convention
now or a factional struggle, given the absence of clearly defined
political divergences. But if Cannon forces us into it and tries, as
he is trying, to make the international question the issue (when it
was thoroughly liquidated at the plenum, by their own admis-
sion)—then we have no other course but to fight the thing out.
You have your own ideas about Cannon's "maneuvering supe-
riority" in an internal fight and I don't intend to argue the point
here. But it is hardly involved here. It sometimes takes only one to
launch a fight, and considering Cannon's determination to "liqui-
date us," the fight appears to be unavoidable now that it has been
opened up. That is why I must once more bring up the question
of the position you will take. I am not engaging in empty flattery
when I say that your influence, particularly in the Chicago
branch, is of the highest importance in the dispute and I am
anxious that it shall be exercised properly, and by properly I mean
that it would be hurtful to the interests of the League if you were
to adopt a passive or semipassive attitude now. I have no doubt
that Oehler, who has adopted a most distinctly factional attitude
here in favor of Cannon, has been writing his views to the Chicago
comrades, and will continue to do so even if they have decided to
have him stay in New York as paid local organizer. That is why it
becomes imperative now that you explain some of the basic ques-
tions involved to the leading Chicago comrades at least. You know
quite well the important questions that lie behind many of the
superficial issues of the moment; you know what Cannon repre-
sents and why Swabeck, Dunne, and Skoglund support him. And
now that Cannon has forced an open factional struggle, it is nee-
A Great Relief 325
essary to enlighten the active comrades, particularly Giganti and
the leading youth comrades, of what is what. We are counting upon
you to act in the spirit you expressed in your recent letters. And
we want you to write us forthwith about your views and sugges-
tions. Best regards from Marty and Al.
4 ^ ^
A Great Relief
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman375
4 July 1932
Here Trotsky replies to a June 18 letter by Shachtman that enclosed a
copy of his plenum statement on international questions.™ Shachtman
assured Trotsky that he had not written to anyone in the Spanish section
about the disputes.
Your letter of June 18 was a great relief to me in all respects.
First, I hope that our friendly relationship will now develop fur-
ther, undisturbed and with enhanced mutual openness. Second,
the fact that the disputed issues were decided unanimously at the
plenum and that you personally were reelected unanimously as
editor of the Militant is a guarantee that in the future the League
will be united and march with closed ranks. Third, your statement
on the international issues in conjunction with the plenum's
decision is of the utmost importance for the resolution of the Span-
ish question, which at present worries me most of all. The more
resolute the international public opinion of our organization
toward the obvious political mistakes of the Spanish section, the
more hope there will be that the Spanish comrades will be aided
in returning to the correct path without personal convulsions.
Unfortunately, the most difficult thing in collaborating with the
leading comrades in Madrid and Barcelona is that they always
regard a programmatic rebuttal or a political criticism only from
a purely personal standpoint, thus making debate difficult in the
extreme. If I ask them: For what political reasons did they do this
or that? They answer me: We have the right to our own opinion—
as if someone were disputing this right and as if it were not a
326 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
question of what concrete use one makes of this right in a con-
crete case.
Really healthy party democracy presupposes a certain public
opinion that has crystallized through common experience. With-
out this foundation one would have to start at the beginning every
time, and that is the case with the Spanish comrades: Instead of
learning from our previous experience, they want to force us to
begin again with the first letter of the alphabet.
^ ^ ^
Reply of the National Committee
to the Minority Statement
by James P. Cannon
14 July 1932
Submitted to the resident committee and adopted on July 14 against the
vote ofShachtman, Abern, and Glotzer, this document was published in
CLA Internal Bulletin no. 2 (July 1932).
The statement of comrades Abern, Glotzer, and Shachtman
which purports to give an account of the proceedings and results
of the plenum in reality distorts and falsifies them. It attempts to
represent the plenum— which rejected their standpoint on all the
essential questions— as a vindication of their rejected position. By
this fact they demonstrate that the changes of position which they
made at the plenum deserve to be considered merely as diplo-
matic maneuvers and cannot be accepted in good faith. The real
aim of the statement is to circumvent the plenum, to restore the
state of affairs in the committee to that which obtained before
the plenum, and to hold together a factional grouping in the
League as a support for such an attitude.
The International Questions
On this point— the most important issue in dispute— the state-
ment says: "It was shown that, in spite of contrary assertions, a unani-
mous line exists in the committee" (our emphasis).
NC Reply to Minority 327
In this presentation of the question they seek to pass off the
most serious disputes in the committee as nothing at all, as mere
"contrary assertions" against comrades who were in full agreement
with the standpoint of the plenum all along. This is a complete
falsification of the whole matter. It is an attempt to deceive the
membership in order to cover up comrade Shachtman, who
brought his factional war against the National Committee into the
open in protest against the position taken on the international
question.
Here again, as in the five-months' conflict which preceded
the plenum, comrades Abern and Glotzer are playing the perni-
cious role of "friends" and "protectors" of comrade Shachtman,
instead of responsible communist leaders seeking to clarify policy
in order to protect the interests of the movement. In this they only
follow the example of comrade Shachtman, who got himself in-
volved in such fatal blunders and brought so much harm to the
European sections of the Left Opposition out of personal consid-
erations and sympathies for individuals who obstructed the
development of the Opposition by their careerist aims and worth-
less intrigues. The fatal logic of personal clique formations is
illustrated in every line of the deceitful statement of Shachtman,
Abern, and Glotzer.
Yes, from a formal standpoint "a unanimous line exists in the
committee" on the international questions. This "was shown" at
the plenum by the unanimous adoption of the resolution. But only
after Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer had retreated from their previous
standpoint and voted for the original resolution of the National Com-
mittee. That is why there is a "unanimous line."
But instead of saying so, openly and honestly, in the manner
of communists who are sincerely attempting to rectify an error
and safeguard against its repetition, comrade Shachtman seeks a
way out of the difficulty by the simple expedient of denying that
there ever were any differences. In this unworthy stratagem he
has the assistance and support of comrades Abern and Glotzer,
whose "protection" of comrade Shachtman had already led them
to cooperate with him in the obstruction of the committee's
intervention on the international questions for five months before
the plenum. By their explanation of the plenum decisions, their
whole conduct there— including their vote for the NC resolution
on the international question— stamps itself as a maneuver to gain
328 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
time and shield themselves from a direct condemnation by
the plenum.
The differences over the international questions, which were
quite fundamental ones, have been so completely and so convinc-
ingly established in the documents and records of the committee
that no ground is left for doubt as to how matters really stood
before the plenum. In the document of March 22, entitled "Inter-
nal Problems of the Communist League of America," signed by
comrades Swabeck and Cannon, the origin and essence of this
dispute, which comrade Shachtman has tried to sidetrack with his
venomous polemic in defense of Carter, was clearly outlined.377
Comrades who wish to trace the dispute to its roots are referred
to this document, which retains its validity in all respects. In order
to avoid repetition we shall limit ourselves here to the citation of
records and documentary proofs which show how false are the
present contentions of comrade Shachtman about mere misunder-
standings and "contrary assertions"— to say nothing of outright
"frame-ups"— of which he was the victim.
The first "contrary assertion" in regard to the position of com-
rade Shachtman on the situation in the European sections was
made by comrade Trotsky. And his indictment did not concern
itself at all with merely episodic questions, but with the whole course
of comrade Shachtman in the International Left Opposition, with
his failure to recognize the conflict of tendencies, with his unwill-
ingness to draw any conclusions from the long struggles against
the elements of disintegration, of shoddy careerism and intrigue,
and his consequent direct and indirect support of these elements.
Moreover, the protests of comrade Trotsky were not made once
but several times; they were never in the least heeded by comrade
Shachtman; and on the very day the plenum opened, a letter from
comrade Trotsky returned again, in more emphatic terms than
before, to his criticism of the international position of comrade
Shachtman.
The conduct of comrade Shachtman since his return from
Europe— his contrary votes and his stubborn attempts to sabotage
the passing and the publication of the NC resolution on the
question, his virulent factional attacks and his attempts to shift
the dispute to other, far less important questions— only tended to
confirm the accusations of comrade Trotsky and not to refute them.
These letters of comrade Trotsky are submitted as documentary
NC Reply to Minority 329
material with this bulletin. Included also is the lengthy letter of
comrade Shachtman to comrade Trotsky from Paris on the date
of 1 December 1931. Here we quote a few extracts from this
material.378
Under date of 25 December 1931 comrade Trotsky wrote to
the committee:
My efforts to find a common language with him (Shachtman) in
the most disputed European questions were never crowned with suc-
cess. It always appeared to me that comrade Shachtman was, and
still is, guided in these questions, which were somewhat more re-
mote from America, more by personal and journalistic sympathies
than by fundamental political considerations.
You will, however, have to understand that it is not taken very pleas-
antly here when comrade Shachtman, at the acutest moment, adopts
a position which completely counteracts the struggle which the pro-
gressive elements of the Opposition have been conducting for a long
time and upon the basis of which a certain selection took place,
and which appears to be covered by the authority of the American section
(our emphasis).
On 25 December 1931 comrade Trotsky wrote to comrade
Shachtman:
Unfortunately, you have answered nothing to my objections to your
conduct in Europe. In the meantime, I had to take a position against
you also openly, without, at all events, calling you by name, in a cir-
cular to the sections. I must establish regretfully that you have drawn
absolutely no conclusions from the bad experience, beginning with
the international conference of April 1930. The difficult situation
in the French Ligue is, to a certain degree, due thanks also to you,
for directly or indirectly you always supported those elements which
acted like a brake or destructively, like the Naville group. You now
transfer your support to Mill-Felix, who have absolutely not stood
the test in any regard.
What you say about the German Opposition sounds like an echo
of your old sympathies for Landau, which the German comrades
do not want to forget and rightly so. In the struggle which we led
here against the accidental burned-out or downright demoralized
elements, you, dear Shachtman, were never on our side, and those
concerned (Rosmer, Naville, Landau, and now Mill) always felt them-
selves covered in a high measure by the American League. I by no
means believe that the American League bears the responsibility
for it, but I do find it necessary to send a copy of this letter to the
American National Committee so that at least in the future our
European struggle may be less influenced by your personal connec-
tions, sympathies, etc.
330 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Again on 5 January 1932 comrade Trotsky wrote to the
committee:
My concern becomes still more heightened by the fact that com-
rade Shachtman has not replied to the letters and warnings on my
part and on the part of close friends, and that comrade Glotzer,
too, who promised me to call comrade Shachtman to order a little,
did not take up this matter by a single word. I had the impression
that both of them, Shachtman and Glotzer, stood under the impres-
sion of the small Jewish Group in Paris and completely overlooked
the Opposition movement in Europe.
In a word, clarification of the situation on your part is absolutely
necessary.
On 19 May 1932 to the National Committee:
I am very glad you have taken a firm position on the international
question.
On the internal dispute in the American League I do not as yet
take a position because I have not had an opportunity to study the
question with sufficient attentiveness. When I take a position I will
try not to allow myself to be influenced in advance by the false and
damaging position of comrade Shachtman in all the international
questions, almost without exception. On the other hand, however,
it is not easy to assume that one can be correct in the most impor-
tant national questions, when one is always wrong in the most impor-
tant international questions.
So much for the vile insinuation that the dispute over the in-
ternational questions arose as a result of assertions falsely made
against comrade Shachtman by other members of the committee. From
the above quotations it is perfectly clear that the opposition to
comrade Shachtman's position came most decisively from com-
rade Trotsky, who was in a far better position to keep track of the
international activities and connections of comrade Shachtman
than was the National Committee, which he did not find it neces-
sary to consult. But the conflict over the international questions
in the National Committee, which comrade Shachtman carried
into the membership on other pretexts, did not by any means rest
solely on the letters of comrade Trotsky. There is a clearly estab-
lished record of actions, votes, and abstentions from voting which
all go to supplement and confirm the apprehension expressed by
comrade Trotsky. Consider this record in contrast to the subter-
fuge about mere "contrary assertions."
1. On 13 January 1932 the National Committee declared that
comrade Shachtman's views on the disputes in the European sec-
NC Reply to Minority 331
tions had been put forward by himself as an individual without
consulting the National Committee and that it took no responsi-
bility for them. Comrade Shachtman abstained from voting and resigned
his position as editor of the Militant. Comrade Glotzer wrote into
the record of the meeting: "In order to clarify my position, particu-
larly because I have returned almost at the same time with comrade
Shachtman, I want to state that my views on the international situation
are not in accord with his" (minutes of the NC, 13 January 1932).
2. On February 3 the committee adopted a motion expressing dis-
agreement with the nomination of Mill as a member of the Inter-
national Secretariat by the Spanish section. Comrade Shachtman
voted against (minutes of the NC, 3 February 1932).
3. On February 1 7 the committee passed a motion to adopt a reso-
lution on the situation in the International Left Opposition, "The
resolution draft by comrade Glotzer to be taken as a basis and the
outlined points submitted by comrade Cannon to be incorporated
for the final resolution." Comrade Shachtman voted against (min-
utes of the NC, 17 February 1932).
4. At the meeting of March 7 comrade Shachtman began his open
factional attack against Swabeck and Cannon, on the Carter-Engels
dispute, in the presence of New York branch members, rejecting
motions to consider the matter first in a closed session! There he
first advanced the idea that the international disputes were a
"frame-up" against him. There also he rejected for the second time
the proposal that he return to his post as editor of the Militant
(minutes of the NC, 7 March 1932).
5. At the meeting of March 15 comrade Glotzer refused to accept
the combination of his draft resolution and the outlined points
of comrade Cannon, which he had previously agreed to. Comrade
Abern also submitted a separate draft. Comrade Shachtman abstained
on all drafts.
Thus all resolutions failed of a majority in the resident com-
mittee and a delaying referendum of the full committee became
necessary before the position of the NC could be established
(minutes of the NC, 15 March 1932).
6. On April 18 it was reported at the committee meeting that the
international resolution had received a majority of the votes in
the full committee. A motion carried to send it to the branches
332 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
and ask them to proceed with the discussion and record their
opinions. Comrade Shachtman abstained. Comrade Glotzer and
Abern insisted on sending out their own draft resolutions to the
branches along with the official resolution, an action which was
bound to create, and it did create, confusion in the branches and
militated against a mobilization of the membership in support of
the official resolution. Motion carried to print the official resolu-
tion in the Militant. Comrade Shachtman voted against (minutes of
the NC, 18 April 1932).
In the face of this record, how can anyone seriously maintain
that there was no previous objection to the international resolu-
tion on the part of comrade Shachtman? And how, likewise, can
it be denied that comrades Abern and Glotzer, who were "not in
accord" with his position, nevertheless assisted him at every step
in his opposition and obstruction? In addition, there were many
occasions, not recorded in the minutes, when comrade Shachtman
frankly stated his disagreement with the resolution, his objection
to publishing it in the Militant, his opinion that we were "too hasty"
and that we would regret it, etc. As a matter of fact it was not until
the last day of the plenum that comrade Shachtman— after days of
debate— informed us of his agreement with the resolution and his
readiness to vote for it.
This correction of position can be welcomed and was wel-
comed by the plenum. It motivated the plenum in refraining from
passing a resolution of condemnation and in its attitude of con-
ciliation with the comrades of the minority. But when it is now
maintained that the most important factor in the disruption of
the resident committee— the dispute over the international ques-
tions—was not a real dispute but a manufactured one, and that
the plenum only straightened out a misunderstanding, it can only
raise the most serious doubts as to the reality of the agreement
arrived at. It deprives the organization of any assurance against
the repetition of the errors at the next turn in developments. This
is precisely the worst feature of the practice of changing a posi-
tion without frankly saying so and saying why: It leaves the door
open for a return to the abandoned policy at any time. We can
hardly condemn the Stalinists for this practice with any consis-
tency if we tolerate it in our own ranks.
The attempt of the statement of the minority comrades to
explain the change of position by reference to the resolution
NC Reply to Minority 333
introduced by comrade Spector, which, they say, "represented our
point of view," is no explanation at all. Comrade Spector's resolu-
tion follows completely the line of the original NC resolution and
does not contradict it at any point. It deals also with some new
matters which have arisen since the adoption of the original reso-
lution and takes the position on them in accordance with its fun-
damental line. For these reasons it was accepted by the plenum,
not as a substitute but as "supplementary and further elaboration of
the NC resolution already adopted" (minutes of the plenum).
The fault of comrade Shachtman's position on the interna-
tional questions of the Left Opposition was not incidental or epi-
sodic; they concerned his approach to the whole problem and his
inability to draw the necessary conclusions from the long process
of internal struggle in the European sections. One only needs to
read what he has written on the subject to convince himself of
this. If it is assumed for the moment that comrade Trotsky may
have been mistaken in his judgment as to the position of comrade
Shachtman and that the attitude recorded in the minutes of the
committee does not indicate what it seems to indicate, then turn
to the lengthy letter of comrade Shachtman to comrade Trotsky
under date of 1 December 1932, which is included as material in
this bulletin. What he said there, as well as what he left unsaid,
proves conclusively that his letter has nothing in common with
the resolution of the NC.
The NC resolution regards the struggle in the French Ligue
as a conflict of tendencies and takes a firm position in favoring
one and against the others. Comrade Shachtman's letter estimates
the matter from the standpoint of episodic disputes of the day,
overlooking the conflict of tendencies and giving no support to
the more revolutionary current at the moment when international
support was the most decisive necessity.
He devotes most of his criticism to the leadership of the French
Ligue, shields the Mill-Felix group and minimizes its mistakes, and
refrains from criticism of the Naville group altogether. And from
this he concludes that the present leadership of the French Ligue
should be replaced by a "concentration" leadership, in which the
Mill-Felix group and the Naville group will participate and pre-
vent the "domination" of the present leading group. If you see
the situation in the French Ligue as a conflict of tendencies, as
the NC resolution estimates it, the proposal of comrade Shachtman
334 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
has to be regarded as a fundamental error, which would make
confusion worse confounded and, in effect, support the faction struggle
of the Mill-Felix and Naville group.
The NC resolution says, "The leadership of the German sec-
tion, which has taken shape in the struggle against Landau and
his sterile factional regime, must be given all possible international
assistance and support in its tremendous responsibilities and
opportunities." Shachtman's letter deprecates the abilities of the
German leadership in such a way that it called for the reply of
Trotsky: "What you say about the German Opposition sounds like
an echo of your old sympathies for Landau, which the German
comrades do not want to forget and rightly so."
The NC resolution demands a collective participation in the
affairs of the European sections. It says:
In order for the League to be useful in the solution of the interna-
tional problems of the European sections and to educate itself in
internationalism in the process, it must firmly organize a collective
participation. The NC as a whole must familiarize itself with
the international questions and bring a collective judgment to bear
upon them.
The letter of comrade Shachtman and his general course of action
in Europe, regarding which he neither informed nor consulted
the committee, are a shining example of the purely personal and
individualistic method of dealing with the affairs of the interna-
tional Opposition which brought such harmful results.
The vote of comrade Shachtman for the NC resolution can
have a real significance only insofar as it represents a complete
reversal of the position taken in his letter. As long as he does not
see that, as long as he does not frankly acknowledge it, he gives
no assurance against the return to the direct or indirect support
of the disintegrating elements at the first superficial change in
the situation.
The New York Branch Situation
The attitude of the plenum toward the situation in the New
York branch— the second major question of dispute in the resident
committee— was also decidedly different from the representation
made in the statement of the minority comrades, Abern,
Shachtman, and Glotzer. In this case, as in the case of the inter-
national questions, the claim is made that the position of com-
NC Reply to Minority 335
rade Shachtman and the others had been misrepresented and that
the plenum discussion clarified matters and made possible a
common effort for a "speedy solution" of the problem. This can
hold good only to the extent that the minority comrades make a
radical change in their preplenum attitude and adapt themselves
to the resolution on this point worked out by the resident com-
mittee on the instructions of the plenum. This resolution conforms
to the analysis of the problem contained in the statement of com-
rades Swabeck and Cannon, introduced into the NC on March 22
("Internal Problems of the Communist League of America").
The Carter group, as defined in the resolution, is a crystalli-
zation in the New York branch which obstructs its development
and menaces its future. The dispute over this question was nei-
ther the result of misunderstanding nor of misrepresentation, but
rather, as in the international dispute, of a difference in approach,
analysis, and conclusions. For a long time comrade Shachtman
minimized the harmfulness of this group and in practice gave it
direct and indirect support. His first open attack was made in
defense of Carter (see the "Statement by Shachtman" dated March
12). This was the signal for the opening of the faction struggle in
the New York branch, during which comrades Shachtman, Abern,
and Glotzer and those closest to them combined forces with the
Carter group against us on every issue of dispute in meeting after
meeting, both in the branch and in the branch executive commit-
tee. At the opening of the plenum, comrade Swabeck demanded
as a condition for agreement a common struggle against the Carter
group, as well as a common support of the NC resolution on the
international questions. This condition was fully supported by the
plenum and remains unaltered.
On the concluding day of the plenum comrade Shachtman
submitted a statement on the Carter group— an annihilating
political characterization, which was acceptable to us and was
included in the final resolution on the question of the New York
branch. But when it came to the point of drawing the logical con-
clusion from such a characterization— to provide in a resolution
for a militant political struggle, under the leadership of the NC,
to free the branch from this paralyzing influence— comrades
Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer drew back and sought to dissolve
the whole question in meaningless words that would leave
336 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
everything where it stood before and cancel the results of the
plenum discussion. They refused to accept the resolution of the
NC on the New York branch.379
In this action there is to be seen a striking parallel— and not
by accident either— with the drawn-out course of ambiguity and
evasion we encountered in our efforts to bring the whole commit-
tee to a concrete and unmistakable standpoint on the international
questions. And it raises very seriously again the question as to
how their final vote for the international resolution of the NC is
understood by them and what it will signify in practice. The fight
against the elements of disintegration on an international scale
and the corresponding support of the revolutionary groupings in
the various sections is undoubtedly the foremost duty. Comrade
Shachtman, according to his vote at the plenum, understands that
now. But the European sections are far away. A resolution in re-
gard to them costs nothing and may mean nothing.
The test of one's understanding of the international policy
and consistency in support of it arises concretely in connection
with the analogous problems at home. The long internal struggle
within the European sections has not been a struggle of persons.
It has been a fight, on the one hand, to make a selection of the
genuinely progressive and revolutionary elements in the Interna-
tional Left Opposition and, on the other hand, to rid the move-
ment of alien tendencies and influences. The refusal to see the
problem in this light was at the root of the consistently false judg-
ments of comrade Shachtman in the international field. A real
correction of this basic error ought to manifest itself in a ready
comprehension of the issues involved in the New York branch.
The problem there is to consolidate a firm political nucleus
and progressively to transform a heterogeneous body into a com-
munist organization. The Carter group is the polar grouping which
attracts around itself the politically weak and demoralized elements
and disorientates the youth. A resolute fight against it follows in-
escapably from the premise laid down in the international resolu-
tion. The NC resolution on the situation in the New York branch
is the complement to and the American translation of the inter-
national resolution. Comrade Shachtman's present support of the
first will have a weightier significance and will deserve to be taken
more seriously when he discontinues his opposition to the second.
By this it is nowise intended to represent the Carter grouping
NC Reply to Minority 337
as an exact duplication of this or that European group, nor in
general to transplant the concrete struggles of any of the European
sections to the American League in a mechanical and artificial
way. We have in mind the essence of the problem which is more
or less common to all sections of the international Opposition:
The consolidation of the organization around a selection of the
progressive and revolutionary elements in the course of a system-
atic struggle against the "negative and harmful" tendencies of vari-
ous kinds, each of which have their own peculiar and national
characteristics. The thing is to see and understand the specific
problem and danger in one's own organization and to deal with
it concretely. Otherwise a hundred general resolutions on the
faraway sections are meaningless.
The Carter grouping is not as great a problem nor as great a
danger as the groups of Landau-Naville and others proved to be
in Europe, nor has it matured all the negative qualities of these
groups. And it is not likely to do so. Or, at any rate, it is not likely
to do as much harm to the League, although the potentialities
are there. But this is to be attributed chiefly to the circumstance
that for the past period a systematic struggle has been carried on
against this group by a part of the NC, despite the interference
and protection accorded to the group by comrade Shachtman, and
in the course of this struggle a certain selection has already taken
place. The group now stands formally condemned by the plenum,
after a lengthy discussion in which its representative was heard.
On that basis the struggle can and must be raised to a higher stage
and brought to a successful conclusion. This is the way we under-
stand the question. And that is the way we shall proceed, with or
without the cooperation of the minority.
The "negative and harmful characteristics" of the Carter group
and the "bad influence" exerted by it "particularly on the younger
comrades," which comrade Shachtman explained with sufficient
lucidity in his statement to the plenum on the question, are not
exaggerated by the NC and thereby elevated above their real pro-
portions. No, it is the coddling and shielding of this group, the
direct and indirect support given to it under guise of protest against
the "clubbing of the youth," that nurtures and strengthens this
group and draws out the process of liquidating its influence. Il is
this attitude, maintained over a period of time by Shachtman,
Abern, and Glotzer, that has magnified the issue and necessitated
338 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
a direct intervention by the plenum of the NC. A united struggle
of the entire NC along the lines of the adopted resolution would
dispose of this obstruction in a comparatively short time and
without convulsions in the branch. The shilly-shally policy of the
minority comrades would prolong the difficulty, enlarge its scope,
spread demoralization in the organization, and result in an inevi-
table convulsion.
For the Unity and Consolidation of the League
The aim of every serious-minded and conscientious Opposi-
tionist must be the consolidation of our organization and the pres-
ervation of its unity for the great tasks that lie before us. This is
the policy and the aim of the National Committee, which has been
demonstrated in practice throughout the nearly four years of the
existence of the American Opposition. The leadership has been
successful up till now in maintaining the unity of the organiza-
tion because it has understood that the foundation for unity can
only be a common policy on the most important questions and a
resolute struggle against divergences from it. The various attempts
at disruption which we have seen (Fox, Weisbord, Malkin, etc.)
were not frustrated by pacifism and personal diplomacy and pious
appeal for peace at any price, but by uncompromising struggle
against the elements of disintegration and the false conceptions
they advanced. Our unity was won and confirmed in struggle, and
so it will always be.
They are wrong who see in the present situation, which threat-
ens a faction struggle in the League, a problem of persons and
personal relations which may be solved by diplomacy and by con-
cessions here and there: We understand that personal relations are
an important but nevertheless a secondary question. That is why
the plenum, which was summoned together to deal with the con-
flict in the resident committee, yielded absolutely nothing from
the policy which it considered correct and necessary and then went
to every reasonable length toward conciliation to the extent that
its political demands were met. Every sign of a reawakening of the
conflict in the membership discussion is due entirely and exclusively
to the attempt of the minority to negate the conclusions of the
plenum and to return to the positions they abandoned there. A
conciliation on such a basis would be an artificial one and would
only prepare the ground for deeper convulsions later on.
NC Reply to Minority 339
The statement of Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer speaks a
great deal about unity and the avoidance of faction struggle, but
the contentions in the document and their actions since the
plenum speak a different language. And it is the actions which
are most important and decisive, for they have a logic beyond the
control of protestations and even of intentions. It is true that the
tone of the new statement is more polite than the one heard in
the polemics before and at the plenum. The foul accusations of
"frame-up" with which comrade Shachtman poisoned the atmo-
sphere of the committee a short while ago, the attempt to side-
track the important issues in favor of personal, outlived, and sec-
ondary questions, are moderated for the membership discussion
into sly hints to the same effect. But the basic position which he
maintained before, which brought about the conflict, is restated
in the document. The content is there and it is not made more
acceptable by the moderated form in which it is presented.
In reality the statement does not speak for a liquidation of
the faction struggle but for the postponement of it. The statement
is the program for a truce, during which the worthless "issues"
which they withdrew from the plenum will be kept alive in a con-
cealed form and a faction grouping held together on that basis
which would be a standing menace to the unity of the League. If
the membership of the League allows itself to be deceived by such
a stratagem, if it seeks to purchase a momentary peace on such a
basis, it will only condemn the League to a long period of demor-
alization which will lead the way to a real convulsion. The unity
of the League must be asserted in the firm rejection of this attempt
to circumvent the actions of the plenum.
The unity of a communist organization is not realized by
universal agreement, but by an organizational process, by discus-
sion and decision and eventually by the subordination of the
minority to the majority. Democratic centralism signifies not only
discussion but also decision. The idea that decisions of the
organization can be ignored, that endless discussion can proceed
as though nothing had happened, has nothing in common with
the communist principle of organization. A plenum of the National
Committee is a highly important and significant affair. The League
can allow it to be ignored only at the peril of its own disintegra-
tion. Yet that is precisely what the statement of Abern, Glotzer,
and Shachtman sets out to do. The attitude of the plenum did not
340 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
suit them— therefore they appeal against it. The statement even
goes so far as to polemicize against the decision of the national
conference on the composition of the NC. They hint at all kinds
of "differences" which they did not ask the plenum to decide. And
all the time they protest that they do not want a factional struggle
in the League and do not consider a conference necessary. How
can a communist organization tolerate such an attitude?
If a conference is not needed and not demanded, then it is
self-evident that the unity of the organization has to rest on the
decision of the plenum. One cannot face both ways on this ques-
tion. The appeal of the minority against the plenum— the decisions
of which are concretized and guaranteed by the co-optations— is
an appeal to repudiate the National Committee, to deprive it of
the necessary, to make it dependent in its decisions on the agree-
ment of the minority, and thereby to paralyze its work. To com-
bine such an understanding with pious expressions about the desire
for unity in the organization and a "functioning collaboration in
the leading committee" is a cynical mockery. It is factionalism in
the worst possible form. The League must speak categorically
against it.
For or against the decisions of the plenum— that is the way
the minority puts the question in its statement. The National Com-
mittee has no choice but to accept it and to call upon the mem-
bership to reinforce the plenum decisions with their approval. All
the material is submitted for the discussion. The questions must
be gone into deeply. They must be firmly and deliberately decided.
The greatest menace to the organization will come from any sort
of ambiguity, from any tendency to leave the questions undecided.
From that demoralization would inevitably follow. Against that we
appeal to the comrades for the firm consolidation of the unity of
the League, for the establishment of discipline and the concen-
tration of the membership on the new program of activity on the
basis of the plenum decisions and under the leadership of the National
Committee.
341
Molinier's Personality Is Not the Issue
Letter by Max Shachtman to Andres Nin380
19 July 1932
First of all I must apologize for never having written to you since
I left Barcelona; our mutual occupation with work since then has
undoubtedly prevented us from opening up the correspondence
about which we spoke when we met. And I must tell you candidly
that I am impelled to write to you now (however briefly) because
of the uneasiness I feel over the developments recently manifested
in the Spanish Opposition. While I have not at hand all the infor-
mation I would desire, I nevertheless have read enough of the
correspondence that has passed between the Spanish center of
the Opposition and comrade Trotsky, plus other documents, to
strengthen the impressions I had at the time I visited Spain and
France last year. Since my name has been mentioned and used in
this connection, I feel it necessary to write to you about my opin-
ion so that the utmost clarity may exist on this score. If I make
some criticisms of the course that the Spanish comrades have
pursued in this connection, be assured that they are motivated by
a concern for the cause in which we are commonly interested.
On the surface, it appears that the dispute in which you are
involved with the other sections of the International Left Opposi-
tion centers around the situation within the French Ligue. On this
question, I believe that the leading Spanish comrades have adopted
a false or, at best, an ambiguous position. When I was in Madrid,
I urged comrades Lacroix and Andrade that they (that is, the whole
organization) must participate more actively in the internal life of
the Opposition, particularly of the European Opposition; that to
this end, the whole Spanish organization must be kept informed
about events in our inner life through the medium of an internal
bulletin. The objections of these comrades were that the "Span-
ish Opposition must not be dragged into such disputes," etc. I got
the impression from them (and, I must add, also from you) that
they regarded the struggle inside the French Ligue in particular
342 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
as an unprincipled personal quarrel, centering around the per-
sonality of comrade Molinier. You will recall that I agreed with
some of the criticisms made by all the comrades of the personal
characteristics of comrade Molinier. At the same time, I warned
the comrades, especially in Madrid, that they showed the tendency
to make comrade Molinier responsible for all the difficulties and
errors made by the Spanish Opposition. I believe that the Span-
ish comrades have substituted a personal consideration for a politi-
cal judgment of the important struggle inside the French Ligue.
This line of conduct has brought them to a false position.
What is important in the internal developments in our little
international is not whether this comrade or that one has good
or bad personal characteristics, or makes this or that mistake. The
important thing is the political tendency he represents and the
political attitude we adopt toward him, and toward the individu-
als or groups opposing him, and the political motivations on which
we base ourselves. At the time I was in Paris, I thought for a short
time that the "way out" of the internal situation was a "concentra-
tion leadership" of all the groups. I was mistaken in this idea and
after some time I informed the comrades that I no longer shared
it. For its execution would put the French Ligue back to a stage
which it has already passed. The present leadership in the Ligue
may not be the "best" directing group in the abstract, but it repre-
sents the result of an internal process of revolutionary develop-
ment, grouped together in the course of the struggle against other
more or less clearly defined tendencies. And it is in this charac-
terization of the Ligue's development that I fail to find the Span-
ish comrades having taken a clear position— and a clear position
is now more necessary than ever.
If one leaves out of consideration secondary, episodic, and sub-
ordinate phases of the struggle, it must be recognized that the fight
against the group of intellectuals (Collinet, etc.) and Rosmer was a
progressive struggle against intellectualistic and semisyndicalistic
elements. The struggle against Naville and his friends bore the same
stamp, for Naville revealed himself most clearly on two decisive
points: in the struggle against Landau's miserable intrigues, where
he took an arch-"diplomatic" position, and in relation with the
"Gauche Communiste" where he took a no less typically Navillist
attitude. I do not know now just what Naville's position is at the
present time, and it is not of very great consequence, because I
Molinier's Personality Not the Issue 343
believe he plays with important political questions. Or, take the
leadership of the "groupejuif" [Jewish Group] and comrade Mill.
You know that I have a regard for some of comrade Mill's quali-
ties, but the fact remains that he has not measured up to his task
in the most important respects. Regardless of personal consider-
ations, which take a subordinate place in this respect, he has ori-
entated himself— or rather disorientated himself— in a completely
false position in the Ligue. Toward the very end of the fight against
Rosmer he completely compromised and discredited himself and
the Jewish Group by the letter they sent Rosmer— semisyndicalist
and supporter of the Opposition's enemy, Landau— inviting him
to lead the fight against Molinier! All of this you know better than
I. The question which the Spanish comrades must answer is not
whether they are for or against this or that phase of Molinier's
personality, but if they are for or against Rosmer, Naville, Mili-
ar^ on what political grounds.
At one time you voted to make comrade Mill your representa-
tive in the International Secretariat. Our National Committee here
voted against this nomination. I voted against the other comrades
here, not because I agreed with your nomination but because I
did not want to appear to deny the Spanish comrades the right to
make their own selection. But that right is not the important thing,
nor does anyone question it or deny it. What is important is the
political reasons which motivate such a nomination. This the Span-
ish comrades did not and do not give. Yet it is necessary. Rosmer,
Naville, Landau, Mill— these represent certain tendencies inside
and outside the International Left Opposition. The majority of
the national sections, which have taken a stand against these groups
and individuals, represent a different political tendency. On which
side do the Spanish comrades stand?
You know, I suppose, that the paper of the "Gauche Com-
muniste" in Paris has publicly speculated on the differences of the
Spanish comrades with the International Secretariat and the other
sections. Rosmer and his friends are openly hinting (is that not
clear?) that the Madrid conference showed "friendliness" to them.
Have the Spanish comrades repudiated these claims and hints
publicly? I hope so, for otherwise they would compromise the Span-
ish Opposition. Ambiguity in such questions as I raise is some-
times the first door to a deep internal crisis, which I hope the
Spanish section will be able to avoid in time.
344 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
There is one other phase of the internal disputes particularly
in the recent life of the European Opposition, which is not of
insignificance. Underneath the surface of the clique fighting and
machinations of Paz, Urbahns, Frey, Landau, Rosmer, Naville (to
a clearer extent also the Prometeo Group), etc., has been the
attempt to establish in the International Left Opposition a "new
leadership" in place of that which we recognize in the cadres of
the Russian Opposition. To this attempt, all these elements have
a "right." Only it must be done openly and in the name of a dis-
tinct and avowed platform. And what platform could these mot-
ley elements offer? What platform have they offered? Not one of
them has stood the test in any important question. To support
them in any way, even indirectly and involuntarily, means to oppose
the line that the Russian and international Oppositions have
followed up to now. The Prometeoists do this openly, it must be
admitted, on the question of "democratic demands," the united
front, etc., and they are fundamentally wrong. The others also do
it, not so openly, but with equally fundamental wrongness. The
present position of the Spanish leading comrades puts them at
best in an ambiguous position.
Finally, you know that certain elements naming themselves
"Left Oppositionists" in Europe advocate a "universal" congress
of the Opposition, which would include those elements and groups
with which we have already broken in the past. I cannot imagine a
more ludicrous idea. This proposal means that we shall start all
over again and go once more through the process of purging which
rid us of Urbahns, Van Overstraeten, Rosmer, et tutti quanti [and
all the others]. If it does not mean this, it has no meaning at all.
The American League is unanimously opposed to such a sterile
proposition. I hope that the Spanish comrades will take an equally
firm stand against it.
In all of these observations, I repeat, I am actuated by the
desire to clarify the situation and advance the cause of the inter-
national Opposition. The Spanish Opposition should intervene
more actively— and from a correct standpoint— in the life of the
other sections; the other sections must intervene in the life of the
Spanish Opposition. It is in this way that the essence of true inter-
nationalism will be served. Perhaps this personal letter from a
friendly critic will contribute toward that end.
Trotsky on Field and Weisbord 345
With best wishes to all the Barcelona comrades whose acquain-
tance I was fortunate to make, I send you warmest Opposition
greetings.
PS: Will you be kind enough to communicate my views also to
comrade Lacroix? I am afraid he has created a wrong impression
in the minds of some comrades (particularly comrade Gonzales
in New York) by implying that I am in agreement with him on the
French Ligue, and I have written him a few lines about my disas-
sociation from such a standpoint. At the same time I am taking
the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to comrade L. Trotsky
for his information.
^ ^ ^
A Reply on Field and Weisbord
Letter by Leon Trotsky to the
CLA National Committee381
20 October 1932
On October 6 the resident committee unanimously approved a letter
to Trotsky, protesting his public collaboration with B.J. Field, who had
been expelled from the CLA's New York branch earlier that year for
indiscipline.™2 This is Trotsky's reply.
A statistician by training, after his expulsion Field traveled to
Prinkipo and aided Trotsky, who was then gathering data for a pro-
jected book on American capitalism. While in Prinkipo, Field wrote sev-
eral articles about the prospects for an upturn in the international
economy. Trotsky wrote an introduction and circulated the articles for
discussion in the ILO. Field's letters were published by some European
ILO sections.
Cannon was particularly concerned about the Field case because it
came shortly after Trotsky 's intervention in the case of Weisbord, who
earlier in the year also visited Prinkipo. After searching discussions with
Trotsky, Weisbord abandoned his call for a bloc with the Right Opposi-
tion, and Trotsky then requested that the CLA seek a rapprochement
with Weisbord 's Communist League of Struggle. The CLS wrote a letter
addressing Trotsky's programmatic concerns and the CLA National
346 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Committee published a lengthy response, recognizing that the CLS had
made "a partial turn in the direction of the Left Opposition, " but insist-
ing, "The Weisbord group has made a retreat from its old position, but
it has done so in the worst possible way-without criticizing its former
position or acknowledging its falsity." The NC sought another CLS state-
ment to "more seriously and more satisfactorily constitute a revision of
its ideological baggage, especially on the questions of centrism and the
bloc with the right wing. " 383
The NC's demand for clarification was not controversial in the resi-
dent committee.384 Cannon, however, feared that Trotsky might demand
more from the CLA. He wrote Dunne, "The action of comrade Trotsky
in dealing independently with Weisbord-and I must say in misjudging
and inflating the importance of this mountebank-created a new prob-
lem, or rather revived one that had been well disposed of" He drew from
the Weisbord and Field affairs "some very serious misgivings, not only
in regard to our relations with the International Secretariat and with
comrade Trotsky, but also in regard to the whole functioning of the Left
Opposition as a real organization."385 Cannon was very relieved to receive
this letter.
This is in reply to your letter of 7 October 1932 on the Field
question.
1. You seem to make a certain connection between the Field ques-
tion and the Weisbord question. Therefore I must begin with the
latter.
The Weisbord group formally appealed to the International
Secretariat to intervene. Weisbord came to me on his own initiative.
The International Secretariat wanted to know my opinion on this
question, and I had no formal basis to avoid expressing my opin-
ion, nor did I see a political reason to do so. It goes without saying
that I considered it my duty in this particular, delicate case to do
everything to strengthen the position and authority of the League
vis-a-vis the Weisbord group. Meanwhile, I see no reason to regret
all that was done in Prinkipo in this matter. As against the League,
the Weisbord group had to recognize the incorrectness of its own
position on the most important questions. That is a significant
political gain. Your reply to Weisbord's letter can only continue to
strengthen your position and authority. I already observed this in
the case of comrade Field: He recognized that your reply is tactful
and correct. What complaint can you have in this case?
Trotsky on Field and Weisbord 347
2. The Field case is completely different— simpler and more com-
plicated. Simpler because we are dealing here with an individual
comrade; more complicated because it seems that in this instance
our practical goals seem not quite to correspond.
After discussions with comrade Glotzer, after articles on the
subject in the Militant, and after conciliatory discussions with com-
rade Field, I had the firm impression that Field's collaboration in
the League became more difficult and impossible not because you
might see him as a politically or morally unworthy individual or a
fundamentally alien type, but because his past has not prepared
him for a leading role in a revolutionary organization, although
he is impelled in this direction by virtue of his intellectual quali-
ties. This contradiction, which occurs not infrequently, could be
overcome in a large organization. But since the League remains a
small pioneer organization, it feels compelled to resort to more
drastic measures for self-preservation. That is approximately how
I see the matter.
On the other hand, it seems to me that comrade Field, with
his knowledge of economics and statistics, could perform a very
significant service for the Left Opposition as a whole. We need
someone who follows attentively the world economy day in, day
out and who is capable of giving an accounting of it to himself
and others. For quite a while I have looked for such an economic
specialist in the Left Opposition, to no avail. I hardly think that
we will soon find another with Field's qualifications.
Of course I have taken into account the importance of the fact
that comrade Field was expelled by the New York local organiza-
tion. But such a formal act as an expulsion must be evaluated not
only formally but also politically. Someone can be expelled because
he is a spy, another because he is inwardly corrupt, a third because
he represents a tendency which is hostile in principle. But some-
one can also be expelled because, although honest and fully valu-
able in principle, he disrupts the unity of the organization under
the given circumstances and threatens its capacity to act. In (his
last case (and that is the case with Field), it might be good to call
upon the assistance of the international organization from the
beginning in order to neutralize such a comrade for the national
organization while not losing him. This is not a rebuke bul more
a suggestion for the future.
These are the general considerations from which I proceeded.
348 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
The cases of Landau, Gorkin, etc., which you cite and exploit with
great polemical skill (which I personally enjoyed), are not decisive
here. Landau was never expelled; he tried to expel the majority
of his own organization. When objections were raised, he consti-
tuted his own faction. Two competing "Left Oppositions" were
fighting over the supporters. In this instance, to abet Landau would
really mean betraying our German organization.
Gorkin left the Left Opposition in order to make a pact with
the most suspect political organizations, including the Right Oppo-
sition. According to the indictment of the Spanish comrades,
Gorkin engaged in dirty personal dealings (involving money, etc.).
The Weisbord group can in a certain sense be classified as a
competing organization. But in no case comrade Field. Also, Field
did not make contact with Muste or the Lovestoneites against the
League. This is a really big difference. The fact that he went around
the leadership of the League is not correct from an organizational
standpoint. The fact that he went to Europe to find his way to the
Left Opposition does not speak against Field, but for him. This
proves that he is serious about the issue.
All this led me, after very serious consideration, to send Field's
work on America to the sections as discussion material. The work
contains important ideas, is stimulating, and deserves to be read
and discussed thoroughly. Even if it should come to an interna-
tional decision in the case of Field, this work could serve as
important informational material for the sections.
The fact that articles by comrade Field were published in the
Opposition press without prior consultation with you is really not
correct. For this I take the appropriate responsibility and, if you
think it is useful, I am prepared to send all sections an appropri-
ate apology.
But I insist that the Field question must be decided individu-
ally, not only from the standpoint of the organizational conflict
in New York but also from the standpoint of the international
organization.
I would appreciate it very much if you would translate this letter
into English so that it is accessible to all members of the leadership.
349
Cannon Is Prepared to Break With the ILO
Letter by Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky386
31 October 1932
Replying to the NC's request for further clarification, Weisbord wrote a
lengthy document accusing the CLA leadership of "endless letter-writing
as a maneuver" and disparaging the National Committee with ample
use of material on the CLA's internal dispute from CLA Internal
Bulletins nos. 1-3. 387 On the day Shachtman wrote the letter below, the
CLA National Committee wrote to the Communist League of Struggle
to break off unity negotiations. The NC asserted, "Instead of a clear
statement of its point of view in the sense we indicated, the reply of the
Weisbord group takes a step backward in this respect and attempts to
defend the errors which have separated it from us."*88 The resident
committee unanimously approved the break with Weisbord; a sub-
committee of Cannon, Shachtman, and Swabeck finalized the letter to
the CLS*89 Trotsky subsequently agreed with the NC's negative assessment
and wrote to Weisbord, "I cannot find your steps very happily chosen for
the purpose, if the purpose remains fusion."*90
I have for some time been unable to attend to an accumu-
lated correspondence because of the work here and I hope you
will excuse the long delay in replying to your letter.
With regard to your article for Liberty, I have seen Mr. Bye
twice and spoken with him concerning it over the telephone sev-
eral times.391 He continued to assure me that there was not the
slightest danger of Liberty deleting any section of the reply to its
questionnaire. I have just heard from Bye that the second part of
your reply has been received, and I have arranged with him that
as soon as the editors of Liberty inform him of their decision, I
shall in turn be informed so that any proposals they make about
omitting sections of your article may be considered by me. If the
editors accept it without any proposals concerning its contents,
then my task is done without very much difficulty.
Foster's book on a "Soviet America" has already been for-
warded to you by his publishers, the head of which has begged
350 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
me to inform her of any comment you may make on the book.
Will you let me know if you have received the book from New
York?
I am glad to learn that you are taking advantage of comrade
Field's visit to Prinkipo to establish a collaboration with him which
may produce a book on the United States. While the fundamen-
tal considerations advanced by you in Europe and America still retain
their validity in the main, a good deal has nevertheless happened
since it was written which makes the book sound out-of-date.392 It
is too bad that in this connection there should have developed a
"Field incident," about which the National Committee of the
League has already written to you. I would like to add my own
voice here to observe that it is not with me a question of narrow
pride and circle prestige which is involved, for, as comrade Field
will recall, even at the time of his expulsion from the New York
branch I proposed to him in my final remarks that although he
would not be a member of the organization, he should find it pos-
sible to continue his literary collaboration with the Militant. But
from that to the position of initiating our internal pre-international-
conference discussion, without the regular procedure of taking
an appeal against the decision of the American League, is some-
thing that could only— and has— create confusion among the com-
rades here. I hope this question will be clarified without it being
magnified beyond all proportions.
By this time, I assume, you will have received the second state-
ment of the Weisbord group, together with our final declaration,
in which the further negotiations with his group are temporarily
suspended by our National Committee until Weisbord takes the
steps which we indicated to his group in our first reply. While I
do not share Weisbord's exaggerated views as to what the League
could accomplish as soon as he entered it (although the League
could even now do far more than it is doing), or what he intends
to contribute on his own accord, it would nevertheless have been
preferable to have the earliest possible unification of the two
organizations. On the basis of his two statements— and particu-
larly of the second statement— of the Weisbord group however, such
a possibility is for the moment excluded. I do not believe Weisbord
has shown an attitude which would have helped the fusion of the
groups. He continues to insist, for example, that his disagreement
with the Opposition on the question of centrism was a "misun-
Cannon Prepared to Break with ILO 351
derstanding" or a matter of "formulation"— although not only his
main thesis, but also his lengthy polemic against your thesis on
the Russian question in which he challenged the existence of
centrism in the Communist movement, plainly showed that the
divergence between him and us was of a deep and irreconcilable
nature. In his second statement also, he continues to dwell upon
those same invented or exaggerated "differences" of a second- and
tenth-rate character with that same violent bitterness of tone and
accent which previously made it impossible for us to discuss
objectively with him. I would suggest that you write Weisbord a
personal letter along the line of the first one you sent to him. Some
pointed remarks from you would undoubtedly help to make it clear
to him that an approach to the League cannot be made success-
fully if he comes toward it by means of violent polemical attacks
on insignificant questions without an honest statement of views
on the principled differences which previously divided us.
At the same time, you should be aware that there is an opin-
ion in the National Committee— which I do not share— that if the
International Left Opposition insists upon the entry of Weisbord
into the League, it will be necessary to break with the ILO on this
point. While, to put it frankly, I cannot be very enthusiastic about
the prospect of Weisbord entering the League with his present
outlook and attitude, which would only create confusion and dis-
ruption in the organization, I am, however, certain that no greater
harm could be done the Opposition in this country than to split
from the ILO on such a question, and I intend, consequently, to
resist any such tendencies (as expressed, among others, by comrade
Cannon and his friends) to the maximum of my ability. That is
not what the League "needs" at the present time. On the contrary,
as is indicated by the constant financial crisis in the organization,
the League must absolutely and immediately broaden its field of
activities, participate more energetically in the general class
struggle, and widen the base of its membership and sympathiz-
ers. The lack of such a broad basis is, at bottom, the cause for our
financial and other difficulties. Up to now there has been a pas-
sive resistance to such a turn in our work, to which I pointed (you
may recall) in the statement to the National Committee on the
"Prospect and Retrospect" of the League, about five months ago.
Any attempt made here to ignore this need will only increase the
discontentment of the membership— at least a large section of
352 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
it— with the purely propagandistic activities of the League and the
failure of some of the leading comrades to participate in the
"schwarze Arbeit." Weisbord could help to orient the League in
this necessary direction, but only upon the condition of a change
in his present venomous and disruptive attitude. As for myself, I
am still willing to collaborate with him and his friends, as well as
with all other comrades. Up to now Weisbord has made it impos-
sible; I hope you will agree with me that a letter from you might
help to improve the situation.
I am now engaged on a very ambitious undertaking, the writ-
ing of a history of the Comintern, for which I have been collecting
material for some time. In English, there is no such work; in Ger-
man, there are only a couple of worthless brochures. I need hardly
say that I would be deeply grateful to you for any suggestions and
aid you may find it possible to give me in this connection, and I
am counting on it. Please give the enclosed self-explanatory note
to comrade P. Frank.
^ > 4*
Developments in Light of the
Failed Co-optations
Letter by Max Shachtman to a Comrade393
26 November 1932
This letter is from the papers of Albert Glotzer, who left New York in
October 1932 to seek a job in his native Chicago. Addressed "Dear
comrade, " it was probably circulated to Shachtman faction supporters
around the country.
Over the summer Shachtman, Abern, and Glotzer had mounted a
campaign against the plenum co-optations, circulating "Prospect and
Retrospect " and corresponding with CLA members in Youngstown, Bos-
ton, and Chicago. Accusing Cannon and Swabeck of bureaucratic sup-
pression of discussion and "old-Party maneuver, " Carl Cowl, Shachtman s
agent in Minneapolis, also took aim at the branch leadership: "Cannon 's
support in Minneapolis is not merely conservative but on a number of
Failed Co-optations 353
decisive questions can only be described as opportunist. " 394 Cannon wrote
to Dunne, "I have never seen a dirtier, more dishonest, more demagogic,
and noncommunistic campaign than the one which has been waged by
Shachtman-Abern-Glotzer, etc., since the plenum, " and explained:
You may have thought it negligence on our part that toe... have not even
kept up any communication since the plenum. But that was more-
or-less deliberate policy on our part. We thought it best to let the docu-
mentary matter sent out in the internal bulletins speak for itself.*95
Cannon and Swabeck retained a solid majority in Minneapolis, but the
CLA membership nationally voted down the co-optations by a small
margin.
Shachtman here reports on the resident committee meeting of
November 25, where the results of the referendum were discussed. Given
the failure of the co-optations, the committee voted (against the objec-
tions of Shachtman and Abern) to establish a Political Committee of
Shachtman, Abern, Cannon, Oehler, and Swabeck.™ Cannon was com-
missioned to write a statement to the membership on the referendum re-
sults. Noting that the postplenum discussion was officially closed, the
committee rejected a motion by Shachtman to circulate his own state-
ment to the membership as well.
Trotsky had received a visa to travel to Copenhagen to give a lec-
ture to a social-democratic student group on the Russian Revolution,
his first opportunity to visit Europe since his exile from the USSR.*97 At
the November 25 meeting Shachtman and Abern voted against Cannon's
proposal to send Swabeck to Europe as an official CLA delegate empow-
ered to "make proposals for a preliminary conference at this time when
Trotsky can participate"; Shachtman protested that such a conference
was impossible. All the same an informal meeting of Left Opposition
supporters convened in Copenhagen in connection with Trotsky's visit
and resolved to hold an ILO preconference in Europe in December to
prepare for the long-planned international conference. 398 The precon-
ference finally took place in February in Paris. Swabeck attended, but
the Shachtman faction refused to help finance his trip.'1'99
It is sometime since I have written on the situation as it stands
today. It might therefore be well to touch on some of the ques-
tions which have arisen or developed since the National Commit-
tee plenum a half a year ago.
1. At last Wednesday night's National Committee meeting—
the first in three weeks!— the result of the plenum discussion in
354 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
the branches was finally reported. We had been demanding for
months past that the scandalous situation in which a plenum of
the NC took over five months to be reported on, discussed in the
branches, and its results finally made known should be brought to
an end. At each meeting the mechanical majority of the Cannon
faction simply brushed aside our arguments. Despite every effort
that was made, it was clear from the beginning that the League,
while practically unanimous on the international question, wouldn't
as a consequence support a factional reorganization of the NC as
proposed in the so-called co-optations. For this reason, although
the vote of the branches was fairly well-known months ago, the
results were deliberately withheld so that the three "co-optees"
might continue to sit and vote in the committee by purely factional
and not League mandates. The discussion report rendered by
Swabeck was really ludicrous; it attempted to draw no conclusions
and showed that its real interest wasn't concerned with those ques-
tions over which the fight in the committee allegedly commenced,
but that it was really aimed at an organizational victory which didn't
materialize.
Even so, Swabeck tried to paint up the results. The Newark
branch, which exists largely in the sky and is heard from only on
holiday occasions, had originally cast four votes for co-optations
under Basky's tutelage; Swabeck reported five Newark votes. Phila-
delphia, where Cannon's faction leader, Morgenstern, manages
without difficulty to reconcile his membership on the National
Committee of the Bolshevik-Leninists with marriage by a Jewish
rabbi and all the accompanying religious rites, originally cast seven
votes for co-optations; Swabeck reported nine.400 Kansas City, where
there is only one member, comrade Buehler, and has been only
one for the last three years— as both Swabeck and Glotzer reported
after their tours, confirmed by the report of Clarke when he was
located in KC— the branch suddenly acquired two new members,
making a total of three for co-optations. St. Louis, where the four
comrades originally voted against the co-optations, a little "moral
suasion" was exercised until the branch a couple of weeks ago
changed its vote into the opposite. This will give you some idea as
to why the report to the NC was delayed for such an unprecedented
period of time. And, in spite of all this juggling, the co-optations
were nevertheless rejected by the membership as a whole.
By this vote it would appear the membership had expressed
Failed Co-optations 355
its opposition to Cannon's attempt at reorganizing the commit-
tee on a factional basis. Nevertheless, after reporting the results,
the committee majority jammed through a motion, establishing a
"political committee" of Cannon, Oehler, Swabeck, Abern, and
Shachtman, in place of the old resident committee, which means
that absent members will now be replaced by faction substitutes.
To such a victory they are entirely welcome. It is not a victory
against an opposing faction but a victory against the League and
what it stands for.
2. At the same committee meeting, without any previous discus-
sion or announcement, Swabeck proposed in an offhand manner
that since comrade Trotsky was on his way to Copenhagen and
there might be an international conference held there, a delegate
should immediately be sent to represent the American League;
the delegate of course is to be Swabeck. If you want an example
of the truly light-minded manner in which important international
questions are really approached by the Cannon-Swabeck faction,
this little episode— which is not so little— gives it to you in one
installment. Just think of the situation: That same evening Swabeck
brought to the attention of the committee the draft outline sent
by the International Secretariat on the various points which the
theses for our international conference are to contain. It is a care-
fully elaborated document and each national section has been
allotted a portion of it to work out through the medium of a sub-
committee. When the full draft is ready the whole Opposition is
to discuss it so that when the conference actually convenes it will
be thoroughly prepared to adopt the definitive platform of the
international Left. This is the only way to proceed. Swabeck's pro-
posal to leave for Denmark immediately ignores and blows up this
whole procedure. It is based upon a piece of wildcat speculation
which makes a caricature of genuine international relations.
In the first place, a preliminary conference in Copenhagen has
no point to it whatever. What purpose would it fulfill? What would
be its agenda? What time is allotted to make its convention pos-
sible—not on paper but in Copenhagen? Swabeck is supposed to
leave immediately. Our letter to the secretariat proposing the pre-
liminary conference is only now being sent. The secretariat must
communicate with the various national sections for their approval.
If this fantastic proposal is approved, the delegates to the so-called
preliminary conference would probably arrive in Copenhagen in
356 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
time for the international skiing match, but not for a conference
with the already departed comrade Trotsky. We have no idea as to
just how long the Danish social democrats will allow comrade
Trotsky to stay. It is not at all impossible that Swabeck will still be
on the high seas when comrade Trotsky is already on his way back
to Prinkipo. The whole enterprise is so truly speculative, unsound,
and irresponsible as to make argument against it quite unnecessary.
Our countermotions, which aimed at setting up a subcommit-
tee to work seriously on preparations for our long-delayed inter-
national conference which is now really under way, were accepted
purely for the record. The committee decided, it is true, for such
a subcommittee, but the plan is that Swabeck shall leave in all
likelihood before the committee has even started to work. As a
matter of fact it was only as an afterthought and for the record
that Oehler made a motion for a document on the American situ-
ation to be drawn up for Swabeck to take along. You can imagine
the value of such a document. It will be drawn up with all the
haste and superficiality of a newspaper article only in order that
it may later be said that Swabeck took along a thesis. As for pre-
liminary discussion on that mountain of problems with which we
are faced in the International Left Opposition, there will of course
be none.
The real purpose of the trip, it is clear, is factional, nor can it
have any other purpose. To this end the branches are now sup-
posed to make a speedy collection of funds at a time when the
sheriffs are literally at our door every day and the appearance of
each issue of the Militant is accomplished only by miracles and
our debts rise increasingly. I would never oppose Swabeck's tak-
ing a trip to see comrade Trotsky on his own hook, because I find
nothing wrong with that, either now, in the past, or in the future.
Nor are my objections based upon financial considerations alone,
because if there were a real need at the present time (as there
undoubtedly will be when the international conference is actually
called), the League would have to make every effort to raise the
necessary funds regardless of their difficulties.
Abern and I appealed the decision of the resident committee
to the full committee, requesting that no action be taken in the
meantime. This procedure was followed in 1930 when Cannon
objected to the decision that Shachtman should go across. But this
time, while we have a "right to appeal," the decision is being car-
Failed Co-optations 357
ried into effect in the meantime. I hope the other NC members
will express themselves on this question in no uncertain terms.
3. The situation in the New York branch is becoming increasingly
tense. I hope none of the comrades is taking the attitude that this
is a storm in a teapot; that nothing is wrong anywhere except in
NY. Such an attitude, besides being provincial, would signify that
we are ignoring one of the central points around which the whole
League is now being kept in a dangerous factional war. The
imperfections and shortcomings of the NY branch are undeni-
able, but in general they are certainly not greater than those of
our other branches. In many respects the NY branch is markedly
superior. Its greatest "defect" in the eyes of the Cannon faction is
that it refuses to accept blindly all the mistakes, prejudices, and
procedures of that faction. By its very nature, the Opposition draws
into its ranks as a general rule the most critical of the Commu-
nist elements. As a reaction to the dead calm and compulsory obed-
ience that prevails in the Party, this attitude sometimes becomes
supercritical. What is decisive, however, is that this reaction is a
healthy one. In the Opposition, even more than in the Party, we
must keep in mind every minute of the day Lenin's precepts on
discipline, leadership, policy, ranks, and their interconnection as
set down in that excellent passage in "Left-Wing" Communism. Had
the Cannon faction conducted itself with Lenin's penetrating views
in mind, the situation in the NY branch would automatically have
improved 100 percent.
Just one example: When the comrades rise in the NY branch
to criticize the NC for publishing a program on unemployment
only after more than three years of the crisis, the criticism is not
dealt with objectively, the defect is not acknowledged, but instead
a violent and abusive offensive is launched against the critics. It is
this bureaucratic attitude, and not "Shachtmanism" or "Carterism,"
which has aggravated the NY situation to its present pitch.
The Cannon group has met the situation in the good, old-
fashioned manner of the Bolshevization era in the Party.401 From
its adherents, big and small, we hear: The branch must be purged.
The division in the branch is based upon the struggle between
the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie in which, needless to say,
Cannon represents the proletariat. It is a fight between the young
upstarts and the old, experienced, stable leaders. One Cannon
358 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
supporter has even developed, on the floor of the branch, the
theory that after four years of existence the League is going
through a period of Thermidorian reaction in the NY branch!
For these and similarly profound reasons, every effort has been
made to gain a faction majority for Cannon in the NY branch
executive. Several weeks ago the elections produced the opposite
result. By a purely arbitrary exercise of its power the NC ordered
the discarding of four votes which would have given the Cannonites
an additional branch executive member. The branch decided to
circumvent this faction trick by holding new elections. The results
are as follows: Weber (32), Saul (32), Milton (31), Lewit (30),
Bleeker (30), Capelis (30), Sterling (29), Petras (29), Orland (21),
Oehler (20), Stamm (19). Only the last two are Cannon support-
ers. In the previous election there were three.
The failure to get a faction majority in the branch is render-
ing the Cannon group desperate. We have made every effort to
collaborate with them in the practical work. I need point only to
the fact that against the desires of many comrades we argued for
putting in Oehler as full-time organizer of the branch, in spite of
the fact that he has acted in an unbelievable factional manner dur-
ing his whole tenure of office. The Cannon group on the other
hand has stopped at nothing to disrupt the branch work. With
hardly a single exception the branch activities for the past months
have had to expend hour after hour in sterile discussions over
purely factional issues artificially injected by Cannon to keep the
branch in a state of turmoil so that it may be discredited. They
have now reached the point where in the National Committee
meetings, as well as on the branch floor, they make open threats
of expulsions. It is unnecessary to state that we intend to resist
any splitting of the organization, no matter what guise it may
assume. Expulsion of groups of comrades is one of those guises.
4. Just a word on Weisbord. With the acceptance of my motion
in a recent committee meeting, negotiations with Weisbord have
been suspended, for the time being at least. His stubborn refusal
to meet our proposals seriously and honestly, his ridiculous and
unworthy diplomacy on questions of his past standing in regard
to centrism and the bloc with the right wing— to say nothing of his
violent attitude in general— made further negotiations impossible.
It is now up to Weisbord exclusively. If he finds it possible to restate
his position in a politically satisfactory manner, then I am not
Failed Co-optations 359
opposed to resuming the negotiations and making his entry into
the League a comparatively easy matter. This does not mean that
I have any illusions about Weisbord. While he has a tremendous
capacity for work which the League can utilize and which it
wouldn't hurt some "leaders" to emulate— this quality is largely
outweighed by other negative features. Assuming that Weisbord
finally enters the League, there are two possible outcomes: One
is that he proves to be alien to our movement, unassimilable and
undesirable. This would mean that the experiment has failed and
that we part company. The other alternative is that Weisbord is
absorbed into the stream of the Opposition, his negative features
are substantially modulated, and the League is able to profit by
his positive qualities. In our present weak state the second alter-
native is of course preferable.
All of this is based upon a very serious and at present not yet
visible change in Weisbord. Even LD has written some letters in
which he expresses a dissatisfaction with Weisbord's procedure since
he returned from Turkey. This may have an effect on Weisbord. In
connection with this question I have been approached— not once—
with the proposal that come what may and regardless of what
position Weisbord takes, he should under no circumstances be
admitted into the League, even if our refusal may mean "tempo-
rarily" a break with LD, and the International Secretariat. I think
such an attitude (that is, if it should come to that) would be a guar-
antee of the League's ruin in a short time. And I for one will not
go along with it. To break with the International Secretariat and
LD over the Weisbord question, even assuming that we disagreed
with their position, would mean to reduce the League to a tiny,
nationally limited sect, consumed by internal wrangling and ren-
dered impotent. Our international relations are the cement which
not only holds the League together today, but prevents it from
departing from the line of the Left Opposition. I have no hesita-
tion in saying frankly that there is no limit to my fears of the con-
sequence if the League under the Cannon faction leadership were
left to sail on a national lake; the first substantial wind could then
drive it to strange shores, that is, if the ship even held together.
5. Many comrades have raised the question of a conference in
the early future. I myself am beginning to incline in that direc-
tion. First it is necessary to work out a program to be submitted
to the National Committee. Such a program must not only
360 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
constitute a critical analysis of the past, taking stock both of our
internal developments and external policy, but it must contain con-
crete proposals as to the sharp change in our policy (also both
internally and externally) which is so urgently necessary now, which
is generally acknowledged in words, but about which precious little
is being done. For example, our proposal that either Swabeck or
Oehler go to the mine fields during that critical period of the
struggle where such excellent possibilities were afforded the Left
Opposition, instead of sending two young and inexperienced com-
rades, was rejected by the NC, which doesn't, however, spare any
phrases about the need of a "turn" in our work.402 Swabeck and
Oehler, they say, were needed for work in the office. Besides,
Swabeck was soon to go on a national tour which would cover the
mine fields. The national tour has meanwhile been replaced by—
or shall I say expanded into?— the international tour! How much
of the internal situation would a conference solve? If it left the
status quo it would solve nothing; worse than that, it would give
its stamp of approval to the present intolerable situation. But if a
conference could make the necessary changes in our work, in our
external policy, in our internal regime; if it would in concrete
reality, and not merely on paper, turn the face (and the hands
and feet) of the League toward far more energetic and militant
participation in the class struggle, then it would undoubtedly mark
a milestone in the progress of the American Opposition.
I am very anxious to hear the opinions you may have on this
subject. This brief survey leaves many questions untouched. I hope
to deal with them on another occasion.
361
Mobilize Against Swabeck's Trip to Europe
Letter by Max Shachtman to a Comrade403
2 December 1932
Addressed "Dear comrade" and found in the papers of Albert Glotzer,
this letter was probably circulated to Shachtman supporters nationally.
Last night's meeting of the National Committee makes neces-
sary this hasty postscript to the letter I sent you on November 26.
Being ill, I could not attend the meeting myself, but Marty was
present during the whole session. The only question of real im-
portance dealt with there was the proposed trip across of Swabeck.
What the Cannon faction decided last night confirmed to an iota
and in every respect the views I advanced in my last letter!
In the most casual and offhand manner, it was reported that
in all likelihood comrade Trotsky would be compelled to leave Den-
mark in a comparatively few days. In addition, it seems that we
have a letter from Trotsky himself informing us that his stay in
Denmark is to be of brief duration. These two intelligences by
themselves, one would think, should suffice to deprive the pro-
posed voyage of even that meager foundation which was originally
advanced for it. When it was first advanced (about a week ago),
the argument presented for the dispatch of a delegate, posthaste,
centered exclusively around the argument that "only an idiot"
would imagine that Trotsky went to Denmark "merely to deliver a
lecture"; that the real purpose of it was for Trotsky to get closer
to the European Opposition so that a "preliminary international
conference" might be held in Copenhagen. We, on our part,
argued that the whole enterprise was purely speculative, based on
sheer impulse (and factional considerations), and that even if such
a conference were held, the haste and suddenness would deprive
it of any significance whatsoever; that the membership of the in-
ternational Opposition would not have the slightest opportunity
to discuss the burning problems that confront us. We said that
Copenhagen not only did not offer any advantages over Prinkipo,
but certain distinct disadvantages. As late as last Tuesday, at the
362 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
New York branch meeting, Oehler reported on the committee
decision, repeating the formula that this had to be done without
delay because "we take it for granted" that there will be a confer-
ence, since that was the real purpose in Trotsky's mind when he
left for Denmark.
Without batting an eyelash, however, Cannon and Swabeck
yesterday reversed themselves without the slightest explanation.
Cannon moved that if Trotsky leaves for Turkey, then Swabeck
should proceed to Prinkipo! If the "preliminary conference" is to
be held in Prinkipo— that is, in a locality where the factor of time
pressure is eliminated, in contrast to Copenhagen— then every
genuine basis for the trip at this time is removed. There remains
only the factional basis. If Cannon's faction wants to send Swabeck
to Trotsky, I have not the slightest objection. I object to the cyni-
cal hypocrisy of sending him as an "official delegate" to a nonex-
istent "preliminary conference." In view of this latest turn in the
situation, I think it imperative for every branch of the League
(yours in particular) to adopt a resolution of protest or criticism
against the enterprise, not so much on "financial grounds" (which
are after all subsidiary, even if not unimportant, considerations),
but on the grounds that the genuine international conference is
in the process of preparation and that the membership must have
the opportunity to discuss the questions at length, prepare the
documents in a carefully considered manner, and then decide the
question of delegates when the date for the conference is actually
fixed. This is the only way in which to prepare for a real interna-
tional conference so that it may have the necessary authority and
prestige when its labors are concluded. The plan for the "prelimi-
nary conference"— for which no agenda has even been proposed,
for which no documents are being prepared, for which no organi-
zational arrangements have been or can have been made— is not
merely a caricature, is not merely inconsequential from any stand-
point, but still worse, it is merely the formality that masks an
exclusively factional purpose. It drips with the odor of those trips
made by the various caucus leaders in former years in the Amer-
ican Party, ostensibly to attend "international plenums or
congresses," but in actuality to "beat comrade X or Y to the draw,"
that is, to get a factional advantage by reaching Moscow in suffi-
cient advance time to be the first to reach the central apparatus
men. That Trotsky will not be a party to such a trick— for he does
More Direct Contact 363
not operate that way, nor can the Bolshevik-Leninists operate that
way— goes without saying. It may serve as enlightenment to report
that Stamm gave away the game by telling me: "I can easily under-
stand why you are afraid (?!) of having Trotsky see Swabeck. Up
to now the Old Man has seen the face of only two National Com-
mittee members, Glotzer's and yours. You have everything to lose
by his (i.e., LD's) seeing Swabeck"! Why I should "have everything
to lose" by such a historical meeting, I cannot figure out. I do know
that we have all talked more than once of what a good thing it
would be for LD to make the personal acquaintance of Swabeck
and Cannon. But that does not alter the need of standing up
against the present proposal. It is a different thing entirely. If the
Cannon faction is not interested in having the League pass through
a thorough discussion prior to the sending of an international del-
egate—then at the very least the League members should make it
quite clear that they do not regard Swabeck's delegateship as
proper or representative of their opinions.
Swabeck, in his haste to depart (even though the office is on
the verge of collapse, induced by an acute financial and organiza-
tional crisis), plans to leave in about ten days. From this you will
see how necessary it is for the branches to act at their very next
meeting and to send in a formal expression of opinion concern-
ing this whole scandalous procedure.
^ ^ ^
We Want More Direct Contact
Letter by Arne Swabeck to the
International Secretariat and Leon Trotsky101
16 December 1932
In our letter of December 8 we informed you of the decision of
our National Committee to send comrade Swabeck to Europe as
an international delegate. At the time the decision was made, we
were under the impression, from press dispatches, that comrade
Trotsky had been granted a three months' visa by the Danish gov-
ernment, with the possibility of a longer stay there. Naturally we
364 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
thought such a prolonged visit of comrade Trotsky to western
Europe would be utilized to strengthen the contact of the various
sections of the Left Opposition with him and with each other, and
thereby put a firmer foundation on the preparations for the
international conference.
From that point of view the National Committee decided to
raise a special fund to send comrade Swabeck to Denmark and
authorized him to propose the holding of a preliminary conference
of representatives of the leading sections with comrade Trotsky, if
circumstances made it feasible.
A few days later we learned from a letter from the Interna-
tional Secretariat that the Danish visa was for eight days only. The
National Committee thereupon decided to reaffirm its decision
regarding the international delegate, with the amendment that
comrade Swabeck proceed directly first to Prinkipo, in case com-
rade Trotsky returned there. The visit of comrade Trotsky to
Denmark had not been the fundamental consideration of the
National Committee in its first decision, but only a special cir-
cumstance facilitating and hastening an action which had been
too long delayed for one practical reason or another.
To our surprise and indignation, comrades Shachtman, Abern,
and Glotzer opposed the decision to send comrade Swabeck to
Europe and organized a furious campaign in the ranks of the
League against it. With casuistic arguments which contrast our sug-
gestion of a preliminary conference of the representatives of the
most important sections with comrade Trotsky to a regularly
organized international conference, with theses published in
advance, full discussion in the sections, etc., they are creating the
impression in the ranks, especially among the less experienced
comrades, that the decision of the National Committee to send
an international delegate to Europe, before the international con-
ference is definitely scheduled, is an abnormal and indefensible
action. In some of the agitation around this question on the part
of the supporters of comrade Shachtman, there is to be noted a
decidedly ugly nuance from an internationalist point of view. It is
painful to report, on top of all this, that the special fund asked for
by the National Committee to finance the trip abroad is systemati-
cally sabotaged— the comrades influenced by the Shachtman gos-
sip, among whom are to be found most of those still having an
income, are all declining to contribute. This latter circumstance
1. James P. Cannon
and Red Army soldiers at time of
Comintern Sixth Congress, 1928.
2. Max Shachtman,
Berlin, 1930.
3. Youthful supporters of Communist Party's Cannon /action, Chicago, 1927.
From left: Gil Green, Carl Cowl, Max Shachtman, Albert Glolzer.
In background: Nathan Schaffner (Foster supporter).
4. Arne Swabeck at his desk, CLA headquarters, New York, 1934.
rlfl
UMrasoFTK WU UWEIITI
IIP: %-«2S
^5 JESsTvl
Lr\ L m
ml
5. Mural painted by Diego Rivera in CLA headquarters, New York, 1933.
Upper roiu (from left): Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht,
Friedrieh Engels, Leon Trotsky, V. I. Lenin, Karl Marx.
Loiver row (from left): Ruth Cannon (daughter of James P. Cannon),
Sarah Avrin, Edgar Swabeek (son of Arm Swabeek), Carlo Cowl (son of Sarah Avrin),
Arne Sivabeck, Max Shachtman, Christian Rakovsky, James P Cannon.
L, D. TROTSKY
The Draft Program
of the Communist
International
A Criticism of Fundamentals
■Presented to the Sixth -m
World Congress of the J
.Communist International J
Introduction by JamesP. Cannot
THIRTY-FIVE CENTS
■ lit* Strategy
Of the World
Revolntion
Leon
Trotsky
6. CLA published Trotsky's 1928 Critique of the draft program of the CI
in two parts. Left: Sections brought by Cannon from Moscow (1929).
Right: Pamphlet contains "Strategy and ladies in the Imperialist Epoch " (1930).
11. Christian Rakovsky 12. Andres Nin 13. Leon Lesoil
% ■ :1
14. Kurt Landau 15. Josef Frey
16. Oskar Seipold
17. Pierre Frank 18. Raymond Molinier 19. Pietro Tresso
20. Leon Trotsky (center)
with Pierre Naville (left),
Gerard Rosenthal,
and Denise Naville,
Prinkipo, early 1930s.
21. From, left: Jan Frankel,
Leon Sedov, Natalya Sedova,
Jiri Kopp (Czechoslovakian
Trotsky ist), and Leon
Trotsky, Prinkipo, 1930.
DURING THE GERMAN CRISIS THE MILITANT APPEAR! I TIMES A WEEK !
SUMILITANT ,£>
Official Organ of The Communist League of America (Opposition)
II. \(> H I H HOIK NO. IS.-. |
Hit )HHk, IMIIMMIO. I 1 ,11111 \n* 15, 1933
II ■> I.'..
Hitler Is Consolidating the Power of Fascism In Germany!
Whoever Blocks the Workers* United Front Is a Traitor!
23. CLA's Militant
(15 February 1933).
Militant went triweekly during ^Cw
campaign against Hitler's jS&
consolidation ofpoiver.
SCOTTSBORO
BIG VICTORY
SPECIAL ANTI-FASCIST STRIKE NUMBER
^VANGUARD
Organ of the International Left Opposition of Canada
Hail Red Russia!
Workers Celebrate Fifteenth Anniversary of Soviet Rule
24. Young Spartacus
Strike Against Hitlerism July 11! (November 1932),
Fascism, Support Joint Council's Call for Two-Hour Stalinites and the . ; r /"< T A Ti. T • • 1
Soei.1 Democracy General Strike against Fascst Terror Un.ted Front JOlimal Of CLA NatlOUal
and Stalinism ^ ^ _, ^ ^ __..„ „.,,.., J J
'■-;•:■- ;'■ ;:--v Youth Committee.
25. Vanguard (July 1933),
organ of
Left Opposition in Canada.
ANOIKTH EnilTOAH j n n/nnn7TllrTmiiiirni*nv u.v H nOAtTIKH A1AGHKH
r OIKOlJOITHIEWERiOfll ! toyaenin
^jpats
WWW W^IWMWTl mXP
26. Communistes
(December 1931),
Greek journal of the CLA.
27. Unser Kamf
(15 February 1932),
Yiddish journal of the CLA.
Ueo n Irotsky
THE PERMANENT
1
Leon Trotsky
Leon Trotsky
WHAT NEXT?
REVOLUTION
PROBLEMS OF
THE CHINESE
\ VITAL QUESTIONS FOR THE GERMAN
PROLETARIAT
TransUlel hy
Max Shachtman
REVOLUTION
[ 7V,™ W /,«», ri, R,„u. i, Jiucpl y^Ur
Wilt Appcndka by Zmoricv, Vuyovittk, N«.uoov
a 0«t.<r>
T
TnuuUttivilk
*« lnlroiuclio*
hy Max Shachtm*H
qp
PIONEER PUBLISHERS
Koncw PubliAm
NEW YORK, ipji
qp
PIONEER PUBLISHERS
New York, 19)2
***■•■>•
28. Books (above) and pamphlets by Trotsky,
part of the CLA's ambitious publishing program.
Leon Trotsky
In Defense of
the Russian
Revolution
Speech Delivered at Copenhagen
December .952
LEON TROTSKY
Communism
and
Syndicalism
On the Trade
Union Question
J
Loon Trotsky
THE #P/HV19H
KIVOIIHOI
mi D/tMOER!
Shall Fascism Really Be Victorious?
K»
Germany
The Kev to the International
Situation
LEON TROTSKY
29. CLA member Gerry Allard,
editor of Progressive Miner.
30. Militant (10 September 1932)
hailed PM A founding.
Springfield, October 1932:
15,000 Illinois miners rally for
PMA union recognition.
HHMILITANT *>
"Weekly Oman of the Communist Leaaut of America lOvhosition} w
Weekly Organ of the Communist League of America [Qppo,
M
ers Form New Union
Luau Gretti Nt* Raise ^tru39le *° New Heisli s
QflTHE Progressive Miner||
GENERAL STRIKE LOOMS!
NATIONAL GU/UUK RUSH TO HHE1
AREAS AND ARREST MEMBERS OF
PROCRFSSIVE MINERS OF AMERICA
1^
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Issues UltiniHtum to Horner; JQgjg gjj
AppealtoAmerican Workers mtrr mrrntf
31. March o/PMA women's
auxiliary, 1933. PM A journal
Progressive Miner (13 January
1933) reports murder of
auxiliary member by Peabody
Coal Company gunmen.
32. Progressive Miners of America picket at Peabody mine near
Taylorville, Illinois, fall 1932.
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BACKING THE HQTEL JTRIKE, _OUR MILITANT APPEALS i TIMEt A WEEK
35. New York hotel strike,
early 1934. Militant went
triweekly during strike.
1S1MILITANT &
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EDITORIAL "[F.W.I. U. **«" '*"«' ■—*«■* fc*«r 0l»
'• .-..,: ... ; . ••- .- «Fortress» -"^ _ c-^T^I.r
36. Hote/ worfors feadm. 5./ Field, with telephone, was expelled from
CLA for violating party discipline during strike. Others (from left):
James Gordon, Charles Fairbanks, Emile Smith, Alexander Costas.
31. Shachtman and Cannon during 1934 strike
in Minneapolis, where both were arrested.
38. Pickets confront scabherding deputy, 1934 Minneapolis Teamster strike.
Strike leaders included CLA NC members Wince Dunne and Carl Skoglund.
39. Shachtman and Cannon in Paris at time of founding of
Fourth International 1938.
More Direct Contact 365
puts extraordinary difficulties in the way of the early execution of
the National Committee decision and compels a postponement of
comrade Swabeck's journey. With the present financial difficul-
ties of the League and the burden it places on the membership,
the collection of a special fund sufficient to finance the trip to
Europe without full cooperation will unavoidably be a slow process.
However, we remain firm in our determination to strengthen
our international relations by direct and official representation
and will carry it out at all costs. The deep internal crisis of the
League, which has grown steadily worse since the plenum despite
the unanimous agreements there, is only one of the considerations
prompting our decision. For a long time we have felt the neces-
sity of more direct contact, through a qualified representative, with
comrade Trotsky, with the International Secretariat, and with the
leading bodies of the most important sections in Europe.
We have not had an official delegate abroad in this capacity
since the early part of 1930— nearly three years ago. (The journeys
of comrades Shachtman and Glotzer last year were undertaken
solely on their own responsibility and financed by private funds.
It is not necessary to speak of the unprofitable results of these
journeys. But it is worth remarking that comrades who construed
international relations in such a lighthearted and personal man-
ner are precisely the ones to raise objections to the formal decision
of the National Committee of the League to send its secretary to
Europe as an official representative.)
We have had reasons more than once to feel that the interna-
tional contacts of the League were far from adequate. Comrade
Trotsky's statement in his letter of May 27 that "It is unfortunate
that you have no reliable comrade in Europe to represent your
organization in the secretariat" did not pass unnoticed, and we
have been seeking a way out of our practical difficulties to make
such a representation possible— at least for a certain period.405
To a certain extent, meantime, we have found ourselves iso-
lated from the international movement. The developments within
the most important European sections in recent times remain
insufficiently known to us. It is needless to add also that we have
felt most acutely the necessity of personal discussion with com-
rade Trotsky and the leading comrades of other sections in regard
to the new problems which the situation of American imperial-
ism is posing in all their magnitude. It is inconceivable to us that
366 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
grown-up Communists can say— and mean it honestly— that the
necessary interchange of information and opinion on these and
other questions has to wait for the international conference.
Concerning the internal crisis of the League: In the Internal
Bulletin nos. 1, 2, and 3, which were forwarded to you after the
plenum, the essence of the conflicts is indicated. All that has hap-
pened since the plenum, deepening and aggravating the crisis,
has proceeded along the same line in substance, if not in form.
On the international question comrade Shachtman corrected
himself at the plenum and subscribed to the National Committee
resolution. But that did not prevent him from transferring to the
League the same false methods of approach that led him astray
in the European questions, and— it must be said plainly— some of
the methods of those whom he covered or supported, directly or
indirectly, in Europe.
The National Committee majority is struggling to raise up a
cadre capable of estimating questions from a fundamental political
standpoint and orientate itself accordingly. Comrade Shachtman,
by his actions, directly contradicts this process. This, in one word,
is the basic cause of the conflict from our point of view.
At the plenum he joined us in condemnation of the Carter
group as representing a scholastic and harmful tendency. After
the plenum the Carter group abstained from voting on the inter-
national resolution on the ground of insufficient information, al-
though all the material at the disposal of the National Committee
was given to the entire membership in mimeographed bulletins.
By this abstention they did not mean to support the disintegra-
tors in Europe. But with true scholasticism, they looked for "in-
formation" down to the last detail and overlooked entirely the fact
that a struggle was taking place in the European sections which
concerned the life of the International Left Opposition and which
required every Oppositionist to take a stand. This action of the
Carter group— since supplemented by direct attacks upon our
international resolution— has not in the least drawn comrade
Shachtman closer to the majority of the National Committee as
against this group. On the contrary, he maintains a close bloc with
this group to struggle against the National Committee.
The National Committee is engaged in a conflict with a group
of comrades in Boston who reject our trade-union policy (in the
needle trades in which they are employed) from a standpoint of
Cannon Overreaches 367
ultraleftism which, in the given situation, converts them into virtual
camp followers of the Stalinist "Third Period" dogmas. Comrade
Shachtman's trade-union policy is identical with ours, but he forms
a factional unity with the Boston comrades against us. This
muddles up and sabotages the fundamental conflict and strength-
ens the comrades in their prejudices.
These two examples do not by any means exhaust the ques-
tion of the postplenum disputes, but they indicate their funda-
mental character and explain, what is yet confusing to many com-
rades, why the League has a violent internal struggle "without
political differences." We are now drawing up a document on the
conflict since the plenum. All material will be submitted to the
international organization so that all the sections can have the
necessary information and be in a position to express their opin-
ions before the conference of the League to be scheduled later.
PS: Enclosed you will find copies of comrade Shachtman's motion
in the NC and the resolutions adopted in some branches along
the same line and at his instigation.
^ ^ ^
Cannon Overreaches Himself
Letter by Maurice Spector to Max Shachtman406
29 December 1932
1. Last night our branch unanimously rejected the proposal to
send Swabeck on an ambiguous trip to Prinkipo. The grounds are
the absence of convincing and substantial political reasons. The
executive is instructed to draw up a resolution for New York, which
could be sent as soon as possible. I have myself never received a
copy of your appeal.407 Swabeck neglected to enclose it, and in a
second letter he apologized for his absent-mindedness and again
omitted to enclose it! It is this hiatus which has delayed my
recording my stand. I cannot truthfully say that I have seen your
appeal at least formally. But perhaps I shall let that go, and cast
my vote on the basis of what knowledge I have of it from your
other letters.
368 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
2. I am somewhat disappointed, however, that under the circum-
stances, I had (judiciously, I believe) to withdraw a suggestion that
you come here for a week's stay. I was going to make it coincide
with a banquet we are arranging for the 7th. At any other time,
the suggestion would have carried without the slightest hesitation.
But it came on the heels of the rejection of Swabeck's trip, and
the feeling was expressed by Mac, principally, that your coming,
especially as it was not on the initiative of the center, would be
construed as a continued factional maneuver. The defect in this
argument is patent. Cannon/Swabeck have long ago decided where
to put the Toronto branch. I could in all likelihood by more vigor-
ous intervention have still swung the decision in favor of your visit.
I did not deem it wise, for the same reasons that our branch had
to delay its vote on the plenum co-optations for so long, because I
prefer to carry the branch with us instead of a split vote. More
particularly, it is always a marked advantage to us if we can get the
support of MacDonald, as we did on the co-optations and now on
the Swabeck trip. The branch is built around our collaboration,
that is not to say that if questions of principle emerge on which
we differ that we will slur them over in the interests of a false
harmony. But that is not the situation today.
Of course, if the center were to send you, the demur of "fac-
tional interpretation" would lose its point. This matter of your trip
to Toronto is worth some more attention. One way or another, it
should be made to materialize, while at the same time protecting
it from any formal objections that it is not correct (in the diplo-
matic sense of the word).
Marty raises the Krehm matter again. Swabeck does so
monotonously and purposefully. Our branch is sending a resolu-
tion to New York on that, rejecting the miserable proposal of a
couple of months ago— that "comrade Spector" and "comrade
Green" get together to talk matters over. If you recall, the resi-
dent committee's resolution in one sentence complimented us on
our good work. Sentence two: Krehm and co. were stigmatized as
having proven themselves more irresponsible. Sentence three: "Get
together." In the name of everything, what kind of conclusion is
this? From what premises? Are acts of disruption, refusal to accept
plenum decisions, slanderous letters, degeneracy, etc., to be
followed by no consequences in the Opposition? Is all that is
necessary a verbal profession of acceptance of a "platform"? My
Cannon Overreaches 369
dear Max, there is no Krehm group, there has not been, there
cannot be! This little clique of 37th-class pseudopoliticians have
no standing, have not done a stroke of work, have not met more
than once or twice since the plenum, have vilified us, and have
carried on anti-Opposition activity. This is neither a Field nor a
Weisbord element; it is an insult to the intellectual caliber of either
of these to compare them with both. In a word, they should
have been suspended or expelled from the organization for their
postplenum conduct. They were not even censured. We loyally
stood by the plenum commitments. But since then much water
has flowed under the bridge and I refuse to recognize them as a
"group." One or two can find work in the LO, if they apply to us
for membership. Their applications will receive attention on their
merits. Others who apply, like Roth or Yolles, I shall frankly oppose.
But more material will be available for you when you scan my letter
to Swabeck, and also the resolution.
3. As to the conference: Al correctly writes me from Chicago that
he feels a conference on the lines of the last plenum would be
worse than useless. There is no magic in conferences. The prereq-
uisite for any conference results must be a fresh analysis of condi-
tions, the formulation of the new problems, definition of objec-
tives, and proposals for action. If we can accompany our project
of a conference with such a political preparation, it is justified.
But candidly, I lack enthusiasm for a conference that will merely
retrace the history of the organization and the lamentable record
of Cannon's passivity and sabotage. To a certain extent, I am
influenced by the fact that the LO in Toronto at least is drawing
in fresh people, whose polemical education must be based on
something more solid than what they might regard as hearsay. The
estimation of the groupings, the characterization of the leaders,
must always renew itself in the light of experience. It is not I that
needs to be convinced, nor you, but the organization. I regret
nothing, but you know as well as I do, my friend, that we were an
extremely fortunate little band at the last plenum. We should all
have been decorated with the order of the horseshoe (first class).
I came to NY with the handicap for the NY colleagues of a
wretched internal fight in Toronto. Marty (I know he is too honest
to take umbrage at what I say), a prey to this impossible inferior-
ity complex or lack of self-confidence, call it what you will, had
370 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
not enacted by miles the role he is entitled to as a front-rank leader
of Communism. But you, especially, in view of your responsibility
and your location, increased our heavy handicap. We fought a
defensive battle, on terrain that was not of our choosing. I believe
that experience must have aged you considerably, at least have had
a sobering effect. Our grouping was paying the penalty of loose-
ness of organization and haziness of thought and lack of collec-
tive leadership. Had we been in the position that Cannon/Swabeck
demagogically arrogated to themselves or even had half their cards,
the results for Cannon/Swabeck would have been unforgettable.
What aided us of course was the essential honesty of our interna-
tionalism and the pretentiousness of theirs. In a word, the last
conference just saved our grouping from being heavily compro-
mised and the organization from being delivered up to the ten-
der mercies of an Oehler, a Swabeck, a Gordon, et tutti quanti
[and all of them]. All this recapitulation is by way of explaining
one's cautious approach to another conference.
What is undoubtedly encouraging is the demonstration we
have had since the plenum that factional smartness by itself is not
decisive. That is where even a master of intrigue with the resources
of a state at his disposal will break his neck, if he cannot confront
and solve the big issues. And while Cannon is smart he is no Stalin.
Even as a factionalist Cannon overreaches himself. I submit that
had he accepted our suggestion to let the committee stand as it
had been, his position would have been stronger, particularly would
his prestige have mounted, if accompanied by a statement to the
plenum renouncing all "the spoils of victory," "generously" offer-
ing collaboration, you know the rest. But his mistakes flow from:
1. undue personal animosity ("subjectivism" he would say in oth-
ers) coloring his political measures, that same spitefulness, against
which Lenin warned in a revolutionary leader; 2. from the under-
estimation of his opponents; 3. the narrowness of his horizons,
theoretical and strategical.
This letter is overly long. I was going to raise the question of
the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, but it will keep for
another time.408
371
Results of the Postplenum Discussion
by Martin Abern and Max Shachtman409
3 January 1933
Submitted to the resident committee on January 5 and appended to the
minutes, this document was a reply to the NC majority 's statement on
the referendum, which had been authored by Cannon and published in
CLA Internal Bulletin no. 5.410
On Cannon's motion the committee decided not to immediately dis-
tribute Shachtman and Abern s statement as they demanded. Rather,
the committee voted that the statement "be received in the record and
published in the internal bulletin of preconference discussion." Having
decided at its previous meeting to begin preparations for a national con-
ference, the committee intended to publish discussion material in Inter-
nal Bulletins instead of the Militant, as had been the practice for the
CLA's First and Second National conferences. However, the third confer-
ence was delayed, and this statement never appeared in an IB.
The Shachtman faction was making an issue of the fact that Bernard
Morgenstern, on the night of his release after 90 days in prison for
"sedition, " had consented to his parents' request that a rabbi perform
his wedding ceremony. The resident committee discussed the matter on
December 29, when Morgenstern submitted a statement: "My act was
done under certain sentiments and considerations of a personal nature
and not out of the least impulse on my part toward reconciliation with
bourgeois ideology or any of its religious superstitions. " He regretted that
his action had harmed the League and offered his resignation as an
alternate member of the National Committee. Shachtman moved to sus-
pend Morgenstern from the League for one year. Instead, because of
Morgenstern 's excellent record, the committee voted for Cannon 's motion
to condemn Morgenstern and to accept his resignation from the NC.
Cannon explained to Dunne:
One might ask why the derelictions of Morgenstern, which are purely
individual and isolated, can be grabbed up so eagerly as an issue, and
why people who maintained an unruffled indifference to such over-
shadowing questions as the international resolution can work up such
372 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
a lather about it. The explanation, of course, lies in the inescapable
logic of a faction that is not grounded in principle. Having no prin-
cipled differences, or not daring to bring them forward and defend them,
they must resort to all kinds of personal issues. An
The statement finally issued by the National Committee
majority on the results of the postplenum discussion and voting
is so out of harmony with the facts, omits so many important
points, and so distorts those with which it deals, that we are com-
pelled, apart from other considerations, to set down our own pre-
sentation of the situation.
One of the aspects of the discussion which invested it with
such an importance was the fact that it was the first one to revolve
around a major internal dispute in the American section of the
International Left Opposition. Consequently, its results afford the
opportunity for drawing some lessons and conclusions for which
there was no occasion in the past. An examination of some of the
features of the discussion will show that they occupy a unique
position in the records of the international Opposition, at the very
least in the records of the American Opposition.
1. The plenum met on 10 June 1932 and ended a few days later.
The statement on the postplenum discussion was first presented
to the National Committee by the Cannon-Swabeck faction con-
trolling it, on 29 December 1932— that is, more than six and a half
months later. Our repeated requests for a tabulation of the votes
cast were ignored in the committee. It entertained the hope to
the last minute that by some chance more votes would be cast, or
votes already cast would be changed in order that the proposal to
co-opt three members of the Cannon group into the National Com-
mittee might finally be endorsed in the referendum. One would
look with difficulty if not in vain for a precedent in the Commu-
nist movement for so protracted a postplenum or postcongress
period. The protests registered by us against this procedure were
either passed over in silence or answered with sophistical insis-
tence that "everybody be given a chance to vote"— although every
branch had been informed at the outset that the discussion period
was set for 30 days.
2. The discussion, as actually conducted on a national scale, was
in many respects a mockery of a democratically organized inter-
nal discussion. Although the issues involved are of vital signifi-
cance for the League, no internal bulletin was issued in which the
Minority on Postplenum 373
members of the organization might express their views. On several
occasions, our proposal in the committee for the issuance of such
a bulletin was flatly rejected.412 A favorable recommendation on
the same point made by the New York branch met with the same
fate. The fault was the following: By means of the three bulletins
issued, the Cannon-Swabeck group was able to reach the entire
membership with its point of view. But a member of the Chicago
branch, for example, had no means of communicating his views
and opinions on the plenum to the members of the Minneapolis,
or Boston, or New York branch, and vice versa. Other sections of
the International Left Opposition have internal bulletins at all times
in which members may contribute divergent views for discussion.
Our League has the distinction of being denied an internal bulle-
tin even during an "abnormal" period of sharp inner dispute.
3. This arbitrary refusal to issue the internal bulletin is even more
reprehensible in the light of other considerations. The "Carter
group" was specifically criticized or condemned in two plenum
resolutions, which were sent out to the membership for endorse-
ment. The non-New York membership has never set eyes on Carter
or his "group," or even seen a trace of any political statement or
document from which his position might be judged. It should have
been afforded the opportunity to read the standpoint of Carter,
since we assume that they are not "hopeless idiots" who "take
somebody's word for it." Yet the membership, by the refusal of
the Cannon faction to permit an internal bulletin, was deprived
of the opportunity of hearing from Carter, just as Carter was
deprived of the opportunity of making known his point of view at
least on the resolutions directly affecting him. What Opposition-
ists can defend such and similar procedure (which has such
atrocious precedents in the proletarian movement)? Only those
who talk so incessantly about "principle" in order that the practical
application of principle may be ignored. What political signifi-
cance can now be attached to the votes of those comrades outside
of New York who voted against the "Carter group" without ever
having seen what they stand for or what defense they have against
the criticisms and charges leveled at them? The only positive gain
from this procedure lies in the hope that the membership will
never permit its repetition, save at the risk of sacrificing in deeds
what we proclaim in words.
374 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
The same procedure applies also in the case of Saul in New
York. He presented a resolution to the New York branch which
criticized both groups in the National Committee.413 In New York
he was able to defend his standpoint quite adequately. Outside of
New York, nobody knew of Saul's opinions. Nobody could associate
himself with them or disassociate himself from them, for the simple
reason that the elementary vehicle for an internal discussion in the
Opposition— a bulletin at the disposal of the membership— was
denied the organization, without even a reason for the denial being
given us in the National Committee. From those and subsequent
facts may be estimated how justified is the criticism recently made
in the NY branch by comrade Cannon that, if anything, the
procedure in the League heretofore has suffered from being
"ultrademocratic."
4. Less excusable than any of the numerous arbitrary acts of the
Cannon faction during the discussion was the complete suppres-
sion of the document, "The Situation in the American League-
Prospect and Retrospect," signed by Abern, Glotzer, and
Shachtman. This document was presented for the information of
the June 1932 plenum in answer to the document by Cannon and
Swabeck (Internal Bulletin no. 3). Following the agreement reached
on the most important question before the plenum, we agreed to
withdraw our document from the records in the interests of unity,
i.e., it would be withdrawn from the records in the interests of
unity provided that the Cannon-Swabeck document, to which ours
was an answer, would be kept in the archives and not be sent out.
If it were to be sent out, our reply could not be withdrawn. After
the plenum, Cannon presented a statement on its results which,
he acknowledged at that time, could not be acceptable to the
minority. At that committee meeting, provision was made for send-
ing out in the Internal Bulletin a counterstatement on the plenum
results. When we presented it, Cannon withdrew his first statement,
wrote the one which finally appeared as the NC statement (Bulle-
tin no. 1) and then proceeded to violate the plenum agreement
by sending out in the discussion precisely those documents which
were not to be sent out: i.e., the Shachtman statement on the Engels
controversy and the Cannon-Swabeck statement attacking
Shachtman. Confronted with an accomplished fact, we had no
other course than to demand that our document also be sent out
in the discussion.
Minority on Postplenum 375
To this the Cannon faction agreed and the National Committee
voted to send it out. But like so many declarations and records on
paper, the decision was never, to this day, carried into effect. With
the decision came the motion that it be sent out only after a reply
to go along with it had been drawn up by the National Commit-
tee, that is, by comrade Cannon. The latter has had six months'
time in which to draw up the reply. A few months ago in order to
delay ending the protracted discussion in the New York branch,
comrade Cannon announced that he had only a few pages to com-
plete in his reply, which would be ready a few days later. Months
have elapsed and no reply has been forthcoming. Worse yet, how-
ever, is the fact that our document was never sent out to the member-
ship in the discussion. This did not prevent the just-then organized
Newark branch from adopting, under the tutelage of comrade
Basky, a categorical and violent condemnation of the minority
right at the beginning of the postplenum discussion.
In a word, the three Internal Bulletins contained all the
documents ever issued by the Cannon group but not the princi-
pal document of the minority. In New York, the minority of the
NC could defend its standpoint orally on the branch floor. On a
national scale, its voice was shut off by the above-outlined
"ultrademocratic" procedure.
To this should be added the following facts: 1. Our amend-
ments to the Toronto resolution of the National Committee were
never sent out, despite our insistence; 2. Important corrections to
the plenum minutes which we made and which related to the
postplenum discussion were also prohibited from a place in the
Bulletin?™ 3. It was decided in advance by the National Committee
(Swabeck motion, 25 November 1932) that the minority can file
its own statement on the postplenum discussion for the archives,
but cannot have it sent to the membership together with the
National Committee majority statement. From all this it will be
seen that to sign solemn statements in America against Landau
and Landauism in Germany is a comparatively simple thing to do.
But that is no guarantee at all that the signers are above employ-
ing the very methods pursued by Landau in dealing with minor-
ity opponents.
In the face of these indefensible, anti-Opposition, and anti-
democratic practices, the minority must continue to refuse to take
seriously all the paper charges about "petty-bourgeois politics,"
376 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
"political inconsistency," "factional excesses," "heterogeneity,"
"unprincipled blocs," "only principled path," etc. The documents
and speeches of the majority faction in the NC are decorated with
them. As shown by the first important dispute on a national scale
in which the Cannon faction has engaged with an opponent, these
practices and methods, plus others which are beneath mention,
characterize the former group. Until they are changed, the glib
repetition of the word "principle" will retain its hollow sound to
the increasing injury of the League.
5. The votes cast in the discussion may be analyzed as follows: The
League voted virtually unanimously on the two resolutions deal-
ing with the situation in the European Left Opposition. Nobody
in the League could be found to defend the course of those groups
or tendencies condemned by the plenum resolutions, thus putting
to rest the light-minded charges made at the beginning about the
existence in the American League of a "Landau" or "Naville" ten-
dency. The attempt to make capital out of the fact that all nine
abstentions on the international resolution are recorded in New
York is shallow and crude. The list of the nine thus recorded be-
cause of lack of information on the subject or other reasons will
be seen to include in it just as many supporters of the Cannon
group as there are opponents among them. In this case, as in so
many others, can be found that factional myopia with which such
important problems are approached by the National Committee
majority. The charge was made against Shachtman by Cannon that
the former prevented the National Committee from acting speed-
ily on the disputed international questions, from recording the
League promptly in order that alien tendencies in the European
Opposition might not speculate upon possible support in the
American League. This did not prevent the National Committee
from prolonging to an unprecedented length the period of time
originally set in order to enable the whole League to act swiftly
and present its opinion to the European leagues in time to exert a
positive influence. The discussion on the international question
also showed the quintessential importance of providing the League
membership with timely information on the developments in the
ILO, primarily by the prompt issuance of the international bulletins,
which are now more than a year delayed in the English edition.
6. The significance and value of the votes cast on the "Carter
Minority on Postplenum 377
group" have already been referred to. Neither of the two resolu-
tions obtained a majority of the votes cast. Out of the ten branches
that voted in the postplenum discussion, only five voted on the
question (New York, Boston, Youngstown, Philadelphia, Newark),
whereas in none of the other five was a distinct vote cast specifi-
cally on either of the two documents before them (Minneapolis,
Kansas City, Chicago, St. Louis, Toronto). This may be ascribed
essentially to two causes: a. Most of the League members felt, and
justly so, that there was no good ground for seeking to magnify
the so-called "Carter group" of three young comrades into an issue
of national political significance and to convert it into a factional
football; b. The failure of the non-New York comrades to learn
what the position of Carter actually was, as we indicated above,
made them hesitate to vote a condemnation out of hand. The
efforts made since the plenum to sharpen the situation with respect
to these comrades, to alienate them, in a word, to act toward them
in a manner directly opposite to that proposed by us in our ple-
num statement (a passage which is also incorporated on paper in
the resolution of the NC majority) has not served to improve the
situation. A glaring example of the attitude that should not be
adopted is the provocative passage in the NC statement on the
postplenum results which declares that Carter "has openly attacked
the international resolution at branch meetings." Not only is this
statement quite untrue, but it is calculated to exaggerate and
artificially sharpen the attitude toward Carter in the League. Our
intention to counteract the influence of Carter where it is harm-
ful rests as before on the position we have taken in the past, without
in any way making it difficult or impossible for him to continue
with the work in which he has been actively and loyally engaged
among the youth. We shall refuse also, as in the past, to make any
factional combinations with the NC majority which seems, as
implied in its first resolution on the question, to attain the earliest
possible expulsion of these comrades from the League. There
remains only to establish the actual vote on the two resolutions
in question. The majority received the following votes cast
specifically for its resolution: New York, 19; Newark, 4; Phila-
delphia, 7; or a total of 30. The minority received the following
votes cast specifically for its resolution: New York, 11; Boston, 7;
Youngstown, 1; or a total of 19. These figures compare with the
more than 130 votes cast for the international resolution.
378 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
7. The Toronto resolution received a majority of the votes cast
on it. Many branches did not record themselves specifically on
the resolution, most likely on the grounds of insufficient infor-
mation on the question. At the same time, it must be stated that
the Toronto situation has not yet been brought to a definitive con-
clusion. Our amendments were aimed at facilitating this conclu-
sion by more clearly disassociating the NC from the thoroughly
sterile elements around Krehm-Roth and strengthening the group
around Spector and MacDonald. The leaders of the former group
actually suffer from all the defects, multiplied a number of times,
which the Cannon group ascribes to Carter. Nevertheless the
unnecessary prolongation of the Toronto situation has been nur-
tured by the dilatory tactics of the NC against which we many times
have taken a clear stand. The Krehm-Roth group since the ple-
num has led an entirely unproductive life and conducted itself in
a manner that not only hampered the sturdy progress the branch
has been making but has served to discredit the Left Opposition
in Toronto. The branch around Spector-MacDonald, on the other
hand, has not only grown considerably in membership, but has
unfolded a healthy activity, gained in prestige and influence, and
issued its own monthly organ, the Vanguard. The Krehm-Roth
group continues to eke out an existence today largely due to the
fact that the NC majority has consistently failed to bring matters
to a solution, by insisting on an empty formula which the situa-
tion has long since passed beyond. Less than ever is there any
reason now for continuing a quite artificial preservation of the
"two branch" condition in Toronto, where one is flourishing, while
the other vegetates and stands in the way.
8. In the course of the discussion, the question of the co-optations
proposed to the National Committee soon became one of the prin-
cipal axes. Our unheeded warning at the plenum against this purely
factional proposal to establish a permanent, arbitrary, "guaran-
teed" majority in the NC for the Cannon group, without any
foundation in principled differences, was verified by the results
of the referendum on the decision. Every effort was made to obtain
a majority for the co-optations, but it was properly rejected by the
League. In this connection, the figures published in the NC state-
ment are not quite accurate.415 The vote on the co-optations was
as follows:
Minority on Postplenum 379
Branch
For
Against
Abstaining
New York
22
35
5
Chicago
4
9
2
Boston
0
7
0
Philadelphia
7
0
0
Newark
4
0
0
Toronto
0
5
0
Youngs town
0
1
2
St. Louis
4
0
0
Kansas City
1
0
0
Minneapolis
12
8
3
Totals:
54
65
12
The discrepancy in the two sets of figures is explained as follows:
The Philadelphia branch first cast seven votes; later on it sent in
two more votes; but as is known, the branch has only seven
members or did have seven at the time of the discussion. Newark
first cast four votes; later on after the Newark "discussion" was
concluded, another vote was sent in, the vote of a new member.
Kansas City cast three votes, but as is shown by the reports made
from the tours of comrades Swabeck, Clarke, Glotzer, Lewit, and
Bleeker, there is and for the last two years there has been only
one member in Kansas City.
(We counted the Minneapolis vote on the co-optation, for that
is what was actually at issue when the vote was taken. It should be
noted that despite the presence in the branch of two NC mem-
bers and one alternate, no vote was taken on a single resolution
or motion of the plenum. It was cast as follows: "for the majority"
and "for the minority.")
Although the results of the referendum were known and were
quite clear months ago, the "co-opted" members continued to sit
in the National Committee and exercise the right of participation
and decisive vote which they did not justly have. Following the
decisive defeat of the co-optations, the NC majority, in direct
violation of the spirit expressed in the referendum, voted to
constitute a factionally aligned "political committee" in place of
the resident committee which has been in existence since the foun-
dation of the League.
380 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
The explanation for the defeat of the co-optations given by
the NC majority is entirely out of conformity with the facts. It
declares that the three comrades of the "Carter group" cast the
"deciding votes against the co-optations." The figures above
promptly dispose of this contention. Further on, it says, "Other
comrades who are in conflict with the NC on important political
questions (Boston branch) also voted against the co-optations."
And again the Boston comrades are referred to as being "in con-
flict with the NC as a whole on questions which have a prin-
cipled character."
In these two observations are condensed the essentially fac-
tional outlook of the Cannon group. Its subjectivity toward oppo-
nents in the League drives it to the artificial magnifying of small or
casual differences and even to the creation of them for the purpose
of discrediting those who refrain from becoming part of the "revo-
lutionary kernel" in which, as is known, there are no conflicts of
a "principled character." On what "important political questions"
"which have a principled character" is the Boston branch in con-
flict with the NC? On not a single one! No record or document
or trace of one exists to indicate it, nor can one be produced.
If the reference is to one question, the NC policy in the needle
trades (and that is the only possible reference), the statement is
equally untrue. The branch has endorsed the NC policy of having
the left wing demand unity on the basis of joining en masse and
freedom of fraction and opinion. Not even the branch minority
of two or three declares itself in disagreement with this policy. As
we understand it, they do, however, declare that the Opposition
should not take the initiative in openly proposing this policy, but
leave it instead to the logic of events to force the Party to adopt it.
In this disagreement, the two or three comrades are, of course,
wrong, and their wrong stand is not mitigated by the fact that as
disciplined comrades they carry out the decisions of the NC. Our
policy toward these three devoted comrades, who have such a good
record in the left-wing movement, should be to convince them of
their false position by comradely discussion. It is in this manner
that we gained the support of these comrades in the past when
their views on needle trades policy did not harmonize with those
of the NC. But not an inch of progress will be made by launching
a factional, exaggerated offensive against them simply because they
are not supporters of the Cannon group.
Minority on Postplenum 381
The idea that our policy is correct, but that we should not
take the initiative in it, leaving that instead to the Party, is
undoubtedly wrong on the part of these rank-and-file militants in
Boston. But wherein does it differ from the position taken by com-
rade Swabeck on the Gillespie Progressive Miners' Convention a
few months ago?416 We proposed in the NC that our fraction at
Gillespie should take up the Communist banner, in the absence
of the Stalinists; that it should defend the Communist Party presi-
dential candidates and seek to win the assembled workers to revo-
lutionary political action. In this we were supported by comrade
Cannon. Swabeck, supported by Basky, proposed that we should
not raise the question of endorsing the revolutionary ticket at all —
unless the Socialists first raise the question of endorsing the So-
cialist ticket! This did not, as is the case in Boston, put us at the
tail of the Communist Party, but it did propose to have us drag
behind the tail of the Socialists. Its political significance could only
be, in effect, this: We are for the Communist ticket, but if the So-
cialists are good enough not to bring up the question of politics
and elections, we will not bring it up either; if they force us to,
then we will. This question was of course settled on the spot in
the NC, but nobody, not even comrade Cannon, proposed to con-
duct a campaign against comrade Swabeck (who continued to in-
sist that his position was correct) for having "conflicts of a prin-
cipled character" with the NC.
The attempts to explain away the defeat of the co-optations
in the manner of the NC majority is in harmony with the factional
obliqueness which prevents it from seeing a disputed question in
anything but a distorted form. The minority lays no claim to any
factional hidebound "homogeneity," or the title of "Marxian
trunk," or "revolutionary kernel," or "Bolshevik group" of the
League— claims which have driven the Cannon group blindly along
that course which eliminates from it increasing numbers of League
members. We do, however, assert our ability to collaborate in the
work of the League in a comradely manner even with those mem-
bers with whom we are in disagreement on this or that question,
so long as these differences do not extend to the fundamental doc-
trines of the Opposition. The lack of this ability in the Cannon
group, in the mind of which a verbal "intransigence" and
"principledness" covers up factional violations of many of the prac-
tices and methods which are the distinct attributes of the Left
382 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Opposition in the Communist movement, has forced this group
into most of its untenable positions and arguments.
Thus a mountain is made of the election of Petras to the New
York branch executive as a "reward" for the violation of discipline
in going to the Weisbord meeting despite the NC prohibition— as
if this act— indefensible though it is— constituted the sole or main
test in the case.417 At the same time, it is discreetly forgotten that
the other two members violating the NC prohibition (Berman and
Shulman) are supporters of the Cannon faction. And on top of
that, no mention is made at all of the case of Morgenstern, leader
of the Cannon faction in Philadelphia. His violation of elemen-
tary Communist ideas (religious marriage) for doing that for which
he had himself expelled two members of the Young Communist
League several years ago— as they deserved— was covered up by the
NC majority. Our restrained motion for suspension for one year
was met with the theatrical cries, "You shall not lynch comrade
Morgenstern!" The countermotion of Cannon must be read to the
very end before one discovers whether Morgenstern is being
praised or criticized for his conduct.
The same attitude is displayed in the complaint over the elec-
tions to the NY branch executive (which the NC tried arbitrarily
to overthrow), but no mention is made of the fact that in Minne-
apolis, virtually all the comrades supporting the minority were
eliminated from the executive at the last election.
The failure to gain the factional victory on the co-optations is
not to be attributed to the "heterogeneous composition of the NY
branch" or the "Carter group" or the "Boston branch." To present
this utterly false picture as the one side and a "homogeneous prin-
cipled group" on the other side will not stand the test of the slight-
est examination. The fact remains that the bulk of the support
given the Cannon group in the postplenum discussion came:
1. from the two most stagnant and least active branches, Newark
and Philadelphia, led by Morgenstern; 2. from the leaders of the
Minneapolis branch, comrades Dunne and Skoglund, who have
pursued such an opportunistic policy on one question after
another as to bring them into real, and not imaginary, conflict
with the NC time after time.
This is not the place to draw all the lessons and conclusions
from the recent developments in the internal situation of the
League. Nor can this serve as the occasion for presenting a series
Minority on Postplenum 383
of proposals on the steps to be taken to solve the problem, as well
as the many other problems of our work in general, which have
been neglected and which press for solution. But it can be said
now that it is fundamentally wrong to approach the problem, as
does the NC majority, from the standpoint that the "NY branch
remains as the focal point of the internal crisis." The fact is that
the bulk of the members with party training and tradition in New
York do not support the course of the Cannon group. The fact is
that the bulk of the proletarian elements in the branch do not
support the course of the Cannon group. The fact is that the bulk
of the young comrades, in whose development the League places
its whole future, do not support the course of the Cannon group.
The fact is, above all, that we reject entirely the attempt to estab-
lish the divisions in the NY branch on this arbitrary and essen-
tially reactionary basis. It impedes the fusing together of all the
diversified elements into a harmonious interlocking whole by fos-
tering artificial barriers. It also plays to the prejudices of the back-
ward comrades who begin to believe that our internal dispute is
part of the general class struggle, in which one faction represents
the proletariat and the other the petty bourgeoisie (or as one com-
rade expressed it, the Thermidorian elements).
To accept the formula of the Cannon group means to shift
away from the central axis of the problem. It is not the problem
of the New York branch, but the problem of rectifying the
relations between the leadership and the membership; of closing
the gap which has been created between them; of restoring the
confidence of the one in the other (which cannot be established
merely by demanding that the authority and prestige of the NC
be acknowledged); of a patient, comradely approach to the
membership and not a factionally distorted indifference or
contempt for their views, particularly when they are not in agree-
ment with those of the leadership; of eliminating those harmful
and dangerous practices and methods to which we refer above— a
problem of paramount importance; of not immediately meeting
criticisms made by calling them "slanders" and "venomous per-
sonal attacks"; and, not least of all, of orienting the League in
actuality toward the systematic participation in the general class
struggle, with the National Committee helping to set the example,
etc., etc.
Unless the problem is approached from these angles, il will
384 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
not be solved. It most assuredly will not be solved by the method
proposed in the statement of the NC majority which pledges it-
self to a continuation of the past policy which has already so greatly
sharpened and deepened the internal crisis in the League. The
results of the postplenum discussion mean that it is high time that
a halt be called and a change in the course inaugurated. In the
coming preconference period, which we hope will not be unnec-
essarily delayed, we shall endeavor to pose more concretely and
extensively the steps that must be taken by the National Commit-
tee and the League as a whole for a solution of our problems,
steps which flow inexorably out of an objective analysis of our
present position.
^ ^ ^
Cannon's Regime Is on a Par With Landau's
Letter by Max Shachtman to Maurice Spector418
3 January 1933
This letter was written shortly after Morris Lewit and Sylvia Bleeker
returned from a national tour to build Unser Kamf clubs. The tour
was a means for organizing the anti-Cannon forces nationally.
Your letter was a relief in many respects, for it clarified a num-
ber of points which were not previously clear to me. If I take them
up below in enumerated form it is only in order that I may cover
everything I want to call to your attention and that the letter shall
not be overlong and verschwommen [vague].
1. The decision of the branch on the Swabeck Luxusreise [luxury
trip] did not come too soon, but it is highly satisfactory. Be assured
that I understand the position you are in with regard to the score
of new comrades who can but too easily be disheartened by being
plunged into what is at first blush a rather obscure internal dis-
pute. New York, Boston, Chicago, Youngstown, and Toronto— the
distinct majority of the membership— have now registered their
protests against this plan; but it appears that Cannon and Swabeck
intend to go through with it at all costs— and one of the costs may
quite likely be the weekly Militant. The latter is, as you will have
Cannon Regime Like Landau 's 385
gathered, hanging by a thread now and the somewhat dubious
office management which has brought about the crisis is being
veiled behind the age-old charge of factional sabotage on our parts.
The sabotage presumably consists in my devoting seven months
now to full-time work without one single penny of wages; Lewit's
and Bleeker's full-time work on Unser Kamf for a year now with-
out having drawn a sou; and the fact that our friends in the New
York branch are not only the heaviest but virtually the sole im-
portant financial contributors in the organization. If my skin were
not so impervious to the venom of Cannon, I would feel more
outraged at the insolence of the man who makes the charges
against us, but who never distinguished himself by his sacrifices
for the movement, as we recall....
Your inability to arrange for my visit to Toronto is distressing,
but I don't suppose anything can be done about it under the
circumstances. Here, too, I can understand the prevailing senti-
ment and make allowance for it. Still, I regret tremendously that I
am to be deprived of the opportunity of discussing with you and
the other comrades the many questions of paramount importance
to the League.
2. The Krehm question has been on the agenda for some time
now in the committee and all our efforts to bring it to a conclu-
sion have met with stubborn resistance on the part of the major-
ity. When I wrote you some time ago that I thought you might
have brought an end to the situation sooner and more favorably
if you had been a little more astute— I expressed, of course, a judg-
ment from a distance, with all the defects that such judgments
usually contain. This assertion did not signify on my part any re-
vision of my previous appraisal of this "group." Certainly it did
not mean that I have at any time relented in the National Com-
mittee in my endeavors to have the regular branch recognized and
the rotten faction game of Cannon with Krehm and co. desisted
from; up to now, as you know, our efforts have been fruitless. Can-
non has affirmed a burning desire not to "cut off comrades with-
out making efforts to save them"— and demagoguery bolstered by
a safe voting majority in the committee is virtually invincible! I
look forward to your resolution and if it is along (he lines I antici-
pate, we will press again for a conclusion on Toronto.
3. The Morgenstern case came up at the last committee meeting,
386 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
where I finally made the motion for his suspension from the
League for a year, emphasizing that were there a normal situa-
tion I would have moved for his expulsion, even as he had himself
expelled two comrades from the Philadelphia Young Communist
League years ago for no greater a crime against Communism-
marriage by religious ceremony. Cannon presented a lengthy
resolution. It must be read to the very bottom before you realize
that M. is not being praised for his act, but.. .condemned. No ac-
tion is taken against him beyond the harmless "censure." His "vol-
untary" resignation from the committee (continued membership
would have been too much, don't you think?!) was accepted. The
scandal is made worse by the fact that throughout the trial it
seemed that not Morgenstern, but Shachtman, had to be investi-
gated and punished! At the end, Cannon launched into a decla-
mation for the benefit of the gallery assembled outside the door.
When he reached the exclamation: "You shall not lynch our com-
rade Morgenstern!" (yes, literally!), I said: "Save your campaign
speeches for the proper occasion, Cannon. You're in the National
Committee now!" I could almost hear the applause from outside
the door. This clear-cut case of Tammany protection for "one of
the boys," accompanied by a stink-bomb offensive against those
who demanded simple Communist procedure in his case, will not
serve to increase Cannon's prestige or that of his "revolutionary
kernel," Morgenstern included.
4. Our most important problem now is the national conference.
Your caution is not entirely warranted and, candidly, unless it is
overcome we shall not be able to present the firm front which the
situation demands. You will not, I hope, complain about the fait
accompli when I tell you that we presented a demand at the last
meeting for a conference on May 1. It was voted down in favor of
Cannon's motion "endorsing the idea" of a conference on
St. Nimmerlein's Tag [a day that will never come], which means
absolutely nothing. The postplenum discussion results were a griev-
ous disappointment to Cannon and he realizes his weak position.
The muttered threats of a split, in the event that the "Communist
group" (I must enlighten you: Cannon means himself) is in the
minority, continue to be peddled in the corridors. We took action
on the conference only after thoroughly sober reflection, be sure.
Morris and Sylvia brought back a careful report from the various
branches, and the demand is universal— without a single exception.
Cannon Regime Like Landau's 387
You will err to think that Cannon made any progress in the land
with his campaign about "Landauism," etc. To the contrary, it
proved a boomerang, and the decisive results on the co-optations
(you are correct about his having blundered seriously on that score)
will indicate that I am right. Take St. Louis, for instance. They
voted against the co-optations. Then Goldberg, under a misappre-
hension about a whispered report about what Chicago was going
to do, prevailed upon the local comrades to vote for the co-
optations. He explained craftily to Morris that it was done in order
to give Cannon a false impression about his strength; this would
impel him to call a conference in the expectation of "winning";
St. Louis would appear on the scene with a delegate vowed to
trounce the Cannon faction! If you stop laughing long enough at
this naive Machiavellianism, you will see that the aims, at any rate,
of the St. Louis comrades are laudable. Chicago, now, on its own
initiative, has unanimously adopted a resolution (which we pro-
posed to the committee to endorse, but which it did not) calling
for a conference on May 1, and John and Al are staunchly for it.
So is Cowl; so are our two comrades who built the Davenport
branch; so is Boston; so is Angelo, who supports us; so are the
great bulk of the New York comrades.
Will the conference be another June plenum? I more than
doubt it. If I had any idea that it would repeat the wretched events
of the plenum, I would continue to oppose the idea. I have held
off with my agreement to a conference for two reasons, neither
of which holds water any longer: 1. The plenum atmosphere cre-
ated by Cannon, which has now completely worn off; not even
Cannon seeks any longer to do much exploiting of my 1931 visit
to Europe and the complications surrounding it. And how could
he and what results would he obtain? It is a bit tedious to have
dinned into your ears the worn echoes of a dispute that originated
a year or a year and a half ago, and the comrades don't pay much
attention to it. It will appear at a conference only as a sadly
decomposed wraith. 2. My uncertainty about a staff with which to
replace the present "leading kernel"— a most important question,
for what political indictment of the present leadership can be
presented without following it with inevitable organizational pro-
posals and alternatives? Here, too, the situation has improved con-
siderably. I believe that Marty is now prepared to take the place in
the work which properly belongs to him; all the comrades have
388 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
commented on the fact that his activities have increased consider-
ably, and during the branch elections there was a spontaneous
demand from the New York membership that he take the post of
organizer instead of Oehler, who has proved to be not only fac-
tional but incompetent. We resisted the demand not so much on
Marty's account but because of our desire to cooperate as much
as possible and not to leave ourselves open to the demagogic charge
of "removals." As for a new National Committee, there is timber
aplenty in our group and of an infinitely superior quality to the
saplings and petrified redwood proposed in the late referendum.
There are not only Marty, Al, Edwards, you, and I, but also Lewit
and Jack Weber, a comrade I am desirous of proposing for the
next committee. He has not been in the League for the period
required by the Constitution; that is true; but his case in no way
resembles Gordon's. Weber is not only a highly intelligent, well-
informed, well-poised scholar, but a man of considerable experi-
ence in the movement. Engineer by profession, he has been in
the movement for two decades at least, to my knowledge. He taught
in the Rand School in his old SP days; entered the Communist
movement at the very outset; joined the Opposition some while
ago. Interestingly enough, Cannon sent him into our group! That
is, alter his first visits with Cannon at the time he joined the
League, he sized up the man with uncanny accuracy. He stands
high in the eyes of the New York comrades and his articles (even
if they are drawn out) on Japan have aroused considerable inter-
est concerning himself.419 If I draw so long a portrait, it is only to
acquaint you more intimately with a well-balanced and reliable
comrade whom you will find it a pleasure to meet and for whom
you will feel no need to apologize if he joins you on a National
Committee.
So you see, the questions you raise so cogently have been con-
sidered by us here too. The conference, if it does not dispute over
"Landauism," will not dispute either about what happened four
years ago. There is enough and more in the last year to speak about.
If I say that Toronto has given a picture of what the League as a
whole must begin to do, not any longer on paper but in actuality,
I am only stating a conviction. The self-satisfied office-chair squat-
ting which forms the beginning and end of Swabeck's horizon—
and Cannon's, for that matter— is compelling the League to stag-
nate in its own tiny pool. We propose to draw up a resolution,
Cannon Regime Like Landaus 389
separate from the general thesis on which formal agreement is so
easy to reach, dealing with the "internal situation and the next tasks
of the League," or words to that effect. It will be an arraignment
of the whole inner course and the methods of leadership of the
Cannon group. This is not a "political question" in the grammar-
school definition of the term adhered to by Oehler; but it is
nevertheless of the highest significance for the League at the
present time. Cannon has established a regime in the League— I
am not throwing the word around loosely— which is mutatis mutan-
dis on a par with Landau's. Perorations on principle for the pur-
pose of executing unprincipled games; the arbitrary suppression
of minority views (failure to issue an internal bulletin during the
discussion; suppression of our lengthy preplenum statement;
refusal to send out our concluding word on the postplenum dis-
cussion; bureaucratic prohibition against attending "Weisbord's
meeting"; failure to provide Saul and Carter with an opportunity
to defend their views in the discussion on a national scale; etc.,
etc.); the artificial exacerbation of disputes and the manufacture
of "differences" where they do not exist ("our fundamental differ-
ences on policy with the Boston branch"— a new song from the
Cannon repertory); the paralyzing of the New York branch with
factional intrigue and disruption, simply because it burns no
incense at Cannon's shrine; and the impeding of the work in
Toronto for the same good reason— all this and much more from
the voluminous catalog created by Cannon in the last year alone
will constitute an arraignment against which he will have to draw
to the very bottom of the wells of cunning for a reply. At the same
time, we intend to present in the same preconference statement a
positive criticism of the stagnation and permanent financial cri-
sis (two sides of one coin) in the League and our proposals that
the League strike out boldly on a course which will enable it to
quit its present circle existence and slough off the elements who
thrive on such an existence (Cannon, by the way, exemplified
them), gaining by that new recruits who will more than make up
for the dubious losses.
The internal situation has reached the stage where to desist
from a conference will only render the difficulties more acute. It
is either/or! We must accept the inevitability of a Cannon incu-
bus in the leadership, plus a sniping criticism here and there, now
and then; or else we must challenge it openly. I am determined
390 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
on the latter. Remember this: If we emerged from the plenum to
our present position despite the handicaps which you refer to with
such painful accuracy, it is a sign not of our weakness but of our
strength.
Now that Cannon, despite his previous boasts that he would
agree to a conference the minute the minority demanded it, has
voted down our proposal, we intend to exercise our constitutional
right to demand it from the membership directly. The statutes
provide that it can be convoked by the executive committees or
membership of branches representing the majority of the League.
This can and should be done— but done promptly, else our objective
will not be attained. Chicago is already recorded unanimously.
Boston will vote this week on it. New York will undoubtedly carry
our motion tomorrow night. So will St. Louis, Cleveland, Youngs-
town, and Davenport. If Toronto throws its vote into the balance,
the knife is at their throat. To act, you require no formal notifica-
tion from the center. The initiative can come from you, on the
basis of the need to settle the internal situation and the proposal
of Chicago. I urge you solemnly to bring the question up (regard-
less of what may stand in the way at the moment) at the next
branch meeting and adopt a motion calling for the conference
on May 1 . The date is most necessary, in order that the votes may
count on a national scale for a common date. If you agree, do not
bother to write immediately; your action will be better. If you are
in doubt, write me air mail, because speed and concert of action
now count for worlds. More later.
391
Cannon's Suave Calumny
Letter by Max Shachtman to Albert Glotzer420
8 January 1933
The date of January 8 may be an error, since this letter refers to disputes
recorded in the resident committee minutes dated January 9, where Abern
and Shachtman submitted a statement against Cannon becoming CLA
national secretary. Also at that meeting Cannon objected to the Militant 's
report of the Spartacus Youth Club intervention led by Glotzer in Chicago
at the recent Student Congress Against War.*21 The committee postponed
consideration of Cannon 's motion labeling the article "an inadequate
and incorrect treatment of this affair, "pending receipt of a more detailed
report by Glotzer.
I am enclosing to you a statement on the results of the
postplenum discussion which Marty and I submitted to the
National Committee. It speaks for itself and less could not have
been said. As we expected, the committee decided that it was not
to be sent out to the membership. The— by your leave!— grounds
for the refusal were the highly formal ones that the "discussion is
at an end" and that the NC must have the last word on it. At the
same time, Cannon promised to safeguard the rights of the
minority by assuring us that when the preconference discussion
opens, the present statement would appear in an internal bulle-
tin. With this polestar before us, we are supposed to console our-
selves in the meantime with the thought that the document will
be safely stowed away in the archives. However, I am afraid that
ways will be found by the membership of learning the contents of
it even in the face of the suppression. I would not use the latter
term if I did not remember that even under different circumstances
and when the same formality could not be summoned to his aid,
Cannon systematically sabotaged the sending out of our plenum
document to the membership in the recent discussion, on the
grounds that he was "preparing an exhaustive reply"— which never
appeared for the simple reason that it was not and could not be
written. If there were ever any doubt about it, it is now as plain as
392 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
a pikestaff that our recent discussion was a stigma with which the
League was branded by the Cannon faction which, in the course
of it, showed that it had not risen very much higher in its meth-
ods than the Stalinists, not, of course, of the 1932 vintage, but
the Stalinists of 1925-1926, let us say. To learn by rote all the
political and theoretical formulae of the Bolshevik-Leninists is
evidently a far cry from having become a Bolshevik and from
practicing those loyal methods with which that distinguished name
were once associated.
The other enclosure is a motion we made today in connec-
tion with a new development in the committee. For some days
the office has been buzzing lightly with the report that Cannon
was to be dismissed from his job. On Thursday last, Swabeck
presented us, out of the clear blue, with the motion that Cannon
act as secretary during (and after) his trip to Europe with a wage
minimum of $25. Had the proposal been made honestly and forth-
rightly, it would not have induced in us the nausea it did. With a
burst of righteous virtue, Cannon announced that under the
pressure of "the masses" and of the situation, he had decided to
sacrifice his job and work for the League. There is the whole Elmer
Gantry for you! We requested and were finally given time for con-
sideration and the matter was laid over to this afternoon's special
meeting. Here we introduced the enclosed motion which opened
up all the sluices of Cannon's infinite reservoirs of suave calumny.
We were not only this, that, and the other thing, but also posi-
tively the worst faction he had ever seen in his day and age; we
were trying to starve him out before he began; we were trying to
prevent him from working professionally for the organization, but
we should not succeed. And more of the same. However, the
memory of that nightmarish period during which he occupied the
post in question and kept his feet cocked on the desk while the
organization collapsed, plus the more recent memories of his
genteel abstention from any work that would soil his fingertips or
entail the expenditure of more energy than is required to indict a
document against the minority— these are too redolent of what
Cannon in office means to the organization for us to have been
blackjacked into acquiescence by his blustering. We made that plain
in the committee, too. Swabeck, who covered more than one page
of type with bitter complaints about Cannon's negligence, indif-
ference, and indolence, turned his bitterness against Marty now,
Cannon's Suave Calumny 393
in an attempt to make us forget what he once wrote to both Jim
and us against the former. Oehler, who came to New York with
the oath still fresh on his lips that he would find out why Cannon
is doing nothing for the League, not writing for the paper, etc.,
and who for six months has sat like a stone image while Cannon
pursued his sweet old way, made a campaign speech that would
put Bourke Cochran to shame. You will see that we are forthright
and blunt in our motion, as we are in the "discussion" statement;
and high time it is. For years we have all suffered to varying degrees
from a bad survival of the Party faction days. Years ago, regard-
less of how acute the factional situation in the Party, the various
leaders would make clever political points and achieve smart par-
liamentary victories over each other in public, always preserving
a sham dignity and politeness to each other, which served to fa-
cilitate the 180-degree turns about-face with which the factions
regularly startled the Party: "intransigent" hostility one day; ami-
cable blocs or unity the next day. In private, the most deadly criti-
cisms, the most annihilating analyses of the other camp were ex-
pressed—and went no further. This dualistic system was not merely
calculated to preserve the traditions and prestige of the institu-
tion of leadership among the "masses." It was a part-conscious,
part-unconscious reciprocity agreement among the faction chief-
tains. The leaders' personal characteristics (I don't mean his fam-
ily life, of course, but those of his characteristics which were re-
flected in his political life and which were in some cases so rotten
as to disqualify the man automatically from leadership in a healthy
organization) were a. party taboo. Lovestone attacked Foster politely
for his "line," which did not prevent him from making one un-
principled bloc after another with him; but privately, Lovestone
told the story of Foster's war record. And vice versa, for Foster
secretly told the story of Lovestone's court testimony.422 I think
we were right in the Militant in telling both stories publicly, because
both these individuals were patently unfitted to lead the proletar-
ian party, regardless of what "line" they so lightly signed their
names to. In a sense, the same applies to our situation. To preserve
Cannon's prestige for the movement, to enable him to function
unmolested, we covered up the record of his boundless laziness,
his criminal negligence of the tasks assigned to him, those petty
factional digs and intrigues which he clothes so masterfully and
brilliantly with the oral garments of "principle." Unfortunately,
394 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
he overreached himself, as Maurice would say. He has forgotten
that this is the Bolshevik-Leninist Opposition and not the good
old days in the Party. That is why we are now compelled from
time to time to throw a beam of light upon dark spots and sewers.
If they are filthy and stink, they are at least not of our creation.
They can be cleaned up not by covering them up with a layer of
leaves, as they used to do in medieval England, until the floor
was covered with the stratified droppings of generations, but by
pointing the light at them and telling the organization to clean
them up. That is why we are compelled again to label Cannon
and his faction leaders as what they are. And as we have learned,
there is no possible ovei estimation of the abuse, the polished slan-
ders to which we will be submitted because of it. But I for one am
through with even the suspicion of hypocrisy in party relations
for the sake of and in this meaning of the Oppositionist command-
ment: To speak out what is....
In the long run and even right at this moment, it will bring
nothing but good to us and the movement. It does not matter over-
much what the Cannons will say in the coming weeks or months,
although they will say a great deal. The amount of things they say
will be in inverse proportion to the truth contained in them. I
venture to predict that when Cannon is ready to pour out his
arguments, you will hear him say with that serious eloquence of
his: "I saved the League from disaster; Abern brought it to the
brink of collapse. I worked to bring the League to its present level;
Abern and Shachtman sabotaged. I made sacrifice after sacrifice;
Abern and Shachtman brought us to the verge of financial ruin."
Mark my words!
A final point. At today's meeting, an attack upon you and our
fraction at the Chicago antiwar conference was presaged by some
"preliminary motions" by Cannon. He assailed your first article
as inadequate and incorrect; opposed voting for the conference
resolution which was adopted in Chicago; opposed Geltman
accepting on the Action Committee.423 What he has in mind will
be clearer at the coming meeting of the committee, to which
Geltman is to report, as well as at the joint meeting of the NC
and the National Youth Committee proposed by Cannon. You
know that Clarke introduced into the latter body a proposal re-
jecting any united front of Communists and non-Communists in
the struggle against war, rejected it in principle. It smacks of puerile
Against Cannon as Secretary 395
leftism to me, and I will go into the matter more extensively in
the committee. In the meantime, I am awaiting your report
on the conference, as well as the critical second article you
promised.
Swabeck leaves tomorrow, on the basis of a century loan and
$80 raised by Minneapolis, which came through in the "emer-
gency," although its regular contributions have been down to the
thin line of late. Imagine if the same held true for New York: With
what impassioned gestures would the charge of "financial sabo-
tage by the minority" be flung into the stormy discussions of the
branch!
Thank you for the Daily Workers. It is a good... beginning! Let
me hear from you, John, and Joe at the earliest opportunity. And
it should not be imagined by you that the enclosed material is
intended solely for your archives or for the perusal of a select aris-
tocracy. Best wishes to you and yours.
^ 4> 4>
Against Cannon as National Secretary
by Martin Abern and Max Shachtman424
9 January 1933
This statement was submitted to the January 9 meeting of the resident
committee and circulated as part of the minutes. The committee deferred
action on the question until the following day.
At the last meeting of the committee, comrade Swabeck made
the following proposal: That in his absence, comrade Cannon shall
occupy the seat of national secretary; that this selection is visual-
ized as more than a merely temporary measure; that the occupancy
of the post be based upon guaranteeing a minimum weekly wage
of $25 to comrade Cannon and $15 a week to comrade Shachtman.
We cannot agree to this proposal for the following reasons:
1. It would add to the disbursement of the League a sum of $170
a month. We are entirely in accord with the idea of paying the
functionaries of the League on a regular basis, and the League
must strive toward reaching this position as quickly as possible.
396 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
But the realities of the situation must take precedence over the
desires we may have. The fact is that at the present time and for
months past, the income of the League has barely made it pos-
sible for us to publish the Militant as a weekly and that only on
the condition that for the past seven months neither of the two
functionaries of the League has drawn any wages. The addition
of $170 per month to our expenditures can only be accomplished
by immediately endangering the issuance of the weekly Militant,
if not also of other enterprises. The practical reality indicates that
it will not be for several months yet that we shall even be able to
approach the sum set for wages without risking the Militant's life.
2. The past conduct of comrade Cannon in the League is a fact
that we cannot ignore. During his occupancy of the post of secre-
tary, comrade Cannon neglected his work in so disastrous a man-
ner as to endanger the cohesive existence of the organization and
to provoke the protest of every unit of the League. Even in the
last seven months alone— to say nothing of the preceding period-
comrade Cannon has not undertaken any important work for the
League. His activity has been confined largely to the writing of
some statements for the committee. These facts we are compelled
to take into consideration when deciding upon the election of the
administrator of the national work of the League— for which post
is proposed a comrade whose conduct has not warranted in any
way the agreement of any comrade with the proposal.
We are desirous of obtaining the maximum possible contribu-
tions to the League's work from every leading comrade and on
the best-ordered and organized basis. In view of the situation, there-
fore, we make the following counterproposal to be in effect for the
coming period, until the League's position requires its revision:
1. That in comrade Swabeck's absence in Europe, the secretarial
work be conducted by a secretariat composed of comrades Cannon
and Abern.
2. That under the supervision of the NC this secretariat shall divide
the current work of the national office among its two members.
3. That until the financial improvement of the League's position
warrants the payment (and not merely the promise of payment,
which is all that we have been able to give up to now) of the
functionaries, the two comrades composing the secretariat shall
be requested to carry out the function assigned to them on a
For Cannon as Secretary 397
voluntary basis, in such a manner that they will be able to
devote the greatest amount of their free time to it. Wherever
necessary, other League work in which either of them is en-
gaged shall be transferred to other comrades so as to facilitate
their functioning.
^ ^ ^
For Cannon as National Secretary
by Arne Swabeck and Hugo Oehler425
10 January 1933
This statement was submitted to the January 10 resident committee
meeting and attached to the minutes.
The document submitted by comrades Abern and Shachtman
on the proposal for comrade Cannon to return to full-time work
for the League is a stab at the organization, dictated by personal
and factional considerations; dishonest in its contentions and
assertions and false in its political motivation.
On the political side of the question their proposal to solve
the financial crisis by economy in the organizing staff reflects that
superficial concept of the League as a literary circle, a concept
which has already done too much harm and which stands in funda-
mental conflict with our aims to develop the League along the
lines of a fighting political movement which utilizes the full time
of the most qualified people in the organization and direction of
actions in the party and in the class struggle directly.
The system of the complete nonpayment of functionaries which
has grown up by default in the recent period— and which they now
propose to establish formally in respect to the office of national
secretary— is one of the heaviest contributing factors in causing the
crisis. The basic weakness of the League is its narrow organiza-
tion basis, its lack of contact and of organized actions, and its one-
sided preoccupation with purely literary propaganda. This state of
affairs, which to a certain extent was imposed on the League by
circumstances and which served a certain purpose in popularizing
the main ideas of the Left Opposition, represents now an outlived
398 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
phase in the development of our movement. Any tendency to re-
main on this spot, to freeze the organization into this narrow mold,
carries with it the greatest danger of stagnation and retrogression.
The League must broaden its base, extend its organization,
and increase its activities in the Party and the class struggle. The
first step in this direction is not to weaken the staff but to
strengthen it. This is the concept motivating our proposal to call
now on the full-time services of comrade Cannon, the most expe-
rienced and qualified comrade in the League. The proposal of
comrades Abern and Shachtman to restrict the functioning of
comrade Cannon to the service he can render in spare time while
working for a living elsewhere and, besides that, to encumber him
with a paralyzing division of functions and useless "assistance,"
can only tend to narrow down the scope of our activities, to ren-
der the financial crisis chronic, and to consecrate the League to
stagnation as a literary circle. The differences reflected in the con-
trasting proposal are not mere disagreements over a "practical"
matter. They go to the heart of the conflict between us concern-
ing the kind of an organization that is to be built, its opportuni-
ties, perspectives, and tasks— a conflict which is going deeper and
taking on a fundamental character.
To dispense with professional functionaries; or to restrict their
selection to those having private means of support; or to propose
an editor as the sole full-time functionary of the League— this cor-
responds in no way with the true conception of the present tasks
of the League, with its possibilities and resources even as it is
constituted today, and it shuts off any perspective of its rapid
development and mobility in a situation which is rich in the
prospect of big changes and shifts in the working-class movement
and in the movement of Communism. The course now must be
to tighten the organization internally to strengthen its political-
organizing staff, to establish Communist discipline and responsi-
bility, to cleanse the League of trif lers, windbags, and bohemians,
to insist on activities and sacrifices from every member. The
Bolshevik struggle for these aims is inextricably bound up with
any serious orientation toward increased and more effective
participation in the class struggle and in the Party movement. Talk
of the latter without supporting the former is only phrase-
mongering that will not lead the League one step forward, but on
the contrary can only retard its progress.
For Cannon as Secretary 399
The concrete counterproposal regarding the work of the
national office of the League made by comrades Abern and
Shachtman conflicts with our view of the matter no less funda-
mentally than does their whole general concept of the problem
under consideration. The national secretary of the League, in our
conception, is not to be simply an "administrator" of various
"enterprises." The function is not a sum of technical and admin-
istrative duties to be divided between two or more comrades.
For the necessary work of a technical character the League has
adequate forces which can volunteer their services to assist the
secretary or be drafted for this purpose. The business adminis-
tration of the Militant and the Pioneer Publishers is already in
competent hands and constitutes no problem. The function of the
national secretary is to organize and direct the activities of the
League from a political point of view according to the policies
and decisions of the NC. In an organization of the size of the
League it is a farce to speak of two secretaries. The political and
organizing direction requires a concentration. The thing is to select
the one who is best qualified, who is ready to assume the full
responsibility and to take the risks of economic personal survival.
This is the meaning of our proposal of comrade Cannon for
the post.
In the attempts to dispute the qualifications of comrade
Cannon for the office of national secretary and the objections to
his appointment on this ground, comrades Abern and Shachtman
reveal once again— as in their opposition to the sending of an in-
ternational delegate— that narrow factional attitude that strikes
directly at the interests of the movement. The opposition to com-
rade Cannon's return to full-time work at the moment when the
League and the movement generally stand in the greatest need of
his services to the fullest extent comes with characteristic consis-
tency from the very people who up till yesterday led a personal
agitation against comrade Cannon because he didn't devote his
full time to the League. The personal campaign against comrade
Cannon, carried on with such venomous slander and in such a
contradictory manner, bears its real character on its face. It is not
based in the least degree on his lack of "qualifications"; it is not a
criticism of his weakness but a tribute to his strength, as is the
case with the campaign of the enemies of the Left Opposition in
America who, from the first to last, have directed their slanders
400 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
to the personal address of comrade Cannon. The campaign in the
League on the same lines merely rides on the waves of prejudice
set in motion by the agitation in part and caters to the weakest,
most backward, and most susceptible elements in the League who
are influenced by this agitation.
The attempt to undermine the solidly grounded prestige of
comrade Cannon, and now the bolder attempt to challenge his
qualifications for the post of national secretary, can only alarm
the experienced and tested militants of the League who know the
leaders and also know how to appraise them. The more helpless
the group of Abern and Shachtman finds itself in the conflict where
political considerations are involved, the more reckless becomes
their purelv factional course. Commencing onlv a few months ago
with protests against an alleged design to eliminate them in a pro-
test that never had the slightest foundation in fact— they are already
demonstrating in practice a real program of elimination of their
own. In the New York branch where, by an unprincipled combina-
tion with the Carter group and with various other elements in
disagreement with the NC and with each other, thev have a major-
it v, the factional course has already led to the elimination of all
but two supporters of the XC from a branch executive committee
of eleven members, to their exclusion from all important subcom-
mittees, to the system of the crassest factional abuse of the chair-
manship at meetings, to the course of insulting and baiting of the
XC majority and the creation of an atmosphere of split.
Xow, by their document under consideration, they proceed to
announce their program for the national organization in the same
sense— to eliminate comrade Cannon and those most closely asso-
ciated with him from the national functionary staff, if not from
the XC itself. This is what is really involved in the factional struggle
for control of the League by the block of Shachtman-Carter. That
it signifies for the disintegration of the League and its political
disorientation is written all too plainly in the false positions they
have taken every time they have come forward with an indepen-
dent policy against that of the XC. The reckless factional progress
of the Shachtman group is a direct menace to the life of the League.
The political and personal objections to the return of com-
rade Cannon to full-time work in the League are supplemented in
the document of comrades Abern and Shachtman bv "financial"
arguments. Our proposal to lift the League out of the crisis by
For Cannon as Secretary 401
strengthening its staff, expanding its activities and thereby its
financial revenue, is represented simply as a proposal to add so
many dollars to a budget already out of balance. By that they seek
to construe the proposal not as a benefit to the League but as a
burden to it. And some of the less conscious immediate followers
are already agitating against the proposal as a personal benefit to
comrade Cannon. With this the ground is laid to sabotage the con-
tributions which would be required to carry out our proposal and
then to attribute the ensuing financial difficulties of the League
to the wages taken by comrade Cannon. We have seen a sample of
these tactics in the sabotage of the international delegate fund
which met with a complete boycott from the Shachtman faction.
Among Communists who have raised themselves above the
crude prejudices of such primitive movements as the IWW, the
necessity for professional functionaries has been recognized and
defended, their personal disinterestedness had not been questioned
without good reasons, they have not been considered per se as
exploiters of the movement, and they have been respected in their
calling. Among all those who have devoted themselves to the move-
ment in America to our knowledge no one has a better right to
this respect than comrade Cannon. In entering the employment
of the party, in remaining in it, and in leaving it, he showed his
personal disinterestedness no less than any other revolutionists.
His record in this respect is known. Not even the Stalinists, who
spared few slanders, ever ventured to impugn it. In none of the
inner-party struggles, from the foundation of the Party onward,
was the accusation of any motive of personal financial gain ever
directed against comrade Cannon; or, so far as our knowledge
goes, against any other leading professional workers.
It remained for the partisans of Shachtman and Abern— in the
Left Opposition— to circulate this nauseating calumny. The doc-
ument of Abern and Shachtman is a direct incitement on the
"money question" to the ignorant, the backward and demoralized
elements who are infected with syndicalistic prejudices against the
payment of functionaries and to the petty bourgeois-minded who
measure in money. We know quite well that such a foul agitation
will weigh heavily against the success of comrade Cannon's work
as national secretary, at least in its first stages. But in spite of that
we insist on our motion and we urge comrade Cannon to take up
the assignment and at the same time the Communist battle against
402 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
such alien arguments and methods. The very fact that such
degenerate sentiments can exist in our ranks and that leaders can
be found to exploit them is a fearful warning of internal danger
to the League. An intransigent Bolshevik fight is necessary to com-
bat it. Comrade Cannon has the duty to lead this fight, even
though the alien, anticommunist sentiments are directed, in the
present instance, against him personally.
<► ^ ^
On Assuming the Post of National Secretary
by James P. Cannon426
10 January 1933
This statement was attached to the minutes of the January 10 resident
committee meeting that considered the proposal for Cannon to assume
the post of national secretary in Swabeck 's absence at a weekly wage of
$25. The committee deadlocked, with Swabeck and Oehler voting for,
Abern and Shachtman against, and Cannon abstaining. Swabeck then
moved to accept Cannon 's offer to take the post on a voluntary basis.
Cannon voted for this motion, which passed over the continued objections
of Abern and Shachtman.
I agree fully with the main point of view outlined in the
statement of comrades Swabeck and Oehler, insofar as the funda-
mental questions are concerned, and think this is the direction
the League must take. And I am ready, as I said at the previous
meeting, to take the responsibility and all that it involves on my
part in accepting the office of national secretary, not simply as a
temporary measure. My aim and desire is to devote my time
exclusively from now on to professional work for the movement
as long as the movement finds my services acceptable.
Together with comrades Swabeck and Oehler I am in favor of
a Bolshevik fight on the fundamental issues involved and will do
my part in it in any case. But I doubt the wisdom of allowing myself
to become the center of a "money argument" as is now indicated.
It is hardly compatible with the dignity of a revolutionist. Besides
that, a dispute on these grounds would undoubtedly have a strong
No Financial Sabotage 403
tendency to obscure the really important and fundamental ques-
tions in dispute, add to the demoralization, and also militate
against the solution of the financial crisis.
For these reasons I think it best to remove the "money ques-
tion" insofar as it relates to me personally and to accept the post
of national secretary on a voluntary basis. I will give all the time I
can; as long as my personal resources and credit hold out I will
give my whole time. The conference will have to decide the
fundamental disputes concerning the character, the tasks, and the
perspectives of the League as an organization. The disposition of
my services will follow logically from that, one way or the other.
On this point I will neither present demands, nor refuse responsi-
bilities. It is a matter for the League to decide.
4- 4- 4>
No Financial Sabotage
by Martin Abern and Max Shachtman427
23 January 1933
This statement was submitted to the resident committee meeting of
February 4 and attached to the minutes. Abern and Shachtman here
refer to a resident committee meeting on 15 December 1932 where the
charges of financial sabotage were discussed. In a 17 September 1932
letter to the Minneapolis branch, Tom Stamm had written:
The financial crisis is still raging here like a typhoon. As far as I can
see the minority is sitting tight on this question and letting us struggle
as though we were in a quicksand, getting in deeper in our efforts to
extricate ourselves. Their contribution to the solution of the problem is
to make it appear that we were inefficient in the running of the office
and the handling of finances.
The resident committee rejected Shachtman 's motion to censure Stamm
for his letter, in favor of a motion by Cannon to ask Stamm to separate
his personal factional correspondence from CLA business affairs. Swabeck
submitted a statement, appended to the minutes, that he opposed
Shachtman 's motion
not because I approve of the method of comrade Stamm, but because it
is an established fact that comrades Abern and Shachtman have upon
404 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
several occasions failed to collaborate with the NC in its efforts to raise
sufficient finances to keep the League going, which failure has in some
instances necessitated specific motions that these comrades support before
the membership motions by the NC. Similarly, comrades in the New
York branch who are in the most favorable economic positions have failed
to collaborate in the financial emergency of the League.
Three questions have arisen recently in the National Commit-
tee over which disputed views were put forward. The committee's
minutes contain statements on these questions presented in the
name of the Cannon group. In order to obtain the greatest clarity
on the disputes it has become necessary for us to express the view-
point of the undersigned.
1. "Financial sabotage." For some time the dirtiest gossip and
insinuations have been directed against us by supporters of the
Cannon-Swabeck faction, inspired by its leaders, concerning our
alleged "financial sabotage" of the League. This weapon in our
internal controversies is borrowed directly from the days of the
worst factional corruption in the Party. The contending factions
would hurl it at each other indiscriminately, with an indignation
that almost concealed the fact that they were all engaged in
misusing Party funds for factional purposes. In the present case,
the accusation is evidently being made in order to "clear" the
atmosphere from the "poisonous agitation" which our accusers
ascribe to us. Despite our demands, not the slightest attempt has
been made to corroborate these insinuations either with formal
charges against us, preferred in the regular manner, or with proof
of their correctness. This failure alone suffices to rob the accusa-
tion of any seriousness. Our challenge to comrade Basky,
who promised at one meeting to bring proofs of our "sabotage,"
ended with his promise and nothing more. A similar demand made
by us against comrades Swabeck and Stamm— on the occasion
when the latter had to be formally reprimanded even by his
colleagues on the National Committee for the factional abuse of
his office— has met with a similar failure to present concrete
charges, much less proofs. The statement in the National Com-
mittee of 15 December 1932 by comrade Swabeck impels us to
put the whole question sharply in an attempt to force out into the
open those who slander us and our friends; either to prefer charges
and bring proofs, or else to stop playing such a dirty game once
and for all.
No Financial Sabotage 405
Financial sabotage is organizational sabotage. It is not a slight
matter and must be settled immediately and finally. Our "finan-
cial sabotage" consists in the following: For several years, comrade
Abern gave his full time to the League work at an insignificant
wage. The same holds true of comrade Shachtman. In addition,
Shachtman has been working full-time as editor of the Militant for
the last seven months without receiving a single penny in wages, a
service which comrade Swabeck has also been compelled to render
the League by reason of our poor financial condition. Comrades
Lewit and Bleeker, also "financial saboteurs," have been giving the
last 12 months of their full time to the League in the Jewish work
(managing and editing Unser Kamf). They have not drawn a single
penny in wages during the whole of this period; quite the contrary—
they contributed the last of their personal funds to keep the work
going. The largest and most generous contributions made by the
New York branch to the maintenance of the center have come al-
most invariably from a large and diversified group of comrades
who support the minority of the National Committee. Loans made
for the national office have been taken out and paid for by our
supporters in the New York branch. Both the Boston and Chicago
branches stand at the top in financial contributions.
The Swabeck statement that "specific motions" were required
to make us "support before the membership motions by the NC"
is a conscious falsehood, nothing less. The "specific motions" made
were exclusively for the purpose of building up a "record" in the
minutes for utilization in the factional struggle. As every member
knows, neither Shachtman nor Abern have been remiss in urging
the members of the NY branch to give the greatest possible financial
assistance to the organization, especially in times of emergency.
This contemptible insinuation against us is aimed to be a sort
of weapon held in reserve in the dark, to be drawn against us when-
ever it suits the requirements of the Cannon-Swabeck faction or
else as a facile explaining away of the fact that the financial con-
dition of the League becomes acute from time to time.
Because of the seriousness with which we take the insinua-
tions—and they can be taken in no other way— and because unless
they are settled definitely in one way or another, they will continue
to pollute the atmosphere of the League, we demand the estab-
lishment of a control commission to hear the case and arrive at a
final decision.
406 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
2. Comrade Swabeck's trip to the preconference. We wish to re-
affirm our opposition to the sending of comrade Swabeck to rep-
resent the League at the preliminary conference of the ILO and
to visit comrade Trotsky in Prinkipo. Our opposition to the pro-
posal under present circumstances does not make us any the less
internationalists than did the insistence upon it make the major-
ity of the NC "more internationalistic." The attempt to present
the division in this sense is deserving of the same reply we give to
the charges of "sabotage" dealt with above.
The main purpose of comrade Swabeck's trip is to lay before
comrade Trotsky and the European Opposition the faction stand-
point of his group in the National Committee. This he has a perfect
right to do. The official motivations (for they have already been
changed once or twice), however, are not sufficient grounds in
our opinion for sending a delegate at the present time, nor have
they ever been uppermost in the minds of the National Commit-
tee majority. The first proposal was to send Swabeck posthaste to
participate in the mythical Copenhagen conference. Its advocates
at the time "took it for granted" that comrade Trotsky went to
Copenhagen for the express purpose of holding an international
conference of the Left Opposition. They proposed sending com-
rade Swabeck there on the totally unwarranted assumption that
Trotsky was to stay in Denmark for a few months. The attempts
made now to picture the gathering of many European comrades,
who hastened spontaneously to Denmark upon learning of com-
rade Trotsky's trip there, as the "international conference" simply
does not fit in with the facts. In a public statement, comrade
Trotsky denied as a Stalinist report the story that he had come to
Copenhagen to hold an international Opposition conference.
Further, in a confidential circular to all Opposition members,
comrade Gourov declares: "When Stalin communicated by
radio to the capitalist police about a 'Trotskyist conference'
assembling in Copenhagen this was a lie. Having come by acci-
dent, the Copenhagen trip necessarily took the Left Opposition by
surprise.... A conference unfortunately did not take place and by
the course of things could not take place." We do not deal here
with the indisputable value of the gathering which did take place
in Copenhagen and its valuable results. To conceive of it as the
"conference" which Swabeck-Cannon-Oehler "took it for granted"
would take place, is, however, ridiculous. We advocated then, as
No Financial Sabotage 407
we do now, a serious participation by the American League in a
well prepared international conference. To send a delegate across
on ten minutes' notice without even the slightest attempt to have
a discussion in the membership of the League— to say nothing
about the National Committee itself— about the problems confront-
ing the international Opposition, so that our delegate might really
participate fruitfully in the conference— such a procedure makes a
caricature and a phrase out of our internationalism. Only when
we raised a protest against this procedure and demanded that we
discuss the situation in the international Opposition and, above
all, make arrangements for elaborating a document on the situa-
tion in the United States as a whole and the American League in
particular, was a purely "record" motion adopted. A "commission"
was set to work out such a document to be sent along with com-
rade Swabeck. To this day, the commission has neither been called
together, nor has it met, nor has it written a single line.
The arrangements for a preconference in Paris do not invali-
date our objections. The preconference is intended primarily for
the preparations of the regular international conference of the
LO. It was not conceived by the secretariat as the regular confer-
ence in which all the sections should participate. Its call, which is
omitted from the circular sent out two weeks ago by comrade
Cannon as secretary, reads: "3. To the preconference will be invited
only the European and Russian sections. The other sections are
not invited only for material and financial reasons. In any case, if
other sections will declare their ability to participate it is agreed
that they will have that right."
To send a delegate from America to this preconference is an
unwarranted outlay of funds at the present moment of intensely
severe financial crisis in the League. This must be said plainly,
regardless of the demagogic and disdainful charges of playing to
"syndicalist prejudices." We do not base our internationalism nor
our duty to participate actively and directly in the life of the ILO
on financial considerations— that goes without saying. We left
that, in the past, to comrade Cannon when he opposed sending
Shachtman to Europe. But in the present case, it is a practical ques-
tion. Virtually right after comrade Swabeck's return, the League
will be confronted with the necessity of sending a delegation (prob-
ably two comrades) to the regularly convened international con-
ference which is even now being prepared. To such a conference,
408 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
the American League will be deeply obligated to send delegates.
In addition, its delegates will have had, we hope, the advantage of
going after a thorough preliminary discussion of our international
problems in the League and in the National Committee— a dis-
cussion of a more serious and real character than that which was
begun and ended with the recent "record motion" in the National
Committee. To argue that it is a good thing for the League to
send a delegate even to the preconference is to beg the question
entirely. It would also have been a good thing for the League and
the ILO to have had a permanent American representative all this
time in the International Secretariat. That has been and is a per-
spective for us. Up to now we have not realized it, nor have we
attempted to, for the practical "syndicalist"(!) consideration of the
financial difficulties involved. It is sheer hypocrisy and demagogy
to deny that the same difficulties, which are of such an extreme
nature in the League at the present moment, should have been
taken into consideration by the National Committee in action on
the proposal to send Swabeck to Europe at the present time.
3. Comrade Cannon's nomination as secretary. The statements
submitted by Swabeck, Oehler, and Cannon, intended solely for
public consumption, are the most scurrilous documents yet written
in our internal dispute. They are filled from beginning to end with
falsehood, deliberate distortion of facts, and outright calumny. To
reply to all the questions they raise would require an answer twice
their length. We can deal here only with their salient features.
The statement reeks of the detestable spirit of the messianic
personal cult worship which we always considered alien to the
International Left Opposition. This is not, it is true, the first time
that Cannon has identified the Opposition with himself, but it is
the first time it has been done so crudely. We decline to accept
the theory that Cannon and the Left Opposition are one and the
same thing; that a criticism of him is equivalent to an attack upon
the League. What he seeks to introduce into the Opposition— not
for the first time— is the unbelievable conception that stigmatizes
any criticism of Cannon as emanating only from Stalinists, or those
who ride "on the waves of prejudice set in motion by the agita-
tion of the Stalinists and the right wing." We will miss no oppor-
tunity to combat this monarchical theory of lese majesty which is
a disgrace to the Left Opposition.
No Financial Sabotage 409
Our proposal to put comrade Cannon and Abern in charge
of the secretarial work of the League, on the basis of voluntary
contributions of their time, was a purely practical one. No attempt
is made in the Cannon-Swabeck-Oehler statement to give a con-
crete refutation of the arguments advanced by us to support our
proposal. The broad generalizations about the need of maintain-
ing paid functionaries in the League are absolutely meaningless,
as our whole past experience, particularly in the last seven or eight
months, has shown. Every assurance given thus far, every "resolu-
tion" and "motion" adopted solemnly and with the best inten-
tions, has remained on paper. Is this a fact or not? Has comrade
Swabeck's complete failure to pay himself or Shachtman (the two
"paid" functionaries in the League) any wages for more than half
a year been due to his "syndicalistic" tendencies, "dictated by per-
sonal and factional considerations," "dishonesty," or has it been
due to the practical inability— at least up to now— of the League to
meet its budget? Only a blind and deaf man can fail to see that it
was the latter reason. Has a single concrete proposal yet been
brought before the National Committee to show how the budget
is to be arranged so that Cannon and Shachtman may even begin
to be paid the sums originally proposed by the former? Not even
the attempt has been made. Do we gain a single inch by cheap
and empty generalizations about the "need" of paid functionaries
or by the routine resolutions stating that they "should" be paid—
at a time when our financial crisis makes each week's appearance
of the Militant a questionable prospect? Quite the contrary, we are
only practicing self-deception thereby. The cold fact is that the
League's income does not at present permit the payment of any
functionaries. What it may be three months from now is another
question. That the League must strive to extend its activities and
consequently its income so that it is possible to employ the most
capable comrades for their full time— of that there has never been
any question in our minds, nor could there have been. With that
highly desirable and necessary aim in mind, we provided in our
countermotion for a reconsideration of the financial aspects of the
secretaryship as soon as the income even begins to make possible
a concrete and semirealizable proposal. To attribute to us any other
views is tantamount to conscious misrepresentation.
The pathetic war cry sounded by the majority that we "want
410 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
to starve out comrade Cannon" has exactly as much foundation
as would have the equally preposterous charge that Swabeck,
because of his inability to pay wages to himself or to Shachtman,
wanted to starve himself and Shachtman out of working for the
League. The same contempt is deserved by the argument that we
are seeking to prevent Cannon from contributing his services to
the movement, in which we are presumably manifesting a new one
of those "fundamental differences" with the Cannon faction which
it has just invented: "our" "literary circle" spirit. The only com-
rade that has stood in the way of Cannon's contributing his ser-
vices to the League up to now has been Cannon himself, and no
amount of vile abuse can cover up the incontestable records in
this respect. We criticized Cannon in the early days of the Oppo-
sition for his gross neglect of the secretarial work which the
National Committee and the First National Conference has
charged him to carry out. His reply to our comradely criticism
was to retire completely from the work, leaving the job in the hands
of comrade Abern, who kept the League together on a national
scale while it was being boycotted by Cannon, who now dispar-
ages and sneers at Abern's contributions. Since that time, com-
rade Cannon's contributions to the work of the League have been
the outstanding and notorious example of precisely that "literary
circle" type which he now fulminates against on paper, with the
same violence he employed in attacking our proposal a few months
ago (before the phrase "participation in the class struggle" became
so "popular") that Swabeck or Oehler leave the office for a couple
of weeks to organize in the Illinois coalfields during the high point
of the miners' strike movement. It is simply another invention to
assert that we "up till yesterday led a personal agitation against
comrade Cannon because he didn't devote his full time to the
League." We have never demanded that of any comrade whose
personal circumstances made it difficult or impossible. We have
criticized him in the past— and so has virtually every member of
the League, Swabeck and Oehler not excluded— for not having
devoted his spare time to the work of the organization to the extent
that the League has the full right to expect and demand of any
member, to say nothing of a leading comrade. This criticism has
been part of that "reckless factional program of the Shachtman
group (which) is a direct menace to the life of the League." The
No Financial Sabotage 411
rabid subjective reaction shown each time the criticism was made
has been due solely to the fact that it was thoroughly justified.
The ardent defense comrade Cannon makes of himself against
the nonexistent charge that he is seeking "personal benefit" is very
melodramatic, but quite unnecessary— as "unnecessary" as his own
charge that Shachtman is a place-hunter whose services to the
movement are meant to advance his own "career." The indignant
protests are made at straw men and are "meant for the public."
The solemn ABC lessons on the falsity of the I WW conceptions
and on syndicalism are of the same caliber. The only comrade
who is distinctly infected with these and similar views in the New
York branch is comrade Schwalbe. He is allowed to air his
syndicalistic prejudices in the New York branch without comment
from his factional associates in the Cannon group. He is consci-
entiously given factional protection by this same group which talks
so glibly about Communist principle but continues to foster the
prejudices of the new and backward elements in the League in
the name of the class struggle which, it has discovered, is raging
in the American Left Opposition.
It is unfortunate that valuable time must be spent on writing
such statements as the present. But we are compelled to resort to
this means of making clear our position, by the fact that the
Cannon group continues to fill the records of the NC with slan-
derous and demagogic factional attacks upon us. They are intended
to "prepare the ground" for the national conference of the League,
at which this faction plans and hopes to deliver a final annihilat-
ing blow at us on the grounds of those "fundamental differences
in principle" which the self-styled "revolutionary kernel" has been
concocting for the past year. In going further with these ruinous
methods, the Cannon group is only continuing to play that
dangerous factional game which has, on more than one occasion
already, brought upon it the merited reprimand of the majority
of the League's membership.
* +
412
Cannon a New Man in Chicago
Letter by Albert Glotzer to
Martin Abern and Max Shachtman428
6 February 1933
This letter recounts Cannon 's visit to Chicago after speaking at a Trades
and Labor Council conference in Gillespie, Illinois on January 29. Called
to consider the creation of a new trade-union federation to challenge the
AFL, the conference was backed by the newly founded Progressive Miners
of America. More than half of the 1 70 delegates were PMA members.
Cannon's speech against founding a new federation made a big impact
on the conference; his report in the Militant noted, "The conference
revealed most convincingly that the organizational basis for a new general
labor movement is by no means sufficient at the present time, and the
project was taken off the agenda. Instead of that, a realistic program of
agitation to coordinate the work of militants inside and outside the AFL
was adopted."429
I have been ill for the last few days and could not write about
some of the recent events here.
1. At the meeting where the discussion of the NC statement on
the plenum results took place, the following sums up the situa-
tion. The "old" comrades of the branch, plus those who for all
practical purposes are no aid to the branch, supported the major-
ity of the NC because of "stability," "experience," etc., etc. They
include Buzzy, Booth, Mashow, Judd, Martin. Of these only Buzzy
is a member of the executive committee. Booth because of cir-
cumstances cannot be very active, although he is doing work in
the Jewish field. Mashow is an anchor upon the branch and the
unanimous opinion of all comrades is that it was a mistake to take
him into the League. Martin likewise because of circumstances is
inactive. Judd cannot be counted as a supporter of the majority.
In support of our point of view are: Edwards, Sacherow,
Giganti, Bornstein, and myself. Four are members of the execu-
tive committee. Bornstein up until a few months ago was the most
active member of the branch. Satir and Gould support neither
Cannon a New Man 413
group because they do not see on what political basis they could
support one group or the other when there are no obvious politi-
cal differences. Both however expressed serious differences with
the majority methods of carrying on internal struggle, Satir espe-
cially so. They are waiting for the preconference material and dis-
cussion in order to ally themselves one way or the other. Ritz is a
new member and I can say little about him. I enclose a copy of a
letter I received from Hamilton in reply to a copy of the state-
ment I sent him (our statement on the results of the plenum dis-
cussion). You can judge from that his point of view and I am of
the opinion that either of you two comrades should drop him a
line. That, I think, sums up the position of the branch members.
At the discussion I opened up on the statement of the majority
on the plenum results and showed how it falsified figures, its at-
tempts to win votes through petty factional trickery, its utterly false
perspective on the solution of the internal struggle. I have no doubt
that our point of view does make an impression on all the com-
rades, including those who are for stability and experience. I got
a good laugh out of Gould when citing the figures on the votes.
Gould just came back from Kansas City and met the whole branch,
but for the life of him he can't remember all the comrades. No
matter how hard he tries he can only remember one comrade.
Undoubtedly he did not stay long enough to meet the other two
"Swabeck comrades."
The most active comrades of the branch, those who really
count and make up almost the whole of the executive committee,
support us. But the real test here will come in the preconference
period, during the discussion when we shall have to carry on a
struggle not only on the questions of organization, which are fun-
damental in themselves, but likewise on questions of program.
Then we shall be able to tell precisely where we stand. Inciden-
tally no vote or decision was taken anyway on the statement of
the National Committee on the plenum results.
2. The second great event was Cannon's arrival and the meeting
we had with him. I should have written about this last week, but
as I stated in the beginning, illness prevented me from writing.
I must declare that I met a new Jim, if only for that night.
Briefly, I shall tell you his attitude. He was very cordial!?! The
narrative: We did not quite understand the situation in Illinois.
We were too far away to really grasp the significance of the mass
414 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
movement and have lost valuable time. There are great possibili-
ties for our movement if we concentrate our forces in the field.
The coal situation may be the means to open up a new stage in
the development of the American League. It will help us break
from our shell of isolation and get into some mass work. The
organization has been stagnating somewhat (!) and we have an
opportunity now to do real class-struggle work. We must take
advantage of the situation and I am amazed with the possibilities.
I shall propose to the NC that I return and spend two months in
the coalfields. Then we must have somebody there permanently.
The whole League must be mobilized for a big campaign of the
Left Opposition in the coalfields. Retreat is impossible. We can-
not afford to retrench! Retrenchment means further stagnation
and retreat. We must go forward! And so, ad infinitum.
He was enthused or at least appeared that way. This was the
first time I heard him speak in this fashion for at least four years.
And I am sure that Swabeck would have been the most discom-
forted man to have heard the remarks he made. I must say that
for a moment I thought one of us was speaking. He explained
that four years of work on a lousy job warps one's perspective and
prevents him from seeing straight, or words to that effect, and
that, now he has gotten out into activity and made contact with
masses of workers, he has a new slant on things and wants above
all work and work and work. He will go back to New York and lay
before the comrades the same report he made to us in Chicago,
get the whole organization behind the campaign, and return to
work in the Illinois coalfields.
It is this kind of stuff that makes a good impression on those
who support the majority. Our comrades, I think, did not misun-
derstand Jim nor his remarks. Gould smiled because this was all
so new and surprising, and certainly did not sound like the majority
statement on the results of the plenum. But all of us will not be
the comrades to prevent the work that Cannon speaks of. Quite
the contrary, the comrades are willing to do everything possible
to carry through such activity. What they cannot understand is
Jim's remarks. It was enthusiasm plus. I am anxious to know what
kind of a report he made in New York. Here he did not revert to
the inner situation once. He only spoke of a change in the line of
the League toward greater participation in the class struggle and
mass work! Build the League, break from the isolation and stag-
Cannon a New Man 415
nation! Warm and happy! That describes him during the few hours
he was here.
So you see I am really anxious to know if he carried this pose
with him to NY, to learn if he maintained the same attitude with
the New York comrades and in the NC in order to know just how
much of a pose he really made and what was the actual aim he
had in mind.
The Freiheit reports the dissolution of the German Opposi-
tion. I assume it refers to the capitulation of Well and Senin. It
speaks of a third leader. Who might that be? Incidentally, I know
nothing about the German situation except bare outlines, nor of
the situation in Spain or in France. It seems to be an unwritten
law that comrades living outside of the center are doomed to
ignorance of what transpires in the international movement. I
know that letters have come from the Old Man, statements and
resolutions are received containing information. But so far I
haven't received as much as an indication of the situation in
Europe. Won't you comrades do something about it?
International Bulletin no. 17 has not reached us yet. Why I don't
know.
I received a few sets of minutes but all of these or most of
them are old. I don't know what actually transpired in the meet-
ing of the committee except what Marty wrote with regard to the
war congress. I'd like to know what reasons they gave for their
motions. Needless to say, he mentioned nothing to me about the
affair when he was here.
What information do you have on the Lovestone split? I read
the item in the Freiheit this morning about the split, and I sup-
pose that the Militant will carry additional items in the next issue.430
But I would like to have the real inside dope on the situation and
I think you can supply it. Do you know what Minnie Lurye's posi-
tion is?
Incidentally, I wonder why the sub I sent in was not recorded
in the Militant among subs gotten in the drive. Would you com-
rades call it an oversight?
As soon as Marty's article on the student question is complete
I shall send one too, in support of his point of view. What does
Max think of the question?
Geltman is in town on the way to New York. When he arrives,
make it a point to have a discussion with him without delay. I think
416 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
you will find his point of view altered considerably. I will see him
today and have a discussion on these questions.
Did Cannon report the contact we have with Verblin?431 If not
I can write details later.
With best regards to all the comrades. Did Weber get the note
I sent him? Ask him to write.
+ ^ 4
Resolution on the Proletarianization
of the New York Branch
by the National Committee [Cannon Group]432
[Early February 1933]
After discussion in two consecutive meetings of the resident committee in
September 1932, this undated resolution was submitted to the branch
executive in October in the name of the NC over the opposition of
Shachtman and Abern.4** After the executive rejected it by a vote of four
to two, Cannon was assigned to present the resolution to the branch at a
meeting in early February. 4M Cannon later described the local discussion
about his proposal:
The single proposal to take in no petty-bourgeois elements for the period
of six months called forth an attack against the NC which sponsored
the proposal, and against us personally, that cannot be described in
words. All the militancy that has been so painfully lacking in the struggle
against the Stalinists, especially in the needle trades, was supplied with
double measure against us. 435
The NC recommends to the New York branch executive com-
mittee that it adopt the following for consideration by the branch
as a joint resolution of the National Committee and the branch
executive committee.
In order to improve the class composition of the organiza-
tion and to provide a firmer foundation for a greatly increased
activity in the class struggle in a systematic, planned, and organ-
ized manner, the NY branch decides:
1. For the next six months to admit only bona fide proletarians
to membership.
For Proletarianization in NY 417
2. All others applying for membership in this period (excepting
those now on probation) shall be enrolled as sympathizers and
assigned to regular duties and tasks suitable to their abilities and
opportunities under the direction of the branch executive com-
mittee without prejudice to their right to become members of the
League later.
3. The workers admitted to membership under the terms of this
motion shall be required, as a condition for membership, to agree
to become members of their respective trade unions (where ini-
tiation fees or other restrictions are not prohibitive) and to carry
on active work within them. Workers in unorganized trades or
industries shall take the initiative to form unions where possible
or to enroll themselves in one or another non-Party workers mass
organization according to the circumstances in each case, as the
branch executive may direct. Unemployed workers shall join the
unemployed councils or similar organizations.
4. This motion to restrict membership to workers only is designed
as a special measure for a definite period and is not laid down as
a principle. Intellectuals have a place and function in the League,
but this function can be fulfilled most fruitfully under the condi-
tion of a strong preponderance of active revolutionary workers in
the organization.
5. The branch organizer stands instructed to call, within two
weeks' time, a general meeting of all branch members now affili-
ated to trade unions for a general discussion of the problem of
trade-union work and the working out of practical plans to organ-
ize and develop it.
6. Similar meetings of all branch members now affiliated to non-
Party mass organizations shall also be organized within three weeks
for the same general purpose.
7. Following this a special meeting shall be called of all members
not now affiliated to trade unions or other mass organizations
for a concrete consideration of ways and means of deciding on
such an affiliation in each case, to one organization or another.
8. The goal of the campaign is to realize the slogan: "Every mem-
ber of the League an active member in a mass organization."
9. The branch meetings and discussions in the next period shall
be conducted in conformity with this orientation of our work.
418 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Discussion of general political questions, as a rule, shall be con-
ducted at special meetings called for this purpose. Regular meet-
ings shall prominently feature reports of the work of the fractions
in unions and other organizations and action on them.
10. The NC proposes a joint meeting with the branch executive
committee to discuss the proposal to present this resolution as a
joint recommendation.
^ 4> ^
Reject the Proposal on the Proletarianization
of the New York Branch
by the New York Executive Committee
[Shachtman Group]436
[Early February 1933]
This undated response to the National Committee resolution on
proletarianization was submitted to the New York branch in the name of
its executive committee. Later in the month the resident committee and
the New York branch executive held a joint meeting to discuss dividing
the branch into three units: Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx. The
division was supported in broad outline by both groups. 437
The New York branch has before it a proposal to close the
books of the branch to all applications for membership in the
League except those who are "bona fide workers belonging to mass
organizations." The executive committee of the branch recom-
mends the rejection of this proposal on the following grounds:
1. It is in violation of the Constitution of the Communist League
of America which makes the following provision for application
to membership in the organization and no other provision: "Article
IV, Section 1. All those who subscribe to the principles and tac-
tics laid down in the first four congresses of the CI, who accept
the platform of the Communist League, and who agree to abide
by its discipline and engage actively in its work shall be eligible to
membership in the Communist League."
2. The proposal attempts to create the impression that the per-
Reject Proletarianization in NY 419
centage of nonworker elements in the New York branch is so great
as to threaten the proletarian revolutionary character of the
organization. As the registration of the branch will show, this
is far from being the case. The overwhelming majority of the
branch membership are workers engaged in industry or office
work or formerly so engaged and now unemployed.
3. Limitation of membership to proletarian elements at one period
or another has been confined in the whole history of the Com-
munist movement to the Russian party and no other. This is so
because its domination of state power, plus the preponderance of
petty-bourgeois elements in the country, has endangered and
diluted the proletarian character of the party, especially danger-
ous when it counts in the millions. Our League, which offers its
membership none of the privileges of the Russian party member-
ship, cannot in any sense of the word be put in the same category
with the Russian party in this respect. As for other parties, we
repeat, the matter has never arisen in such a way as to call forth a
proposal like the one before us.
4. One of the main problems confronting the League at present—
the most rapid possible elimination of the "circle spirit" which
prevails throughout the ranks as a result of various historical cir-
cumstances—cannot be solved by such a mechanical proposal. The
problem cannot be solved by creating an artificial, potentially dan-
gerous, and confusing class division in the membership. Some
of our nonworker comrades are very active members. Other
comrades, including some who are workers belonging to mass
organizations or able to join them without difficulty, are inactive.
Our task is to bring the nonworker comrades closer to active
participation in the mass organizations and the general class
struggle, and to organize the work in such a systematic manner as
will enable the League as a whole to utilize the connections with
the masses of workers and their broad organizations which the
worker-members already have and are not utilizing, or utilizing in
an unorganized, haphazard manner. We can accomplish this task
essentially by elaborating planned activity for all the members of
the League:
a. By making it obligatory for every member, without excep-
tion, to join a mass organization; particularly does this apply
to new members who must do this before their probation
420 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
period is up, else they should not be accepted as regular
members.
b. By putting our trade-union work and trade-union and other
organization fractions on a functioning basis so that the
comrades belonging to them shall utilize their membership
in them in an organized Communist manner for the Left
Opposition.
c. By the energetic and timely elaboration of our policy for
every situation that arises, or every problem confronting
these mass organizations, so that our comrades may be able
to present our specific point of view in a systematic man-
ner. This manner of organizing our work, of participating
systematically and not only journalistically in the everyday
struggles of the workers, will do infinitely more to bring to
our ranks the worker-revolutionists than any mechanical
proposals divorced from the problems of the general work
and orientation of the League.
5. While we believe that the branch and the League as a whole
should exercise special care in taking into its ranks nonworker
elements and should provide special work for them to undertake
before their probation period is concluded (as well as afterward),
we do not believe that such a proposal as the one before us, with
its indefinite and ambiguous characterization, should be adopted
for the purpose of excluding automatically and in advance any
comrade applying for membership in the League who is not what
the proposal designates as a "bona fide worker belonging to a mass
organization." Such a proposal can easily create confused ideas
among our membership about the real essence of the question
(that is, the fundamentally proletarian character of the Commu-
nist movement), and lead to the introduction of syndicalistic preju-
dices into the minds of the comrades.
421
Motion on the Situation in Germany
and the Role of the Red Army
by Max Shachtman438
20 February 1933
This motion was submitted to the February 24 resident committee meet-
ing, attached to the minutes, and published in CLA Internal Bulletin
no. 10 (18 March 1933).
After Hitler's appointment as German chancellor, the resident com-
mittee, by unanimous vote on February 4, decided to make the Militant
triweekly to stress the urgency of a proletarian united front. CP support-
ers concerned by the German events snapped up thousands of Militants.
The CLA was also intervening aggressively into the Party-organized
unemployed movement. Cannon's speech as official CLA delegate to a
January 22 conference of unemployed in New York City was well received
and the League followed up with an intervention into a second confer-
ence on February 5. Hugo Oehler's highly successful national speaking
tour on Germany was scheduled to end in an extended stay in the south-
ern Illinois coalfields, where the League was attempting to solidify its
supporters in the PMA.
In February the CLA held a series of forums in New York City on
Germany-in Manhattan on the 5th; the Bronx on the 12th; and Brook-
lyn on the 15th. Hundreds of workers attended the meetings, where
Shachtman and Cannon were the principal speakers. Stalinist spokes-
men took the floor, attempting to counter the burgeoning impact of the
League's agitation for united-front defense of the German working class.
In a letter to Trotsky, Shachtman motivated his resolution:
This motion by me in the National Committee was occasioned by the
speeches made at our "Germany " meetings by comrade Cannon, in which
he falsely raised the slogan for the Red Army to be mobilized now to
come to the direct assistance of the German proletariat. "The knife of
fascism is poised over the body of the German working class and the
Red Army must be mobilized to shoot this knife out of its hand. " Such
a standpoint enabled the Stalinists and the right wing to launch a dema-
gogic attack upon our position, with the result that our campaign in
New York, at least, has been vitiated to a certain extent. That the
422 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Stalinists approach the problem from the nationalistic standpoint of
"socialism in one country " does not mean that we may permit ourselves
false and harmful formulations with regard to the Red Army. My mo-
tion was aimed to have the National Committee take a position with-
out a factional issue being made of the question; that is why no direct
criticism is made of Cannon or anyone else. Unfortunately, Cannon
has made a counterstatement attacking our standpoint and denying
that he had ever advocated the immediate use of the Red Army in
Germany. 439
With regard to the present situation in Germany and the ques-
tion of the role of the Red Army, the National Committee adopts
the following policy:
The Communists cannot entertain any objections in principle
to the use of the present Red Army in the Soviet Union for the
purpose of giving direct material assistance to the proletarian revo-
lution and the Communist movements in other countries. We do
not regard the Red Army as a "Russian" army but as the army of
the international revolutionary proletariat. The fact that the Red
Army came to the assistance of the Polish movement in 1920 and
gave direct aid to the Georgian proletariat and peasantry in their
liberation struggle against foreign imperialism and its Menshevik
agents is proof that the Communist International in the Leninist
epoch did not consider it wrong in principle for the "Russian"
Red Army to carry out revolutionary tasks beyond the "frontiers"
of the Soviet Republic. For this reason, it is necessary to reject
the prevailing Stalinist opposition to employing the Red Army in
the interests of the international revolution as a typical character-
istic of national-Bolshevik degeneration of this faction.
The employment of the Red Army outside the "frontiers" of
the Soviet Union to help the revolutionary movement triumph in
the capitalist countries is not and cannot be a question of dispute
in principle for the Marxists. It is and cannot be anything but a
tactical question, based upon concrete considerations of time and
place and relationship of forces.
The accession of Hitler to power in Germany is a direct threat
to the international revolution in general and to the Russian
revolution in particular. That is why the International Left Oppo-
sition has declared that "the attempt of the fascists to seize power
in Germany can bring in its trail nothing less than the mobiliza-
tion of the Red Army. For the proletarian state, it will be a matter
of revolutionary self-defense in a most direct and immediate sense."
Shachtman on Germany and Red Army 423
The International Left Opposition has not, however, and does
not now raise the demand that at the present time, in the situation
as it is today, with the present relationship of forces, the Red Army
is to be mobilized for the purpose of "marching upon Germany"
now. We do not advance this slogan at the present time and regard
its propagation as out of harmony with the tactical line of the
International Left Opposition on Germany today.
Before the worker masses of Germany have been unequivo-
cally set in motion to resist Hitler, before the sharp cleavage that
exists between fascism and the working class has been translated
into open civil war in Germany itself, so that the bare proposal of
marching the Red Army into Germany would appeal to the German
masses as well as to the world proletariat as meaning direct aid to
their class in its revolt against bourgeois military dictatorship, such
a slogan could only serve to alienate non-Communist workers and
drive them into the camp of nationalist reaction. The premature
advancing of such a slogan, before civil war in Germany has
appeared unmistakably, means laying the ILO open to the charge,
on the part of the official CP, of provocation to precipitate war
on the Soviet Union. It means that we alienate the sympathies of
those Communists who have become orientated toward the Left
Opposition on the basis of the complete correctness of our poli-
cies in regard to the German situation.
If the Left Opposition is attacked similarly for advocating
immediate mobilization of the Red Army, our answer is clear. The
correctness of our position on German fascism merely serves then
to add emphasis to our analysis of the inevitable international
consequences of a fascist victory. This slogan clearly aims to warn
the Soviet Union to prepare in good time to defend itself. War in
that case comes not on the basis of a Red Army marching into
Germany, but because the international Brownshirts are march-
ing on the Soviets.
The propaganda and agitation of our League and the Militant
is to be conducted in accordance with the above views. This state-
ment of position is to be sent out to all branches as the guiding
line of the League for the work of all its members and spokesmen.
^ ^ ^
424
The Red Army and the German Revolution
by James P. Cannon
24 February 1933
This draft article was submitted to the February 24 resident committee
meeting. With only Abern, Cannon, and Shachtman in attendance, the
committee held in abeyance Cannon 's motion to print the article in the
Militant, but unanimously approved Cannon's motion, "That the
discussion of the differences on this question be carried on in the internal
bulletin and not in the Militant and that the Militant carry only material
reflecting the official standpoint arrived at by the committee/' Cannon's
article was published in CLA Internal Bulletin no. 10 (18 March 1933).
After receiving Trotsky 's "Germany and the USSR, " Cannon withdrew
his article with the following motion, "In view of the information
contained in the article of comrade Trotsky regarding the present capacity
of the Red Army to fulfill its role, the article be not published now, but
its correctness, theoretically, is reaffirmed."440 Shachtman voted against
the motion.
Our references, in speeches on the German crisis, to the
international role and duty of the Red Army have called forth a
furious agitation and incitement against us by the Stalinist bureau-
crats. In the press and on the platform they are accusing the Left
Opposition of "provocation" to precipitate a war against the Soviet
Union. And with this monstrous slander as a covering formula
they are turning the internationalist concepts upside down, dis-
orienting the Communist workers, drugging them with murder-
ous doses of national-socialist poison, and closing their eyes to
one of the most important and decisive aspects of a fascist victory
in Germany. It is high time for an elucidation of this question in
the columns of the Militant, for it is precisely the function of the
internationalists to tell the truth and conceal nothing.
The Stalinist demagogy around this question is in essence a
capitulation before bourgeois public opinion. The Left Opposi-
tion has the duty not to retreat before this demagogy, but to probe
it to the bottom and reveal its treacherous implications. It is not
Cannon on Germany and Red Army 425
the danger of provoking a war on the Soviet Union that might be
avoided. It is the danger that the Soviet Union and the world's
working class will be taken unawares and fail of the necessary
preparation in a war that is inevitable if fascism triumphs in
Germany. That is the danger. That is the crux of the question.
It is hardly necessary to deny that the Left Opposition is
demanding that the Red Army "march to Germany" at the present
time and under the present conditions. For us it is self-evident
that the German working class will organize and conduct its own
struggle for power. That is why the Left Opposition concentrates
its agitation on the demand for a united front and a program of
action to smash fascism and clear the road for Soviets in Germany.
But in this life-and-death struggle, which will not be settled in a
day, the German bourgeoisie will seek and receive the support of
international capital— moral, financial, and, if necessary, military.
The German working class will also seek and must receive inter-
national support in no less degree. To exclude the Red Army from
participation in this grandiose world struggle on the side of the
German working class on the ground of "protecting the interests
of the Soviet Union" is to leave the ground of internationalism; to
bind oneself in advance to the national boundary lines established
by the bourgeoisie which in crucial moments are not in the least
binding on them; and in the final analysis to endanger the exist-
ence of the Soviet Union itself.
A fascist victory and consolidation in Germany means an
inevitable war on the Soviet Union. A victorious German fascism,
which has crushed the working class at home and annihilated its
organizations, would become the spearhead of a world attack on
the Soviet Union on a scale far surpassing the previous interven-
tions. This war would be accompanied by a worldwide wave of
reaction against the labor movement everywhere. Such a war,
headed by German fascism, cannot be undertaken now because
German fascism is not yet victorious; it has not consolidated its
power and established the economic and military basis for such
an undertaking. What stands in the way is— the German working
class, still powerful, still undefeated. The attempt of fascism to
crush the German working class is a necessary preliminary; looked
at correctly, it is already the beginning of the war. Can the
Red Army remain passive and indifferent to the outcome of this
struggle on German soil? Can it hesitate for a moment, in case of
426 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
need, to throw its weight into the scale before the fascization of
Germany is completed and the "march on Moscow" formally
begins? That is the question which we have raised in our speeches
and which evoked the rabid campaign of the Stalinists against us.
Please do not answer this question with acknowledgments of
internationalism "in principle" and "in general." The proletariat
was hurled into the bloody pit of the world war in 1914 by people
who "had no objections" to internationalism "in principle." The
question of internationalism, now as then, has a meaning in terms
of the concrete. The focal point of the international situation at
the present time is Germany. Our internationalism and the inter-
nationalism of the proletariat in every country, including the Soviet
Union and the Red Army, is put to the test there. Here the prin-
cipled lines must be clearly marked out and the fundamental ques-
tion given a precise answer. Our reference of course does not deal
with the moment and the nature of an intervention by the Red
Army on the side of the working class. Such questions naturally
belong to the domain of political and military strategy, which in
turn depends on an estimation of the conditions, the relation of
forces, the tempo of development, etc. As propagandists, our con-
cern now relates to the fundamental question of attitude and not
to the actions of the moment.
And here, we affirm our conviction— not "in general," if you
please, but in direct connection with the civil war in Germany—
that "the Red Army is not only the Red Army. It is the arm of the
proletarian world revolution." So it was conceived by its founders
and organizers. So it was understood by the workers of the entire
world and by its own soldiers under the Lenin teaching. Before
the Red Army ever existed in reality, before there was any "social-
ism in one country" or any talk about it, Lenin elucidated the
internationalist role of a proletariat (and its army) which would
triumph in "several or even in only one individual capitalist
country":
The victorious proletariat of that country (wrote Lenin in 1915) hav-
ing expropriated the capitalists and organized socialist production,
would be up in arms against the rest of the capitalist world, attract-
ing oppressed classes of the other countries to its side, causing in-
surrection in those countries against the capitalists and acting in
case of need even with military power against the exploiting classes
and their governments.
And it is known that Lenin was not talking idly and still less was
Cannon on Germany and Red Army 427
he "provoking" the capitalists to make war against the proletarian
country. For one thing he knew that the capitalist governments
needed no such provocation, but only the capacity to make good
with their war. He was speaking calmly and deliberately of what a
victorious proletariat in a single country should and must do "in
case of need." In Poland in 1920 and in Georgia the Lenin doctrine
laid down in 1915 had a literal fulfillment— the latter successfully
and the former unsuccessfully. But from the experience in each
case, Lenin and all the Marxists with him drew conclusions only
of a practical character relating to the situation, the time, the place,
and the "need." The demagogy of the bourgeoisie and their social-
democratic lackeys about "red imperialism" influenced his strategy
not at all and his principled considerations still less.
Zinoviev, chairman of the Comintern, said in 1919 in a speech
to 3,000 military experts of the Petrograd District at the Uritsky
Palace:
Military men often object, "but if the war is coming to an end now,
what will they do with us?". ..First, we must liberate, not only Rus-
sia, but also, together with the workers and peasants, the whole world
too. The international Red Army will grow. Our Red officers and
former officers of long standing will achieve the great honor of sup-
porting in their struggle not only the Russian workers and peasants,
but also the workers and peasants of France, Germany, and the other
countries, (applause)
There can be no greater honor than this! Is not the bourgeoisie
of France and England sending its sons to Taganrog, Novotcher-
kassk, Odessa, to train the Russian beasts for the struggle against
the workers and peasants? With far greater right we shall send our
best men to show the French and English workers how to organize
the Red Army, overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie, take the power
into the hands of the people.
It may be objected: Is it necessary to talk about this ABC
question of the international role of the Red Army? Isn't this
understood by everybody and is it not best to keep quiet so as not
to alarm the class enemy? Yes, it is necessary to speak because,
unfortunately, in these days of the Stalinist degeneration there is
a lack of understanding and more than that, there is a muddling
and distortion of the question which forebodes great evil to the
cause of the international proletariat. The very fact that the
Stalinist bureaucrats incite against us for our reference to the
international role of the Red Army in the German events conceals
within it the most treacherous implications. The dogma of
428 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
socialism in one country has wrought a fearful havoc in the brains
of those who stand before the Communist proletariat in the
capacity of official leaders.
Wicks, for example, said at the Bronx meeting that "the Red
Army is international in the sense that the workers of the other
countries will join it. The German workers will make their own
revolution and organize their own Red Armv." This half-truth con-
tains a treacherous lie, for it evades and thereby answers in the
negative the question of whether the existing Red Armv will help
the German workers to make their own revolution "in case of
need." This is the theory of neutrality toward the civil war of the
classes in Germany, of capitulation to bourgeois opinion. If the
Russian proletariat is not to intervene, in its own way and with its
own means, then why should we in America "intervene,"' as we
are doing now in our own way and with our own means? In this
connection it is not without significance that the first meetings of
the Party on the German crisis were held three weeks after the
appointment of Hitler and onlv then after the Left Opposition
had shaken the whole Party with its campaign and driven the panic-
stricken bureaucrats into action.
Yes, it is necessary for the Left Opposition to speak openly
about this and every other problem of the German civil war, giv-
ing each one its proper place and emphasis at the moment but
concealing and soft-pedaling on none. The Left Opposition is a
small faction armed with great ideas which have been tested and
confirmed in world events. It can grow and expand in numbers
and influence onlv bv being true to itself, fearing no incitement.
and telling the whole truth to the Communist workers about each
and every question. Our mission is to keep alive the doctrine and
spirit of internationalism. That cannot be done fully and com-
pletely without elucidating the question of the Red Army and the
German revolution.
429
Motion on the Illinois Mining Campaign
by Max Shachtman441
24 February 1933
This motion was attached to the minutes of the February 24 resident
committee meeting attended only by Cannon, Shachtman, and Abern.
Cannon submitted a statement for the minutes: "I disagree with the motion
as formulated by comrade Shachtman and will submit counterproposals
to the committee." He put forward a motion to conduct the discussion on
the mining campaign in the Internal Bulletin, and another to publish
in the Militant only material on the miners approved by the editorial
board. Both were adopted unanimously.
The National Committee adopts the following line of policy
with regard to the situation in the Progressive Miners of America
and the tasks of the Left Opposition within it:
1. The insurgent movement in and around the PMA is a progres-
sive movement of the rank-and-file miners seeking to rid themselves
of bureaucratism, reaction, and class collaborationism as symbol-
ized by the agents of the bourgeoisie, Lewis, Walker, and co. This
circumstance determines the support which the Left Opposition
gives to this movement.
2. One of the greatest weaknesses of the PMA is the fact that the
"Third Period" policies of the official Communist Party have dras-
tically reduced the influence of Communism as such among the
members of the PMA, discredited the name and prestige of Com-
munism to a large extent, and isolated the Communists from the
organization. This leaves the PMA without a firm Communist
nucleus, that is, a revolutionary lever, in its ranks. If it exists and
above all if it pursued a correct policy, its presence would be the
best guarantee against the degeneration of this miners' movement.
3. The absence of a Communist nucleus in the PMA has made it
possible— at least it has been one of the principal factors— for a
more or less heterogeneous element to gain control of the move-
ment from the very beginning. The fact that the leadership of the
PMA comes largely from the "ranks," that among them are many
430 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
"sincere" and "honest" elements, only means that it is possible to
win many of them to a genuinely class-struggle standpoint, but does
not change the fundamental nature of the ideology of this leader-
ship and the role it plays. A political estimate of this leadership and
its policies (which it is already possible to make upon the basis of
its actions up to now, its official pronouncements, its tendency)
leads to the conclusion which is fortified by all experience with
such and similar elements in this and other countries: The contin-
ued domination of the PMA, unchallenged, by these elements
means the certain degeneration of the new union into a reformist,
class-collaborationist, or even outright reactionary movement.
4. Of the several forces contending for influence (which means
domination, in the last analysis) in the PMA, it is possible to dis-
cern the following groups or tendencies: a. a reactionary, anti-
Communist, pure-and-simple trade-unionist tendency, which, while
apparently not well knit organizationally on a district scale, is
closely bound together by its ideology; b. the Socialist Party,
particularly the Norman Thomas "militant" wing, which has
reestablished its influence and organization to a large extent in
the coalfields as a result of a skillful campaign of demagogic sup-
port to the new movement and by taking advantage of the weak-
ness of the Communist Party, which formerly held the position of
the dominating workers' party in that field; c. the Muste group
(CPLA), which has several of its direct supporters actively engaged
in the official work of the PMA and whose dangerous and treach-
erous ideology is reflected to a large extent by the present official
leadership of the PMA; d. a vague, formless, unorganized element
of militant rank-and-file miners who are serving as the officials
in many posts, among whom there are many sound proletarian
elements, who want a "clean and militant union" but who are "mili-
tant" reformists or less than that; e. the official Communist Party,
which objective circumstances have compelled to "drop" the NMU
sect and to attach itself to the PMA, with the obvious intention of
penetrating and influencing it; f. finally, the Left Opposition,
which is directly represented in the movement by its two members
and by a certain moderate prestige it enjoys among a small num-
ber of miners in some localities.
5. As the problems confronting the PMA increase, as they demand
an answer in the course of the struggles and activities in which it
Shachtman on Illinois Miners 431
must engage, the position of each of these groups and consequently
the groups themselves will become more clearly defined and will
be counterposed, one to the other, in increasingly sharp form. The
present "vague" and "loose" lines— which are not visible to the
masses of the miners, but are fairly distinct to us— will, in a word,
take on unmistakable and conflicting form, clear enough for every
worker to distinguish. The task of the Left Opposition is to help
strengthen the left-wing and Communist line and movement as
the best (and only basic) guarantee against the reformist degen-
eration of the new union.
6. To fulfill this task is a tremendous problem, but we can begin
to solve it not so much by skillful maneuvering as by intransigence
in principle— even though the two are not mutually exclusive. The
first step in this direction is the establishment of the independent,
disciplined, reliable fractions of the Left Opposition, however small may
be the numbers we can rally at the outset on this "narrow" basis.
Neither organizational nor political maneuvers can offer a substi-
tute for this quintessential preliminary in point of order or in point
of emphasis. One of the main reasons for the purely literary
influence to which we are limited in southern Illinois is precisely
the fact that we have no such fractions or organizations, that in
the past our activity has been largely dissolved into amorphous,
unstable, and speedily dissolved "progressive groups" or "educa-
tional leagues." The first task of the Left Opposition members
and groups (which should be recruited on a broad basis) is to dis-
tinguish itself by word and deed (i.e., by policy and conduct) from
the other tendencies in the PMA. Without in any way associating
ourselves with the false policies of Stalinism, our comrades must
maintain an independent and an actively critical attitude not only
toward the conservative and reactionary elements in the new
union, but especially toward the Socialist Party and the CPLA,
which are pursuing an anti-Communist (consequently, an antipro-
gressive) course in the PMA. But especially in order to make clear
the distinction between our opposition to these two organizations
and the opposition that may be manifested toward them by other
elements (sometimes out of reactionary considerations or out of
"pure-and-simple" trade-unionistic considerations), our comrades
must also separate themselves from the present leadership of the
union, which is not following a course essentially different from
432 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
that of the CPLA et al. We cannot make an inch of headway by
maintaining a silence of tacit consent by neglecting to make
urgently necessary criticism out of "diplomatic" considerations.
7. Up to the present time, we have not dealt with this task in the
proper manner. With the exception of one or two comments in
the Militant with regard to comrade Allard, we have not clearly
disassociated ourselves from the standpoints which he has devel-
oped in the PMA, as an active leader of it and as editor of its
official organ. Meanwhile, it is necessary, unfortunately, to estab-
lish the fact that comrade Allard has followed a course which has
already served to discredit his revolutionary position and along
with it to discredit the Left Opposition. For this the National Com-
mittee itself bears a share of the responsibility, but the main bur-
den of it falls upon comrade Allard himself. In no way can we any
longer take the slightest responsibility for the editorials he writes
in the Progressive Miner, which are in flagrant conflict with the
line of the Left Opposition. We have come to the point where the
extenuating circumstances of comrade Allard's youth and inexpe-
rience are far outweighed by the fact that the Left Opposition is
being heavily compromised by his position. To occupy the post of
editor of the paper of a reformist trade union is already a diffi-
cult and dubious position, even in the case of a highly experienced
and capable Communist. Here matters are made worse by the fact
that comrade Allard's position is most frequently indistinguish-
able from that of a left social democrat. Instead of marking himself
off from the reformist (at best, confusionist) leadership, he has
more and more merged his position with that of the latter. Instead
of attacking the Socialist Party (of course skillfully, not as if he
were editing a Communist paper but nevertheless as if he were a
Communist editing a trade-union paper which if progressive
should allow free expression of opinion), he declares that he has
no quarrel with it. Instead of shattering the miners' illusions in
the bourgeoisie, its legislature, and its state governor, comrade
Allard has been unwittingly fostering those illusions. It is now
imperative for the League to explain patiently and in a comradely
manner to comrade Allard the untenable position he is in and
the intolerable relationship between his position and that of the
Left Opposition— but to do this with the aim of coming now to a
final conclusion in this case. Further delay will not only be of harm
Shachtman on Illinois Miners 433
to comrade Allard, but more than that, it will dangerously com-
promise the League.
8. At the same time, we must also record a very serious short-
coming of the League's position toward the PMA, as revealed by
the position taken by our representative, comrade Cannon, at the
Gillespie conference. Both the report of comrade Cannon in the
Militant and the heading are misleading, uncritical, and inad-
equate. Comrade Cannon was sent to the Gillespie conference in
order to present to the delegates there, or to as many as possible,
the standpoint of the League. The TUUL, together with other aux-
iliaries of the Communist Party, not only sent their representa-
tives to the conference, but they appeared in their own name,
advanced their policy (such as it was), and were elected on the
permanent committee at the end of the conference.
We consider it a serious mistake that comrade Cannon
appeared at the conference, was seated there, and spoke to the
assembled delegates, not as a representative of the Communist
League, but as a result of the incorrect and unjustifiable maneu-
ver of introducing himself to the conference as a representa-
tive of "left-wing workers in New York" and speaking as such a
representative. To appear before the workers in this manner—
"incognito, under a mask"— was an entirely false concession to the
reactionary and pseudoprogressive elements at the conference.
This is not the case of a rank-and-file miner, who, in order to retain
contact with the masses in a reactionary union, is sometimes obli-
gated to deceive the fakers by denying his membership in the revo-
lutionary organization. It is the case of an outstanding known
leader and national secretary of the CLA. The subterfuge was fur-
ther rendered harmful by the fact that the comrade who one week
presents himself in the guise of a representative of "left-wing work-
ers in New York" is present the preceding and succeeding weeks,
in the columns of the Militant which is read by miners, as the
national secretary of the Communist League. The League would
be making an enormous error to sanction the tactic of its leading
representatives, its formal, known spokesmen, acting among the
miners under some "innocuous" banner, in the name of a
"harmless" group, by means of anonymity— and, what inevitably
accompanies such a tactic, to speak without distinguishing our
position from that of the reformists and the confusionists in the
4M CLA 1931-33: The Fight
PMA leadership, without conveying to the delegates and workers
our critical altitude toward them.
A criticism of the leadership and the policies of the PMA, at
least such a criticism as could and should have been made at the
conference, was not delivered by our representative, as we gather
from the report in the Militant and the Progressive Miner. Our criti-
cism of the original plan to "form a new federation of labor" was
of secondary importance, for this plan was far from the worst of
(he mistakes made in the past and being made now by the PMA
leadership. As it is now, in the eyes of the Communist workers on
(he one hand and of the Illinois miners on the other, the Commu-
nis! I ,eague of America has no position different from that of the
union's leadership, or more accurately, our position is not in any
way as clearly disassociated from the Pearcy-Keck position as the
whole situation and our task demand. It is necessary to understand
and establish the nature of the Gillespie conference and the part
we played in il so that a similar error shall no! he repeated in the
future, so thai our miner-comrades shall he- clearly oriented in (heir
work, SO thai (he organizers we are sending now and in the future
into the Illinois field shall conduct themselves on the basis of past
experiences and the necessary con eel ions in our policy.
9. Beginning immediately, before the interests of the League (and
consequently of the progressive miners' movement) are further
harmed, we must lake a clear and unambiguous stand in the Mili-
tant especially toward the whole question of our relations with the
PMA and the various tendencies within it. However belatedly, we
must begin with a Hal-tooted— not hostile, but honest and open—
ciii ic ism of the course the PMA is now being compelled to follow
by its leadership and the dangers confronting the movement. If
our influence in this movement is still at a very low point, at its
inception as a matter of fact, the way to increase it is the one out-
lined in the preceding paragraphs. Above all, it is necessary to
make our position clear to our own members of the League in
such a manner that no room is left tor unclarity, ambiguity, or
opportunistic errors. Toward this end, it is necessary not only to
utilize the columns of the Militant for articles written with the
Militant "reading public" in mind, not only to utilize the presence
of comrade Oehler in the coalfields, but also to send out the
present statement of policy lor the information and discussion of
the League- members.
435
Statement on the Dispute over the
Red Army and the German Situation
by Max Shachtman
12 March 1933
This statement was published in CLA Internal Bulletin no. 10
(18 March 1933).
On March 1 Cannon submitted his "Resolution on the Red Army
and the German Revolution" to the resident committee. Noting that
Shachtman 's February 24 motion was "a capitulatory retreat before the
pogrom agitation of the Stalinists around this question, " Cannon insisted:
The Red Army exists to defend the conquests of the October revolution
and to aid in extending this revolution to other countries. The Red
Army is not only the arm of the Soviet Union as it exists at the present
time within the territorial limits of old Russia (and not even the whole
of that), but it is in the fullest sense of the word the arm of the interna-
tional proletariat. [...J
The agitation of the American Stalinists to the effect that "the Red
Army is international in the sense that the workers of other countries
will eventually join it"; of Wicks, that the German workers must com-
plete their own revolution and organize their own Red Army without
the direct aid of the existing Red Army of the Soviet Union, and that
the elucidation of the true international role of the Red Army by the
Left Opposition is "provocation for a war on the Soviet Union "-in all
this agitation of the Stalinists there are contained the most reactionary
national socialist conceptions and an ideological preparation to sanc-
tion a colossal betrayal. The spirit of this agitation is, in essence, the
spirit of August 4, 1914. This the Left Opposition must say out loud.442
Shachtman voted against Cannon's motion to adopt the resolution
as "the guiding line of our policy in the Militant and on the platform."
Cannon's resolution was also jmblished in CLA Internal Bulletin no. 10.
The motion hy comrade Cannon on "The Red Army and the
German Revolution" demands an unambiguous and blunt reply.
The whole dispute is presented by him in a deliberately falsified
light, and an objective discussion of it is recklessly perverted for
the factional ends of his group. This is not the first time Cannon
436 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
has practiced this method in our internal disputes; this time, how-
ever, he has exceeded all possibly legitimate boundaries.
Some Facts
My original motion on the question is characterized as if it
were forced upon me by semi-Stalinist elements in the League (who
are they?) for the purpose of "manufacturing" political differences
with the National Committee majority. Exactly the contrary is the
case. So that the precise nature of the dispute and the manner in
which it arose may be known, it is necessary to establish the
following facts.
At our first meeting on the German situation in the Stuyvesant
Casino, comrade Cannon in his speech raised the slogan of mobi-
lizing the Red Army to intervene in Germany. This is not a "Stalinist
lie" but a simple statement of fact. "Hitler's knife is poised over
the body of the German proletariat"— I quote directly from
Cannon's speech— "The Red Army must shoot the knife out of the
hands of fascism." This was no mere rhetorical flourish. Everyone
in the audience understood it in just that sense. The numerous
questions that were asked from the floor, orally and in writing,
showed that this is how everybody understood Cannon's slogan.
Nor did Cannon seek to rectify any "misunderstanding" when work-
ers in the audience protested against the demand to send the Red
Army into Germany under present circumstances. Shachtman, in
replying to the questions from the floor, was obviously unable to
separate himself openly from Cannon's position, and consequently
confined his remarks to an explanation of the principled Commu-
nist position on the international role of the Red Army, illustrat-
ing our stand bv reference to the events in Poland in 1920 and in
Georgia in 1921. Unfortunately the damage had already been done
and it was obvious that the workers present did not perceive a dis-
tinction between the two presentations.
Had the matter rested there, it would have remained an
incident without much repercussion. I did not take up the matter
officially, although any number of our League members requested
that I bring up the question in the National Committee. At the
German meeting in Brooklyn, however, Cannon repeated the same
false slogan in somewhat different terms, but no less unmistak-
able in purport.
The impression immediately made the rounds of the Commu-
Shachtman Statement on Red Army 437
nist and sympathizing workers that this was the viewpoint of the
Left Opposition. Wicks (with whose view I will deal further on) at
the Bronx meeting exploited this irresponsible blunder of Cannon
to the maximum, seeking to whip up a lynching spirit against the
Oppositionists present, whose arguments for the united-front
policy he found it impossible to meet. Among the Communist
workers— both among followers of the Stalin faction and the
Lovestone faction— the discussion of our viewpoint (in New York,
of course) immediately turned away from our main standpoint
(united front) to a discussion of the slogan raised by Cannon, on
which score our opponents naturally took the offensive.
It thus became imperative that the matter be brought up
formally in the National Committee. Far from seeking to make a
factional issue of the matter I was concerned with the League and
its leading representatives adopting a correct position without mak-
ing the question a subject for factional dispute. It was in this spirit that
I discussed the matter not only with comrades directly associated
with me in the internal League dispute, but with a number of com-
rades who are not associated with either of the factions. It is a
demonstrable fact that I wrote my original motion after consulta-
tion with the latter; it was they who suggested that I write the
motion in that manner, without making a criticism of Cannon, with-
out even mentioning his name, without referring directly to the
mass meetings or the fact that Cannon raised the slogan in the
manner mentioned above. I readily agreed with this suggestion.
My main concern was not with an attack upon Cannon, but with
settling the question correctly and without factional bickering.
Cannon's reply to this effort can be read in his document.
When my motion was introduced into the committee, Cannon
opposed its adoption. Later he presented— not a countermotion,
but an article for the Militant, filled with ambiguous formulations,
deliberate evasions of the only real issue involved, and factional
attacks upon his opponents in the League (myself in particular)
made in the now customary form of innuendo and insinuation. I
voted against the article and demanded that before any article on
the disputed point is printed in the official organ of the League,
the National Committee should first adopt an official position—
an opposite procedure being false from beginning to end.
The official position proposed by Cannon was presented by him
at a later meeting in the form of the motion referred to above.
438 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
This motion is not meant, so to say, for "New York consump-
tion," but exclusively for the record and for the branches outside
of New York. For while there is of course no stenographic record,
the New York comrades— and the hundreds of other workers who
attended the mass meetings— know only too well what Cannon
really said and advocated in his speeches. They can and will
designate his present denial of his own slogan as nothing but a
falsehood. That this denial is made amid a barrage of fire against
me will not suffice— at least not in New York— to cover up the
incontestable facts.
"In his journalistic (ahem!) comments in the Militant" writes
Cannon, who does not make any sort of comment in the Militant,
"comrade Shachtman has not devoted a single word to the slan-
der of the Stalinists, has not answered it, has not called it slan-
der." Shachtman's motion, continues Cannon, "is not an answer
to this slander. It is a supplement to it." This "slander," i.e., the
charge that Cannon advocated in his speeches the immediate Red
Army intervention in Germany, was first made at the Stuyvesant
Casino meeting on February 5 by workers present who challenged
Cannon's exposition on this point. Cannon did not call it a slan-
der then, nor did he think it necessary to point out to these work-
ers that this was not really his position. When Wicks repeated it
at the Bronx meeting two weeks later on February 19, Cannon
did not consider it a slander either. He never once proposed to
me or anyone else that the Militant should repudiate Wicks' charge
as a perversion of our point of view. He never once proposed, did
not even mention, that he would write anything in the Militant so
that his actual position and the actual position of the International
Left Opposition might be clearly stated. Cannon presented his
article on the Red Army for Militant publication only at the National
Committee meeting of February 24, that is, only after I had intro-
duced my motion on policy, which evidently caused comrade Cannon
to reflect on the untenability of his previous position.
But instead of making a simple acknowledgment of the error,
he merely denies the whole thing and seeks to cover it up with a
violent factional assault upon me. We have always attacked the
Stalinist leadership for its repugnant method of "self-criticism,"
which consists in ascribing to others the mistakes which it itself
has made, or in covering up its own mistakes by bald denials that
they were made or by concocting "mistakes" on the part of its
Shachtman Statement on Red Army 439
opponents or critics. In the present dispute, there is no distin-
guishable difference between the method we attack and the
method employed by comrade Cannon.
But you are capitulating to the Stalinist pogrom agitation
against the Opposition? Not in the least. The best way to meet
such an agitation is to present our position correctly and not falsely,
so that we force the Stalinists to attack us for what we really advo-
cate. That they do not like to do, because it cannot be done
successfully. The argument about "capitulation" and "retreat" is
simply flag-waving in a demagogic appeal to sentiment. When
Urbahns demanded the "return of the Chinese Eastern Railway"
to Chiang Kai-shek, the Stalinists launched a violent campaign
against him and the whole Left Opposition. Their agitation against
Urbahns' utterly false position (like the Wicksian agitation against
us now) had a distinctly reactionary and national-Bolshevik flavor
in many respects. This did not prevent Trotsky and the ILO from
condemning Urbahns and eventually breaking from him. We did
not then "capitulate" to the Stalinist agitation, as Urbahns accused
us at that time! And we did dissociate ourselves from the Stalinists
at the same time. The real capitulator at that time was Urbahns,
and his capitulation was in the direction of Korschist ultraleftism.
When the right wing in the French Opposition was capitulating
to its "allies" in the Opposition Unitaire, Trotsky did not hesitate
to distinguish himself from the former, even though it was under
attack by the Stalinists (who attacked it from the Stalinist, i.e., the
false, standpoint).
In the present case, the Stalinists and Lovestoneites have
launched an attack upon the Opposition in the same way: Their
attack upon Cannon's position has a distinctly nationalist and
treacherous connotation; they utilize Cannon's false slogans in
order to cover up their own reactionary position. Cannon, on the
other hand, tries to cover up his own error and to make factional
capital against us by bracketing me and several unnamed others
with Wicks and the Stalinist pogrom agitation to which I am
"capitulating." But it is precisely in order to arm our comrades
against Wicks and co. that I proposed to settle the question by my
motion, aimed to end the confusion in Cannon's presentation and
the consequent confusion on the subject which he has helped to
create among our own comrades as well.
Even this stratagem might be contemptuously overlooked were
440 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
it not for the fact that Cannon's motion on policy does not yet
make matters clear.
What is the dispute about? The only genuine point at issue has
already been indicated above. To evade this point, Cannon "finds"
a point of "principled" dispute. As this does not exist, so far as I
am concerned, Cannon is merely creating straw men to knock
down, is merely rushing violently through open doors. Toward the
beginning of his motion, Cannon grudgingly acknowledges that I
recognize the truly international role of the Red Army, its "defen-
sive" as well as "offensive" role. I do it, of course, "apologetically,"
"negatively," "defensively"; comrade Cannon, being more radical,
does it fearlessly, positively, and aggressively. But toward the end
of his document, carried away by his own flourishes, he charges
me with a "gross perversion of principle."
To my mind there is only one perversion of principle conceiv-
able in this question: the assignment of a purely defensive role to
the Red Army. Such a perversion is really practiced by the
Stalinists, who assign to the Red Army and to an ever increasing
extent to the whole Communist International the role of defend-
ing the frontiers of the Soviet Union, neither more nor less; this
practice flows from their fundamental theory of socialism in one
country. If I share this standpoint to any degree, then there is little
room indeed left for me in the Opposition. Fortunately, matters
are not so bad. My reply to the questions from the floor at the
Stuyvesant Casino meeting was heard by everybody; I spoke at
length on the fundamental principles involved in the Polish
offensive and in the Red Army's activities in the Georgian revolu-
tion. Comrade Cannon's expositions do not "convince" me for
the simple reason that I was convinced quite a while ago that the
Soviet Union and its Red Army have not only a "defensive" but
also an "offensive" role to play. Together with many others I also
learned in the Marxian primers that 1. "Only a traitor can reject
the offensive in principle"; and 2. "Only a blockhead, however,
can confine all strategy to the offensive." Because I take such ideas
for granted, in our ranks at any rate, I do not find it necessary to
present a lengthy argumentation in favor of them when I present
a motion to the National Committee; I confine myself, as I did in
the present case, to a reference to the Polish and Georgian cases.
Comrade Cannon's annoyance with my point of view does not
arise out of the fact that I fail to recognize the "offensive" role of
Shachtman Statement on Red Army 441
the Red Army as well, or that I recognize it "apologetically." It arises
out of the fact that I recognize it so unmistakably that it does not
fit into his factional constructions against me and compels him to
resort for an argument to worked-up protests against a supposed
"apologetic" formulation.
Is there a distinction between the "defensive" and the "offen-
sive"? In the fundamental sense which was attributed to the distinc-
tion during the World War by each of the imperialist powers and
their respective social patriots to justify the "defense of the father-
land," it does not exist. Is there a distinction in the case under
consideration? Of course there is, even though not a fundamen-
tal one.
What is required at the present moment, especially in the ranks
of the Opposition, is not banalities and extensive disquisitions on
the fact that the Red Army cannot be excluded from participat-
ing in the world revolution, that it is not to be confined to a
defensive role only. No. What is required is a clear and unambigu-
ous presentation of the task of the Red Army now, at the present
conjuncture of events. In his motion, comrade Cannon still fails
to give a correct presentation, because what he says is ambiguous,
vague, rhetorical, and he reveals that he has not yet completely
given up the false position which he now denies having advanced.
For the Red Army to remain passive (he writes) while the German
working class is crushed under the heel of fascism, its organizations
annihilated and its capacity for resistance destroyed for a number
of years, would not only create the conditions for a world imperial-
ist assault against the Soviet Union led by German fascism and en-
danger the existence of the former. It would also signify in no smaller
degree a colossal betrayal of the German and consequently of the
whole international proletariat on the part of the whole Stalinist
leadership. For the Left Opposition to keep silent in the face of a
policy that leads objectively in this direction, for it to retreat to a
presentation of the question from the point of view simply of the
self-defense of the present Soviet Union, would be to make itself a
party to this historical betrayal.
And just what is the Red Army to do while "the German work-
ing class is crushed under the heel of fascism"? That is, what is it
to do if— assuming the worst variant— the German working class
"remains passive," if it fails to organize its resistance in time, if it
continues as at present without having organized even a serious
national defensive movement, much less an offensive against
fascism? The Opposition counts, of course, upon arousing the
442 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Communists and the proletariat in good time; it goes without saying
that we have not drawn a "finis" line under the struggle in Ger-
many. But to ask the above question is enough to show how equivo-
cal and therefore dangerous is comrade Cannon's formulation.
Again: In his article for the Militant, Cannon pleasantly
insinuates an identity between my position and that of the social
democracy during the World War. They were "also" for "interna-
tionalism in principle"; but when the question became "concrete
and specific," they betrayed. In his motion he continues: "It is not
now a problem of the right and duty of the Red Army to be ready
to 'carry out revolutionary tasks' in some indefinite place beyond
the 'frontiers' of the present Soviet Republic. The place is Ger-
many. And the question is: the revolutionary tasks of the Red Army
in the German revolution." What is the only possible meaning of
the shoddy comparison? If it has any meaning, it is this: Shachtman,
like the social democrats, is quite ready to acknowledge interna-
tionalism "in principle"; he is ready to give the Red Army the right
and duty to intervene beyond the "frontiers" of the present Soviet
Union— "in principle"; but now, when "the place is Germany," when
the "question is concrete and specific," Shachtman... capitulates to
Stalinist national Bolshevism. The cloven hoof of the position which
Cannon denies he ever held sticks right out of this argument.
Finally: The essence of comrade Trotsky's warnings, writes
Cannon, is "that the Soviet Union must not wait until the fascists
'are marching on the Soviets' but must strike them down before
they are ready. The 'self-defense ' of the Soviet Union in this case
merges completely into the offensive struggle against German fascism
and the defense of the German revolution" This is not, to our mind,
the essence of comrade Trotsky's warnings. The advice that the
Red Army be mobilized as soon as the fascists take power I construe
as follows: We must not wait for the mobilization, the preparation,
the arousing of the Soviet Union and its Red Army until the fas-
cists have completed their preparations for the attack, supported
and urged on by French and international imperialism. This prepa-
ration and mobilization must take place before then, as a "matter
of revolutionary self-defense in a most direct and immediate sense."
To sound the alarm now, to mobilize the Red Army now for the
defense of the Soviet Union, is precisely the way of preventing
the fascists from "drawling this martial air," of forcing them "to
sing it staccato." If war is inevitable— and if fascism wins, it is
Shachtman Statement on Red Army 443
inevitable— the mobilization of the Red Army now will make it
possible for the Soviets to conduct the war of defense under con-
ditions unfavorable to fascism which will not yet have had the
opportunity of suppressing the enemy at home, i.e., the proletar-
ian movement.
Comrade Cannon construes the warning to mean that the Red
Army "must strike them down (the fascists) before they are ready."
This, too, if it has a serious significance, can only mean an imme-
diate military attack (now or within the very next period) upon
Hitlerite Germany as well as upon Pilsudski's Poland, which lies
between the two and which, apparently, is a trifle that does not
enter into comrade Cannon's calculations. As for the "defense of
the German revolution," the tragedy lies precisely in the fact that
this revolution has not yet even begun, and the last way to begin
it is that which is implicit in Cannon's exposition.
Does this mean that the Red Army, after all, has no offensive
role to play? Quite the contrary. Comrade Cannon juggles with
phrases about the defense of Russia, offensive against Hitler,
defense of the German revolution. Let us put it precisely. The
Russo-Polish war of 1920 was forced upon the Soviets by the
Pilsudski offensive; for the Soviets, it was a war of self-defense. In
the course of this defensive war and as a part of it (plus the fact
that the vitality of the Red Army and the maturity of the Polish
proletariat were overestimated by Lenin and the Bolsheviks), it
was converted into an offensive war against Pilsudski. Leaving aside
the false tactical estimations of the Bolsheviks, the Polish events
were a demonstration of how the Red Army did and should fulfill
its revolutionary internationalist role of defending the socialist
fatherland and extending the proletarian revolution by coming to
the assistance of the insurrectionary working class in other lands.
If the present question is concrete and specific— and it certainly
is— the task of the Red Army must be put concretely and specifi-
cally. Generalities about "time" and "place" and "relations of forces"
do not suffice. It is necessary to point out what the "relation of
forces" actually is at the present time and in the given place. This is
left entirely vague by comrade Cannon. Just what role the Red Army
can play, specifically and not "in principle," must be stated clearly
and unequivocally; but it is not done by comrade Cannon. It must
be done in order to eliminate the confusion created. We must point
out, in addition to the above-outlined, that which the Bolsheviks a
444 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
decade ago explained so clearly in connection with the Georgian
revolution. (Merely to repeat here what I said in my motion, i.e.,
my entire agreement with the quotation from comrade Trotsky
which follows, would suffice by itself, if more were needed, to give
the deserved answer to "gross perversion of principle" which Can-
non has discovered in my views.)
The crux of the matter (wrote Trotsky over ten years ago) consists
in the fact that the Soviet revolution in Georgia (which was indeed
brought about with the active participation of the Red Army, for we
would have betrayed the workers and peasants of Georgia if we had
not assisted them by our armed forces, since we had such), took place
after the experiment of three years of Georgian "independence" and
under conditions which guaranteed not merely a temporary mili-
tary success, but also further political development for the revolu-
tion—that is, the extension and strengthening of the Soviet system
in Georgia itself. And in this (if the thickheaded pedants of democ-
racy will allow me to say so) our revolutionary task consists. The
politicians of the Second International in unison with their men-
tors from their bourgeois diplomatic chancelleries smile sardonically
at our recognition of the rights of national self-determination. This
they designate as a trap for simpletons— a bait held out by Russian
imperialism. In reality it is history itself which is holding out these
baits, instead of settling the questions in a straightforward way. In
any case we cannot be accused of turning the zigzags of historical
development into traps, for, while actually recognizing the right of
national self-determination, we take care to explain to the masses
its limited historical significance and we never put it above the in-
terests of the proletarian revolution. A workers state, in recogniz-
ing the right of self-determination, thereby recognizes that revolu-
tionary coercion is not an all-powerful historical factor. Soviet Russia
does not by any means intend to make its military power take the
place of the revolutionary efforts of the proletariats of other coun-
tries. The conquest of proletarian power must be an outcome of
proletarian political experience. This does not mean that the revo-
lutionary efforts of the workers of Georgia or any other country
must not receive any military support from outside. It is only essen-
tial that this support should come at a moment when the need for
it has been created by the political development of the workers and
recognized by the class-conscious revolutionary vanguard, who have
won the sympathy of the majority of the workers. These are ques-
tions of revolutionary strategy and not a formal democratic ritual.443
If comrade Cannon has a point of view "different from that
of comrade Shachtman" and "against it"— it is against the conclu-
sions which the Bolsheviks drew from the Polish and Georgian
events that he will have to counterpose it.
Shachtman Statement on Red Army 445
This is not the place to deal with the factional "appendix" which
Cannon attaches to his argumentation on the Red Army. Its con-
tent will be dealt with at the proper time and in the proper place.
The slanders and falsehoods against the National Committee
minority which Cannon always injects into a disputed question (and
he does it invariably by first raising the hue and cry about our "poi-
sonous" methods) will be answered in full on a more fitting occa-
sion. We will not permit this discussion, however, to be deliber-
ately muddled up and befogged by extraneous questions, which
are calculated to distract attention from the retreat on the disputed
question which Cannon has been compelled to make. However,
since the "appendix" is what he is principally concerned with (it is
clear that all which precedes it serves merely as a preface to the
factional attack), it is necessary to make the following observations:
1. Cannon does not "poison the atmosphere" of the internal dis-
cussion in the League. Far from it. He only designates anonymous
individuals or groups of individuals as semi-Stalinists. What are
their names and addresses, so that the League may know who they
are and be able to combat them properly instead of in the dark?
Cannon, who fights in the open, is holding that "information" in
reserve.
2. Cannon, who does not "hunt for deviations," has quite recently
discovered a capitulationist tendency in the League. To be exact,
the discovery dates back one month; the incentive to the discov-
ery does not originate here, but to be exact again, in Germany.
When the German Opposition was fighting Landau, Cannon dis-
covered Landauism in the American League. When the French
Opposition was engaged in a struggle with Naville, Cannon dis-
covered (among the same comrades) Navillism in the American
League. As soon as the news arrived of the Well capitulation in
Germany, Cannon proceeded to discover (again among the same
comrades) Wellism or capitulationism in the America League. For
one brief week, these same comrades were accused of "Lacroixism"
because they advocated the issuance of an internal organizational
bulletin by the New York branch. Tomorrow it will be something
else— all in the interests of the "international education" of the
League. Comrade Cannon's method is: any stick to beat a dog.
3. In his "appendix" Cannon develops this idea or, rather, this
threat: The minority, starting out "without political differences"
with his faction, is now trying to manufacture them in order to
446 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
have a "different platform." Translated more clearly, this means:
Regardless of the position taken from now on by comrade Can-
non on this or that question, the minority will be charged with
the unprincipled manufacturing of differences if it presumes to
challenge the correctness of Cannon's stand; it will be charged
with Stalinism, semi-Stalinism, capitulation to Stalinism, etc. In
politics this is commonly known as political blackmail. We will be
all the less deterred by this threat when we take a position on any
given question, because of the meaning of the threat.
4. The violence of the attack Cannon makes upon us in his motion
would be perplexing if the fact that there is another disputed ques-
tion on the agenda did not make it clear. I refer to the dispute on
comrade Cannon's policy in Gillespie and in the Illinois mining
situation generally. The unusual fierceness of his attack on the
"Red Army question" is comprehensible only as a barrage laid
down to cover an opportunist position in the "miners' question."
The abusive charge of "capitulation to Stalinism" will not, however,
serve the purpose required by comrade Cannon. Each question
will be put on its own feet and dealt with accordingly.
«fr 4> 4>
Note on Shachtman's Statement
by James P. Cannon
Published 18 March 1933
This undated statement was published in CLA Internal Bulletin
no. 10 (18 March 1933).
In his second document comrade Shachtman had the oppor-
tunity to correct the false formulations in his motion on policy
with regard to the situation in Germany and the role of the Red
Army. Instead of doing that, he only succeeded in demonstrating,
in his lengthy statement, that his first motion is a real expression
of his point of view. By that he convinces me over again that the
answer I made in my resolution was the only possible answer.
The statement of comrade Shachtman that, at the meeting at
the Stuyvesant Casino on February 5, "Cannon in his speech raised
Cannon on Shachtman Statement 447
the slogan of mobilizing the Red Army to intervene immediately
in Germany" is a lie invented after the fact or, more correctly,
borrowed from the Stalinists after he and others associated with
him had felt the full force of the Stalinist pogrom agitation.
Neither Shachtman nor anyone else in our ranks ever said or
even intimated by one word to me that such a construction could
justly be placed on my remarks at the Stuyvesant meeting. Neither
Shachtman nor anyone else ever suggested to me at any time that
there was any disagreement with my treatment of the question.
After the Stuyvesant meeting I spoke again in the same sense at
the Bronx meeting on February 12. I repeated it again at the
Brooklyn meeting a few days later. The motion of Shachtman
introduced at the NC meeting on February 24, nearly three weeks
later, was the first intimation given to me by anybody that the
Stalinist slander had made its way into our ranks. And even then
I was not yet informed that the accusation was aimed at me
personally. That is why I did not "deny" anything for myself in my
resolution, but simply defended the fundamental internationalist
standpoint against the Stalinist slanderers and perverters of
principle. It was only at the NC meeting of March 1, after I had
presented my resolution, that Shachtman for the first time made
the direct statement regarding my speech at the Stuyvesant meet-
ing. Therefore I have never "denied" it before, as he maintains in
his statement, and I do not "deny" it now. I simply say it is a lie
and that it is of a piece with the organized system of lying which
has characterized the factional method of Shachtman since the
beginning of the internal struggle and by means of which he has
sought at every turn to muddle and divert attention from the real
issue in dispute.
But the method of lying and then shifting the issue from a
political dispute to a question of veracity— a method which we have
encountered frequently enough— will not avail here. What is
involved in the present instance is a radical difference of view-
point on a fundamental question. The second statement of
Shachtman has not eliminated or modified this difference. This
is the real essence of the matter. It is in no way affected by what
one says or doesn't say, by what or whom one believes or doesn't
believe. Those members of the League who concern themselves
with political, principled considerations will understand this and
judge the merits of the present dispute accordingly.
448 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
PS: The recent alarming information from comrade Trotsky about
the internal condition of the Red Army, which directly affects its
capacity to fulfill its proper role in the present circumstances, places
an extraordinary restriction on public utterances on the question.
That alone compels me to refrain from publishing my article on
the Red Army in the Militant. But the fundamental question of
the international tasks of the Red Army remains unaffected. From
the standpoint of an internationalist the new information about
the internal weakness of the Red Army— a weakness resulting from
the accumulated effects of Stalinist policy— is not a reason to make
concessions to the Stalinist conception of its nationally limited
role. On the contrary it is a reason to oppose it all the more firmly.
4- 4> +
Motion on April Gillespie Conference
by James P. Cannon444
29 March 1933
Submitted to the March 29 resident committee meeting, this motion was
a compromise after a clash at the previous day 's meeting over policy
at the second Gillespie Trades and Labor Assembly conference. Having
advocated a frontal assault "against the right wing in this movement
(and consequently in the PMA) and the pseudoprogressives who really
cohabit with the right wing or yield to it without struggle, " Shachtman
counterposed his own motion to Cannon's point no. III.445
The motion refers to the urgent defense of the 54 members of the
PMA and its women 's auxiliary, arrested in early January after a pitched
battle with Peabody Coal Company thugs at the Kinkaid mine outside of
Taylorville. One member of the women 's auxiliary and two strikebreak-
ers were killed, and 18 others wounded. Of the Taylorville strikers 22
were charged with murder and 32 others with unlawful assembly and
inciting to riot. The CLA played an active role in defense efforts,
including organizing a March 14 united front meeting in Chicago with
the Civil Liberties Union and the ILD.U&
Cannon on Gillespie 449
I
From a trade-union standpoint, the conference at Gillespie
on April 1 will consist basically of units of the PMA plus a few
scattered local craft unions in the mining area. The nondescript
organizations that may be there in addition will add no serious
trade-union weight to the conference. This applies also to the paper
local organizations of the TUUL which may be present.
With such a composition there is not the slightest ground for
the conference to aim at the creation of a new federation of labor.
The attempt can only result in dismal failure and discredit to its
initiators. We must resolutely oppose this Utopian idea and every
tendency to give the conference such a direction. In view of the
persistent efforts of some of the official elements in the move-
ment to push toward the formal organization of a new paper
federation, it is necessary to take a firmer stand against it and put
the conference on record specifically against such a plan.
The most the conference could do is to create a center for
propaganda and partly also for organizing progressive groups in
the unions. But even in this it can play only a limited role. Both
the composition and the leadership of the conference preclude
the idea that it can become the national organizing center for the
left and progressive forces in the labor movement.
Such a formation requires a further development of the left-
wing movement which will lead toward the coming-together of
the various organization formations and currents for a common
struggle. The Gillespie conference can only be regarded as a single
factor in this development, but it cannot replace it. This must be
frankly stated and explained. The whole idea that a few sectional
organizations (in reality only the Progressive Miners), whose
stability is yet to be established and with a leadership that has yet
to clarify its aims and establish a national prestige, can take over
the direction of a national movement by means of a conference is
unsound and foredoomed to disastrous failure.
Therefore we are of the opinion that the constitution of a
permanent organization at the Gillespie conference would be
incorrect. The right thing for a conference to do would be to
say openly:
1. That the response to the initiative of the Gillespie Trades and
450 CLA 1931-33: The Fight
Labor Council, as indicated by the conference representation,
shows that a sufficient basis for the creation of a new federation
of labor is lacking and therefore this project is definitely put aside.
2. That the representation at the conference, because of its lim-
ited and sectional character, shows that it cannot take upon itself
at the present time the formation of a permanent organization.
Such an organization of the left and progressive forces on a
national scale is a perspective to be aimed at, but it cannot be
realized now through the medium of the Gillespie conference. The
three conferences at Gillespie have made a contribution to this
end. They helped to prepare the ground for an eventual national
movement on a broader basis. That is all that can be done at the
present time.
3. The conference recommends the program adopted at the Janu-
ary 29 session to the consideration of the workers who are strug-
gling for the regeneration of the labor movement and its liberation
from reactionary policies and leadership. It decides on the con-
tinuation of a committee to keep in touch with sympathetic trade-
union bodies and be ready to act jointly with them in the prepara-
tion of a broader conference at some future time when conditions
will be more propitious for success.
Our delegates should oppose the formation of a permanent
organization, the adoption of a specific name, or the calling of a
national conference at this time. Our delegates should point out
the necessity of drawing these conclusions and the danger of play-
ing with illusions and paper organizations which do not advance
but rather retard their declared aims.
II
On the new wage contract, from such information as we have,
it appears to the NC that big concessions have been made to the
operators and that the leaders of the union (Pearcy and Keck) are
minimizing these concessions and justifying them with class-
collaborationist reasoning. There cannot be any doubt that the
two-year contract works greatly to the advantage of the operators
and will reduce the real wages of the miners when prices rise as a
result of an economic upturn, or inflation, or both. The left wing
ought to take a sharply critical attitude on this question and warn
against every tendency to reconcile the interests of the workers
Cannon on Gillespie 451
with the exploiters. If a suitable occasion offers itself in the
Gillespie conference, one of our delegates should speak on this
theme and point out that a union can be really progressive only if
it approaches every conflict from the point of view of the class
struggle and entertains no illusions about the fact that the
employers are class enemies in every case.
In the Gillespie conference our delegates should take occa-
sion to bring out— in a careful, planned way— a distinction between
their position and that of the PMA official leadership on the most
appropriate concrete questions.
They should bring in a resolution on the Taylorville cases,
which refers to the resolution adopted at the January 29 con-
ference. This January 29 resolution called for a class policy in the
defense and a program of mass demonstrations. Instead of that
the Defense Committee, under pressure of the lawyers, came out
for a legalistic policy and dampened down the mass movement.
We have to come out openly against this policy, and the danger-
ous illusions it creates, counterposing to it the class-struggle con-
cept of the nature of capitalist justice and citing the experience
of Sacco-Vanzetti, Mooney, etc.
Ill
If political organizations are admitted to the conference, com-
rade Oehler should present a credential as fraternal delegate of
the League. Since the call for the conference does not provide for
this, it will be best if comrade Allard raises the question specifically
in the executive committee for a general ruling— not in regard to
the League, but in regard to political organizations as such. If the
executive committee decides adversely, our steering committee can
decide whether to take the general issue to the floor. It would be
tactically incorrect to allow this question to become the center of
the conflict. It would give the right-wing elements the best chance
to carry the conference on formal trade-union grounds. At the
same time, they would be in the most advantageous position under
the present conditions if they can center their fight on Commu-
nism as such rather than on the concrete issues.
^ ^ ^
452
Motion on CLA Delegate at Gillespie
by Max Shachtman
29 March 1933
Shachtman counterposed this motion to point no. Ill of Cannon 's res-
olution on Gillespie at the March 29 resident committee meeting, which
was attended only by Cannon and Shachtman. The minutes noted, "On
the point to follow, we send you two motions, one by Cannon and one by
Shachtman, which, as is to be seen, represent different shadings and
emphasis. Since a matter of tactics alone is involved, we have decided to
leave the execution to the steering committee of Allard, Angelo, Glotzer,
and Oehler. " 447
In the executive committee of the conference our comrades
shall propose to invite fraternal delegates from labor political
organizations to greet the conference, pointing out that they are
much closer to the heart and nature of the conference than the
"farmers organizations" that were invited. Should this be turned
down by the executive committee, our steering committee should
bring in the proposal as a minority report, without allowing them-
selves to be maneuvered into a position where this becomes the
central issue of dispute at the conference. Should it be adopted,
comrade Oehler should submit a credential from the CLA and
greet the conference in its name, pointing out our position as out-
lined in the motions adopted by the NC and giving a lead for the
crystallization of the left-wing and progressive elements away from
the right-wing and job-selling elements.
III.
The International Intervenes
455
Resolution on the Situation in the
American Section
International Preconference of the ILO
4-8 February 1933
The International Preconference in Paris, 4-8 February 1933, passed
this motion after hearing Arne Swabeck 's lengthy report on political and
economic developments in the United States and the internal crisis of
the American League.448 The resolution was published in CLA Internal
Bulletin no. 11 (31 March 1933) with SwabecWs report on the pre-
conference. While the resolution takes no position on the CLA fight,
Swabeck reported to Cannon from Paris, "The leading comrades here
are, however, definitely decided on our conflict and will propose a defi-
nite position openly and formally in support of the majority as soon as
the material giving both views is published. As a matter of fact they were
quite definitely decided before I arrived from their own perusal of the
material available then."449 Swabeck left Paris for Prinkipo in mid-
February, traveling through Germany at the request of the I.S.
I. The preconference, after hearing the report of the American
delegate and of the I.S., declares that the American League has
during the most recent period made substantial progress
(increased number of members, creation of new local branches
in Pittsburgh, etc., political activity in connection with the Amster-
dam Congress, German question, unemployed movement, Illinois
miners).
II. It approves the decisions of the leadership of the League for a
better organization of forces, for the establishment of responsible
and collective work, for more energetic and closer participation
in the movements of the working masses. The preconference
regards these measures as the best means for the selection and
training of cadres.
III. Under these conditions, it regards it as wholly indispensable
that the League should supply adequate information as to the
internal conflict as soon as possible, so that the sections can
456 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
express themselves. Since both sides have maintained hitherto that
there are no serious differences of opinion as to the policies of
the League in the class struggle and that this internal struggle is
harmful to the development of the organization, the preconference
has decided:
a. The I.S. is to call upon both sides to prepare a document as
to the differences of opinion for the International Bulletin.
b. The leadership of the American League is to prepare for
its next conference, at which the question of the internal
question is also to be brought up, after a discussion in which
the entire membership of the organization and the sections
of the ILO are to take part.
^ ^ ^
The International Must Apply the Brakes
Transcript of a Discussion Between
Leon Trotsky and Arne Swabeck450
27 February 1933
Comrade Swabeck: We can now most certainly expect a much more
rapid development in terms of the intensified contradictions within
American imperialism and its role as a world power, as well as
intensified class struggle, and this in the near future. This means
a broad perspective for us. We assume that the role of workers
organizations in America will expand greatly in significance in
the future. As this happens, the great problems of the trade-union
movement will be posed, along with the theoretical questions on
the trade unions and the class struggle in general. Naturally this
does not exclude a certain development of reformism as well. To
date, the reformist parties have grown more than the Commu-
nist. The most likely scenario seems to be that developments will
intensify so rapidly that social reformism might not be able to keep
up. This gives the CP big opportunities. Today, the social democ-
racy, the Communist Party, and the trade unions are still small.
The CP is just as bad or even worse than the other Communist
parties and today counts at most 8,000 members. Of course, the
International Must Apply Brakes 457
Left Opposition also confronts major problems, particularly with
such a small Communist Party in such a large country. However, I
believe that we have already taken several measures to prepare
the Left Opposition for the coming developments.
In the initial period our organization grew rapidly, and then
growth came to a standstill until about the end of 1930. At the
beginning of 1931 we built our center and an apparatus; we num-
bered about 100 members at the time. At the time of our second
conference the organization had grown to about 150 members,
and today we have about 210 to 212. All in all, this shows that we
have indeed made a certain amount of progress. We had the
advantage that the central core was a homogeneous group shar-
ing the same views, and was that way when it was expelled from
the Party. There were no differences regarding platform, theses,
or the class struggle in general. Of course, there were minor dif-
ferences of opinion. At the beginning of 1931 we adopted an
Expansion Program, which was primarily a propaganda program
stipulating, among other things, that the Militant would again
appear as a weekly. During this period elements came over to us
who otherwise might not have done so; they came primarily for
literary reasons— of course, not all of them. On the basis of this
program we began to undertake organizational steps primarily in
the direction of expanding and consolidating the membership.
In general our influence is greater than our organizational growth.
Today we do not have the right kind of contact with the Party,
primarily because the Party is conducting an extraordinarily sharp
struggle against the Left Opposition. It expels members, for
example, even for attending our public meetings. Nevertheless we
have sometimes been able to determine that we have influence
on Party members— e.g., on the question of our campaign on the
situation in Germany, on the attempts of the Party bureaucrats to
tar us as murderers, and on the antiwar question.151 Our inad-
equate contact with the Party is a weakness. It is our opinion that
to date we have gone through a period of propaganda and that
we must now participate more directly in the class struggle. This
does not mean a turn but rather a further step along our road.
We are united in questions of principle. The differences result
only from working these problems out. One of the most important
problems is creating cadre who can exercise judgment on all
questions.
458 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
The entire organization must be oriented in international
questions and be able to take a position. We have differed
particularly with comrade Shachtman's methods for a long time.
He viewed everything as a personal question; he often showed us
only a small part of letters and defended this by saying that the
letters were "personal." That is why the League up to now was
always very slow in international questions and why our interna-
tional contact was too weak. Comrade Glotzer's attitude is similar
to that of comrade Shachtman. He came back to America and
made a statement distancing himself sharply from the views of
comrade Shachtman. Now he has united with comrade Shachtman
to combat the majority, declaring that at the time he only differed
with comrade Shachtman's international views.
The internal situation has become more and more exacer-
bated. Comrade Carter published several articles on Engels' views.
We considered these articles to be wrong and dangerous because
they were a defense of social-democratic views. This difference
provided the impetus for a further exacerbation of the internal
situation but was not, to be sure, the reason for it. The Carter
group is an independent grouping, but it has ties to comrade
Shachtman.
At the last plenum we adopted the resolutions unanimously-
including the resolution on the international question, which the
minority initially opposed as being quite wrong. The resolution
on the Carter question, which condemned the views and meth-
ods of the Carter group, was also adopted unanimously. After the
plenum, however, the struggle continued and intensified.
The National Committee has nine members; five of these
constitute the majority, three the minority, and one generally
supports the minority (Spector). The New York resident commit-
tee has five members, but there the minority is in the majority. At
the plenum we proposed that the New York resident committee
either be reorganized, or that one or two representatives of the
majority be co-opted onto it. The minority agreed to this, and a
resolution to this effect was adopted. A later statement by the
minority, however, reopened this question. Today they attempt to
disavow the wrong position that Shachtman had on the European
questions. The minority opposed sending an official representa-
tive of the League to the preconference, just as it opposed the
preconference altogether.
International Must Apply Brakes 459
The minority has begun unprincipled campaigns in various
branches— in New York, Chicago, and Boston— and has also had
resolutions adopted against the majority.
The differences are not over questions of principle but above
all over the question: What conception do we have of a commu-
nist organization? What methods should we apply? The Left
Opposition cannot always remain a literary circle. I do not want
to assert that this is what the minority wants, but in practice that
is what their attitude amounts to. More participation in the class
struggle or more literary work? We demand of every member
greater responsibility and greater capacity to sacrifice; we are
against personal combinations.
At the plenum a resolution was adopted unanimously against
Carter and his tendency was condemned as scholastic.
Comrade Trotsky. This group is not represented on the central
committee?
Comrade Swabeck: No, only in the youth organization. There it has
the majority; however, it was not elected but appointed by the
National Committee.
After the plenum the entire Carter group did not vote on the
international resolution. They demanded more information. We
believed that this position ought to have brought the minority
closer to us. In New York we proposed the election of a new
executive committee because Carter is the dominant factor there.
We offered the minority a united front against this, but they
refused and formed a combination against us.
Despite the fact that the minority had agreed with us at the
plenum on the question of co-optation in New York and had agreed
not to oppose it, they then in fact went with the Carter group against
us on this question. Co-optation, however, was a vital necessity.
We felt it necessary to change the social basis of the New York
group, which is not sufficiently proletarian. In a factional situa-
tion this condition complicates and exacerbates matters. We
proposed that for six months, only workers would be accepted as
members and that others would be regarded as sympathizers until
the social basis of the group changed. In addition, every member
would have been required to engage in active work in a mass
organization and to report on this work. This resolution was sharply
opposed by the Shachtman-Carter combination, particularly the
460 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
first point, and was finally rejected by the New York local organi-
zation. We hold this position for the entire organization as well.
On the occasion of the trip to Copenhagen and at the onset
of the campaign of Stalinist incitement, the minority proposed that
a forum be held on this topic. Shachtman and Eastman were to
speak. We had nothing against this forum, but considered it out of
the question to designate Eastman as a speaker. We had very sharp
fights over this question in three meetings and finally had to pose
the question of discipline.452 The forum did not take place.
Comrade Trotsky. Was the fight over the forum or over Eastman?
Comrade Swabeck: Over Eastman.
In Boston we have a group of seven people; four of them came
over to us in 1928 from the CP. The comrades have always dis-
agreed with us on the trade-union question, from the beginning
to this day. They have a kind of tailist policy vis-a-vis the Stalinist
"Third Period." In the National Committee we agree on the trade-
union question by and large. WTe have always fought with the
Boston comrades, written them long letters, etc. In some cases
they have even refused to carry out decisions. On the question of
co-optation, the international questions, and the question of an
international delegate, the Boston group was connected with the
minority.
Since about April or May 1932 the minority has been work-
ing as an organized faction, with its own center, its own finances,
etc. At that time we took no measures whatsoever against this.
However, building such a faction means the first step toward a
split. We didn't call together the comrades who agree with us until
a few months ago, not before. WTe have no particular objections to
a faction with a political program; but on no political question are
there differences of opinion and on no question has the minority
raised a particular platform. They even admit that themselves. In
this sense the factionalizing continues to be unprincipled and very
dangerous for the League. On such a basis no discipline can
develop and also no authority for the leadership.
In the initial period the League's strength consisted in the
fact that there was a united leadership. That has changed since
April 1932, and now this seriously diminishes the authority of the
leadership. There are enough examples of this.
When Weisbord returned to America he did not get in touch
International Must Apply Brakes 46 1
with us, nor did he write us. He only informed us that he was
holding a public forum where he would speak on the question of
his visit with Trotsky. We were invited and, if we liked, a represen-
tative of ours could speak. We did not agree with this at all and
rejected the proposal out of hand. Some elements were concilia-
tory to Weisbord in the New York local organization. We decided
not to take part in the forum and that our comrades should also
not attend, with the exception of one or two observers. Some com-
rades of the conciliatory tendency declared that they didn't
care— there were four or five; in the end only two went— one who
did not know about the decision and one who stated openly that
he did not care one wit about the motion. In this case as well, we
did not propose any measures. But when the case was raised and
criticized, the minority and the Carter group formed a combina-
tion against the National Committee and also passed a resolution
against the National Committee.
Comrade Trotsky. The minority voted in the local organization
against the National Committee?
Comrade Swabeck: They did not vote for it (for the resolution) but
spoke for it; particularly Shachtman, but also Abern and Glotzer.
In the subsequent elections the comrade who had gone to the
Weisbord meeting was nonetheless elected on the minority slate
to the local executive committee. He has only been in the League
six months. Of the eleven members of the local leadership in New
York, two support the majority; and this leadership was elected
on the basis of a declaration by comrade Shachtman. He would
like to have a local leadership that is against the National Com-
mittee. This is another example of an unprincipled combination;
in this instance, too, we had proposed joining forces with the
minority against the Carter group.
When I left I proposed that comrade Cannon be designated
as national secretary in my place. The minority strongly opposed
this.
Comrade Trotsky: Whom did the minority suggest?
Comrade Swabeck: First, they counterposed the question of finances
to this proposal. Second, they said that comrade Cannon had not
fulfilled all his duties in the past. (For two and a half years he
did not work for the organization. He was in such dire economic
straits that he took a job.) Third, they proposed a secretariat of
462 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
two comrades (Cannon and Abern) who were supposed to work
on an unpaid, volunteer basis.
The wage issue was never a serious one. But we consider two
secretaries to be impossible, particularly coming from two differ-
ent factions as Cannon and Abern do.
Both factions differ in their views of concepts and methods—
particularly now, when measures must be taken to strengthen our
direct participation in the class struggle. The personal combina-
tions of the minority are very dangerous. If nothing changes here,
there must be a split. There is no other way.
We asked the minority whether they also wanted to be repre-
sented in Europe and at the preconference. They demand that we
quickly convene the third conference. We have nothing against that.
But we would like to have enough time to discuss all questions
carefully: How can we better carry out our new measures; what is
the situation in America; what is the world situation; how are we
to orient ourselves correctly?
Comrade Trotsky: What is the composition of the editorial board?
Comrade Swabeck: It has five comrades: Cannon, Shachtman, Abern,
Spector, Swabeck.
Comrade Trotsky: Where does the power of decision lie, with the
editor or the commission?
Comrade Swabeck: The commission, but collective work with
Shachtman is almost impossible; he keeps comrades waiting
for a long time and edits the paper in much too individualistic
a fashion.
The date of the third conference has already been set for the
end of June/beginning of July. It is possible that this will provide
enough time, but we have to have new theses because the old ones
are no longer adequate. The three years of crisis and the intensifi-
cation of the class struggle must be dealt with in a fundamental
way. The main thing is to have enough time for the international
organization to participate fully in the discussion. We would like
the help of the international sections and their advice, particu-
larly in our present situation. If the minority does not change its
methods, there is no recourse but a split. Playing with principled
questions cannot be tolerated, particularly in such a young organ-
ization as the League.
Comrade Trotsky: It is not clear what is at issue here. I have only
International Must Apply Brakes 463
been able to determine that the majority of the central committee
consists of comrades who are, so to speak, more American— i.e.,
they are older comrades who were already in revolutionary or-
ganizations before the CP was founded, in the I WW, whereas the
leaders of the minority are younger comrades who have not worked
in the trade unions and in revolutionary organizations. The other
thing is that in the local organizations, according to comrade
Swabeck's information, the workers, particularly those with trade-
union experience, go more with the majority, whereas the
intellectuals, etc., who came over to the organization more or less
on ideological grounds, go with the minority. This categorization
is not quite exact, but it is by and large correct. This categorization
is important insofar as it corresponds to the facts, because there
are certain social points of support. The fact that the organization
was more active in propagandistic work can explain why these
differences or divergences, which are based on the social compo-
sition of the organization, have not yet broken through to the
surface. Up to now both groups have been preoccupied with the
correct propagandistic formulations, but because the different
composition of the two groups and the different traditions— or the
lack of tradition in the case of one group— do not yet find politi-
cal expression, they are searching for detours, so to speak, in
organizational-personal questions, etc. That is the most danger-
ous thing. The mere fact that both factions have a different social
composition and different traditions is not enough to necessitate
a split, since every party arises from various groups, elements, etc.,
is not socially homogeneous, and is a melting pot. But there must
be active work. In the League the current situation coincides with
the beginning of more energetic external work. Whether the
League will become a melting pot through this work— that is the
question that counts. This also depends to a certain degree on
opportunities and successes; if there are successes, the best ele-
ments will be welded together. If there are failures and development
proceeds at a crawl, discontent can find expression in a split.
Why did so few members participate in the voting for the
plenum resolution on the question of co-optation?
Comrade Swabeck: At the plenum all resolutions were adopted
unanimously, and thus the question arose: "You voted for every-
thing unanimously, so why the co-optations?" We proposed the
co-optations, however, because we knew how serious the situation
464 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
remains despite the unanimity. We had to keep an eye on what
the minority was up to and thus demanded guarantees.
Comrade Trotsky: Where does comrade Spector stand?
Comrade Swabeck: The question of comrade Spector is of second-
ary importance. In Toronto we initially had a group of 27 or 28
members, which, however, sank to about ten. The main blame for
this was placed on comrade Spector. He certainly carries part of
the responsibility because he did not do everything he should have
done. It came to a split because the majority of the group there
demanded that he do a certain amount of work. Spector demanded
that his group be recognized. In the majority of the Toronto group
there are elements similar to the Carter group. We passed a reso-
lution in which we supported Spector's political tendencies, while
also demanding the unification of both groups. Since the plenum
the Spector group consists of 18 people; in addition, six sympa-
thizers are around them. This question, however, plays no role in
our conflict.
Are our differences of opinion personal or political questions?
Personal questions are always involved in such fights, particularly
at the beginning, when the political differences have not clearly
come to the fore. In our view there are political differences, al-
though they are not clear and are not sharply delineated.
Comrade Trotsky: A split would kill the League and greatly compro-
mise the movement. You cannot explain the split to the workers by
the confused social differences, nor by how these differences are
expressed in organizational and personal forms. If an organiza-
tion is politically educated and the participants have experience in
factional struggles, the frictions can be minimized until major
political differences are encountered. Often it is the case, however,
that the disputes seem to be merely personal and organizational.
The peculiarity of the situation consists in the fact that the inten-
sity of the struggle does not correspond to the stage of development
of factional formation. Both fighting factions are, so to speak, in
their infancy; they have no delineated form. But at the same time
they are already organized as factions and confront the League,
more or less, with a split. And that can kill it. If a split occurs after
sharp political struggles, it can be self-evident and natural; but as
things stand in the League, I believe that there also exists an
element of personal fault. The fact that the conflict has flared up
International Must Apply Brakes 465
so prematurely with such intensity and that no one knows how to
ease it— that also seems to me to be a negative symptom for the
leadership.
For example, let us take the question of co-optation: Comrade
Swabeck himself has recognized that this was not a felicitous meas-
ure for the popularity of the leadership. I wonder whether the
result really justifies this measure, because the numbers are very
interesting: The members and the local organizations see that all
resolutions were passed unanimously, and co-optations are pro-
posed in order to consolidate the "majority." The members ask
themselves: "What majority? You have not managed to clarify your
point of view so that the minority is forced to show its colors."
The co-optation proposal has led to dissatisfaction among the
members; on the one hand, they feel that this measure is undemo-
cratic, and, on the other hand, that it is factional, very dangerous
for the unity of the organization. Rather good reasons were deci-
sive in motivating a no vote. The membership does not want a
leadership forced on it artificially, and, secondly, it has plenty of
concern about the unity of the organization. The result was the
vote against the majority and the undermining of the majority's
position, although it wanted precisely to consolidate its position.
It was an inappropriate measure which perhaps showed too much
organizational impatience. As things stand, it might be better in
the long run not to co-opt anyone.
The question of the secretariat is also not quite clear to me.
Of course it is quite natural that Cannon was proposed as secre-
tary, but if I were in Cannon's place I might say, "I would in fact
like a representative of the minority to work as a second secre-
tary." That would be an attempt to settle the disputed issues
collectively, and through day-to-day collaboration the frictions
might indeed be eased. The personal-organizational disputes are
out of proportion to the maturation of the principled differences.
It seems to me, in fact, that on the part of the majority an ele-
ment of organizational "ultimatism" has played a role. It must be
kept in mind that a split in the next period would be a fatal blow
to the organization.
The third conference in June-July: What can it accomplish in
the present situation? It can perhaps adopt good resolutions, but
in respect to the disputes between the groups one can say: 110
there and 100 here, or vice versa. Everything will remain the same.
466 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
The majority only stands to lose because it cannot hope to win
eight seats to the minority's one. In such a situation personal
relations play a very big role. Of course, if you say to yourself that
a split is unavoidable— I have my 51 percent and now I am steering
straight toward throwing the others out— you can follow this course
to the end, but you must have political reasons for doing so. The
international organization has the task of applying the brakes here.
The American comrades must be warned; we can by no means
afford the luxury of a split in America, by no means. If the Left
Opposition had more money, some comrades from the I.S. would
have to be sent to America.
This perspective must be very sharply articulated: What do
comrades hope to gain from the new conference and what can
they hope to gain— 110 to 100? If you aim straight toward having a
majority of a few percentage points on your side and changing
everything, then you will only lose members, because an element
will immediately crystallize that will step over to the sidelines.
The thrice-weekly appearance of the Militant proves that the
League is capable of initiative. And on this question there were
no differences of opinion; here the League marches together.
What differences of opinion were there on the Weisbord
question?
Comrade Swabeck: I read comrade Shachtman's letter on the
Weisbord question describing opinions of those in the National
Committee who said they would leave the League if Weisbord were
to be foisted on them. Such a portrayal is totally irresponsible.
We do not pose the question as though it must come to a split,
but rather we pose the question of how we can avoid a split. But
the comrades of the minority are driving things in that direction.
We agree that we must hold onto the comrades by all means, but
we also consider it necessary to explain the situation as it is.
A word on co-optation. It was doubtless an unfortunate tac-
tic, but we were also in an unfortunate situation: In one local body
the minority held the majority. WTe had to do something, and the
co-optation proposal was adopted at the plenum unanimously; the
minority stated there that it did not want to oppose it. We had to
assume that this question would not become a bone of conten-
tion, otherwise we would not have proposed it.
Comrade Trotsky: In order to justify the co-optation, you would have
Situation in the League 467
had to propose a resolution that would have forced the minority
to vote against it. This, then, would have explained the emergency
measures to the organization. But such a course was perhaps
impossible because no deep-going differences of opinion existed,
and precisely that turned the co-optation into an arbitrary measure.
^ ^ ^
On the Situation in the American League
Letter by Leon Trotsky to the
International Secretariat453
7 March 1933
In forwarding this letter to the I.S., Trotsky noted, "I am not sending a
copy to the League before I reach an agreement with you. If you agree, at
least on the essentials, please send the document to New York with your
decision or with a cover letter. If we disagree, I would like to know your
criticisms and proposals in order to reach an agreement as soon as
possible."454
The situation in the American League demands, as you have
already indicated, a prompt and decisive intervention on the part
of our organization. To the extent that I can judge from the min-
utes of the secretariat and the correspondence, we do not have
any differences with your evaluation of the situation in the Ameri-
can League. However, I consider it my duty to explain to you as
clearly as possible how, after very detailed conversations with com-
rade Swabeck and a study of the documents, I regard the situation
in the League and what measures appear to me to be necessary
on our part.
1. For several years, the action of the League has mainly had a
literary, propagandists character. The number of members has
fluctuated around the same figures, varying according to whether
the work of the center was improving or worsening. The lack of
progress in the movement aroused all sorts of personal antago-
nisms, group antagonisms, or local antagonisms, as is always the
case. The same lack of progress in the movement does not allow
468 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
these antagonisms to acquire a political character. This has given
and gives the struggle an exceedingly poisoned character in the
absence of a principled content that is clear to everybody. The
membership of the organization does not learn anything from such
struggle. They are forced to regroup according to personal ties,
sympathies, and antipathies. The struggle between the groups in
turn acts as a brake on the movement.
2. It may very well be that in this struggle there are plausible prin-
cipled differences in an embryonic form. However, the problem
is that both groups anticipate a lot by sharpening the organiza-
tional struggle between the groups and the members without any
connection with the development of political work and the ques-
tions it raises. In the impatient organizational maneuvers which
have a disruptive effect on the League as a whole by damaging
each group separately, it is impossible not to see the nefarious in-
fluence of the methods and ways of the epigone Comintern, which
has trained an entire generation to solve all difficult situations
through apparatus combinations at the expense of the interests
of the organization as a whole. This is one of the worst features
of bureaucratism.
3. A genuine solution to the internal difficulties can only be found
on the path of expanding mass work. The League has taken that
path. It is developing the work with a magnificent energy in three
directions: a. campaign about the success of fascism in Germany
and the capitulation of the Comintern; b. participation in the un-
employed movement; c. participation in the independent miners
trade unions (Illinois). In all these fields, the League has already
scored moral successes. But— and that is the most important fea-
ture of the present situation— these first successes are accompanied
not by a weakening but by a worsening of the internal struggle.
What does this mean?
4. Of course, it is theoretically possible that with the transition to
broader work, the potential differences may acquire an open and
active political character. But so far it has not been expressed in
any way. There have not been revealed in any of the three fields
of work mentioned above any more or less developed, serious, hard
differences. There remains another explanation: The worsening
of the crisis has been caused by the very mechanism of transition
from one stage of the work to another. This does not exclude that
Situation in the League 469
serious differences will arise in the future, but they probably do
not correspond to the lineup of the present groupings.
5. The only possible way out is through broadening and deepen-
ing the mass work, drawing fresh proletarian elements to the
League, and training all the members of the League in the mass
organizations. This work has already begun. But the struggle
among the groups has become so bitter that a split is on the
agenda. A split under these conditions would have a purely a priori
character, a preventive one, so to speak, which would be incom-
prehensible to all but those who initiated the split. If it is difficult
for us, leading members of the international Opposition, to un-
derstand the motives of the fierce struggle, it will be even harder
for the American workers, including the members of the League
themselves, to understand the causes of the split. This kind of split
at the top would bring incalculable damage to the authority of
both groups and would compromise the cause of the Left Oppo-
sition in America for a long time. Today the Stalinist bureaucrats
would only have to publish the numerous declarations of the two
groups fighting each other to poison all sources of sympathy for
the Left Opposition. In case of a split, the situation would become
a hundred times worse.
The two groups must clearly realize that in case of a split nei-
ther of them can nor will be recognized as a section of the
International Left Opposition. The two halves, condemned to a
lasting impotence, would find themselves in a situation similar to
the present groups in Czechoslovakia who are presently not full
members of the international organization, but only sympathiz-
ing groups.455
6. The preparation for the national conference of the League is
taking place under the shadow of the struggle between the two
groups. We can already picture to a certain degree the perspec-
tives of the conference: more or less unanimous acceptance of the
basic political resolutions, while at the same time a poisonous
struggle on the questions of approving mandates and the compo-
sition of the future National Committee. Since the two groups
are more or less the same size, the changes at the conference would
be reduced to the group possessing 49 percent obtaining 51 per-
cent and vice versa, and with the further application of the same
methods, that would mean a split.
470 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
7. The task of our international organization in this question is,
it seems to me, quite evident: not to permit a split under any cir-
cumstances now that we are on the threshold of the League's
transition to mass work; to explain to all the members of the
League that the leaders of the two groups are sharpening the
struggle bv means of impermissible organizational methods and
by poisoned polemics; to condemn these methods resolutely; and
to call upon all the members of the League for the defense of its
unity.
8. Independently of the possible opinions of anv of us separately
regarding which of the two groups in the League will acquire a
serious and genuine preponderance in mass work, we must as an
organization leave the solution of this question to the future (it is
quite possible that the leadership, after some regroupments, will
be constituted from elements of both the present groups). But the
next conference cannot in any case ensure the domination of one
group, given the lack of political ground prepared for this as well
as the lack of objective criteria. The task of the next conference must
consist of saving the League from a preventive split imposed from the
top and thus preserving the authority of the League and its combativity
for the near future. It is necessary to pose this task in quite an
imperative form before all the local groups as well as before the
two groups of the central committee involved in the struggle.
9. To the extent that we can judge from correspondence, a
considerable number of the members of the League, perhaps even
a majority, do not belong to either of the two groups and speak
with indignation of the danger of a split. Given the absence, or at
least the nonexpression, of the principled basis of struggle between
the two groups, conciliationism is quite justified and a progressive
factor of internal life. It is necessarv now. at the present stage, to
support this tendencv with all the authority of the international
organization.
10. The preparation of the conference should, it seems to me, be
conducted in the spirit of the above-mentioned considerations,
which means:
a. All the local organizations should encourage the leaders
of the two groups to reduce their clashes within such limits
that their speeches, declarations, etc., on both sides, cannot
become a weapon in the hands of the enemy.
Situation in the League 471
b. All the theses, countertheses, and amendments must be sent
out in time, not only to all the members of the League but
also to the International Secretariat, so that a discussion
can take place at all stages before the eyes and under the
control of all the sections.
c. The final time of the conference should be designated in
agreement with the I.S. so that the latter, in case of need,
will have the opportunity to delegate its representative to it.
d. Up to the time of the conference the present National Com-
mittee, which remains, of course, should enjoy the entire
support of all the members of the organization. On its part
the National Committee will abstain from artificial organi-
zational manipulation within its own body which bear a
factional character.
e. The local organizations should be guided in the election
of delegates by consideration of the sufficient firmness and
independence in their representatives on the question of
safeguarding the unity of the League: The instructions to
delegates should be voted upon in the same sense.
f. Inside the forthcoming National Committee there should,
of course, enter leaders of both groups at present engaged
in the struggle; but side by side with them should be placed
some solid comrades possessing authority, not having engaged in
the struggle of the two groups, and capable of bringing about a
healthier atmosphere in the NC. To this end the dimensions
of the NC should be considerably broadened.
g. In case of need, the secretariat should call a special ple-
num devoted to American affairs with the participation of
representatives of both groups.
Historical developments place before the American League
exceptional tasks. They open tremendous possibilities for it. Our
American friends must be aware that we are following their work
with the greatest attention, that we are ready to bring them our
support with all the forces at our command and with all our means,
and that we firmly hope that they will put an end to the internal
malady and that they will issue upon a broader path.
4- 4- 4>
472
The Majority Has No Right to Impatience
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Arne Swabeck456
7 March 1933
Marked "strictly personal, " this letter was, however, sent to the I.S. and
circulated informally in the CLA. Trotsky objects to Abern 's removal from
the resident committee during Swabeck 's absence, a decision taken by poll
of the full NC.457 Trotsky further condemns the undemocratic procedure
followed in drafting the CLA theses on American imperialism for the
International Preconference: Swabeck used notes worked up by the Cannon
group in New York without any input from the minority. Trotsky also
objects to Cannon 's proposal in a letter to Swabeck in Prinkipo to move
the CLA headquarters to Chicago. Cannon argued:
On the tour I was also able to observe that the social composition of the
western branches which I visited is better. The bureaucratic hoops around
the Party out there are looser. Then there is the additional and most
important fact that the working-class movement in the Midwest is, at
the present time, more fluid than here. In New York the unemployment
movement remains a closed Communist affair; in Chicago it is bigger
and broader, more varied, and easier to penetrate. The opportunities
for direct participation in class-struggle activities are greater.
Taking all this into consideration, is it not time now to move for the
transfer of our national center to Chicago? I think it is. And this opin-
ion has been strengthened by the ready agreement I have found in talks
about the project with others. At Cleveland, Philadelphia, and New
York the comrades whom I consulted all favor the move most decisively.
There is no doubt that such a step, at this time, will accelerate the tran-
sition from propaganda to agitation in the work of the League.458
After a series of discussions with you and the acquaintance
with documents, I esteem notwithstanding— totally independent
from the evaluation of the attitude of the minority— that in the
organizational policy of the majority of the central committee
there are elements of formal intransigence which may appear as
bureaucratism, and which in any case will bring injury to the
authority of the central committee, and to its influence rather
injury than advantage.
No Right to Impatience 473
1. After the June plenum, where all the decisions were accepted
unanimously, your group attempted to have recourse to a co-
optation in order to guarantee for itself a majority in the central
committee, though nobody could understand in what the majority
is different from the minority.
2. The proposal of the central committee to the New York branch
concerning proletarianization was a mistake not in its general
tendency, but in its mechanical approach to the issue and the mani-
festly practical hopelessness of the proposal under the given
conditions.
3. In consideration of the fact that the two groups have approxi-
mately the same weight, it would be, it seems to me, reasonable
for the majority to make a concession to the minority, and, after
the designation of comrade Cannon as permanent secretary, to
draw in also comrade Abern as assistant secretary.
4. It appears to me absolutely impermissible to deprive comrade
Abern of his vote on the occasion of the departure of comrade
Swabeck.
5. The elaboration of a draft thesis concerning the prospects of
American imperialism on the back of the minority represents an
ostensibly factional step, less justified as in this question no dif-
ferences appeared up until now. The situation became that much
worse, as the document was destined for discussion with foreign
comrades, who in that way learned of the draft thesis before the
minority members of the central committee of the American
League.
6. The proposition of the immediate transfer of the headquar-
ters to Chicago is practically equivalent to a split.
7. The allegation that, in spite of the hopes of any "optimists,"
the situation in the League since the passage from the propaganda
to the agitation stage became yet more acute seems to me not con-
vincing. By the passage from one stage into another the malady
usually comes to the surface. But the serious successes in the field
of mass work will inevitably produce a favorable inf luence upon
the internal relations and in every case provoke a radical re-
groupment by gradual isolation of the disintegrating elements.
A split now would have an a priori character, understandable
to nobody but its initiators, and would destroy the authority of
474 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
the Left Opposition in America for a long time to come. In the
meantime, from the letters of comrade Cannon, it is particularly
clear that great perspectives are opening up for the American
League.
I permit myself to establish the following axiom: The opposi-
tional minority has a certain right to manifest impatience, but the
leading majority in no case.
+ 4* 4-
I Accept Your Criticisms
Letter by Arne Swabeck to Leon Trotsky459
8 March 1933
Copies of this letter circulated informally in the CLA.
After thorough consideration and in the light of the discus-
sions we have had, I find myself in complete accord with the
criticism you have made of the majority group of the National
Committee in your letter to me of March 7. I fully accept these
criticisms as correct and wish to add the following comment to a
couple of the points cited:
1. On the question of co-optation the majority was guilty, despite
the political agreement it had obtained at the plenum, of initiat-
ing an organizational measure which, regardless of the declaration
made by the minority not to struggle against the co-optation, nev-
ertheless under the circumstances served to maintain and sharpen
the internal conflict.
2. The proposal for proletarianization was initiated by the major-
ity of the National Committee because of the social composition
of an extremely weak proletarian basis of the New York branch.
The proposal was originally accepted unanimously by the National
Committee (Shachtman absent, Abern and Glotzer voting in favor
with the other members), expressly to be submitted for joint dis-
cussion with the executive committee of the branch, with the
endeavor to have it introduced to the branch by the National
Committee and the local executive committee jointly.
/ Accept Your Criticisms 475
3. The proposal for transfer of the League headquarters to
Chicago is so far advanced only for discussion. Such transfer in
due time has been accepted by all leading comrades as a gener-
ally correct orientation. It is to be understood as a proposal to be
submitted for general agreement and not to be carried out in the
face of definite protests which might arise at this time growing
out of the internal conflict.
However, in all of their general and specific implications, the
criticisms you have made are correct. I accept them in the sense
that the majority of the National Committee is the responsible
leading group and especially has the task of steering such a course
which in no way puts strictures upon the full collaboration of all
comrades, which helps to overcome the present internal factional
stalemate, and which in every respect facilitates the development
of the League.
I accept the criticisms as a guide for the future which I shall
endeavor to have adopted in the same spirit by the responsible
leading group, but which under all conditions I shall defend and
support personally. To this I add my pledge also to be guided by
the axiom established by you, so that it may serve at this juncture
for the preservation of the unity of the League.
On the other hand, it is necessary to establish the fact that
the present internal conflict in the League began with our dis-
agreement over the international question. It has increased in
sharpness and intensity, not ignoring the part played by the
measures taken by the majority which you correctly criticize, but
nevertheless becoming more acute as we pressed forward for a
decisive turn in our main activities from the propaganda stage to
the agitation stage. It is necessary to reiterate the fact that in the
League we were confronted from the inception of the conflict with
an organized factional struggle against the National Committee—
that is, its majority— without these comrades having brought
forward a separate platform of political differences.
The worst features of the internal conflict are expressed in
the methods of personal unprincipled combinations. Of this I cite
but two examples:
1. At the plenum the minority comrades accepted our correct reso-
lution on the international question, which they had formerly
opposed. They joined with us in characterizing the Carter group
476 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
as representing a "harmful tendency." After the plenum the Carter
group abstained from voting on the international resolution, which
it has since attacked. The majority made a proposal for unity with
the minority to combat this "harmful tendency." That was rejected
by the comrades who, on the contrary, united with the group
whose tendency they had condemned against the majority on
every disputed issue.
2. At Boston a group of comrades have been in conflict with the
National Committee for a period of about three years, rejecting
the unanimous trade-union policy of the National Committee (in
the needle trades) from the standpoint of ultraleftism, which con-
verts them into virtual camp followers of the Stalinist "Third
Period" dogma. The comrades of the minority, nevertheless, utilize
these comrades of Boston in a factional unity to adopt resolutions
against the National Committee.
Such an attitude seriously militates against the necessary task
of raising a cadre which genuinely seeks to adopt the Left Oppo-
sition platform and which is capable of estimating questions from
fundamental political considerations and orientating itself accord-
ingly. This attitude, I am convinced, it is necessary to struggle
against. I consider this struggle not independent of, but a part of,
the solution to accomplish the turn in our work more into the
field of mass work. In this sense I consider it a progressive struggle.
For the coming conference of the League I urge the greatest
possible collaboration of the International Secretariat. All propos-
als for its composition, conduct, and procedure should be first
ratified by the secretariat before final action is taken by the
League. The widest possible participation in the preconference
discussion by the international organization and its various sec-
tions is absolutely essential. Sufficient time should be given for
these measures, even if it means a considerable postponement of
the preliminary date set.
I agree that this coming conference must have as its main task
the preservation of the unity of the League. To this end, I believe,
the full participation of all newly organized branches, including
those organized most recently prior to the conference (possible
branches in the mine fields), will help in this respect by bringing
in new blood not saturated with the effects of the internal con-
flict. I am in accord with the suggestion made by you on a previous
You Were Wrong 477
occasion, that is, to endeavor to broaden the National Committee
by adding some serious comrades who are not committed to either
of the two groups in the committee.
^ ^ ^
You Were Wrong to Campaign
Against Swabeck's Trip
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman460
8 March 1933
This letter circulated informally in the CLA.
I have not written to you for a long time. For many reasons it
has been difficult for me to respond to your last letters. Even now
I am writing you very briefly. The situation in the League is cur-
rently our biggest worry here. You are moving toward a split there,
and that will mean a catastrophe for the League. It is really quite
inconsequential which side is more in the wrong, because both sides
will be unable to explain to the workers what caused the split. And
that will compromise both groups completely. In one of your let-
ters you expressed the hope that the next conference will settle
the disputes. That is not my opinion, by any means. If your group
gets 51 percent, that will not alter the matter in the slightest. A
decisive intervention on the part of the International Secretariat is
necessary. I am corresponding with the secretariat about the situa-
tion, and hope that you will hear from them in the near future.
I would like to touch briefly on only one question here. It seems
to me that you were wrong to undertake a big protest campaign
against delegating comrade Swabeck. It would have been extremely
opportune if he had come to Copenhagen at the time. We urgently
needed a Danish-speaking comrade, and with his help we surely
could have built a good section. His participation in the Copen-
hagen consultation also would have been of the utmost significance.
Under those circumstances, perhaps the internal struggles in the
American League during the last few months would not have
assumed the extremely sharp character that they have. The
preconference assumed much greater significance than some of
478 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
us, myself included, had imagined beforehand. Comrade Swabeck's
participation was very useful. His stay here is also very useful to
me and the other members of our group. I also hope that com-
rade Swabeck will not regret his stay here. In addition, without
contact with him the intervention of the International Secretariat
would not be so resolute.
I would really like to beg of you and your friends not to be
too nervous, too impatient, but to take a longer view of things
and not forget for a moment that we have an international organ-
ization that is by no means inclined to being one-sided, and in
whose eyes the "attacker," the rabble-rouser, has much more to
lose than to win.
That is all for now. Many thanks for the fishing line, which I
got in good time.
^ ^ ^
Trotsky Expects More of Us
Letter by Arne Swabeck to James P. Cannon461
8 March 1933
At the preconference the question of the American League inter-
nal situation was left to the last. Nevertheless there was a rather
thorough discussion; but I assume it is clear to you comrades that
all the conference could do at the moment was to take the kind of
stand the resolution expresses, that is, in reality, only to propose
that the issues be exhaustively discussed. The preconference did
not have both conflicting views presented. To most of the com-
rades, the existence of an internal conflict in the League was
conveyed to them for the first time and, while they were surprised,
they understood the gravity of our situation. Many questions were
asked of me in an effort to arrive at more clarity, but one must
admit that for comrades who have had no contact whatever with
our issues, the actual differences do not stand out so distinctly.
With comrades Witte and Jan I had a good many discussions,
especially the former, who was in Paris during my whole stay and
remains there. They were both somewhat familiar with our situa-
Trotsky Expects More 479
tion prior to my explanations. While I naturally did not endeavor
to commit them to any factional position or agreement, they are
both definitely of our views as to what this minority tendency rep-
resents and also quite outspoken in this conviction. Their previous
knowledge of this tendency has made it easy for them to under-
stand the whole situation today. Witte was very anxious to have
the immediate brief statements of views, which are requested for
publication in the International Bulletin. He stated he wants to write
a polemical article over his own signature as soon as these state-
ments have appeared. His views are definitely formed and his article
can be expected to be as definite. He is accepted as the leading
comrade in the secretariat. He, of course, made this statement to
me entirely in a personal way, and it must be regarded as such.
In general, I have considerable confidence that the Interna-
tional Secretariat will now be able to make a beginning toward
functioning as an international political center. It is to be expected
that it will be strengthened by the plenum, which will be consti-
tuted by the five sections named in my report.462 When I speak of
"function as a political center," that is naturally to be understood
in a limited sense, corresponding with our present stage of devel-
opment. But we must remember that the movement is young, and
particularly young organizationally, and we must not have too great
expectations.
The numerous letters which are on file here, the personal
letters from Max and Al, really defy description as to their content.
They contain no effort of moderation, neither in tone nor in con-
tent. As a matter of fact, in that respect they are much worse than
anyone could expect. But that only so much more emphasizes the
necessity on our part for moderation and the greatest possible
degree of objectivity and maintenance of political content.
In regard to a couple of the most outrageous statements made
in these letters, I made some comments to LD. But he merely
laughed and said that one does not take such matters so seriously.
I may say also that letters have been sent to Al which are sharper
in their content than we could ever dream of.
Now I will try to describe LD's attitude toward our internal
situation as revealed in the discussions we have had and to
an extent already presented in documentary form. I am in this
stating only such views and conclusions as he has expressed in
definite form.
480 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
First of all there is a world of difference in tone, in approach,
and in criticism made of our views and positions toward me and
that expressed in letters to Shachtman and Glotzer whenever touch-
ing upon the questions of our internal dispute. Toward them, the
tone is sharp throughout and the contents politically condemna-
tory. Toward me it is, while severely critical because of our being
the majority group, at the same time very comradely and sympa-
thetic. With LD as an experienced politician, that is, of course,
not accidental but a political method.
He analyzes the groups in their composition and basis of the
leading cores. In describing this I give only the main points, not
the subsidiary which flow therefrom, which he has also mentioned.
He says it is clear the majority is rooted in the soil of the class
struggle and the working-class organizations. The minority is not.
The tendency is for the various elements who make up the League
to gravitate accordingly. He also draws the conclusion that there
is a consequent degree of difference of political experience.
The majority he analyzes as intransigent politically, that is, in
the good sense of the word. The minority to a great extent lacks
this intransigence and that is a weakness. But the majority is alto-
gether too intransigent in organizational questions, which is not a
virtue for a group having responsibility of leadership, but rather
reacts to its injury. He says this intransigence amounts to a degree
of impatience and ultimatism. He does not find that in the
minority, and then it is a minority not having the same responsi-
bility nor the same powers. This aspect I will return to later on in
this letter.
I have made quite clear in my presentations, and LD would
without that recognize, that the logic of a factional situation as
sharp as ours is a split; that is, unless something intervenes, such
will be the outcome. He views a split at present as fatal and sure
to destroy the authority of the Left Opposition for a long time
to come. He says neither group would be able to explain to the
Communist workers why two groups exist having the same plat-
form, a good number of the membership would be lost, and it
would take a long time before the workers would have confidence
and join. He says that in such a case the international would be
compelled to take the same action as in Czechoslovakia, that is, to
refuse to recognize either group and merely to keep both as
sympathizing groups. This, of course, is a logic that no argument
Trotsky Expects More 48 1
can circumvent, as it is entirely correct, and more so as, in his
view, the differences do not come near justifying a split. That,
also, anyone must admit upon sober judgment to be correct. But
his statement that the international, in case of a split, would not
be able to recognize either group also shows that he is not yet
ready to make a choice of one as against the other, based upon
political or any other considerations. At the same time, he says, a
split later— that is an entirely different question and can perhaps
even become very necessary.
He looks upon our group as the responsible leading group
and says so quite frankly: That is what we are, but we must live up
to it. In view of this, he is much more critical of us, that is, much
more critical of what mistakes we make. He demands more from
us. He particularly demands modifications and concessions on our
part which will serve as measures to avoid a split direction. He
says the majority is the section to give the concessions. He says,
above all, we must maintain the constitution inviolably and main-
tain the correct organizational forms. For an oppositional minority
to violate such rules, that is entirely a different thing. He cites the
many experiences of Lenin, how he would give concession after
concession until there was a whole record, and after that it was
possible to show clearly that the other side was in the wrong. He
says Lenin would often say to an organizational proposal, quite
an innocuous one, but in his mind not entirely formally correct:
"No, we cannot do that because Shliapnikov will immediately pick
it up and it will not appear quite right." And at that Shliapnikov
was in the chronic opposition.
He sees our weakness in this respect. He points out particu-
larly that such arbitrary measures as we have taken are the kind
which will help to really obscure the issues and smother political
differences which may lie hidden, or prevent them from coming
out into the open. He insists upon a longer perspective as the only
possible way, if serious, but unclear, differences exist, to take
political form.
I have tried to picture these views as objectively as I am able,
as you will perhaps find further substantiated in the documents
enclosed. I am compelled to agree completely with him, not merely
out of his superior method of convincing arguments, but because
what he has said, even in the form that I am trying to picture it
here, is correct. He is, as a result of our discussions and having
482 C.T.A 193 1-33: The International Intervenes
recently also read a number of the various statements and decla-
rations, much more concerned with the question of a possible split
than with anything else in regard to our situation. Next I will say
he is much more concerned about us as a majority and responsible
group than he is with the position and attitude of the minority
But in general he thinks that we have permitted the atmosphere
to become entirely too poisoned, and that the sharpness of the
fight has far outgrown what is vet the childhood of our factions
and factional issues.
He cannot see what the conference can accomplish in the way
of settling any issue. He savs perhaps 100 on the one side and 110
on the other, what will it settle, what will the majority have to gain.
He wants to seek to make it a transition, the main task of which
must be to guarantee against a split. I am compelled to agree with
him also in this question, that the conference must preserve the
unity of the League. A split is out of the question so long that
there are no clearlv defined political differences. It is because of
this latter, the fact that there are no such clearlv defined differ-
ences, that LD so much stresses the question of a split, both in
the sense that it will thereby so much more easily occur and in
the sense that it would thereby be so much more fatal.
Now for some comments of my own. The two letters enclosed
are really self-explanatory; LD"s letter to me and my answer. I have
not vet had his reaction to my answer. But the contents of his let-
ter to me he conveyed to me in full before thev were put in final
written form. I have given them much consideration and. hence,
the kind of an answer that I have made. The points raised against
us, and especially the motivation from which he made them and
the general idea behind them, are such as to demand the most
serious consideration on our part. I believe in view of what I have
explained from our discussion they become clear. In regard to the
questions of a distinct organizational character, co-optation, the
secretaryship, and the matter of Abern's vote, he fullv understands
the whole implication, the question of reflecting the will of the
majority of the NC in the resident committee, the question of hav-
ing such a committee which makes possible that work can go ahead;
all this is fully clear to him: and he nevertheless insists that these
organizational methods on our part are something we have car-
ried over from the time of Stalinism. He savs such measures would
be unheard of in Lenin's time. And above all he insists such
Trotsky Expects More 483
measures can only hurt the authority of our leadership. I was some-
what inclined to the idea that the objection contained in regard
to the discussion material, which he calls the draft thesis, repre-
sented rather an effort to find as much ground as possible out of
little to make the criticism more severe. But I must agree that
although a copy was forwarded to America before it was presented
to anyone here and again forwarded, in abbreviated form, in my
official report from the conference, it is nevertheless true that I
have discussed the contents with comrades of the secretariat and
with LD as representing our views, before I knew what is the atti-
tude toward it of the minority on the committee. In its essence
such is a mistake, particularly when remembering that I am an
official delegate of the League. This is one of the small questions
of being formally correct in an organizational sense of which he
quotes so often from Lenin and which he considers so essential
for a majority group. In this he draws a clear distinction from
political questions in which he judges essentially the broad and
the principled contents.
On the question of proletarianization LD understands our
motivation, springing from the unhealthy conditions in the New
York branch. He does not consider its general tendency incorrect;
but he doubts the correctness under the conditions in which the
proposal was advanced, in general, in view of the position of the
Left Opposition and its relation to nonproletarians, and in par-
ticular, in view of our small numbers. However, his main fears in
respect to this question are the fact that he considers it a general
tendency showing our organizational intransigence, or inflexibil-
ity, in a difficult internal situation.
In this discussion between LD and myself, you also have my
answer to the proposal for transfer of the headquarters at this time.
Personally, as you know, I have generally held the view that such
a transfer is correct and the sooner it can be feasible, the better.
But now particularly it must be considered in close connection
with our internal situation, not only from the point of view of its
advantages not merely to a leading group which is correct in the
main, but to the League as a whole; it must however also be con-
sidered from its negative aspect in regard to the internal situation.
If general agreement can be obtained for the proposal, then it
should be carried out by all means as soon as practicable. It should
not be done in the face of opposition, even though it be factionally
484 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
motivated; then it is much more correct to modify and to post-
pone the question. Otherwise, it will give rise to a new issue of a
mechanical character. It would tend to conceal the real issues be-
cause the fight would be made against the transfer, not in regard
to its basic import to the League, but centering entirely around
the question of time of transfer, the "arbitrary" method by which
it was forced through, etc., etc.
In general, in view of the political issues of differences which
do not yet stand out clearly and in view of the acute internal situa-
tion (split situation), it is both necessary and correct to modify
organizationally, even to make concessions on organizational
measures affecting internal relations. We must remember that
whatever the internal consequences from such measures, regard-
less of factional demagogy or misuses, we are responsible as the
leading group. Also, anything on our part in this respect which
tends to blur the political issues, we become responsible for, and
we must therefore endeavor diligently to avoid. LD maintains that
conciliationism in such situations becomes a progressive tendency.
That is true, of course. It is true from the point of view that if
political differences lie hidden, they must be developed and
brought into the open. It is true from the point of view that unity,
before political differences have developed to a point of justifying
a split, is such a paramount necessity. But let me not be misunder-
stood, the question of conciliationism here is in regard only to
internal organizational measures, or organizational measures
affecting internal relations.
The contention made in point no. 7 of LD's letter of March 7
may seem insufficient by a superficial reading.463 But essentially
it is correct. What we are just now experiencing in the League, an
internal situation becoming more acute instead of lessening just
at the time when the turn of activities takes more decisive form,
may be just the process of throwing the "malady to the surface."
On the other hand it does also indicate deeper social roots to the
conflict. But so far it only indicates, and it must be probed deeper
and, if actually so, it must be laid open. For that also, this organi-
zational modification and greater conciliation is necessary, in
order to enable a more normal process of differentiation. If cor-
rectly pursued, the results will establish themselves more quickly
and more decisively, either in clear political divergences and con-
sequent elimination of the unhealthy sections or elements, or else
Trotsky Expects More 485
in lessening of the acute friction and leading toward greater
political and, consequently, also organizational unity, and in all
events to a healthy regroupment. Our trouble is that at present
we have a variant in between the two mentioned.
LD also gives good examples of utilization of people and the
necessity therefor (that is, yet considering a stage where political
differences have not clearly developed). According to LD, Lenin
would say: "We need Kamenev in the Politbureau, he represents a
vacillating tendency, but one which is quite widespread in the party
and by having him in the Politbureau we can better control this
tendency." He would say about Tomsky: "Yes, he represents some-
thing opportunistic which very easily develops in people engaged
in practical trade-union work, but precisely therefore we must have
the closest possible contact with him."
Finally, in regard to the coming conference and my own atti-
tude. It is my opinion that there is absolutely nothing lost, as a
matter of fact, it will be much better, if the final date is postponed
until about the latter part of September. Were it held now, it would
settle nothing, but only be a means to more acute conflict the day
after; it would not improve internal relations, nor facilitate the
turn of our work, and above all, it would not in the least serve as a
brake upon the course toward a split at this juncture. More time
is necessary in order to, as much as possible, give the differences
which exist a political content and actually show to what degree
political differences exist. With a correct attitude by the leader-
ship toward internal organizational measures, in combination with
the turn in our work, the increase in mass work, and consequently
new proletarian recruits, then it becomes precisely that kind of a
period which will give political content and force political differ-
ences into the open. That also gives time for preparations to avoid
a split at this time. The final date should be set only in collabora-
tion with the International Secretariat, in such a way as to give
much time for discussion, not only of the issues, but also of what
measures are to be taken to safeguard the future. We should insist
upon every new recruit, up until the date of the conference, and
every new branch organized, up until that date, having full rights
of participation. In every way there is everything to gain from this.
The group which is correct will gain and the League as a whole
will gain by the effects of this new blood taking direcl pari in our
affairs internally.
486 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
LD has written the secretariat extensively urging it to give the
closest possible attention to the conference, to take all possible
measures to preserve unity, urging it to appeal to the member-
ship of the League in this sense.
The question, which you find mentioned in my letter to LD,
of finding a couple of comrades not committed to either group
who could be added to the National Committee: I am sure that
when you give the whole question thorough consideration, you
will also agree that such a step would be correct at the present
juncture. In practice, however, it is not so simple. It will, of course,
have to be approached genuinely, and not in the sense of any fake
independent elements serving as a more effective cover for one
faction. But if an agreement in principle is at hand, the practical
aspect can be discussed for a solution later.
I had intended to close, but must first convey a few points of
information and also mention a couple of technical points.
LD has just now informed me that he thinks my declaration
of March 8 is very good. He says he felt quite pessimistic before
about our situation, now he feels optimistic. He wrote Shachtman
one short sharp letter; now he can write him another and apply
much more pressure. These were his statements. I saw the letter
mentioned. It was sharp. But these are, of course, statements and
actions of a personal character.
Two days ago we received a notice from the USSR that it is
rumored Rakovsky is dead. The same day a letter arrived from Paris
saying that the French minister of education had addressed an
inquiry to the Soviet embassy concerning the rumors of Rakovsky's
death. This inquiry was made three weeks ago and no answer to
date. I do not believe this should be used publicly yet. But here it
struck LD rather hard coming so close upon the heels of the death
of his daughter.
You remember I mentioned before the prospect of possibly
having an American comrade here, that is, to remain for a con-
siderable period of time, for the purpose of LD's security, as well
as to cooperate in work in English. I still believe that would be a
good step, but, meanwhile, it happened that from England the
offer came of comrade Sara coming here for a while.464 LD did
not accept the offer, replying that at the present moment I am
here and it is not excluded that he later may leave Prinkipo for a
Trotsky Expects More 487
while. Actually he entertains a secret hope that he may obtain a
visa and will be able to visit America.
I note your mentioning my return. I agree that it is time to
think of the arrangements. By the time this letter reaches you,
most of the important aspects of my visit will have been discussed
and there would be no need of prolonging my stay on the island.
I realize it is a good school, and personally I would have much to
gain, but organizationally it is otherwise. The return trip is the
question of money. I should, if at all possible, make another visit
to the secretariat for some further consultations with the com-
rades. I should by all means spend a few days in Germany on the
way and, if possible, a couple of days in Greece to learn a little
from the very efficient Archio-Marxist organization and work meth-
ods. I hope you proceed without delay on the money question. I
may say in this connection that at present the financial conditions
of the Prinkipo nucleus is very precarious. The Copenhagen trip
represented a deficit of about $2,000.
You have sent copies of minutes, documents, etc., here to me.
That is not necessary and better not. I will just have to carry it
around and can be informed from copies coming to LD. But I do
wish to ask you to send a complete set to my Bronx address from
NC minutes no. 1 14, so that I will be sure to have a set for my file.
The advances that are being made by the League are creating
considerable encouragement here. Otherwise, having looked a
little into the European states under reactionary dictatorships or
dictatorships in the making, I admit with "genuine pride" that the
good old U.S. is about the only democratic country left in this
capitalist world. With this appropriate note I close, and with the
warmest regards and Opposition greetings to all the comrades,
yourself especially.
^ 4- 4>
488
A Split Would Be a Catastrophe
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Albert Glotzer465
14 March 1933
I have not written you for a very long time. This is explained not
only because I was very much occupied with unpostponable work
but also because I first wanted to get a more or less clear picture
of the situation in the American League. Now I feel that I have
attained some degree of clarity. I have already written comrade
Shachtman very briefly about this, and I can only give you the
same advice: In no case and under no circumstances should you
aggravate the situation in the League. The International Secre-
tariat will, I hope, intervene in the next few days in the American
question. Any impatience on the part of your group would bring
things close to a split. And a split without a political physiognomy
is the most dangerous kind of miscarriage, capable of killing the
mother as well as the child. Also, the hope that the upcoming
national conference will put everything "right" seems false to me.
Under the present conditions, the conference would only bring
about an insignificant shift in the relationship of forces. It is rather
trivial whether your group has five representatives on the central
committee and the other four, or vice versa, since one group is
dependent on the other if you do not want to drive matters to a
split, i.e., to a catastrophe. Do not be impatient, dear Glotzer. You
must prepare yourself for long-term work.
You will say to me, "And the others, the Cannon group?" Of
course we are dealing simultaneously with both groups. You pro-
tested strenuously against comrade Swabeck's trip. Quite
unjustifiably. His trip was highly useful for the leading European
comrades, also for us here, as well as for Swabeck himself. I am
sure that comrade Swabeck, for his part, will contribute all he can
to bringing life in the League back to a normal course.
You must be clear about one thing: Should it come to a split,
the League would be degraded to two entirely insignificant
grouplets, which in the best case could belong to the International
Germany and the USSR 489
Left Opposition as sympathizers, approximately as is the case in
Czechoslovakia.
I await your reply with great interest.
^ 4> 4-
Germany and the USSR
by Leon Trotsky
17 March 1933
This was published in CLA Internal Bulletin no. 11 (31 March 1933),
marked "For the information of the sections of the International Left
Opposition "*m
1. The complete absence of resistance on the part of the German
workers has provoked certain troubles within our own ranks. We
expected that the on-march of the fascist danger would surmount
not only the perfidious policy of the reformists but also the
ultimatist sabotage of the Stalinists. These hopes were not con-
firmed. Were our expectations false? This question we cannot put
in such a formal manner. We were obliged to proceed from a course
based upon resistance and to do all in our power for its realiza-
tion. To acknowledge a priori the impossibility of resistance would
have meant not to push the proletariat forward but to introduce a
supplementary demoralizing element.
The events have brought their verification. The first lesson of
this proof is drawn in Trotsky's article "The Tragedy of the Ger-
man Proletariat."467 Now one can say almost with certainty that
only a change of conjuncture would create an impulse toward a
real mass struggle. In the meantime the task is mainly one of criti-
cism and of preparation. The fascist terror regime will be a serious
test for our cadres as a whole and for each member in particular.
It is precisely such a period which steels and educates the revolu-
tionists. So long as the fascists tolerate the existence of the trade
unions it is necessary for the Left Oppositionists at all costs to
penetrate them and take up definite conspiratorial work within
them. The transition to illegality does not simply mean to go
490 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
underground (establishment of an organ in a foreign country,
smuggling and distribution, illegal nuclei within the country, etc.),
but also ability to undertake the conspiratorial work within the
mass organizations to the extent that these exist.
2. The question of the possible role of the Red Army is posed
sharply for many comrades. It is evidently not a question of revi-
sion of our principled position. If the internal situation in the
USSR had permitted, the Soviet government, at the time of Hitler's
first approach toward power, should have mobilized some army
corps in White Russia and the Ukraine, naturally under the shield
of the defense of the Soviet borders. Based upon the indisputable
idea that the Red Army can only assist and not replace the revolu-
tion in another country, some comrades incline to the conclusion
that in the absence of open civil war in Germany it would be
inadmissible to take recourse to a mobilization in the USSR. To
put the question in such a manner is too abstract. Naturally the
Red Army cannot replace the German workers in making the revo-
lution, rather it can only assist the revolution of the German
workers. But in the different stages this assistance can have differ-
ent manifestations. For example, the Red Army can assist the
German workers to commence the revolution.
What paralyzed the German proletariat was the feeling of dis-
unity, isolation, and despair. Merely the perspective of armed
assistance from the outside would have exercised an enormously
encouraging influence upon the vanguard. The first serious act
of resistance against Hitler on the part of the German workers
could have provoked a breach between fascist Cjermany and the
USSR and could have led to a military solution. The Soviet gov-
ernment cannot have the slightest interest in acting the aggressor.
It is not a question of principle but a question of the political
expediency. To the peasant masses a war with the objective of
assisting the German proletariat would have been little compre-
hensible. But it is possible to draw the peasants into the kind of
war which commences as a defense of the Soviet territory against
a menacing danger. (All that was said in the History by Trotsky on
this subject, the defense and the attack in regard to revolution,
relates no less to the question of war.)
The form of the Red Army action in the German events natu-
rally would have to be entirely in accordance with the development
Germany and the USSR 491
of these events and in accordance with the spirit of the German
working masses. But just because the German workers felt them-
selves unable to break the chains of passivity, the initiative in the
struggle, even in the preliminary form mentioned above, could
have belonged to the Red Army. The obstacle to this initiative, how-
ever, is not the present situation in Germany, but the situation in the
USSR. It appears that many foreign comrades give insufficient
attention to this side of the question. It is more than a year ago
that we spoke of the necessity of the intervention of the Red Army
in case fascism should arrive in power. In this we based ourselves
upon the hope that not only in Germany but also in Russia the
necessary political change would be produced which would im-
prove the economic situation, and that thereby the Soviet power
would have acquired the necessary freedom of movement. In real-
ity, however, the internal developments have during the last year
assumed an extremely unfavorable character. The economic situ-
ation as well as the spirit of the masses renders a war difficult to
the highest degree. All information from the USSR affirms that
under the present conditions the slogan of military assistance to
the German proletariat would appear even to the advanced Rus-
sian workers as unrealizable, unreal, and fantastic.
We do not yield one iota of our principled position. But the
position of active internationalism serves us today above all for
the purpose of pursuing an unmerciful criticism of the Stalinist
bureaucracy which in the decisive hour paralyzes the workers state,
yet we can in no case leave the objective situation out of consider-
ation: The consequences of the mistakes have become transformed
into objective factors. To demand the mobilization of the Red Army
under the present conditions would be sheer adventurism. But so
much more resolutely must we demand a change in the policy of
the USSR in the name of the consolidation of the proletarian dic-
tatorship and the active role of the Red Army.
4- 4- <►
492
We Have Made Some Errors
Letter by James P. Cannon to Comrades468
27 March 1933
This letter was written to Cannon's leading supporters around the country.
In a letter to Swabeck, drafted subsequently but never sent, Cannon reported
that Oehler, Dunne, and Skoglund concurred with the New York Cannon
faction 's acceptance of Trotsky 's criticisms. He further noted:
Our aims in the internal struggle have been indubitably correct, and
the future of the movement is bound up with their achievement. On
this point there is not a shadow of a doubt in our ranks. But particu-
larly since the plenum, it must be admitted that we allowed ourselves to
a considerable extent to give way to impatience, to be caught in the
logic of a factional situation, and to assist thereby the efforts of others
to confuse and muddle the important and essential issues. 469
I am sending you copies of the letter from Arne and two other
documents received from him— one, the criticisms of comrade
Trotsky, and the other, Arne's reply. In studying this criticism
it should be remembered that it is addressed to us, as stated, "totally
independent from the evaluation of the attitude of the minority."
We have talked the thing over here and are all pretty much of
the opinion that we will have to give this criticism very serious
consideration on its merits and make some gestures and modifi-
cations in our organization policy. Not, however, out of political
conciliation toward the corrupt petty-bourgeois political methods
of the Shachtman clique, but in order to wage a more effective
struggle against them.
I am very anxious to hear from you immediately and to have
your opinions before answering Arne.
I don't doubt we have made some errors. But we have made
some errors of a secondary character in a fight that has been
fundamentally correct and necessary. It seems to me the Old Man
is leaning over backward to find points of criticism because he is
afraid we are driving to a split too soon. It is to be noted, however,
that his criticism of us is restricted entirely to the question of
organization policy.
I.S. Resolution on the League 493
Please let me know right away if you will agree for me to make
a few motions in the NC respecting organization concessions along
the lines specified by the Old Man. As for political concessions I
propose that we give nothing.
PS: I am having a hell of a time here with financial problems at
the office and double ones at home.
<>
Resolution on the Situation in the
American League
International Secretariat
[April 1933]
This undated resolution was published in International Bulletin of
the Communist Left Opposition no. 2/3 (April 1933).
In its resolution on the differences within the American
League, the preconference of the ILO emphasized the necessity
of placing before the international Opposition the conflict within
the leadership of the American organization. In view of the fact
that up to now the discussion material has not yet arrived, and
according to the latest information the situation is full of the dan-
ger of a split and more and more hinders the work of the American
League, the I.S. considers it its imperative duty to intervene to
address itself on behalf of the ILO to the members of the League
and point out this danger to them, drawing their attention to the
following points.
1. The direction in which the League has begun to engage itself
recently, of active participation in the struggle of the working
masses, is the one which can surely lead the League to a higher
stage of its existence; put an end to the purely literary and propa-
gandist activity; and assure real progress to the League. By this
work, it will succeed in drawing new elements into the organiza-
tion and in realizing a better selection of cadres.
2. On the other hand, the work cannot give results so long as the
factional struggle, which poisons the internal life of the League,
494 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
will continue within the group. This struggle, having up to the
present no clear political content, does not permit the organiza-
tion to march forward. It prevents and stops the adherence of new
members to the League; it produces discouragement among mem-
bers who are not sufficiently firm as yet, instead of educating them;
and positively does injury to the work of the LO in America.
3. Still what would be the situation if a split occurred in the League
on the basis of this conflict? Such a split would not be understand-
able to the members and still less so for the workers who follow
the League and would compromise for a long time the LO in
America. The I.S. appeals to the members of the League to pre-
vent a split in the League at any cost, to demand the concentration
of the forces of the League for the realization of the objectives
which have been posed— work among the masses, the unemployed,
among the trade unions, etc., and to demand that the factional
struggle must stop.
4. The I.S. believes that the conference of the League should be
held after a profound discussion within the whole organization
on the concrete tasks of the League and should take up these ques-
tions and secure a leadership which will dispose all its forces for
the realization of these tasks. A concentration of forces in the lead-
ership and the enlargement of the same leadership with the
participation of the militants, especially tested workers, imbued
with the spirit of positive work, seem necessary to us.
Grand perspectives are opening up before the American
League. We are convinced that the members of the American
Opposition will rise to the heights of the period which the Com-
munist movement is passing through in Germany, of the danger
which is threatening the USSR, and the tasks which confront the
Bolshevik-Leninists; and, surmounting the internal crisis, will get
to work to transform the American League into a champion of
the struggles of the American proletariat and a Bolshevik guide
for Communism in its country.
495
Concession on Organizational Questions
by James P. Cannon470
5 April 1933
Cannon submitted these motions to the 5 April 1933 resident committee
meeting, which Shachtman and Abern also attended. He described his
motivation in an unfinished letter to Swabeck:
From these motions it will be clear that our group is ready to do every-
thing to ensure a democratically organized conference and to establish
safeguards against organizational split. The action should also convince
comrade Trotsky that we are by no means so uncivilized as he seems to
fear. The motions, taken together, are obviously in the nature of conces-
sions to the minority. They are directly prompted by the criticisms of
comrade Trotsky. If they result in a certain easing up of the internal
tension, the credit will belong in the first place to him, and to us only
in a secondary place, insofar as our action shows that we are willing to
learn, to improve our manners, and to allay suspicions about our
cannibalistic propensities. 471
At Shachtman 's request voting was tabled until the following meeting.
Motion no. 3 refers to a united-front conference called for April 30 in
Chicago at the initiative of the Tom Mooney Molders' Defense Committee
to revive the labor campaign to free Tom Mooney. Both the CLA and the
Communist Party were endorsers.
1. All decisions in regard to the national conference of the League,
arrangements, representation, and other organizational questions,
shall be subject to ratification by the International Secretariat in
case of disagreement in the National Committee.
2. The functioning NC is to consist of all members resident in
New York. Disputed questions may be appealed by referendum to
the full committee.
3. As previously decided, comrade Cannon shall arrange a speak-
ing tour to the West, timing the schedule so as to be in Chicago as
a delegate of the League to the Mooney congress on April 30.
Thereafter he is to go into the Illinois field for a period of work
among the miners in cooperation with comrade Oehler, who is
also to remain in the field.
496 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
4. During the absence of comrade Cannon, comrade Abern shall
conduct the work of the national office as acting secretary.
5. The mining campaign is to be put before the membership as
the central task of the League in the next period in the field of
mass work and a special fund shall be raised to finance it.
6. Comrade Shachtman shall make a tour of the eastern branches
now, completing the circuit of the western branches about the time
that comrade Cannon returns from Illinois and finishes his tour
with meetings in the eastern points.
7. A special appeal shall be made by the NC for the funds neces-
sary for the return journey of comrade Swabeck.
^ ^ ^
Response on Organizational Questions
by Max Shachtman472
7 April 1933
At the 7 April 1933 resident committee meeting Shachtman counterposed
these motions to Cannon 'sfrom April 5. With only Cannon, Shachtman,
and Abern in attendance and with Abern not voting, the committee
deadlocked on four out of seven questions, including Cannon's projected
trip to the Mooney conference and Illinois coalfields. In sending both
sets of motions to Swabeck in Prinkipo, Cannon noted:
At the moment when the situation has matured and the ground has
been prepared by the preliminary work of comrade Oehler for my going
into the coalfield, the project is tied up by a deadlock in the committee.
We are sending the motions out for referendum vote. But there is very
little hope that it will yield anything except a tie vote. The action of
Abern and Shachtman in this matter is a real blow at our mining cam-
paign. Now is just the time to strike there with full force.™
Shachtman voted for Cannon's motions to give the I.S. veto power over
conference arrangements, to make the mining campaign a priority, and
to undertake a fund drive for Swabeck 's return. Cannon did not vote
for any of Shachtman 's motions.
Shachtman 's third motion refers to joint public meetings with the
Weisbord group. In a February 15 declaration, the Communist League
Shachtman on Organization 497
of Struggle forthrightly stated, "The group as a whole fully accepts com-
rade Trotsky's views" on the centrist character of Stalinism. Moreover, it
abandoned its characterizations of the CLA as a "very plain right-wing
sectarian group, " and a "factional remnant of the old Cannon group in
the Party using the name of L.D. Trotsky as a mask."474 In subsequent
discussions the CLS accepted the CLA as the official section of the Inter-
national Left Opposition and agreed to engage in joint work with a
perspective toward fusion. The first step was to be joint forums in New
York and New Jersey.415
1. The National Committee is to consist of all the members elected
at the last national conference. The resident committee, composed
of all the members resident in New York, shall have full power to
act subject to ratification, when necessary, of the members of the
National Committee not resident in New York. Toward this end,
the decision to deprive comrade Abern of his vote in the resident
committee is hereby revoked. Toward the same end, the decision
to replace the resident committee by a "political committee" is also
revoked.
2. Comrade Shachtman shall begin a national tour of the League,
with his first meeting on April 21 in Boston, then to the Cana-
dian cities, to Chicago, from there to cover the Illinois mine field
and the western branches, to return by the "southern route" with
a final meeting in Philadelphia, speaking mainly on the crisis in
the USSR and the situation in Germany.
3. Until the return of comrade Swabeck, comrade Cannon shall
devote himself mainly to the center, also covering, together with
representatives of the Weisbord group, the cities proximate to New
York where joint meetings of the two organizations are to be held.
->
498
Request for Advice on Allard
Letter by James P. Cannon to Leon Trotsky476
14 April 1933
With this letter Cannon enclosed a copy of his April 10 letter to Gerry
Allard in Gillespie,*77 which informed Allard of the unanimous decision
of the 3 April 1933 resident committee meeting: "That the next issue of
the Militant publish an article polemicizing in a comradely tone and
spirit with the reformist views expressed in the columns of the Progressive
Miner and the false or ambiguous ideas conflicting with the Left
Opposition standpoint voiced in the personal column of comrade
Allard."478 The committee also noted that Allard had disagreed with other
members of the CLA steering committee on several questions at the
April 2 Gillespie conference.
Enclosed herewith you will find a copy of a letter which we
have sent to comrade Gerry Allard, a member of the League who
holds a prominent position in the Progressive Miners Union in
Illinois and is editor of their official organ. The letter is largely
self-explanatory. Comrade Swabeck, if he is still there when this
arrives, can supplement the information as he is very well
acquainted with the whole question.
The problem is undoubtedly a very important one for us and
one that will arise many times in various forms as the League
progresses as a factor in the class struggle and roots itself in the
trade unions. It is highly important that we do not bungle the job,
and we should have some advice from you if possible.
This is all the more necessary because we seem to have a
certain difference of opinion in the NC on the question. The dif-
ference, as it seems to me, is one of method and tempo in dealing
with comrade Allard. In NC minutes no. 135, paragraph no. 7 of
comrade Shachtman's motion, the problem is formulated as one
of "coming now to a final conclusion in this case."479 This appears
to me as too abrupt, as a premise that can force us to break with
comrade Allard prematurely, before all means of pressure and per-
suasion have been exhausted and before the impossibility of
We Don 't Want a Split 499
correcting comrade Allard has been fully demonstrated. As a
matter of fact, I myself am by no means convinced that we cannot
bring comrade Allard along. His difficulty, in my opinion, comes
chiefly from his tendency to adapt himself to the mass movement
and his lack of political understanding and experience. His posi-
tion is difficult and complicated. Above all, he needs direct
and constant political aid. It is from this point of view that I
emphasize so strongly the necessity of having a more experienced
member of the NC present in the mining field in the next period.
I am finishing a document which embodies my estimation of
the Illinois mining situation and our tasks there. As soon as it is
finished, I will send you a copy. Meantime, I wish you would give
some consideration to the special question of comrade Allard.
^ ^ ^
We Don't Want a Split
Letter by Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky 480
15 April 1933
In this letter Shachtman refers to repeated disputes in the resident
committee oversetting the date for the League's third national conference.
At a 29 December 1932 meeting Shachtman and Abern proposed to hold
the conference on May 1. Instead, the committee adopted Cannon's
proposal to begin preparations, with the conference date to be set later.
At the January 12 resident committee meeting Shachtman, noting that
the New York, Boston, and, Chicago branches had voted for a conference,
moved again for the May 1 date. Cannon counterposed June 30, to allow
for theses preparation and the statutory three-month discussion period.
By the time the question was voted on January 23 Shachtman and Abern
had changed their preferred date to June 1, but the June 30 date still
won. At subsequent resident committee meetings Shachtman repeatedly
accused Cannon of delaying conference preparations.
Comrade Sara Weber tells me that she has already written to
you concerning the arrangements for her work as your technical
assistant. In her letter she takes up all the questions involved more
clearly than I could do so; consequently, it becomes unnecessary
500 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
for me to answer in detail that part of your recent correspondence
which deals with her. I can only add that if you find it possible to
conclude the arrangements satisfactorily, you will find her a
capable and devoted worker who will prove to be of considerable
help to you. I hope, also, that you will be able to make the neces-
sary arrangements about her quarters, as that appears to be the
only question disturbing her; in every other respect, she appears
to be delighted with the prospect of being able to assist you. From
the financial standpoint, as you know, she will in no way consti-
tute a problem for the "Prinkipo treasury"— her requirements are
modest enough.
Now as to the other questions which deal directly with the
life of the League. We have not yet received any communication
from the International Secretariat with regard to our internal dis-
pute and it is consequently impossible for me to express myself
one way or another on the intervention of the secretariat to which
you refer in your letter of March 8. However, your letter, together
with the one you wrote to comrade Glotzer (who was good enough
to send me a copy), raises some questions to which it is necessary
to reply.
What you say about the danger of a split in the American
League is correct in this sense: It would retard the development
of the Opposition in this country for a long period of time because,
as matters stand now, it would be difficult to explain to the work-
ers close to us why the split occurred. I think that you exaggerate
beyond reality the "imminence" or "inevitability" of a split in the
League, but for the moment that is not the most important ques-
tion. What is more important at the present time is to determine
what and who are primarily responsible for accentuating what-
ever split danger does exist. We are in no way willing to take this
responsibility upon ourselves. It is not we who ever raised the ques-
tion of a split perspective for the League. That wras done by the
group of comrade Cannon, in his faction circular letter to com-
rade Oehler about a year ago (30 April 1932—1 sent you a copy of
it), the central point of which was contained in the conclusion
Cannon drew from the prospect of his faction losing the leader-
ship of the League: "The downfall of the League as it exists today
would inevitably follow. It would become necessary for the smaller
group, which has been drowned out in the clamor of demagogy,
to begin all over again."481 Can this have two meanings? Can any
We Don 't Want a Split 501
other significance be attached to the campaign Cannon has con-
ducted against us ever since on the grounds that we are the group
of the petty bourgeoisie in the League, whereas he represents the
"revolutionary kernel"; or (as is the case in his latest polemic, on
the occasion of the dispute over the Red Army), that we have
"fundamental principled differences" with the Bolshevik concep-
tion, that we are the channel through which Stalinism finds its
way into the League, that we are capitulating to Stalinism, etc.,
etc.? I do not want to present our internal situation as though our
group has done nothing at all to sharpen relations. Under provo-
cations and in the intensity and heat of a factional struggle, it is
not always possible to maintain an absolutely perfect equilibrium.
But I do not think that it is a question of "distributing the blame"
in this sense: One group is 49 percent wrong and the other group
is 51 percent wrong. It is much more a question of establishing a
healthy, normal regime in the American Opposition, with proper
(instead of the present very bad) relationships between the lead-
ership and the membership, with the application of internal
methods and policies which will make it possible to deal with
political questions, problems of the day, and disputes of any seri-
ous nature in an objective and fruitful manner. In the solution of
this problem, the Cannon group has taken an almost invariably
wrong and harmful position. We have not been able to counteract
this position in any way other than carrying on a fight against it.
And in this we have not only had the support of the majority of
the League's membership, but also of numerous comrades who
are not associated "organizationally" with our group (especially
in New York), yet who are unwilling to let pass without protest the
actions of the Cannon faction.
Whatever assistance you and the international organization will
be able to give us in the form of counsel and suggestions toward
the end of solving the internal problems of the League will not be
met antagonistically by us; it will be welcomed. "Angriffe" [attacks]
and "Scharfmacherei" [rabble-rousing] will not be our contribution
to the solving of the problem. I have tried at all times in my corre-
spondence with you to make this clear, in referring to the numerous
disputes which have arisen in the course of the last year.
What you say with regard to a national conference of the
American League is not entirely clear to me. The conference will
not, it goes without saying, establish peace and harmony in the
502 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
League at one blow. That we never expected. But it will bring the
present dispute to a conclusion in the sense of permitting the mem-
bership as a whole to express a judgment upon it. What other way
is there? It is not healthy for the League to continue in the present
state of incertitude, of artificial protraction and delay. The Cannon
group is at the present time in a minority in the League; the
majority of the membership does not at all agree with its policies
and methods. Only for this reason has the conference been delib-
erately postponed and postponed, time and again. You seem to
have the impression that we are trying to hasten the convocation
of the conference at too early a date, at an unreasonable and dan-
gerous speed. That is not the case. For months, Cannon repeatedly
declared that as soon as the minority expresses the wish for a
national conference, he would vote for it instantly. As soon as the
"postplenum discussion" was over, we made the proposal for a
conference. It was promptly defeated. We had no other recourse
than the democratic procedure provided for by the League's stat-
utes: an appeal to the membership. The important branches voted
for a conference. Only then did the Cannon group agree to set-
ting a date. We finally compromised on the date of June 30. But
the preparations have been dragged out so unnecessarily that I
have no doubt that we shall be confronted with a proposal for a
new postponement— perhaps to the Greek Calends. Our "impa-
tience" in this question lies only in having accepted the challenge,
made by Cannon, that we should propose a conference. We did
propose it; the date has been set by unanimous consent; we are
intent upon having the date adhered to. As to the danger of a
split at the conference, whoever undertakes it will be playing with
fire. We are quite ready to abide by the decisions of the confer-
ence in any case.
And by a conference, we have in mind one which really repre-
sents the membership. We do not have in mind a conference at
which branches with one member shall suddenly appear as
branches with "five" members— as is being tried now with regard
to our Kansas City branch; or that branches with 20 or more mem-
bers—as is the case in Toronto, where the Cannon group has no
supporters— shall be represented at the conference only by
"fraternal delegates," i.e., with voice but no vote. Decisions adopted
by a conference organized on such a basis (and I must tell you
plainly that I am more than apprehensive that it will be attempted),
We Don 't Want a Split 503
will not be worth very much as a solution of our difficulties, any
more than did Landau's "famous" conference organized with
"Ludwigshafen branches."482
At all events, I want to repeat here the opinion of all our com-
rades: The danger of a split does not come from our side. We will
not, I need hardly say it, undertake a split, and we shall endeavor
to do all we can to prevent a split from being precipitated.
With regard to the trip of comrade Swabeck, I am glad to learn
that it has proved to be so valuable. In the midst of the dispute
over the question of comrade Swabeck going to Europe, I wrote
you that we had no objections to his departure. We could not, how-
ever, vote to send him as our representative; first, because he
represents the views and opinions of his faction and not of us;
second, because our proposals for a preliminary discussion in the
National Committee and the League on the problems before the
International Left Opposition— a discussion on the basis of which
Swabeck would have been better able to represent the standpoint
of the organization as a whole— were rejected by the committee's
majority, and comrade Swabeck was dispatched to participate in
the international conference not only without the League discuss-
ing the problems of the conference, but without even the National
Committee devoting ten minutes to such a discussion.
I have read hastily the protocol of your discussion with com-
rade Swabeck of the Negro question in the United States.483 It is
not possible to go into detail on the question in this letter. Unfor-
tunately, however, I am unable to agree with your position. At first
glance, it strikes me as a rigid application of the Bolshevik stand-
point to the question of oppressed nationalities in general, to the
specific, and almost wholly unique, question of the Negroes in
the United States. I have written an extensive pamphlet on the
question and am now going over the manuscript for final correc-
tions.484 I am proposing to the League to publish it and I shall
take the liberty of sending you a copy of the manuscript for your
perusal. While it is essentially a semipropagandistic-semiagitational
pamphlet, I also attempt to deal with the question from a funda-
mental theoretical angle. I come to a conclusion opposite to your
conclusion, that is, in my polemic against the present official Party
standpoint, which is opposed by practically every member of the
504 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
League at the present time. Will it be possible for you to read
through the manuscript I send you? Your opinion of it would be
greatly appreciated by me.
Also, I must beg to impose upon you again with the request
that you assist me— as soon as you can spare the time for it from
your work— with replies to the series of questions I sent you in con-
nection with various phases of the history of the Comintern.
Please thank comrade Frank for his letter which I will try to
answer soon; the Nin-Trotsky correspondence is to be sent out for
discussion to the membership.485
PS: I enclose comrade Abern's report on the "German campaign"
during the period when the Militant appeared three times a
week.486 It is for your information.
<>
Setting a Date for the Conference
Letter by Arne Swabeck to James P. Cannon487
16 April 1933
The Gourov letter coming from the International Secretariat-
concerning the League internal situation and specifically our com-
ing conference— I assume you will have by the time this letter
reaches you. It does not attempt to judge or to characterize the
issues involved in the internal conflict; but, as you will notice, it
proposes definitely complete collaboration with the International
Secretariat on all matters concerning the conference on the basis
of joint agreement, including even the question of setting the date.
In conformity with this, I wish to present the following motion to
the National Committee:
That the conference date be set for September 15; all mate-
rial, theses, and resolutions to be ready in time to assure a
discussion period of at least three months. This date is to be pro-
posed to the International Secretariat for common agreement.
I submit the following motivation, which I ask to have com-
municated to all NC members:
Setting a Date for Conference 505
1. It should be obvious that the conference cannot take place on
June 30, if it is to permit for an adequate discussion by the League
membership, not to speak of the international sections. The
League is facing much greater tasks than hitherto, due to the new
perspectives opening up for the International Left Opposition
growing out of the defeat in Germany. To the International Left
Opposition, this means a turn of orientation in which all of its
sections must participate. The League's tasks are already indicated
in a measure by its present activities. The League is facing a diffi-
cult internal situation which has become a serious obstacle to its
further advance.
Both of these problems, external and internal, require for their
solution not a speedily organized, but a thoroughly organized, con-
ference, thoroughly prepared theses and resolutions, thorough
discussion by the membership, and fully participated in by the
other sections of the International Left Opposition.
2. It should be obvious that a conference held in the present
atmosphere of factional friction and hostility can bring no solu-
tion whatever, but serve only to seriously endanger the unity of
the League. And in this proposal for extended time, I also pro-
pose that all the leading comrades pledge to endeavor to remove all
factional frictions and obstacles which are of an organizational
and personal character, and to endeavor to conciliate the differ-
ences growing out of this basis prior to the conference, in order
to guarantee the possibility of objective deliberations and to secure
the unity of the League. I propose this extension of time to make
possible effective intervention by the International Secretariat if
such should be necessary. Revolutionary objectivity and the inter-
est of the League demands that this period of time be allowed for
the conference preparations.
Comrade Trotsky has expressed his agreement with my
proposal in regard to our perspectives and its expression in our
conference material as contained in my letter of April 6 (that section
which deals with the question of perspectives).488 He also wants it
understood that the Gourov letter concerning the League internal
situation and the coming conference must be viewed in connec-
tion with the letters he formerly sent to the League regarding
comrade Shachtman's position in the European questions.
506 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
As the League representative, I am sending the motion above
and motivation direct to the International Secretariat.
The very best regards to all comrades with all due sympathy
to the secretary's position.
<- 4- ^
An Offensive for Unity
Letter by Arne Swabeck to James P. Cannon489
16 April 1933
This letter was marked "entirely personal."
It is 1:30 at night. Here one always gets to bed about 10:30,
but just a couple of lines.
This evening I received your letter and minutes concerning
the question of your tour to the Illinois mine fields and the coun-
terproposal by Shachtman-Abern. I discussed it with LD. He says:
Yes, that is a blow to the League, but it is the kind of blow which
grows out of a bad internal situation. Shachtman by his position
can only compromise himself seriously, not only in the League,
but also in the international organization.
We discussed my idea for more time and preparation for the
coming conference. He says he will write the secretariat again in
that sense. He says he will also write Shachtman and Glotzer again
personally— and they will be hot letters.
The International Secretariat proposes to invite a representa-
tive of the minority to its coming plenum May 6-7. I wrote them,
stating my belief that it would be physically impossible, but urged
them to extend the invitation.
I propose there should now be an offensive made on the basis
of my motion, not particularly the part for postponement, but the
proposal for removal of frictions and conciliation of organizational
and personal differences to preserve the unity of the League. Not
just in a backhanded manner to restore some rights taken away by
wrong organizational measures, but openly, even admitting what
was wrong, and openly and demonstratively leading in the direc-
tion of organizational conciliation for the unity of the League— but
Not More Favorable to Minority 507
uncompromising firmness on political views, and more so when
they involve differences. The League situation absolutely demands
that, and that is the way to carry a majority for it in a bad factional
situation.
Why have you not long ago sent your statement on the Illi-
nois miners question? I have already discussed it with LD, giving
my views as distinctly opposed to Shachtman's. He sees clearly
the danger of Shachtman's position, but it would have been much
better to also have your statement.
I would not mind if you would also make my proposal on per-
spectives contained in the letter of April 6 known to the NC
members, if not to discuss it with the membership in general (not
the internal section, that was not written for general consumption).
^ ^ ^
I Am Not More Favorable to the Minority
Letter by Leon Trotsky to the
International Secretariat490
17 April 1933
This letter was also sent to the National Committee of the CLA.
It seemed to you that my letter could be interpreted as being
more favorable to the minority than to the majority of the central
committee of our American section. If this is your impression, I
didn't express myself well. In intervening in this question, my pur-
pose was to totally discount our previous experiences on the
international plane (the case of comrade Shachtman) and to fol-
low step by step, without the least prejudice for one side or the
other, the development of the internal conflicts and differences
in the American section.
It seemed to me— and it still does— that the minority is tremen-
dously overestimating the importance of the national conference,
not as the regular political convention of a revolutionary organi-
zation, but as a way to solve the internal struggle by forcing a
decision through organizational means, i.e., by winning a small
majority of only a few votes. In my opinion political wisdom means
508 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
understanding that, at the present stage, there is no organizational
way of forcing a decision that would favor the development of the
organization itself. Quite the contrary, it is necessary to put poli-
tics in the forefront and to be careful not to rush things.
It also seemed to me that the majority, as the leading faction
in the central committee, showed some impatience and applied
or attempted to applv organizational measures that, while not yield-
ing any lasting results, could not help but sharpen the conflict.
I note with satisfaction that the majority has withdrawn on its
own initiative one of the measures, which consisted in depriving
comrade Abern of his decisive vote in the committee in the absence
of comrade Swabeck. And if I understand correctly the meaning
of the recent central committee minutes, the minority's reaction
seems quite worrisome to me.
What is at stake are our opportunities in the miners federa-
tion in Illinois. Cannon is well-known down there and has an
authority based in particular on his past trade-union activity.
Everything seems to indicate that he was the one who had to go
back there in a situation that is rather promising. The continuity
of the work under way also demands it. However, the minority
opposed it with the candidacy of comrade Shachtman and it is to
be feared that the central committee will remain undecided.
Such a measure on the part of the minority could only be jus-
tified by deep differences on our work among the miners. My
impression is that the minority is not correct in its criticisms. Far
from it. Thev criticize comrade Allard for not sufficiently empha-
sizing the point of view of the Left Opposition in the trade-union
paper of which he is the editor. They criticize comrade Cannon
for presenting himself as a representative of progressive workers
and not as a representative of the League. I cannot judge whether
the first criticism is founded; I read only two issues of the paper
in question. In one of them, the editors played up the speech of
comrade Cannon quite big, which is of course of great importance
for us. It may be that comrade Allard does not utilize all the pos-
sibilities; but he was the only one— or at least he was up to very
recently. Besides, this is a trade-union paper, the editing of which
requires a great deal of tact and caution. The criticism against
comrade Cannon appears to me to be dictated by a purely for-
malistic intransigence. I do not think that comrade Cannon had
to present himself as a delegate of the League, the latter being a
Shachtman Flounders 509
political organization. Not much is accomplished through politi-
cal demonstrations inside of the trade unions; what is important
is getting into them, gaining authority within them, working in-
side, creating a fraction, which in turn must not abuse the name
of the League on every occasion, especially not as long as it re-
mains a tiny minority. A mass trade union is not a meeting called
by some political organization. Of course, there are no inflexible
rules for those things; it is a matter of concrete circumstances.
But it seems to me— although, of course, from afar I could be mis-
taken—that there is a certain spirit of sectarian formalism in the
objections of the minority. In any case, these objections do not at
all appear to me to be sufficient to prevent Cannon from pursu-
ing this very important work among the miners.
Since I have decided to follow step by step the development
of the internal struggle, I am asking you to please not consider
this letter as "final." Its purpose is to supplement the previous
letter in the light of new experience.
^ ^ 4*
Shachtman Flounders Between Scholasticism
and Softness on Stalinism
Letter by Arne Swabeck to James P. Cannon491
17 April 1933
Today LD wrote a letter to the International Secretariat with copy
to the League NC, taking up the issue raised in NC minutes nos.
145 and 146, and other matters.492 I have not translated it as I
thought it better that the original be sent over. This, I am sure, is
a quicker response than you had expected and should help to put
the brakes on the irresponsible factional actions. If you had been
so prompt in sending your statement on the miners situation, we
would have had a more completed picture here and more up-to-
date. But you have a very bad habit in certain instances of stalling
and delaying, which some day will be your undoing.
Nevertheless LD's letter on that aspect of the question is clear
and should be a help in the present situation.
510 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
The idea expressed in regard to the conference, I believe,
should also exert itself in favor of a different approach. It should
strengthen the proposal I submitted in my letter of yesterday. I am
certain the League will benefit from that proposal, and feel quite
sure it will meet with the approval of the International Secretariat.
On a whole the future course should now appear much clearer.
As I mentioned in my personal letter to you yesterday, it is now
time to follow a definite strategy which will, when correctly car-
ried out, lead to a correct solution of the internal difficulties, and
it will be up to us to carry that out. We must put first on the agenda
the question of preserving the unity of the League in the sense of
removing all the organizational and personal issues of friction
which have led in the opposite direction. In that respect the heavi-
est demands are upon us, not upon the minority. In other words,
to accept openly the criticisms of our measures contained in this
letter and continually take such measures which will correct these
mistakes of the past. (As a matter of fact, the more that could have
been accomplished prior to the arrival of this letter, the better.)
That course will be certain to rally a response from the serious
elements among our membership. With this course there will be
a strong basis prepared upon which to fight out the political issues;
where no compromise is made and no quarter is given. The
political issues should be pursued relentlessly. As examples we have
these two questions of the Red Army and the Illinois miners. I
am, of course, quite aware that to the extent they have appeared
as issues of dispute, they are episodic. That is, they will not con-
tinue to remain issues of dispute, upon which political divisions
take place. But nevertheless they are symptomatic and express a
certain conception or rather conceptions which exist within the
minority group and its allies. They represent in the case of the
first question the elements unconsciously conciliatory to Stalinist
ideas and practices (Bleeker and Lewit are the best representa-
tives of this element). In the case of the second question, we have
the pressure from the scholastic intellectualist tendency, for which
important issues are settled academically and not by the live pro-
cess of the class struggle. When facing the problem of working-class
policy, this will work out sectarian. (Our Carterites and half-
Car terites represent this tendency.) Shachtman is weak politically
and flounders in between both. It is therefore certain that these
early symptoms will be repeated and finally find conscious, politi-
Shachtman Flounders 511
cal form and expression unless they are fought effectively. That
we can only do on the basis of the idea expressed in the first part
of this paragraph.
Another subject: We are informed by our German comrades
that they have received news of $100 being collected in the U.S.
for the German Left Opposition, but that sum is being diverted
into other purposes. I am convinced that there must be a mistake
somewhere in this. Perhaps they are alluding to the announcement
in the Militant of the $100 collected in the New York meeting.
But if it should not be a mistake, then I fear it can become an
international scandal. In any case we must find means of collect-
ing funds for the German LO. The comrades have gigantic
possibilities, but are so poverty-stricken that it is almost impos-
sible to issue Unser Wort, although the success of the mere fact of
our having a paper, of revolutionary literature penetrating Ger-
many, almost amounts to a sensation. I know the financial
condition of the League. I know your heavy job in the matter.
But we must undertake a campaign in such a way that we do not
sink ourselves, even though the most favorable moment therefore
is already past.
Yes, and another money question, although that will perhaps
be in this case a matter of ex post facto, the $75 which you so
kindly informed me about. I expect to have to leave any day for
the antifascist congress. Will it have to mean taxing LD's at present
very slender resources? He says I must get there, particularly now
that we expect it in Copenhagen.493 1 agree. But if I get there I am
compelled to remain until funds are available to proceed. I can-
not think of staying in France not knowing how long it will last. It
is too expensive. But I should be there for the plenum meeting
May 6 and 7 and then be able to return to the U.S.494 So here is
hoping you can say when you receive this, "alles erledigt" [all taken
care of].
The very best regards to all the stalwarts, from the top down
the line.
PS: I am enclosing LD's letter herewith.
4> ^ ^
512
We Will Not Suspend Our Fight
Letter by Max Shachtman to Albert Glotzer495
17 April 1933
The enclosed is self-explanatory. I have already sent a copy to
Maurice whom it seems impossible to arouse from silence; I am,
however, not entirely without hope. Naturally, the comrades here
discussed LD's letters and nobody is alarmed over them; there is
no need to be. He is unmistakably concerned primarily with the
danger of a split without political physiognomy, as he puts it. That
there is such a danger is incontestable. Only it does not emanate
from us. The fact is that in cold reality we are a majority in the
League and majorities are not in the habit of splitting. This is not
to say that Cannon could not, if he were so determined, get a
majority at the conference. He has already indicated this, and how
he intends to get it: four, five, or six "members" in Kansas City;
disfranchisement of Toronto (will he dare to go through with it?);
and I am told that the Minneapolis branch is raking the cemeter-
ies and exhuming several corpses, who are promptly registered
on the branch books without a flicker of the eyelash. (Votaw was
recently reinstated, without even a probationary period, although
he has been dead as Moses for two to three years! Just watch: The
branch, which has an average attendance of seven to nine mem-
bers, will claim no less than 30 when the conference rolls around.
Cannon moves in a mysterious way his wonders to perform!)
LD's letter is of course deliberately ambiguous on many
respects. If he means what I hope he means, well and good. If he
has the idea that it is possible for us to suspend the fight against
Cannon's policies and methods in the League, I'm afraid he'll have
to count me out of his calculations. I didn't start the fight as a
pastime to be dropped at a signal.
Now a few other points, very briefly: The miners situation:
Cannon has not yet presented his countermotion, although it was
due long ago. His speech in the New York branch, however, was a
model of opportunism. All the arguments, comma for comma, of
Allard Must Take a Stand 513
the French right wing (Rosmer) in the trade-union question, were
repeated by him, even if not so literally. As for Allard, it was rather
astounding. He delivered a peroration for Allard, a heated defense
of him, "a sterling militant in the thick of the fight," and declared
that he would propose him for the National Committee at the next con-
ference so as to bring him closer to us! Nothing less. Since then, Allard
has written a signed statement for the Progressive Miner about the
"slanderous charge" that he was a member of the national execu-
tive of the Communist Party. The statement is horrible.
You are required to vote on the two sets of motions introduced
in the committee recently. The Cannon caucus has already voted
the ticket straight, including Coover. I hope you and John find it
possible to vote immediately. The motions are clear enough, it
seems to me.
I am too rushed to write much more. But if you will forgive
me for the delay in typing this reply, I promise you an extensive
letter in a few days. I hope I can get to Chicago soon.
^ ^ ^
Allard Must Take a Stand Against Redbaiting
by James P. Cannon496
19 April 1933
Cannon submitted this resolution to the April 19 resident committee
meeting where Shachtman and Abern submitted their own motion. With
only these three NC members in attendance, the committee adopted both
resolutions as "noncontradictory " and decided to send Cannon 's motion
to Allard and to enlist Oehler to take the matter up with him directly.
Copies were sent to Glotzer, Edwards, and Angelo so that they could also
put pressure on Allard.
The business unionists had by this time gained the upper hand in
the PMA. Having negotiated a new, two-year contract not fundamen-
tally different from that of the Lewis UMW, the PMA leadership followed
the coal bosses in opposing militant defense efforts for the Taylorville
miners and in joining a growing redbaiting campaign against PMA
leftists. The Taylorville Breeze singled out Allard for attack as a member
514 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
of the Communist Opposition in an article headlined "Allard Speaks to
Communists." Allard's denial of Communist Party membership was pub-
lished in the 14 April Progressive Miner.497
1. The attack on Allard as a Communist by the Taylorville Breeze
and other organs of the big coal interests is a part of the general
campaign of reaction against the Progressive Miners Union. The
object of the "Red Scare" is to discredit the union before public
opinion and thus to prepare the ground for more terroristic
aggression; to intimidate the membership and consolidate the con-
servative right wing in the union; and to drive the official
leadership of the union at a faster pace on the path of conser-
vatizing the union.
2. The policy of the leadership in this question as indicated in
the statement of president Pearcy supplements and aids the cam-
paign of reaction and prepares the way for a red hunt inside the
union— one of the most important prerequisites for the disorgani-
zation of the union and the paralysis of the fighting capacity. In
this the leadership is only taking another step on the rightist path
they have been treading. In the circumstances, the disavowal of
Communism, without an assertion of the right of Communists to
belong to the union and participate in its leadership, is, in reality,
an acknowledgment of the promise of the reactionary attack and a
capitulation to it.
3. The statement of comrade Allard in the same issue of the
Progressive Miner (April 14) only rounds out, supplements, and com-
pletes the strategy of the reactionary press and the union
leadership. In general and especially in the concrete circumstances,
the reply of comrade Allard to the reactionary provocation is a
false one. The statement of comrade Allard in no way fulfills his
obligations as a Communist and a member of the Left Opposi-
tion. From the standpoint of protecting the union from a
reactionary attack the "strategy" is of no use and serves an oppo-
site purpose. Comrade Allard's denial of formal membership in
the CP is at best an unworthy subterfuge, for the issue raised is
the issue of Communism. He cannot now evade a frank reply to
this charge. His failure to defend his position as a Communist and
to couple his criticism of the Stalinist Party with an open declara-
tion of his own adherence to the Left Opposition compromises
him before the movement and deals a blow to the union, to the
Allard Must Take a Stand 515
left wing, and to the League. An immediate correction of this
action is imperative.
4. The strategy of denying or concealing one's Communist affili-
ations, sometimes resorted to in order to retain contact with the
masses in reactionary organizations, has no application in this case.
The PMA is the product of a miners revolt. Its preservation and
further development depends on a sustained militant policy which
is impossible without a free participation of Communists in the
union. The progressive character of the union, which has distin-
guished it from the Lewis UMW, cannot be maintained if it permits
the hounding of Communists. At the present stage this is precisely
the crux of the problem of the PMA. An open fight for the right
of Communists to participate in the union is the only way to
counter the attack of the reactionary press. Those who do not sup-
port that right are already traveling the road toward betrayal of
the miners movement and reconciliation with the class enemy and
eventually with the Lewis union. Those who surrender the right
by implication, by denials, and futile subterfuges, as comrade
Allard does in his statement, serve as conscious or unconscious
supporters of this betrayal.
The NC, in the interest of the union and the Communist cause,
deems it absolutely necessary now to demand of comrade Allard
a clarification of his position and a correction of his previous
action in the sense of the NC letter sent to him under date of
April 10.498 Specifically, the NC insists on the following:
1. A signed statement by comrade Allard in the next issue of the
Progressive Miner in which he clearly states his position as a Com-
munist and a member of the Left Opposition and points out that
his criticism of the official CP has nothing in common with the
attacks of the class enemy against the Party.
2. In this statement comrade Allard should point out the real
significance of the attack on him as a Communist, declare that he
faces the issue squarely and is ready to take the full consequences
of his stand, as a stand for the interest of the workers in their union.
3. These actions must be taken at once. Otherwise the League
will be compelled to express itself publicly on his actions and to
sever relations with him.
^ 4> 4>
16
Allard Discredits Left Opposition
by Martin Abern and Max Shachtman4*
19 April 1933
This resolution was submitted to the April 19 resident committee meeting
and adopted with Cannon s motion.
The National Committee condemns the statement of comrade
Allard in the current issue of the Progressive Miner as a capitula-
tion unworthy of a Communist and in violation of the elementary
principles of the Left Opposition. Confronted with the charge that
he is a Communist and a member of the Party or of the Left
Opposition, a charge made bv agents of the coal operators in the
public press, comrade Allard. with the opportunity available to him
of making a personal declaration in the columns of the Progressive
Miner, has issued a statement which violently denies the "lie" that
he is a member of the national committee of the Communist Party.
This statement is supplemented by his Collinsville speech, published
elsewhere in the same issue of the paper, where he also denies being
a member of the national committee of the Communist League.
This worthless subterfuge which takes refuge in "pure truth" (for
Allard is not. to be sure, a member of the national committee of
either the Party or the Opposition) is aimed to conceal the fact
that Allard is a Communist or a member of the Communist League.
Nowhere in the statement does comrade Allard take occasion to
mention by even one word or even to imply that he is a Commu-
nist or a member or supporter of the Left Opposition. Instead of
taking advantage of the stool pigeon's charges of membership in
the national committee of the Party or the Opposition, to point
out that he is a Communist Oppositionist: to point out wherein
the Left Opposition— on even so narrow a scale as the miners ques-
tion—differs from the official Partv standpoint: to point out that
the charge is part of the coal operator right-wing alliance in the
union to start an "anti-red" drive against all militants and class-
conscious fighters. Allard has resorted to a miserable "stratagem."
beneath the dignity of an active and prominent Communist. His
A Hard Discredits LO 517
statement, far from meeting the elementary requirements of the
situation, can do nothing but leave the impression with the min-
ers that he is not a Communist, although he is quite ready to
entertain a "liberal" attitude toward "all tendencies and groups"
in the labor movement.
The statement of Allard, which is so shrewdly seconded by
the statement of the president of the PMA, Pearcy, can no longer
be considered as falling within the category of "partial errors" or
isolated, casual blunders due to inexperience. It comes after a series
of less tragic but no less significant blunders on his part. Com-
rade Allard's editorship of the Progressive Miner has never been in
accord with the requirements of a Communist or a member of
the Left Opposition. His conduct as a leading member of the PMA
has never been in accord with our fundamental standpoint or our
tactical orientation, being at all times an evasive and ambiguous
veering between a semi-Communist and semireformist position.
The latest statement by him is only the culmination of a long series
of lesser mistakes of an impermissible nature which the National
Committee of the League has sought to warn him against and rec-
tify. Instead of adopting the course urged upon him, not only in
the interests of the Left Opposition per se, but in a broader sense,
in the interests of the progressive miners movement in general
and in the interests of the advancement of a left-wing miners move-
ment in particular— comrade Allard has pursued a policy which
could only discredit and compromise him and the Left Opposition
of which he is a member.
In view of all these facts, the National Committee feels
impelled to demand of comrade Allard an immediate rectifica-
tion of his statement in the columns of the Progressive Miner, in
which he shall make clear his political position in face of the chal-
lenge of the coal operators and their right-wing allies in the union.
It is necessary for comrade Allard to state his membership in the
LO, to distinguish himself as such from the policies of Stalinism,
to defend his right and the right of any other member of the PMA
to belong to any political organization, Opposition, official Com-
munist Party, socialists, Republicans, Democrats— and to defend
his views within the confines of the democratic framework of the
union; above all, to explain in a more correct manner the signifi-
cance of the attack of the stool pigeons, not merely as an "anti-red"
movement per se, but essentially an attack upon the progressive miners
518 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
movement as a whole. He must point out that the LO has no inter-
ests separate and apart from the interests of the miners in general
and the PMA in particular; that the Opposition supports the PMA
and has at all times assisted it in the most fraternal manner— giving
his own activities for the miners as the best example.
If comrade Allard fails to act in the manner prescribed above,
it will be necessary for the Communist League to come to an
immediate and conclusive break with him.
On the basis of this decision and in line with the contents of
it, a statement is to appear on the case of comrade Allard in the
very next issue of the Militant. The decision, further, is to be com-
municated immediately to all branches, to all NC members,
especially to comrades Oehler, Glotzer, and Edwards, and a copy
sent immediately to comrade Allard and comrade Angelo.
4> ^ ^
A Cold Douche
Letter by Maurice Spector to Max Shachtman500
24 April 1933
The Trotsky correspondence is a cold douche, nicht wahr [isn't it]?
Clearly LD regards the now voluminous statements and memorials
of both sides as a tempest in a teapot. He is of course correct when
he suggests that a split at this time would be unintelligible. We
have been aware of this all along. But it is a pity that the onus is
not placed where it rightly belongs. C is a type the Old Man would
better appraise under personal observation. Prinkipo could con-
tribute greatly toward clarification at the coming conference, if it
could see with us that the regime in the League is all-important
and if it rejected once and for all the C-S "constructions" of
"Navillism-Landauism," etc. Failing that, I cannot say that I expect
overly much from the conference decisions, except a protraction
of the struggle. Your position on the Negro question will be
exploited demagogically and factionally to our disadvantage. All
one can do is to continue the main course of our policy, posing
questions and issues objectively and in a Bolshevik-Leninist spirit.
Our Group Must Not Dissolve 519
Our "campaign," I am afraid, against the Swabeck trip was too
extensive and did not add to our prestige. I voted for and induced
the branch to support your views, but my enthusiasm was a bit
damp. We must learn to select our terrain more skillfully.
What do you know of the surrounding circumstances of
Trotsky's "Tragedy of the German Proletariat"? You spoke on the
subject in New York. Who is to take the initiative for the new party,
and does this mean a new party at last, or the old party without
Stalinist leadership? I don't see Unser Wort, but have you any bet-
ter idea of what the Germans mean when they urge the Russian
Opposition to apply the lessons to the USSR— what does the "4th
of August of Stalinism" mean?501
4> <- ^
Our Group Must Not Dissolve
Letter by Max Shachtman to Albert Glotzer502
1 May 1933
Shachtman wrote this analysis of Trotsky's 7 March 1933 letter to the
I.S., "On the Situation in the American League, " on board the He de
France en route to the ILO plenum in Paris.
You are probably aware by now of the reasons which made
my departure for Europe such a hasty one. There was so little time
left between the receipt of the invitation from the secretariat for
the minority to send a representative to the plenum and the last
sailing day which would permit my arrival at the plenum in time
that it was impossible to inform all the comrades of the decision
or to consult with those who are out of town. Every minute of the
scant hours at my disposal was consumed with cleaning away loose
ends and making the necessary preparations. Still, we did manage
to find a few hours in which the New York comrades discussed
the situation, particularly in connection with the Gourov letter.
Although it did not appear to be the case at first, we soon dis-
covered that we had a fairly unanimous estimation of the
significance of the letter and the attitude which our comrades
everywhere should have toward it. I want to take advantage of the
520 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
enforced leisure of steamship traveling to set down the views which
I believe all our active New York comrades hold in common. That
these observations center around the Gourov letter is only natu-
ral in view of the fact that the internal life of the League in the
coming period will have the same center of gravity, so to say.
1. With the exception of two points, we can express our hearty
agreement with the Gourov letter; we could not have expected,
considering the position of its author, that it be written in a very
much different manner. The two points are: a. the direct implica-
tion that our group is equally responsible with the Cannon group
for the present situation in the League; b. the estimation of the
role and significance of the "conciliatory tendency." I will deal
with each of these points separately later on. For the moment, let
us confine our attention to other aspects of the letter.
2. The analysis of the situation, while not exhaustive, is far from
being in conflict with what we have said in the past. Quite the
contrary, it is in direct accordance with it; in fact, there are whole
passages in the Gourov letter which are identical, in spirit and
sometimes in letter, with what we wrote almost eleven months ago
to the day, in our statement "The Situation in the American
League: Prospect and Retrospect." From the latter document, I
want to make a few extracts which you can compare, with striking
results, with identical declarations made in the Gourov letter:
An organization of our kind, separated from the main current of
the class struggle by the powerful Stalinist apparatus and other fac-
tors, constantly threatened with isolation, ingrowth, and circle spirit,
tends to have its inevitable frictions develop on various questions
and to become increasingly acute.
(See point no. 1 in Gourov letter.)
On the danger of a split, which C*ourov emphasizes, as well as
he does the fact that it would be of a purely "anticipatory," "pre-
mature" nature, we wrote as early as June 1932:
The prospects we have will vanish quicker than they arose, if we do
not eliminate the threat of a split which hangs over the head of the
organization. We do not ground our opposition to a split on
sentiment. A split is inevitable and sometimes even desirable if there
exist irreconcilable differences on fundamental questions of
principle or if, in general, one of the conflicting tendencies repre-
sents an alien current in the movement. We do not believe this to
be the case in the present dispute.
Our Group Must Not Dissolve 521
Gourov points out the possibility of "principled differences
in embryonic form" existing in the League fight. What did we
have to say on this score a year ago? Let me quote a couple of
excerpts from the same document:
We believe that the possibilities for the unification of the League
and its advancement still exist and we must not allow them to be
destroyed for factional reasons. We cannot hope to change the per-
sonal relations of comrades involved by the adoption of a decree.
But there still exists sufficient community of basic political views
to make possible the collaboration required to continue the work
of the Opposition. The task to be accomplished immediately is to
reestablish the unity of the committee and the League as a whole
on this "minimum basis." The joint work in the future, the consid-
eration of broad political problems that we must take up in
increasing measure, the events themselves will reveal in time what
is not yet fully ascertainable at the present moment: Either the
present conflict is the result of personal antagonisms, petty frictions
magnified by the circle atmosphere under which we still live in part,
or inevitable secondary differences on questions of policy which have
no fundamental importance or significance and can be straightened
out in the course of the work. Or the present conflict bears con-
cealed within itself half-formed, still unclear, but nevertheless fundamental
differences which only await further development, a collision with an im-
portant political problem or problems, to appear in their full light and
magnitude. It cannot yet be said definitely and conclusively which of
these alternatives is correct. Time will offer the test and the test can best
be made under the conditions of unity.
And again, further on:
We want to underline our belief that measures can still be taken to
prevent a destructive factional struggle. What we have said above
concerning the possibilities of a "minimum collaboration and unity,"
and our desire to allow the passage of time and events to test out clearly
and to the end any deeper political and principled differences that may
exist in embryonic form today should be borne in mind.
In two words, Gourov proposes intensification of mass work
and drawing of new elements into the leadership. At a time when
nobody in the League was even talking about "mass work"— that
is, before it became fashionable, before Trotsky began to empha-
size it persistently— we said in our document in connection with
the immediate problem before the League, as raised by the inter-
nal situation:
How should the League arm itself for the coming period? It must
undertake a general tightening of its ranks. It must not only engage
in greater activities in general, but above all the League must turn
522 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
its eyes and efforts toward an increased direct participation in the
class struggle. Our small numbers put definite limits to this work,
but we have conducted a sufficient propaganda training in our ranks
to enable us to make a serious beginning in initiating movements
on our own responsibility. (We have in mind particularly the move-
ment in Minneapolis, in the Illinois coalfields, and in New York.)
And further:
Not only should the National Committee change its manner of work,
but, like the League as a whole, it must be broadened. Its narrow,
exclusive base must be extended considerably to embrace the col-
laboration of new elements, drawing in new forces particularly from
among those outside the ranks of the old Cannon group in the Party.
What kind of forces? Supporters of one faction or the other? Not
necessarily. As we pointed out in connection with an elucidation
of the Second National Conference dispute over the National
Committee's composition— where we were a million percent right
and Cannon a million percent wrong:
We would go still further and say that even had all the charges made
by Cannon against Lewit, or any other comrade who was generally
qualified for membership on the committee, held true, even if such
a comrade held differing views on certain questions and was criti-
cal of any member of the committee or of the committee as a
whole— even if this were so, we find in it no reason for opposing him
as a member. The Opposition has no need of such a spurious and stran-
gulating "monolithisr?i"; it will concur in it only to its own detriment.
I think enough has been quoted to indicate the essential har-
mony between our position, reiterated often enough since it was
first set down a year ago, and the position sketchily outlined in
the Gourov letter.
3. Now wherein does the analysis harmonize with that of the
Cannon faction? The answer is that it doesn't harmonize in any
respect whatsoever. It is the most crushing destruction of the whole
factional edifice of the Cannon group that could be imagined.
This edifice has been in the process of construction for almost
two years now, painstakingly filled out brick by brick, ardently and
violently defended by Cannon and his faction. What were its foun-
dation stones?
The Cannon group represents the revolutionary kernel in the
League; the minority represents the petty-bourgeois kernel. The
struggle between them is based upon decisive fundamental ques-
Our Group Must Not Dissolve 523
tions. The Cannon group is the principled group; the minority is
unprincipled. In the Cannon group, there is complete and abso-
lute agreement on every single question; in the minority there is
not 100 percent agreement on every question. The Cannon group
is the homogenous group; the minority represents a heterogeneous
group, an unprincipled bloc. Look again at our internal bulletins
and you will see these comparisons presented and defended ad nau-
seam. The Gourov letter blows all these pretensions into a cocked
hat. It brushes them aside; it ignores them; it explicitly rejects
them— in a word, it does everything that a brief letter can do to
demolish completely the whole faction structure of the Cannon group.
The so-called "conciliators," whom the Cannonites treated with
such supercilious contempt, whom they bullyragged and bulldozed,
whom they so systematically alienated, whom they disdainfully
described as "people whose heads are not shaped in such a way as
to make it possible for them to assimilate Communist ideas"
(Cannon to Oehler last year)— these elements Gourov describes as
a healthy factor in the situation, who, under the circumstances,
must be supported by the international Opposition.
The organizational maneuvers of Cannon— those ultrafactional
co-optations which he proposed and defended as arch-Bolshevist,
the removal of Marty from resident committee vote, etc., etc.—
Gourov sees as "one of the worst traits of bureaucratism" and
proposes in point no. lOd that "the central committee should
abstain from artificial organizational manipulations within its own
body which bear a factional character."
The aristocratic claims to heredity in leadership— running
through every declaration of Cannon, from his gestation theory
down to his letter to Oehler and since then— is dismissed by Gourov
with the proposal that the faction majority now enjoyed in the
NC by the Cannon group should be taken from it by the member-
ship at the coming convention (point no. 8).
It may be said: This applies equally to both groups. I contest
that. We never made the claims of the Cannon group and cannot,
consequently, be similarly affected.
The minority (we wrote on 3 January 1933 in our postplenum
discussion statement) lays no claim to any factional, hidebound
"homogeneity" or to the title of "Marxian trunk" or "revolutionary
kernel" or "Bolshevik group" of the League— claims which have
driven the Cannon group blindly along that course which alienates
524 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
from it increasing numbers of League members. We do, however,
assert our ability to collaborate in the work of the League in a com-
radely manner even with those members with whom we are in
disagreement on this or that question, so long as those differences
do not extend to the fundamental doctrines of the Opposition. The
lack of this ability in the Cannon group, in the mind of which a
verbal "intransigence" and "principledness" covers up factional vio-
lations of many of the practices and methods which are the distinct
attributes of the Left Opposition in the Communist movement, has
forced this group into most of its untenable positions and arguments.
If you read over the seven proposals under point no. 10, you
will find that we can agree with every one of them without diffi-
culty. And that includes, as I shall try to explain further on, the
proposal that neither of the present two factions shall be given a
majority at the coming national conference, that is, in the com-
ing National Committee.
4. The Gourov letter proceeds from the following premise: A split
is imminent in the League; there is no other way out in the present
situation and with the present relationship of forces; a split with-
out clearly defined or discernible principled differences would be,
as Trotsky wrote in his letter to you, a "miscarriage that would kill
the mother as well as the child," reducing both groups to impo-
tence. A new element must therefore be introduced into the
situation, changing the relationship of forces, the directional flow
of the struggle, its outcome, etc. This element is the group of con-
ciliators, whose organization is inevitable. From my point of view,
it is not merely inevitable but beneficial.
Is there a danger of a split? Essentially, yes. As matters now
stand, the conference would divide on the question of mandates.
Cannon would like to disenfranchise Toronto, for example, to give
about 30 members to Minneapolis and five to Kansas City. Would
we challenge that? Of course. The outcome of such a fight is not
hard to see.
Cannon is, in my opinion, in a desperate position. He is in a
minority in the League, even though our faction, as a faction, is
not in the unmistakable majority. According to the Gourov letter,
Cannon's faction hegemony of the National Committee is a
pernicious factor which must be eliminated. What Cannon's per-
spective in connection with a split has been in the past we know
but too well. You remember his letter to Oehler last year in which
Our Group Must Not Dissolve 525
he pointed out that should his faction be the minority at the com-
ing conference, the League "would disappear" and the minority
(i.e., Cannon) would "start all over again." This split perspective
did not originate then. Recently, I chanced to come across a letter
written in September 1931 by Jack Carmody, then on his road to
becoming a Cannonite but not yet convinced of the "gestation
theory," to another Cannonite, Sam Gordon. Remember that this
was written before it was discovered that "Shachtman is a Navillist
and Landauist," before "differences on the international question"
were ever heard of. Carmody writes literally as follows:
I have had a chat with Jim and in my opinion luckily we had had
some beer over our conversation. I told him what was developing
and he seemed to treat it lightly, only on the question of the Cannon
group. Granting that the Cannon group developed into the Ameri-
can section of the International Left, that is no reason why we should
still be known as the Cannon group, even though acknowledging
Jim as leader of the American section of the international Opposi-
tion. From our conversation, it seemed that Jim would not budge,
then he posed the question this way— If the branch repudiates the
Cannon group, "I'm through!"
Here all comment is indeed superfluous!
Now, how is a split to be avoided? I do not think Gourov could
have made any proposal other than the one he does make. This
brings me to the two points which I referred to at the outset as
being subject to disagreement on our part.
5. The main point of disagreement I have with the Gourov letter
is that to all intents and purposes it puts our group on the same
plane as the Cannon faction. I do not believe this is warranted by
the situation. The abuses which led to the present dangerous
situation in the League are precisely the ones we fought against.
I will not elaborate on this score here. There only remains for me
to explain the whole situation over again to the I.S. and to com-
rade Trotsky.
The only other point is not so much a matter of disagreement
as it is of interpretation and elucidation. I refer to the "conciliators."
Now, I do not, of course, agree at all with Gourov's exaggeration
of their numbers and strength. These elements are far from a
majority in the League; they are not— at least they have not been
up to now— a considerable number. But that is not the important
question, for if they have not been, that does not mean to say that
in the coming period they will not be. On the contrary, there is
526 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
every reason to believe that they are going to be a very important
factor.
The important thing is to establish: Who are the conciliatory
elements? I have a definition which excludes some elements. For
example, among elements who "do not belong to either of the
two groups"— I exclude all Weisbordites. There are two or three
in the New York branch— like Pappas and Kaldis. They are not con-
ciliatory elements— they are the agents of & faction, the Weisbord
faction. To my mind, all their line of conduct and affiliation— even
though it does not and, so far as we were concerned, has not
excluded collaboration with them in the League— does exclude
them from the category referred to by comrade Gourov.
Now if such a category does exist at all, then it exists in its
clearest and most tangible form in the New York branch, with simi-
lar phenomena, perhaps not so clearly developed, in other
branches. This element has not abstained from the factional
struggle, it is true (there is not a single member in the League
who has); but neither is it affiliated with any of the two factions.
That is, it is not bound by a group or faction. I refer to such
elements as George Saul, Bill Matheson, Albert Orland, Chubby
Geltman, and others who are, to a certain degree, different with
the different comrades, what Gourov describes as "solid comrades,
possessing authority, not having engaged in the struggle of the
two groups, and capable of bringing about a healthier atmosphere
inside the central committee."
This does not mean that these comrades have not shown cer-
tain sympathies in the internal disputes. They have. And it is
significant to note: All the strength of the Cannon faction is con-
centrated in \is faction, which is a hidebound aggregate of caucus
men. Outside of its ranks, it has no sympathizers. Most of our
strength, or a good deal of it, comes from comrades who are not
in our faction. Take New York, for instance: Is it an accident that
practically every single one of the so-called conciliatory elements
has come to the point of supporting us on virtually every disputed
question? Is it an accident that Cannon has succeeded in antago-
nizing and driving away every one of them, one after another? Is
it not a fact that, even in such a question as the election of the
branch executive committee, the victory of our slate was made
possible by the practically unbroken support given it by virtually
every one of the comrades in the branch who is not organized in
Our Group Must Not Dissolve 527
one faction or another? Take even Carter: He has tried so hard—
and in the future he will probably try much harder— to form a
separate group and to follow an "independent line." Yet on every
concrete question he has found himself compelled to support our
point of view. And after all, isn't much the same situation to be
found in Chicago? There the branch majority has pretty steadily
supported our point of view on disputed questions, yet only two
or three of our comrades can be considered as members of the
faction. This feature of the internal dispute, far from being a source
of weakness, is to my mind a source of strength. This is a fact which
is being revealed particularly in the light of the Gourov letter.
Now, these conciliatory elements are going to unite into some
sort of loose group formation— of that there is not the slightest
doubt in my mind. The Gourov letter is a direct and open appeal
to them to unite. We have nothing to fear from such a develop-
ment. If we do not have a narrow, myopic, factional approach, but a
broad, political approach, we will not look upon these elements like
some petty shopkeeper does at a trade rival who is opening up a
place down the street. It is as friends, as allies, as comrades, that
we can regard these elements. And I mean it exclusively from the
political standpoint: We have never found any difficulty in the past
in standing on common ground with these elements; why should
matters be different in the future— provided we pursue the same
methods and policies, even more intelligently, as we pursued before.
Does that mean we immediately dissolve our group? Ridicu-
lous. Groups are not made to order or unmade by decree. Our
group will dissolve when the causes which produced it disappear
or when it merges into a better group. Quite objectively, I consider
the maintenance of our group necessary at the present time, for
without it, there would not be a systematic, coherent, cohesive,
vigorous line of policy presented to the League.
But you give up the fight for a majority of the National
Committee? Not in the least! As I look at it, the Gourov proposals
make it possible for the groups to conduct a Communist struggle
for leadership. Let us look at the mechanics of it, and that fre-
quently simplifies a problem even if it does not exhaust it. At the
next conference, the Cannon group gets three members on the
committee, we get three, the conciliatory elements get five (the
figures are arbitrary, you understand). Now, which of the two
"extreme" groups will the conciliatory members of the committee
528 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
support? That depends, does it not, essentially upon the superior-
ity of the policy and methods and abilities of the two groups. But
these are precisely the fields upon which we should be more than
ready to meet the Cannon faction. If we are afraid to measure our
policies and abilities against the other faction's, we have no right
to demand leadership or fight for it, for we have acknowledged
that another group, and not ours, is entitled to it. As for myself,
I look forward to the prospect with the same confidence I had
when I was confronted with the question of the relationships
between ourselves and the conciliatory elements in the New York
branch fight.
There are many other points that might be dealt with, but these
I believe to be the most important ones. In the brief couple of
days that were available between the receipt of the Gourov letter
and my departure, I did not hesitate to discuss the whole problem
with every comrade I could reach. It is gratifying as well as sur-
prising to find so much agreement as I did find, outside our group
as well as inside. You should carry on the same discussions and
with as many comrades as you can get hold of. We have no need
of concealing our point of view. I will express it thus to the com-
rades abroad; you should have no hesitation in expressing it to
the comrades with whom you speak. That is, if you and the other
Chicago comrades find yourselves substantially in agreement with
the viewpoint as outlined above. As I see it, no other viewpoint,
except a self-contradictory one, is conceivable.
PS: Two points occur to me: a. In fighting Cannon's co-optations,
I said we would prefer, if nominations were in order, instead of
three intellectuals, two of them newcomers, workers like Lewit,
Bleeker, Orland, Saul. Our "nominations" at that time included
two who were not in our faction, b. In the New York branch elec-
tions, we had a fight with the Cannon group which presented a
solid slate. Our slate included two "conciliators"— Petras and Saul,
and eventually, with the aid of our comrades, another, Orland,
was elected. As can be seen, it is not a break with the past line of
the group that is needed, but an even further and bolder develop-
ment of it.
529
The European Sections Will Not Support You
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman503
1 May 1933
1. I am enclosing a letter to comrade Sara Weber with the request
that you forward it immediately. The matter is very important and
urgent.504
2. The question of the American conference worries all leading
European comrades, primarily from the same standpoint that I
attempted to formulate in my official letter. But some comrades
are of the opinion that your faction is heterogeneous, as is usually
always the case in young oppositional groups. You must, dear
friend, have no illusions on the question of the distribution of
sympathies in Europe: Your faction will have the sympathies of
the Spanish comrades and the splinter groups. Basing themselves
on previous experience, all of our sections will tend to support
the Cannon group. I am trying to remain as impartial as at all
possible. Thus I have already been accused, falsely in any case, of
indirectly supporting the Shachtman group. Do not have any illu-
sions in this regard. I repeat: At the present stage of the internal
American struggle, i.e., when decisive political questions have not
yet come to the fore, your group will, in the eyes of all of our
sections, have to shoulder the responsibility for a possible split as
well as for the drawn-out internal struggle. Without wanting to,
you carry a certain heavy political legacy around with you in
Europe: Every group we have had to combat here has invoked
Shachtman, and for all sections your name has become symbolic
in this regard. I do not mean to say that this is correct. If I were of
that opinion, I would not oppose with all my might the intensifi-
cation of the struggle and the prospect of a split, for I know that
the individual tendencies and groupings molt and change greatly.
3. On the trade-union question your position seems to me to be
formalistic. We struggled bitterly with Gourget in France not
because he wanted to adapt to the trade-union milieu, but because
he did not want to subordinate his own activity to the Ligue's
530 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
control; the kind of adaptation must be determined not individu-
ally but collectively. The point is not to unfurl our "flag" in the
trade unions once or twice, and perhaps precisely for this reason
to disappear from them, but rather to gradually win points of sup-
port through which we will gain the possibility of unfurling our
flag fully. The fact that you wanted to prevent Cannon's recent
trip to Illinois seems to me completely wrong, even from the stand-
point of your factional struggle.
4. My opinion on the Negro question is completely hypothetical
in character. I know very little about it and am always ready to
learn; I will read your manuscript with great interest.
5. I will answer the questions you ask regarding the history of the
Comintern as soon as I can. That is unfortunately not possible
now, since I have other things to do which absolutely can't
be postponed.
^ ^ ^
International Consultation Is Key
Letter by Arne Swabeck to James P. Cannon505
12 May 1933
While in Paris, where he attended the May I.S. plenum, Swabeck received
Cannon's long-delayed response to Shachtman's 24 February 1933
resolution on the PMA, and wrote the following letter to Cannon in reply.
Never formally submitted to the resident committee, Cannon's lengthy
resolution insisted:
The PMA is not only an insurgent movement, but in addition to that
it is a mass trade-union organization of considerable weight and of great
strategical importance in the whole labor movement. This fact-and it
is no small fact-renders completely futile any idea of a quick or defini-
tive solution to problems. Likewise it excludes the application of a partial
policy designed for an episodic situation which could either be solved
or withdrawn from. No, in the PMA, by virtue of our connections al-
ready with it, and our attitude toward it, we are inside the trade-union
movement, we are bound up with it, and we bear a certain responsibil-
ity for it which we cannot throw off. In this situation the whole
International Consultation Is Key 531
trade-union policy of the Left Opposition is put to a new test and must
work out over an extended period of time.... A correct policy on our part
imperatively demands that we see this movement as it is, and not merely
the distorted reflections of it in the leadership....
The defects of the resolution of comrade Shachtman derive from the
fact that it is a factional document worked up to serve the purposes of
the internal struggle in the League, and deals with a miners movement
only superficially and abstractly. Taken altogether, this resolution is
not a program for the penetration of the miners movement, but for a
retreat from its realities and concrete peculiarities with a series of for-
mal literary gestures. With the Shachtman resolution as its guiding
line, the League could retire from the difficult situation "with honor"
and with a few points scored against factional opponents in the League.
For participation in the miners' struggle itself, the resolution cannot
serve.
Much that is contained in the resolution is formally irreproachable.
ABC principles retain their validity under all circumstances. The ref-
erence to the perspectives of the new union, the contradictions that will
assail it in its further course, the inadequacy of any policy but that of
class struggle-all this remains correct, even though it was said before,
and many times, by others. Where the resolution fails is in its estimate
of the membership of the new union, of the degree of definite crystalli-
zation of the conflicting tendencies, and of the tempo of the internal
union development. And this is precisely the crux of the Illinois prob-
lem, insofar as it is a concrete special problem and not an abstract ques-
tion of trade unionism in general.
The attempt to discover a "deviation" in the fact that Cannon spoke
at the Gillespie conference, not formally as a representative of the League
but of a group of left-wing trade unionists, is simply comical. Confronted
with a ruling of the arrangements committee against the admission of
political organizations to the conference, Cannon, according to this rea-
soning should have stood aside from the trade-union conference. By that
he would have avoided making an "enormous error, " and he would also
have avoided an opportunity to come into contact with several hundred
trade unionists and to explain to them our ideas on a crucial problem
of the trade-union movement, which they had assembled to consider.5011
Today I received your statement on the Illinois miners ques-
tion. Its general contents correspond with what I had already
expressed as my opinion to LD in opposition to the Shachtman
resolution and with which LD was in accord. He expressed the
opinion that Shachtman's "intransigence" in this general problem
was entirely misplaced and could not correspond to the live process
of union development and its requirements of a Communist policy.
532 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
He said: If Shachtman, based upon the Gourget experience, hopes
by this "intransigence" to win the sympathy of the international
movement, then that records only another miscalculation. LD
expressed the opinion that it is particularly toward such problems
as the miners movement that we must guard against a policy which
will signify sectarianism. According to his impression, the
Shachtman resolution tended in that direction. But LD also
thought that he had already said enough to indicate his opinion
for the time being in his recent letter on the American League,
addressed to the secretariat.
In this connection, a piece of good advice. We should adopt a
method, to be religiously adhered to, of always and constantly dis-
cussing all our problems with the comrades here, with LD, and
with the secretariat. The importance of the latter body will only
increase as it assumes more of the character of an international
leadership in reality. These comrades are all keenly interested in
our problems and our developments, recognize our particularly
grand perspectives, and want to be of much more active and direct
assistance. It was a mistake on our part not to keep such intimate
contact in the past. I can assure you that many letters arrived from
the other comrades— and what letters— not the kind that discussed
problems in a political manner. This, of course, does not even ben-
efit these comrades; it not merely replaces organizational relations
with purely personal ones, but the effect is a harmful impression
of what our League is like. Well, we need not aim to prevent that
kind of personal writing, but we must hence maintain the proper
relations and contacts.
I have, of course, not received the promised long letter. I there-
fore do not know directly to what extent the views I have expressed
and the proposals I have made are acceptable. I have to assume
they are. I know they are correct. Tomorrow begins the plenum
(with a week's delay), and I do not suppose the letter will catch
me. Perhaps it will be of considerable service for me to be able to
read it upon my return?
Comrade Shachtman is here now. He has an opportunity now
to make good to the extent of changing his ways. He will not be
able to fully restore the confidence he enjoyed some time ago until
after a period of new tests successfully met on his part. If he fails
to change his orientation now, he will be politically repudiated. It
is very clear the comrades are all in deadly earnest about that.
International Consultation Is Key 533
But naturally what they want is not a vanquishing but an honest
agreement. Max seems to have a feeling of this, and appears to be
disposed to come to an agreement. I will assist him in this respect.
Our relations are very cordial. Naturally as a basis for an agree-
ment, I am not making any organizational demands, except those
which are of a mutual character.
The secretariat has decided that I must proceed to Copen-
hagen to endeavor to take up work preparatory to the antifascist
congress. Yet we are not certain that it actually will take place;
that is, it may be prohibited there also. But in any event, the pre-
paratory work must be done there, unless we receive notice to the
contrary before my planned departure from Paris. The additional
expenses which this involves, it appears, the secretariat will have
to assume somehow. I will then remain in Copenhagen until
June 5 or 6.
Otherwise, I understand, it has been decided that I am to
return, but I am not informed how. We say about the five-year
plan that a factory which is only 90 percent completed is not able
to run. The same with a steamship ticket, for which only 90 per-
cent, or rather much less of the cost, does not obtain the ticket. I
understand $60 has arrived here, but to the wrong address, to a
name which does not exist, and the necessary identification papers
can therefore not be produced to receive the sum. Why such a
matter has to be balled up I do not know. You have the correct
address.507 It is only with difficulty that I have succeeded in mak-
ing an arrangement whereby comrade Molinier pays me that sum
at the present course, on the promise on my part that the money
will be faithfully remitted to him. You will therefore have to make
the arrangements, either to change the name of the recipient now,
or, if the amount will be returned, to immediately send it Ameri-
can Express money order to R. Molinier, 2 Bis Rue Etienne Marey,
Paris. It should not be necessary to emphasize the importance of
that promise being kept faithfully. But that is only one part. With
the present rate of exchange, it costs $98 from Cherbourg. It costs
more from Copenhagen. I know the financial situation of the
League, but you cannot just leave me stranded here. I therefore
must absolutely receive the balance necessary, sent to Denmark
before June 5. You can still reach me there at the following address:
M. Svaabeck, Lindevej 5, Hillerod, Denmark.
534
Resolution on the American Question
Plenum of the International Left Opposition
13-16 May 1933
This resolution was published in CLA Internal Bulletin no. 14
(29 June 1933). The ILO plenum dealt with the crisis in the CLA as
the first point on its agenda. After hearing reports from Swabeck and
Shachtman, the plenum appointed a commission of Witte, Naville,
Shachtman, and Swabeck to finalize this resolution.™
The plenum declares that no political, principled differences
exist in the American League which are in opposition to the rees-
tablishment of organizational unity and a liquidation of the
factional struggle. The plenum declares that the two factions un-
dertake to make every effort possible in this direction in agreement
with the international organization.
The American political situation and the immense tasks which
confront the Communist vanguard at the present period impera-
tively require the reestablishment of internal unity in the ranks of
the League. At the same time, the enlargement of the outside
activities of the organization furnishes one of the important con-
ditions for an effective liquidation of the factional struggle.
The rapid assurance of the first steps on this path is indis-
pensable. The plenum, in full agreement with the representatives
of the two factions existing in the League, points out the follow-
ing measures:
a. Common efforts should be made for the preparation and dis-
cussion of the third conference in such fashion as to definitely
modify the atmosphere and prepare the final liquidation of the
internal fight.
b. Common efforts should be made to put into application the
general propositions set forth in the letter of comrade Gourov.
c. The factional organizations should be dissolved. The former
subjects under dispute must not serve as a criterion for the liqui-
dation of the conflict. On the contrary, the discussion must before
Resolution on American Question 535
all be based on the political and organizational problems posed
by the general activity of the League.
d. In the case where organizational measures have been taken
which would sharpen the friction, common efforts should be made
to obtain an immediate modification.
e. All the local organizations should invite the leaders of the two
groups to reduce their collisions within such limits that the
speeches, statements, etc., of the two sides cannot become a
weapon in the hands of the adversary.
f. All the theses, countertheses, and amendments should appear
on time, not solely to all the members of the League but also to
the I.S., in order that the discussion in all its phases take place
under the eyes of all the sections and under their control.
g. The definite date of the conference should be designated in
agreement with the I.S. in order that the latter have the possibil-
ity, in case of necessity, to delegate a representative to it.
h. Until the conference, the present CC, which evidently remains
in force, should enjoy the support of all the members of the
organization. For its part, the CC will abstain from artificial organ-
izational manipulations within itself having a factional character.
i. The local organizations should be guided in the election of
delegates by considerations of the sufficient firmness and indepen-
dence of their representatives on the question of safeguarding the
unity of the League; in the same sense, instructions should be voted
to the delegates.
j. The leaders of the two present disputing groups should evidently
enter into the future CC, but it is necessary to put alongside of them
some solid comrades having authority who have not taken part in the
fight of the two groups and are capable of purifying the atmosphere within
the interior of the CC. To this end, it is necessary to enlarge the
dimensions of the CC considerably.
k. In case of need, the secretariat will unite in a special plenum
devoted to the American question with the participation of the
representatives of the two groups.
^ ^ ^
536
Foolish and Petty Actions Did Not Help Us
Letter by Albert Glotzer to Max Shachtman509
23 May 1933
After the ILO plenum in Paris, Shachtman went to Prinkipo where this
letter reached him. At Rose Karsner's insistence Cannon had left New
York to attend the Free Tom Mooney Congress in Chicago, using funds
privately raised by Stamm.510 With 1,048 delegates from a broad array
of labor and left organizations, the three-day conference was a real united
front and a big step forward in Mooney defense efforts. The Stalinists
controlled the steering committee, but they were unable to prevent
Cannon's election to the conference resolutions committee or to the
National Mooney Council of Action. The main conference resolution
incorporated many of the CLA's proposals for action, but it also required
participating organizations to refrain from criticizing one another.
Cannon 's proposed amendment, "Each organization entering the united
front obligates itself to discipline in action but retains its full independence
and its right to criticism, " lost with 63 votes. The CP subsequently
strangled further Mooney defense efforts.
Glotzer 's letter refers to the first Militant article on the conference,
"LO Scores at Chicago Mooney Congress, " which stressed the CLA's 39
delegates and its influence in the PMA rather than the united-front nature
of the affair. A more comprehensive article by Glotzer in the next issue
corrected this skew.511 The Chicago local refused to circulate the Militant
containing the first article, and Glotzer complained to the NC about the
article \s exaggerations and "sensationalism, " which he argued would
endanger the League's work among the miners.512
At the conference, Cannon and Chicago CLA leaders met with Allard,
head of the PMA's substantial delegation, and reached an agreement on
the League's future work in the union. Allard did not live up to the
agreement. Cannon continued his Midwest speaking tour in Kansas City,
St. Louis, the Illinois coalfields, and Minneapolis, speaking on the cam-
paign to free Mooney.
I am sending this letter to Prinkipo with the hope that it will
find you already there. There are many things that could be writ-
Foolish and Petty Actions 537
ten about, but I shall touch only the more important ones in this
letter, in addition to answering yours from the boat, which Marty
forwarded to me.
1. Marty has undoubtedly already acquainted you with the seem-
ingly small question of the first Mooney article that appeared in
the Militant. It was a scandalous report, to put it mildly, and the
"review" that Lovestone's sheet gave it was appropriate. Besides
being inaccurate, its boasting was obviously adolescent. That the
Daily Worker has said nothing about it might be due to their belief
that it is a true report. While Hugo and I both protested, I'm sure
that Hugo doesn't feel so good at learning its authorship. In tell-
ing the story to Jim, he refers to its author in the well-known and
convenient "they" at the center. And Cannon thinks that it is bad,
though not fatal; woe unto us, if any of our comrades had been
responsible for it. But since it was Stamm, who has worked him-
self into agent no. 1, the matter will be conveniently overlooked
as a small incident. In the meantime, of course, Prinkipo and Paris
will have observed this great event and our "greater" role.
2. Cannon's presence at the Mooney congress was a great help
to us. This must be acknowledged, and it appears to me that the
objection raised to his going was not very smart, nor also to his
return to the Illinois coalfields. I shall speak of this later in the
letter in connection with some remarks on the internal situation.
From his report on his stay in KC, he has made good success. As
a member of the National Mooney Council of Action, he was the
principal speaker at the Mooney mass meeting there. He raised
$400, $300 of which was already sent in to the national office. A
Spartacus Youth Club was organized, with a membership of 12,
including three YPSLs. Six new members joined the branch and
its membership is now nine! Now he has received an invitation
from the Mooney committee of Minneapolis to speak at their mass
meeting. Our comrades there were instrumental in bringing about
this invitation. Under the circumstances, the NC members here
(although, I understand, without formal authority) have recom-
mended that he go there. Under the circumstances this is the only
action possible. Naturally we understand that his stay here and
his visits to KC, St. Louis, and Minneapolis are made with an eye
to the internal situation and the coming conference. But you can-
not counterpose that to the other questions involved in his trip.
538 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
While he was here we had a meeting with Allard. I sent Marty
a duplicate letter to forward to you and I believe you have that.
What I wrote about Gerry's attitude was so. As to the practical
application of the agreement, that of course remains a question,
and only the next month or two will be able to ascertain one way
or the other with regard to him. Marty makes an apt remark when
he raised the question of our "negotiations" with Allard, and that
our relations with him are not those of a fellow member of the
League but more or less those of a sympathizer. And giving
thought to the question, I feel too that his membership is more or
less a formal question without real content. I am greatly disap-
pointed in Gerry, and I think I can speak with more authority
than anyone else in the League. Ten years of association with him
gives me such an authority. He is entirely too subjective to be able
to reason. He cannot be objective about matters relating to the
organization. In spite of the years he has spent in the movement,
attending almost every Party training school, and in spite of all
the years of good associations (and some bad, very, very bad),
Gerry consummated that period of his life by acting not as a Com-
munist but as a militant trade unionist. Yet in spite of that, I think
the agreement we made with him was correct, because it creates
the possibility of saving Gerry for our movement and collaborat-
ing in the work. I know too that agreement in words and its
application in practice do not always coincide. But if we are able
to effect a maximum application of our agreement, we will have
laid the basis for our future work in the coalfields and naturally
of saving Gerry. The fact that we have been unable to send Oehler
back soon after the Mooney congress is holding back the work,
but he is to leave this weekend, and then we will be able to tell
just what happens. I have written Allard twice since the Mooney
congress and haven't received a reply or acknowledgment of those
letters. I am not trying to reason why this is so— it might be due to
many things. Likewise, we are unaware of what he has been doing
since he returned to the field. And I must admit that I am some-
what apprehensive. Just such an article as Stamm wrote in the Militant
on the Mooney congress would be enough to destroy our collabo-
ration, as it undoubtedly will hurt us a great deal with the miners,
anyway. If anything breaks soon, I shall keep you informed.
I cannot leave off on this question without mentioning the
opinions expressed by LD on the miners' situation. I do not know
Foolish and Petty Actions 539
who has been supplying him with the information, but I must ask
you to tell him, at least for me, since I once intended to write him,
that his views both with regard to Jim's role at the Gillespie con-
ference and Allard's work are absolutely wrong. We are not
concerned with his general statements, which are correct in them-
selves, but with the fact that they do not apply in this situation at
all. I might say, if I have not already mentioned it, that Angelo, as
far as I can make it out, agrees with the position we hold. If there
is anything that you must make clear to him, that is the question
of the work in Illinois.
John has had some talks with Cannon. I give you the gist of
it. We are the factionalists, and that runs through his whole atti-
tude. Jim admits one error: his proposal of Gordon on the
committee. The theory is now advanced that Shachtman is influ-
enced too much, and from the bad side, by his incurable factional
friends in New York. Glotzer, since he is away from the influence
of Shachtman, is not so bad. Their aim is to drive at Cannon per-
sonally. And he cites such actions as the motion to send you to
Illinois and not him, the attempts to prevent him from coming to
the Mooney congress. Ours is a fight for leadership, we pick up
all kinds of picayune issues, etc., etc. His attitude is extremely bit-
ter, in spite of an outward appearance of calmness. The letter of
LD on the same issues I mention causes him to harp on these
issues. He is reticent to express a conclusive attitude on the na-
tional conference. And he always speaks now of mass work,
independent activity, as if it were his discovery.
I cannot leave off on this point without mentioning Jim's con-
version to the idea of moving the center to Chicago. The question
in itself has merit. My own attitude has for some years been warm
to this idea and it has not been a secret to either you or Marty.
But Jim's enthusiasm over the idea is new, even though he now
poses it, also, as his own brand-new discovery. He would like to
have this move committed by fall!— providing, of course, that there
is unanimity in the committee. Why Jim wants this is clear, at least
at this moment, from his attitude to the internal situation in the
League— in consideration of the situation in the New York branch.
Of course, the other reasons he states are reasons that have been
held before by John and me. Such reasons: Chicago as a central
point of the movement, the key to so many fields of work, the
place to build an American movement, the industrial center of
540 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
the country. He links this up with the "new line" of the League
toward independent work and greater participation in mass work.
Marty, of course, raised the two important questions of our rela-
tion to the Party, the center of which is in New York, and how
such a move will affect the Militant. I mentioned this in a discus-
sion we had. Naturally, neither Jim nor Oehler consider these
important or decisive in the question. John, of course, is for Chi-
cago, now and forever. The question will undoubtedly be raised
in the committee or at the conference, and we will have to give it
special consideration. I propose that the comrades in New York
and yourself give thought to the matter and let me know in detail
what your opinions are. You might even discuss the question with
the Old Man and with Arne, if you still have the opportunity.
3. I mentioned in one of my letters that Jim showed me the Gourov
letter, accompanying with a remark to the effect: Gourov has cer-
tainly set you down a peg or two. This was said in the presence of
other comrades, for effect. Upon reading it I breathed a sigh of
relief, not because I feared that the Old Man or the I.S. would
find themselves in irreconcilable opposition to us, but in the ob-
vious proximity of views between ourselves, as contained in our
main document, and those expressed by Gourov. That is incon-
testable, and I have no reason to doubt that much of the recent
protest of the International Secretariat, re LD's sympathies toward
us, comes from protests of Arne and Jim. It is obviously a rejec-
tion of their views and approach to the internal situation. Johnny
found an occasion to jibe at Hugo, intimating that if Hugo had
followed the line they agreed upon, he would have found LD sup-
porting him. But it never was actually in the cards for Hugo to
follow an independent position in the present struggle. He was
already bound to support Cannon long before he left New York.
While I cannot help but agree with the analysis you made of
the letter— such comparisons were made by us in Chicago— yet I
must warn against an overconfidence with reference to the atti-
tude of the European comrades. The latest letter of LD in answer
to yours, I presume, is a pretty indication of what ails them over
there. I am going to write to LD and express in clear terms my
attitude on the method used by some of the European comrades.
If your position or lack of one in the past is to be made the
barometer for deciding the internal situation here, there will never
be a solution to it. In this respect, I am willing to allow, some
Foolish and Petty Actions 541
foolish and petty actions on our part will not help us any, and I
am inclined to regard the above-mentioned actions in that light.
Naturally, the comrades across will be influenced by "interna-
tional" considerations, and they will no doubt be helped or rather
have been aided in this by our good friend Swabeck. I assume that
your arrival found them well educated on our situation. I say natu-
rally, advisedly, because their problems are closer at hand and your
previous position will always and forever, I'm afraid, be taken in
consideration as a lever by which to judge anything that happens
in the American League. How much that can help to solve our
situation is still a mystery to me. But I accept that it will play a big
part in the position of the committee, and that your famous or
infamous letter to LD of December 1931 will be mentioned in the
course of an examination of the groupings in America; and per-
chance, who knows, my insistence that my resolution go out with
Cannon's may be cited as another instance wherein the minority
stood in the way of a solution to the international questions.
The Old Man already assumes that support will come to us
from those sections who have and continue to play a sorry role in
the ILO. Is this supposition based on fact, or is it an assumption
based on the past actions of these comrades? And, too, is the rest
of the secretariat already definitely lined up against us, as is indi-
cated by LD's letter, even before they have heard your report on
the situation? I guess that I could go on raising one question after
another, but since you will have already had the meeting with the
I.S. and discussions with LD, I will await some news before
expressing any further opinions on the basis of the material
on hand.
Speaking of material, I cannot help but mention once more
that I'm disgusted with the way in which the out-of-town mem-
bers of the committee are informed of international affairs, even
by those who have spent day and night professing their interna-
tionalism. The verbatim reports between Swabeck and LD on ihc
Negro question and the question of American imperialism and
the prospects for our movement thus far remain, at least for my
part, the private property of Cannon, et al. The Nin-Trotsky letters
are also part of the NY archives, and I am to wait until doomsday
before I can see them. I suppose I am being repaid in kind.
4. The Negro thesis has made a strong impression on me. I have
read it only once and any criticism that I make results of thai one
542 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
and hurried reading. I am impressed particularly with the gen-
eral analysis of the Negro and his position in American society,
the question of the Black Belt, and the theory of self-determina-
tion. But somehow I feel that the ms. weakens toward the end, in
the sense that the theory of the permanent revolution is not posed
powerfully enough. From a first reading it appears that you wrote
the pamphlet in little more than one session and tired toward the
end. But I will go over it carefully and make detailed comment on
its various points. I don't know if I will reach you by that time,
but you can make the fight with LD on its present basis without
much fear of weakening our position. I'm quite sure that LD will
see our point and come to its support.
I close for the moment. If anything arises, I shall write in care
of LD. Otherwise, if you should have some information, and
undoubtedly you will have, I expect a letter soon.
^ ^ >
Peace Treaty
Communist League of America National Committee
Published 29 June 1933
This undated resolution was published in CLA Internal Bulletin
no. 14 (29 June 1933).
In the opinion of the National Committee, the resolution of
the plenum of the International Left Opposition, adopted with
the participation and agreement of the representatives of the two
groups in the NC, provides a basis for the cessation of the inter-
nal struggle and the unification of the NC.
The NC accepts the resolution of the plenum and pledges
itself to cooperate with the international organization to carry out
its provisions. It invites the cooperation of the entire member-
ship of the League for a new program of work to be conducted
unitedly in the spirit of the plenum resolution.
The NC considers the conditions especially favorable now for
a considerable development of independent activity in the class
struggle and is working out a practical program of such activity.
We Must Call a Retreat 543
The successful execution of this program, which in itself will exert
a powerful force to normalize the internal situation of the League,
requires in turn the unification of the NC and the liquidation of
faction organizations. The NC members, as leaders of the two
groupings, hereby declare their agreement to work together
deliberately to this end.
^ ^ ^
We Must Call a Retreat
Letter by Max Shachtman to Comrades513
9 June 1933
This letter was mimeographed for circulation among Shachtman's
supporters in the CLA.
I have thus far refrained from writing to you because I was
anxious to avoid giving you fragmentary and superficial impres-
sions. Even though I realized how intense an interest you have in
the opinions of the European comrades concerning our internal
situation, I thought it preferable that you get, from the very start,
a rounded-out picture of how they view the crisis in the American
League.
You must already have a pretty clear idea of what happened at
the Paris plenum. The comrades— with one or two exceptions-
were greatly handicapped in the discussion of the American
question. Most of them pointed out that they and their sections
had never received a single one of the internal bulletins issued by
the American League and were, consequently, at a loss to under-
stand the origin and nature of the dispute. This deficiency was
partially surmounted by a rather brief report to the plenum by
comrade Witte, upon whose objectivity I found it possible to rely
entirely. He was followed by two presentations, one by Swabeck
and the other by me. Neither of the two last-named reports was
of the sharp and tense character that has marked the discussions
in the League, and it was evident that all of the comrades present
were of one mind: While there are certain divergences of view in
the American League and even an unhealthy internal regime, there
544 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
is nevertheless no basis for the continuation of the acute struggle
which has tormented the organization for over a year. The resolu-
tion adopted was drafted by comrade Naville. As you can see, it is
brief and, with the additional proposal that the factions be liqui-
dated as speedily as possible, it merely incorporates the concrete
propositions contained in the Gourov letter on the American
League situation. I was able to support the resolution without any
reservations, thus conducting myself, I believe, entirely in confor-
mity with the point of view we unanimously adopted at the very
last meeting of the group before my departure when we endorsed
the line and the proposals of the Gourov letter. In this connec-
tion, I find it necessary also to point out that while I could not, of
course, associate myself with the point of view elaborated by
Swabeck in his presentation, it was nevertheless apparent that he
was prepared to acknowledge that the majority faction had made
a number of errors in its conduct of affairs, particularly with re-
gard to the minority in the League. Thus, in his speech as well as
in private conversations with me, he admitted that the co-optations
proposal was wrong, equally wrong was the decision to deprive
Marty of his vote on the National Committee, and so on. His atti-
tude was rather conciliatory and he assured me that upon his
return he would do everything in his power— even if it were neces-
sary to break with any comrade with whom he had been associated
in the past— to reestablish a normal and healthy situation in the
League. As for the plenum resolution itself, it hardly needs to be
emphasized that it is my opinion (and I believe it will be yours as
well) that it should be endorsed by us and by the League as a whole
and that a genuine and not merely a diplomatic effort should be
made to execute its provisions in the life of the League.
Even more interesting and important than the resolution of
the plenum are the views of comrade Trotsky in Prinkipo, as well
as of comrade Frank, because both of them, particularly the
former, have followed the discussion in the League virtually from
its inception and are in a better position to express a well-founded
point of view. It is only in the last couple of days that we have had
the opportunity to discuss the American situation. As you will
easily understand, there is more than the League to be discussed
in Prinkipo. Germany, Austria, Russia— these and many other
problems occupy the largest share of the time and activities of
the little Prinkipo group of the Opposition. However, we have just
We Must Call a Retreat 545
had two discussions which you will find highly interesting. The
first one— a conversation between comrade Trotsky and me— I will
communicate to you more extensively because it was here that
Trotsky expressed himself in the greatest detail; whereas in the
second, it took on more the form of a meeting of all the com-
rades who are living here, during which I reported for more than
an hour on our standpoint with regard to the situation, following
which comrade Trotsky did not do much more than repeat in much
more condensed form that which he had already said in his first
conversation with me. I will give you below the gist of what he
said, sometimes paraphrasing him, sometimes summarizing him,
sometimes quoting him directly. At all events, even where I do
not quote him literally, you may take what I give you as a faithful
reproduction of his views:
Trotsky. I do not agree either with you or with Swabeck when you
say that I exaggerate the imminence and danger of a split in the
American League. It is not incomprehensible that the leading par-
ticipants of the two factions overlook the danger the League faces.
The automatic logic of the present situation in the American
League leads directly to a split and that in the very near future. It
cannot continue like this for very long. The League has lost its
recruiting ability. Workers will not join it under the present cir-
cumstances. They will say to themselves: Yes, the ideas of the
Opposition may be good, but the organization is rotten, demoral-
ized, torn to bits with an incomprehensible quarrel that paralyzes
it. The League itself will at best mark time for a while and then
lose ground. The enterprises of the organization will be seriously
injured. Already it is clear that a financial crisis is developing
around the Militant, which is compelled to come out, even if for
only one issue, with two pages instead of four— and this after more
than four years of existence of the League. If the internal situa-
tion continues as it is, the split is absolutely inevitable. And what
will that mean? All the hard work of the past, the work of publish-
ing, the work of issuing the Militant, of gathering together the
initial cadres, will explode into the air. Individually and collec-
tively we will be discredited in the eyes of the Communist workers;
the League, the Opposition, and its ideas will be discredited in
their eyes, and the movement in America will be set back for years
to come.
Everything possible must be done to avoid the split before ii
546 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
is too late. What we have now in the League is mutual obstruc-
tion, from both sides, which prevents the League from moving
ahead. If this strangulating obstruction continues, it may prove to
be better to propose a split from here, that is, with the initiative
of the European Opposition. In that case, we would have a situa-
tion in America similar to that in Czechoslovakia, where the
Opposition is divided and ineffectual and unofficial. But even such
a measure may prove to be necessary if the present impossible
situation is allowed to continue.
What should you (i.e., what should I, Shachtman) tell your fac-
tion: You know that Swabeck promised here to attenuate the
struggle when he returns. He wrote a letter while here, a personal
letter to me, in which he recognizes many of the mistakes of the
majority and in which he promises to help settle the fight even if
it means a break with his faction. I told him many bitter truths
and he admitted the errors because it is the majority which bears
the responsibility for the League and it should be more consider-
ate and conciliatory toward the minority.
But the minority? Let us see. It anticipates too much; it is too
impatient and nervous. The minority, let us say, has no confidence
in Cannon or in the Cannon group. It is convinced that it is im-
possible to work together with him effectively and loyally, or that
he is not a worthwhile element. Good. Let us assume that you are
correct in this conviction (an assumption which I have of course
no ground at all for making). But let us assume it for the mo-
ment. The fact is, however, that the minority has not succeeded
in convincing the International Left Opposition of its view. It has
not yet won the ILO to its side. The ILO is unable to discern any
issues of a defined or definable character or form. Should any
emerge, you may be sure that the sections will take a position one
way or the other. Bear in mind that it is very patient, this ILO,
but at the same time it does not yield an inch in questions of prin-
ciple. Take the case of our present dispute with the German
Reichsleitung [national leadership] on the question of the slogan
for a new communist party in Germany.514 The comrades have a
false point of view. But we are extremely patient with them, we do
not take any measures against them, we scrupulously avoid any
appearance of maneuvering and intrigue, but at the same time
we do not yield a single inch in our principled position. Or take
the case of Frey and Landau. For a long time, Frey kept on writ-
We Must Call a Retreat 547
ing, in his paper and in letters to me, that Landau is an abomi-
nable creature, a cockroach, etc. I continued to reply to Frey:
Perhaps you are correct and perhaps not. We do not yet know and
it is impossible for us to accept your beliefs, your word, on credit,
so to say. We must allow the passage of time to provide the test.
So it is with you (i.e., with us in the U.S.). You anticipate too
much. You must have much more patience. You must orient your-
selves on a longer perspective, on a longer period of work. As for
myself, I do not place a plus or a minus sign before either of the
two groups. I am not prejudiced in favor of this one or that one,
one way or the other. I have a waiting, expectant attitude on the
American question ("Ich habe einen abwartenden Standpunkt").
What would I advise you to write to your faction? I propose
to you a maneuver, which is not at all wrong from my point of
view and which should not injure your faction from your point of
view. I mean a maneuver in the best sense of the term. Ilfaut reenter
pour mieux sauter! You must retreat in order the better to leap for-
ward! You must have patience and not anticipate so much. If your
estimate of Cannon and his group is correct, you have only to wait.
{Interruption by Shachtman: Yes, but then we will be accused of act-
ing like the hungry lion, lying in wait and ready to pounce on an
opponent as soon as there is an "issue.") Trotsky resuming: But it is
better to be an intelligent lion than one that runs around violently
and aimlessly!
What have you to lose by such an attitude? You have every-
thing to gain. It is better for you. If there is a dispute that you
cannot settle in the League, you can count upon the intervention
of the whole international Opposition. If you should prove to be
on the right side, the ILO will support you. But when you have a
problem before you, you should not immediately make a fighting
issue out of it. It is better for you and for the League if you
approach Cannon, ask his opinion about it, ask Swabeck's opinion
about it, talk to them first. Seek to convince them in a comradely
manner that your view is correct. Only if you fail to get agree-
ment in that way, then you can go to the National Committee, or
if necessary appeal to the New York branch. Then you can say:
Comrades, I tried to reach a comradely agreement with Cannon
or with the others and despite all my efforts it was impossible;
now I must appeal to you. What have you to lose by such a
procedure? You will only be strengthened by it. You know how
548 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
savagely Stalin and co. attack the Left Opposition and me person-
ally. Yet, I even make proposals to those people who systematically
defame the Opposition and myself. I recently wrote a letter to the
Central Committee, which I sent to all the embassies of the Soviet
Union, offering my services in the defense of the Soviets in what-
ever capacity they may see fit to employ these services.515 You have
a hundredfold more reason to act in the same way in the League,
where we are, after all, defending a common cause.
I have another proposal which I think you ought to communi-
cate to your friends. The atmosphere in the League is thoroughly
poisoned. I propose that anybody in the League who makes per-
sonal attacks upon a comrade should be immediately expelled.
This applies to both sides, of course. If a comrade has a charge to
make and cannot obtain satisfaction in normal ways and if there
are grounds for his charges, let him appeal if necessary to the In-
ternational Secretariat. But if anyone henceforward continues to
poison the League atmosphere by personal slanders and attacks
and provocations, expel him immediately! Take the initiative! If it
is a comrade on your side, set the example to the others: You your-
self should be the one to make the motion for his expulsion.
Politics nowadays requires numerous abrupt turns. The League
needs an abrupt turn. I propose that you should initiate one. Not
merely a little turn, but a really serious and big one. II faut reculer,
reculer, reculer! II faut commander un recul (A retreat must be
ordered)! Take the initiative; you have nothing to lose by it.
The same evening, we had a meeting with all the comrades
present, where I presented our point of view in some detail, dwell-
ing particularly on the internal regime in the League, without
neglecting to touch upon my role in the international dispute. As
to the former— suppression of our documents, co-optations,
depriving Marty of his vote, no internal discussion bulletins, etc.,
etc.— there was not even a question of dispute. I call to your atten-
tion that even at the plenum, comrade Blasco, after hearing my
report, declared with some astonishment: "C'est evident qu'il y a
quelque chose de malsain dans le regime interieur de la Ligue"
(It is plain that there is something unhealthy in the League's
internal regime). Here, comrade Frank, with whom I discussed
privately the American question, made similar observations. He
We Must Call a Retreat 549
told me how disturbed they were here, comrade Trotsky included,
when Marty had his vote taken from him. He inclined to ridicule
the inflating of the famous Carter "group" into an issue, for the
whole construction seemed to them so trivial and inconsequen-
tial. When I mentioned to him that my proposal to send National
Committee minutes to all branches six months or more in exist-
ence had been voted down as "non-Communist organizational
procedure," he was also dismayed.516 In France, he pointed out,
the local groups receive all the minutes and documents of the
executive committee, they have a permanent discussion bulletin
at their disposal in which are printed statements even of elements
who have been expelled or who have quit the Ligue and are
engaged in fighting it!
In the discussion after my report, Frank asked a couple of ques-
tions and only comrade Trotsky spoke. It was in the evening, rather
late, and he spoke rather briefly... but plainly. His remarks were
largely a summary of what he had already said to me in the con-
versation cited above. "A few words as to the internal regime," he
said. "We already discussed this subject with Swabeck, and with
that sincerity which is characteristic of him, he admitted that the
majority had made not a few mistakes in this respect. We said at
that time that they were the mistakes of a sectarian bureaucrat-
ism. Now we have Swabeck's assurance, in writing as well, that he
will work, as a League member and not as a faction member, to
repair the situation." As for Shachtman's remarks on the interna-
tional question, it seems to me that he sought to "bagatellize" his
differences with the International Left Opposition. In turn he sup-
ported or failed to fight against all those elements whom we
considered pernicious for the progress of the Opposition— Rosmer,
Landau, Naville, Mill, the Spaniards. They continued to base them-
selves upon him, they used his name in their factional interests,
and he took no steps to disabuse them of their confidence in his
support. I do not say that his group had the same position that he
had in the important international questions. But is it not a bad
sign that they did not call him to account when during that whole
period he, who represented not only them but the League as a
whole in the international field, took a false position? I take the
hypothesis that the other members of his group did not support
these alien elements in the ILO only because they did not have
the opportunity to express themselves on the European disputes
550 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
before they were settled. This is only a hypothesis and I do not
make it as a reproach.
I do not share the optimism of Shachtman or Swabeck on the
question of the split danger in the League. I think it is not exag-
gerated to point to its imminence. It must be avoided at all costs,
or else we may be compelled to advocate a separation from here.
Perhaps some expulsions may be the only way out to prevent a
split. You (i.e., Shachtman) should not wait for the others to make
a motion to expel one of your comrades who poisons the atmo-
sphere with personal accusations and slanders. You should set the
example and take the initiative in proposing his expulsion. Then
the comrades everywhere will understand that you mean it, that
you are serious, that you are ready to act.
The aim of my letter, which I am writing in agreement with
comrade Trotsky and which I shall show to him before I send it
off, is not so much to give you his point of view as it is to give you
mine. Although he presents it from a somewhat different angle
and with a somewhat different tone from that of the Gourov let-
ter, you can see that it is essentially the same. Just as he told
Swabeck some "bitter truths," so he told me some as well. Take
our opposition to Swabeck's leaving for Europe: It was neither
well formulated nor well founded, and it is necessary to acknowl-
edge that frankly. You will remember that x\lbert and Maurice
already expressed themselves before my departure in the same
sense. The same may be said of other positions we took. It is true
that I feel now more confirmed than ever in the opposition we
manifested to all the bureaucratic actions and conduct of the
majority in the past period. But even here, where I still feel we
were so thoroughly correct, our position and the position of the
League would have been strengthened immeasurably if we had
tried ten times harder to see to it that we, at least, did nothing by
word or deed that would contribute to the extreme tension in
the League.
I am writing this letter primarily for the purpose of request-
ing that you call a meeting of a dozen or so comrades in New
York to discuss its contents and adopt a formal position toward it.
Also that it be sent to Boston, Chicago, Toronto, Youngstown, and
Minneapolis for the information of our friends. I cannot urge too
We Must Call a Retreat 55 1
strongly upon you the fact that the objectivity and disinterested-
ness of Trotsky and the European comrades can be entirely relied
upon. The advice that Trotsky gives in his conversations with me
can and should be taken into consideration and acted upon, not
merely as a "clever maneuver" from our factional point of view,
but as measures in the initiation of which, we have every reason
to believe, the League, and we with it, will be considerably strength-
ened and be enabled to emerge from its crisis. The proposal he
makes with regard to expulsions is an extremely harsh one, but if
we and all our comrades refrain from laying themselves open to
such a measure as expulsion, if we are overscrupulous and par-
ticularly careful in seeing to it that even if there is a heated political
discussion, we refuse to be personally provoked, refuse to provoke
others, refuse to indulge in personal recrimination, or what may
be considered as such— in that case, we will not only have to our
credit the clearing of the smoky atmosphere in the League, but
perhaps more important than that: The clearing of the "personal"
element from the atmosphere is precisely what will make it pos-
sible for anyone in the League to present a standpoint objectively
and have it discussed on its merits. Then those who in the midst
of such a discussion try to recharge the old atmosphere with its
old fumes will not have a leg to stand on, either in the League or
in our international. Read over again carefully and objectively the
observations of comrade Trotsky. We have, I repeat after him,
nothing to lose by honestly and sincerely taking his counsel and acting
straightforwardly.
PS: On other questions (miners, Negro question, etc.), I will write
later. I may stay here for two or three months and I beg you all to
write to me as to how the situation stands in general. I have already
shown comrade Trotsky some of the letters I have received and,
even where he disagrees with their contents, it helps him to get a
more rounded picture of how matters stand.
^ 4> 4>
552
Report from Prinkipo
Letter by Max Shachtman to Martin Abern517
6 July 1933
This letter was written shortly after Radical Party premier Eduard
Daladier granted Trotsky a French visa. Shachtman accompanied Trotsky
and Sedova when they sailed for France on July 17. Just before leaving
Prinkipo Trotsky completed his first article calling for a new international
and new communist parties around the world. Shachtman 's letter reflects
some of the thinking that led to this decision, but does not anticipate it.518
Shachtman refers to the growing redbaiting campaign in the PMA,
where the leadership was seeking an accommodation with the hated John
L. Lewis and the UMW. Allard had been removed as editor of the Pro-
gressive Miner, and three dozen leftist militants, including CLAerJoe
Angelo, were up for expulsion in the PMA's Springfield district.519
I hope that by this time the letters I have already sent to the
States have arrived and that at least part of the irritating impres-
sion I seem to have made on the comrades has been dispelled. By
now, too, you will probably be aware of the decision of the Daladier
ministry to grant LD a visa for France. In all probability, by the
time this meets your eyes, we shall be on our way to somewhere
in France, with all the attendant excitement. The relief it affords
LD and Natalya Ivanova is so immense that it can hardly be
described. Turkey has been a prison for them for four years and
more, with the solitary exception of the all-too-brief escape to Den-
mark for a couple of weeks. Now as to some more pressing matters,
resulting from another rather extensive discussion with LD on the
situation in the League.
The Miners' Situation. For my own part, I cannot regard the latest
developments inside the PMA except as a literal translation into
reality of the prognosis we elaborated in our statement. If any-
thing, the essentials have been confirmed with even greater
rapidity than was foreseen by us. It is the reaction which is now
on the offensive, for one thing, and a more clearly reformist policy
is being imposed upon the organization by what was once an
Report from Prinkipo 553
"honest rank-and-file" leadership. It was hard to present the dis-
pute here in the same clear manner as we knew it by personal
experience in New York as a result of the oral discussions that
took place inside and outside the branch. I do not hesitate to repeat
my conviction that the outlook on the situation and the perspectives
of Cannon— leave aside all incidental and secondary questions aris-
ing out of the fundamental considerations— were unmistakably
tinged with opportunism, expressed in its crassest forms by Clarke
and Carmody, who lacked only Cannon's poise and argumenta-
tive skill but were otherwise in essential accord with him. Here
we have one of those crying examples of the unfinality, so to say,
of documents alone. They can be written so easily with an eye for
the record, whereas the oral declarations, the accent, the funda-
mental stream of thought, which are so tremendously decisive, are
of such a fugitive character from the point of view of being able
to lay your hands on them, that they are revealed with a far greater
freedom than is displayed in written records.
In his remarks, LD concerned himself essentially, as a result,
with the question of our relations with Allard. His attitude is the
following:
Allard is not an individual, but an institution which we must
utilize to the maximum; if necessary, squeeze and squeeze and
squeeze until the lemon is ready to be thrown aside. He is the
editor of an extremely important trade-union organ. If results were
unsatisfactory in the past, it is because our relations with him were
more or less literary, that is, conducted by correspondence. The
problem can be resolved only by actually incorporating Allard into
an organization, by organizing groups of miners, of which he must
become a part. In their midst, compelled to participate in their
discussions and their elaboration of policies, he will at the same
time be obligated to carry out these policies in the union. The
phrase of Abern is a happy one: Allard is a sympathizer. Does
that mean he should be expelled? No, he must be utilized to the
end. If the League were composed of 40 percent Allards, it would
be a catastrophe; 20 percent would be pretty dangerous; even 10
percent would already be harmful. But there is only one Allard in
the League, and we have nothing to fear. If after he has actually
been made a part of a functioning organization, he fails to fulfill
the obligations of membership, then, of course, we must break
with him. But there is nothing gained by precipitating the end
554 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
before all the preliminary processes have been exhausted. He can,
by his position, be of help to the League in various ways. If he
fails here or there, he should be checked up, but on those occa-
sions where he does not fail us— however few they may be— he is of
service to the movement and we should utilize him. From the for-
mal point of view, Shachtman is of course absolutely correct; but
especially in the trade-union question, where the League is so tiny
and the masses so backward and reactionary, it is well to lean back-
ward from formalism. The Opposition, in America as elsewhere,
is passing beyond the stage of individual selection, where the high-
est qualifications were required. We are entering upon a new stage.
It is therefore necessary to maneuver a little here and there, not
surrendering our principled line, but doing everything now to
establish contact with the masses.
I do not, of course, know the comrade personally, but it appears
to me that the proposal of comrade Cannon with regard to him as
a prospective member of the National Committee is a good one.
Naturally, I may be mistaken, being at this distance from the scene.
Also, if there were two Allards on the National Committee, it would
be a big danger. But one? That is possible. First, it will associate
him more definitely with the Opposition; it will impress him with
his membership in it; it will place more unmistakable obligations
upon him. If it does not work out, we have lost nothing by it except
a member of the National Committee....
That is the summary of LD's remarks, and as you can see,
there is a vast amount of good Communist sense in what he says,
quite apart from the content of our own particular discussion in the
League. Thus Cannon advanced the idea of Allard on the NC with
a flaming campaign speech about the "militant fighter who has
no need to apologize," etc., etc. LD approaches it from a rather
different standpoint. I cannot say that I am in agreement with LD
even when the problem is regarded from his angle, but he
undoubtedly presents considerations of distinct merit. As a matter
of fact, nothing in the organizational policy of Communism speaks
against his views: How many times were similar steps taken in
Lenin's time in the Communist parties with elements infinitely
worse than Allard? Naturally, each concrete case is an individual
case and must be considered on its special merits. I am far from
convinced that in Allard's case the situation warrants the appli-
cation of the method recommended by LD. Rather, I would vote
Report from Prinkipo 555
three times for drawing Joe Angelo closer to, and into, the NC
than Allard. By the way, as far as the Mooney conference report
in the Militant is concerned, LD, it goes without saying, expressed
himself literally as follows, that such exaggerations are inadmis-
sible in the League. There is a word or two to be added to such a
comment, but not very much more, I think.
A Second Party in the U.S. On this score, LD made some observa-
tions which I summarize as follows:
It is quite natural and in the nature of things that following
the German events and the new orientation of the Opposition,
the question of the second party should be thrown up for discus-
sion in various countries. For example, in Switzerland the comrades
have already started a discussion on the expediency of orienting
toward the second-party slogan in that country. It goes without
saying that in the United States we are quite a way off from a situ-
ation which warrants raising the slogan for a second party there.
But it is quite another thing to pose before the League the task of
becoming a mass organization and that in the shortest possible
time. Participation in the class struggles of the day is now the pri-
mary task of the Opposition, in the U.S. included. If we should
be able to rally 2,000 or 3,000 members into the League— of course
we would proclaim a new Communist party! The problem is not
to pose the slogan at the present time of a second party, but to
concentrate our work in such a manner as to lead in that direc-
tion. While avoiding the danger of prematurity, we should also be
careful not to fall into organizational fetishism and conservatism....
While this is somewhat vague— necessarily so, for it is not a
problem that is solved— it is an outlook with which I entirely agree.
You will already have received the Gourov letter, which arose out
of a discussion I and the other comrades had with LD here, dur-
ing which I raised the question of the new orientation, the new
party, and the attitude toward the SP left wing on an international
scale.520 While the situation is greatly different with us than it is
in Europe, the general orientation cannot but bear obvious marks
of similarity. And despite the stupid attempts of those who "were
for the second party all along" to find consolation in the turn we
are in the process of making, it is necessary to orient our com-
rades in that direction.
The Headquarters. Despite many considerations I presented, LD is
556 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
strongly in favor of moving the center to Chicago. He is just as
strongly against it if it is the move of one faction against the other.
But if the NC can be made quasi-unanimous for it, if the organi-
zation as a whole can be swung behind the proposal substantially,
he is thoroughly in favor of it. "We must turn our backs upon Fos-
ter and Browder, and our face to the workers." The National
Committee must be taken out of the New York branch. Even from
a factional standpoint, it is better that there should be such a "split"
as that, rather than a real one. Let New York then demonstrate
what it can do and let the other faction demonstrate what it can
do from Chicago, without NY. Such a "rivalry" will be healthy for
the League. It will enable you to concentrate more easily on the
now-aktuelle [on the agenda] miners' situation. As for the plant,
that is a practical question that must be solved pencil in hand.521
Even assuming that Cannon wants to move for factional reasons,
that only means that he has a smart faction. Besides, I see that
our friend Glotzer, in his letter to Shachtman, urges their common
faction not to commit an error of opposing the transfer to Chicago
regardless of Cannon's motives. It is clear that Glotzer, who is the
cadet (i.e., youngest) in the Shachtman faction, is far from the worst
of its members (ahem!); he must be among the best....
My only comment is this: Thus far, I am not yet convinced.
What do you think about the question? It can, of course, wait for
decision until I return.... For the moment, enough. I will, of course,
write again.
557
The "Master's" Ways
Letter by Martin Abern to Albert Glotzer522
6 July 1933
This letter reports on events in New York after Swabeck 's return in mid-
June. Toward the end Abern refers to Cannon as "the Master, " a term he
and Glotzer often used in their private correspondence.
Thanks for the copy of your letter to Max; it is very informa-
tive. I have just written lengthily again to Max; in fact I've written
him a number of times in the recent days, so that he is fully
informed of affairs at this end; since you have written him fully
too, he can certainly approach matters with complete information.
This machine I'm using doesn't take a carbon very well, so that I
have no copies of any letters that I sent which I could forward to
you. I'll undertake now to cover some matters.
1. I just received another letter from Max. I'll have it copied and
sent to you. It contains a good deal of interesting information.
2. Two weeks ago Tuesday I made the branch executive commit-
tee report to the branch. It was presented in a thoroughly objective
manner, as to past, present, and future needs. From the minutes I
sent you before, you have a pretty good idea of the work we carried
on in the past period. I presented these matters in a way that made
discussion of the problems before us possible in an objective
manner. My report was very well received and its character
remarked upon by many comrades. Indeed, at the elections last
Tuesday, at which I could not be present, I received so many
encomiums from many directions that I'm sure I'd have been
embarrassed at such praise had I been present. But we can leave
that.
Stamm countered with a written and read statement of such a
filthy and ultrafactional character that the branch was revolted by
it, and even members of his own faction reacted sharply against it.
Ever since they have had to be explaining and apologizing for it.
But its rotten character had its effect— against the Cannonites. When
it is finally handed in (Stamm took care to hold it), I suppose it
558 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
will not be recognizable from the original reading, but while the
record may thus be changed, in New York it has had its results,
and not well for them. What one sees and hears isn't erased so
easily in the minds of comrades, despite the well-known habit of
record-making by Cannon and co. I refrain from summarizing my
report to you since you have a good idea of the actual work. I might
say that Swabeck's pussyfooting on Stamm's report, which he
heard, hasn't stood Swabeck in good stead. And just in passing—
in case you're kidding yourself too— Swabeck since his arrival has
just been the same old pliant faction agent of Cannon.
3. Swabeck a week ago yesterday reported to the NC. It was quite
brief. After all it was only for my benefit, Cannon having received
and heard everything many days before. I summarize his report
in reference to America (what he said about the other countries
you already know, having been in the Militant, etc.— a rehash on
Germany, etc.). I quote Swabeck accurately, I'm sure. What he
made was essentially a faction report, and LD is kidding himself
if he thinks Swabeck is any different: By his biological makeup he
is always subject to the influence of the last one exerting pres-
sure. He said:
Trotsky says, concerning America, that the German catastrophe
means the further demoralization of the CPs. In America— the weak-
est section of the CI— we must turn to more independent, mass
work.... A split situation exists in the League.
The National Committee, Swabeck attributes to Trotsky, has
two elements— and presumably its followers are like elements. One
is an older labor group, trained in the unions, going back to even
before the days of the formation of the Party— that's the majority.
The other group is the younger group, intellectuals, etc.
The majority NC is politically intransigent. It was also organi-
zationally intransigent and there it made its mistakes; it must be
more tolerant of a minority. Then Swabeck outlined the concrete
criticisms made by Trotsky on organizational matters— he named
only a few.
Political differences had arisen— according to Trotsky— having
only symptomatic significance as yet. He stood on the criticisms
made of Max on the international (European) question.
The majority had been correct politically on the Red Army
question, the Illinois miners, opposition to the blocs of the mi-
nority. I cite the outstanding points Swabeck attributes to Trotsky.
The "Master's" Ways 559
At the I.S. plenum he and Max arrived at an agreement. The
I.S. plenum was on a comparatively low level.
This report to the NC Swabeck said he would elaborate to the
branch when he reported (which was last Saturday).
These in essence are Swabeck's claims. As you see, just a fac-
tion agent's report. I decline to accept for one second what he
attributes to Trotsky. And I have of course sent a more complete
report of Swabeck's report to Max to take up with Trotsky. Unless
I'm nuts, it should make LD's ears tingle. Imagine the gall: Claim
vindication on the Red Army question— after Cannon devoted a
whole public mass meeting to explaining away his original remarks
and found it expedient to withdraw his article from publication.
As to the miners, shiver my timbers, we've been vindicated en-
tirely by all that has happened; and I note that Max in his latest
letter asserts that point of view sharply. As to blocs, it is to laugh.
In each instance, it was the revolt of the overwhelming bulk of
the branch to the organizational malpractices of the Cannon group
and which are so roundly condemned by the I.S. and Trotsky.
Swabeck mentioned that he did not return as an "indepen-
dent." Indeed not; he returned and remained— in Cannon's pocket.
Don't kid yourself otherwise.
Before I continue on this matter, allow me to turn back a
moment. Chronology doesn't seem to work out exactly. At a sub-
sequent branch meeting— the week after my report to the
branch— when the elections were to take place and when the meet-
ing was already under way, Cannon announced that Swabeck had
requested that the branch elections be postponed till after he had
made his report to the branch. Swabeck was not yet at the meet-
ing. I stated that I had no objection if Swabeck made such a
request, though I could not understand why Swabeck had not at
least mentioned his request to me— as an NC member and branch
organizer— especially since I had spoken to him that very morn-
ing. But let that stand for itself. Or for that matter, why wait till
the very night of the elections for the suggestion? Anyway, as evi-
dence that we hoped only good would result, the branch accepted
the request and postponed the branch elections till July 4. The
next day Swabeck reported to the NC; on the following Saturday-
prior to July 4— to the branch.
At the NC meeting, Cannon spoke some ten minutes on his
tour and his ideas of the future work. You are acquainted with
560 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
them better than I. They refer to the so-called mass paper, to be
called the Rebel, workers clubs on a broad— not opposition-
sympathizing base; have the Militant remain a theoretical organ,
etc., move to Chicago— all based on his latest empirical gyrations
of the mind: independent work, function like a second party, even
if not yet putting out the slogan.
While I'm on this I'll say a couple of words. His ideas are not
formulated at all clearly, so far as I've heard. Empiricism is a mild
word. He turns his back completely on New York, and that is wholly
false. He sees only the West— possibly because he thinks he can
prevail with the simpler and more provincial minds of most of
the comrades, and play upon their prejudices.
His workers clubs idea— that is, his conception— doesn't strike
me so hot. I'm for clubs— where we have also built an Opposition
base or League. Concretely: Capelis has been working with con-
tacts in Paterson, textile workers, ex-Party and YCLers and new
elements. Apart from the question of union work, what shall we
do. Cannon advised Capelis to form a workers club, not so much
as breathing about a League unit. There's a slant to his opportun-
ism. He's looking, like other opportunists, for a mass movement,
no matter what— though it can't be gotten this way.
Has it ever struck you, that as Cannon possibly conjures, the
workers club conception he holds has the germs of the labor party
idea? Think about it a while. What the Minneapolis opportunists
won't do with the "broad" conceptions brought forward is plenty.
Their brands of opportunism will run wild.
Another thought: Have you noted that as the Party neglected
or lost out in its work in the unions, the AFL, etc., it turned to
building all kinds of auxiliaries, like the ICOR, workers clubs, I WO,
alleged new industrial unions, etc., as a means toward mass work.523
Actually, it brought the opposite— no mass contacts or work. It iso-
lated the Party among these alleged or real left-wing elements and
separated them from the mass of workers in the AFL and else-
where. In brief, this way of building new organizations, clubs, etc.,
was the manner in which sectarianism was the outcome.
I do not say it has to be. But some of Cannon's notions can
result, if accepted, in the League putting in its time on such club
building, etc., that work in the AFL, etc., is really let go. These
are only germinating notions. Give them consideration.
I'm opposed to the new paper, the Rebel. That is, the sound-
The "Master's" Ways 561
est procedure is to develop the Militant in the proper sense as a
mass organ and revive our project of the theoretical organ, the
International Communist Review. If still another paper can be
established in the West, we can give it consideration, and then
not something like Muste's Labor Action. But just what can be con-
sidered on its merits.
This fellow abandons New York. Here everything is crystal-
lized, he says: AFL, Party, SP, etc. Nothing can be done for a long
time. Is that a reason for turning one's back, even if it were true,
which isn't the case. Listen, Al, don't also make the mistake of
just dismissing the East. Cannon can dismiss it because he's thor-
oughly discredited in New York— and properly so— and nearly all
comrades see through his eclecticism, crude factionalism, narrow
political vision, and whatnot. So he wants none of it. You under-
stand, I'm not discussing what the West can do, especially Chicago.
I'm speaking against the negative approach of Cannon. He gives
up work in the Party very easily here by just proposing the League
walk off to Chicago. Well, one can't dismiss easily the matter of
the LO center in New York so long as the Party is here, and the
relation of forces is as it is, and objective circumstances are as they
are. I leave aside Cannon's motivations for his proposal to move
to Chicago, though be assured they have to be considered, if one
isn't to blunder in working out policy and programs of work.
However, I intended not to deal with these matters in this let-
ter; so please consider them as hastily jotted down ideas, but worth
considering properly nevertheless. I'm taking a few days off of ne-
cessity—but finding myself writing innumerable letters— but shortly
we are to decide on the numerous proposals raised. I might say in
passing that Cannon attributes agreement with his proposals to
all of you, which is indeed amazing. I made no comments, but
said I would consider all of them. I don't believe we should rush
to decide these matters, but allow time for thought, and I think
Max should also have the chance to consider them before a deci-
sion is made.
To return to my original remarks. Swabeck reported to the
branch last Saturday; I was not present, being occupied with the
disposition of Eastman's film to a producer.521 In essence he made
the same report to the branch, although put more mildly in some
places, but taking a few hours to do it in.
In view of Swabeck's categorical declarations of political victory
562 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
of his faction at the National Committee meeting— to which I give
one, loud, roaring horselaugh and Bronx cheer— we thought it would
be well for Trotsky to know exactly what Swabeck says, so we pro-
posed that a stenogram be taken of the branch proceedings. Our
comrades approached Swabeck and Cannon before the meeting
on this matter, hoping to arrive at agreement; Swabeck, as always,
was wishy-washy, but said he saw no objection (not the advantages—
MA); Cannon was against. We said, well, put it to the branch. The
branch accepted, Cannon and Swabeck et al. abstaining.
And what a tough day Swabeck had, as the reports came back
to me. I hope we can get the stenogram soon. He was plied with
questions of every description, and how embarrassing they proved.
He was compelled to squirm, wiggle, change, modify, and what-
not his original remarks he reported; for the facts confounded him
on every side. His remarks on the Red Army and Illinois miners,
for instance, were greeted by plain laughter, for here the comrades
knew the facts, and Cannon didn't open his mouth when Swabeck's
assertions on various matters, including these, were flatly dis-
proved. I wrote Max thereon and told him we would brook no
acceptance of the Swabeckian assertions, even as modified, from
over there. And I have an idea that Max will take up the cudgels.
Again, I say, anyone who thinks the Dane is different is nuts. The
baloney slices the same, thick or thin. He's still Cannon's Friday.
Changes aren't observable as yet; we shall see, though I hope that
the attempted solution of the faction struggle will prove fruitful
all around and make possible the needed collaboration.
Cannon repeated at the branch meeting in a few words what
he had reported at the NC.
The branch elections, Tuesday, July 4: about 20 absent, Cannon,
Swabeck, myself— almost entirely Cannonites and ourselves. A good
attendance nevertheless. Those elected are: Matheson 42 votes,
Geltman 38, Weber 35, Saul 35, Milton 33, Lewit 32, Bleeker 32,
Kitt 31, Gardanis 29, Field 25, Carter 25.
All our candidates except Sterling elected; he lost by one vote
due to stupidity on part of our comrades in voting on a previous
tie among three. That is, our comrades voted for two of the three
tied comrades, instead of for Sterling only. But that result is only
incidental. The branch, it was demonstrated, is more than ever in
bulk for our basic group and its policies.
But the results had certain aspects of another character.
The "Master's" Ways 563
So resentful was the branch against Stamm's report and his ways
that it defeated him; he got 22 votes. We wanted to elect three
Cannonites. Only one, Kitt, was elected, with 31 votes. He is a
good worker and the fact that he received such a good vote shows
that the branch reacted favorably toward the good elements, no
matter what faction title they were. But the Cannonites deliber-
ately put up poor candidates, hoping and expecting to be defeated
and thus giving them an excuse for obstruction in the future. I
was for electing three anyway, good or bad, and then putting them
to the test and showing them up in the work. But the branch here
has had enough of monkey business, so it set aside good tactics
and voted for good people. The Cannonites, for instance, put up
also Shulman and Schwalbe, who have done little or nothing in
the branch. Even the Cannon followers revolted (and they can
muster close to 25 votes if all are present). Shulman got four votes
and Schwalbe eight. There was a revolt in their faction, all right,
against such monkey business on the part of the Cannon faction
leaders. Some of the Cannon supporters voted for Field, or he
would have been defeated. This group in its own right musters
exactly seven votes and is very little thought of politically. In fact,
it is the weakest excuse for a group I have ever witnessed, its
political and organizational ineptness being quite distinct. The
Field group, for your information, consists of Field, E. Field, Kaldis,
Pappas, S. Weiner (Pappas's wife), Gardanis, and Carr. Anyway,
the branch results are satisfactory, except for the failure to elect
more of the Cannonites, instead of falling for the cheap trick of
Cannon— that is, to be defeated because of putting up miserable
candidates and then to obstruct. And my prediction is already
borne out. Morris Lewit told me that Matheson had been
approached by Cannon, who protested the results of the election
and that "We would see about this." Well, it's the same old hokum
and Cannon. Matheson laughed at him; for here one observes how
these things happen, and Cannon will be in for the time of his
life, even though some of his crap may go elsewhere, if he raises
the matter of the election results. As a matter of political judg-
ment, I would have had any of his nitwits elected, but now that it
is over, any attempts at demagogic and fake protests will meet with
some pretty sharp comments and exposure from me and others—
and that means almost everyone here.
I'm very glad to hear about Chicago's progress and the news
564 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
about the mining situation. You know it can't be gotten from
Cannon, that is, the information that's needed. I agree with your
standpoint; Max arrives at the same ideas from across, as you will
note from his letter when you receive it.
By chance, at the NC meeting a piece of interesting informa-
tion came out, illustrating the Master's ways. In inquiring about
the mining situation and after Swabeck's claims, Cannon men-
tioned that he had sent his reply to our motions on the miners to
Trotsky, but had not given it to us. Isn't that a stunt? He writes
across, Christ knows what, and we can lick our chops. I haven't
seen his reply as yet. I can quite imagine it will be interesting. I
wrote Max to be sure to ask LD for it. What a man!
I heard from Maurice Spector yesterday. As usual, just didn't
get round to it. He says:
A note to assuage your anxiety. I am working on a lengthy report
for the resident committee and a letter that will serve to inform our
friends. I had no difficulty in voting for the resolution of the Inter-
national Secretariat. Certainly we cannot be the losers. Perhaps it is
best after all that the differences should have come to so sharp a
head. It will clear the atmosphere. You will always remember that
we always warned of the danger of a "preventative split" that the
outside world would not understand and the necessity of a suffi-
ciently clear-cut difference of policy and principle. Nor can these
be improvised on the basis of anticipation only. But permit me to
express a caution with regard to this new "third party," the "solid
and honest," "nonpartisan and progressive conciliators." Some no
doubt are unimpeachable in motive and aim. Others I deeply dis-
trust. What you write about Field is symptomatic. Have we a new
little faction leader with a Napoleon complex?... The Krehm rumors
that Field spreads are nonsense (reply to some questions from me—
M). Krehm and Joel were received into the group only after they
had handed in a statement in which they recognized their accusa-
tions of last summer as essentially false and unreservedly withdrew
their slanderous statement.
Maurice Quarter also writes, in part: The general spirit of
Max's letters seem to me to be a healthy and constructive one;
agree with his observation of the Weisbord faction (remind me to
write later on Weisbord— M); agrees with characterization re Carter.
Will continue this letter later; meanwhile sending this on to
you. I presume you send out such information as you think is
required from contents of my letters to Angelo, St. Louis, etc. Or
don't you? Use your judgment. In this letter there might be quite
a few things for you to shoot to others.
565
A Possible Leap Forward
Letter by Arne Swabeck to the
International Secretariat and Leon Trotsky525
10 July 1933
Since my return I have reported to the National Committee and
so far also to the New York branch membership upon the results
of my visit to Europe and the discussions with the comrades of
the international movement, including the agreement arrived at
between comrade Shachtman, myself, and the international ple-
num. The National Committee adopted a resolution for the
liquidation of the factional situation, copy of which is enclosed
herewith. This resolution has also been adopted unanimously by
the New York branch membership. I think it is possible to say with-
out hesitation that among the comrades there is manifested a will
to carry out the provisions of this resolution. The future should
show the extent to which this assumption is justified.
The comrades of the majority tendency also accepted the criti-
cism made by comrade Trotsky of a number of actions taken.
Within the New York membership, the factional situation had
remained quite intense up until this point. In the units outside of
New York, much less so. To a large extent that is due to the differ-
ence of position of our League units, their relationship to the Party
and to the labor movement. In New York the movement as a whole,
especially the trade unions, are rather definitely divided into the
most extremely conservative AFL type, Socialist unions, and Party-
controlled unions, with the result that it is easier for the Party to
keep the Left Opposition within a certain isolation. In the rest of
the country this is much less marked. The various streams
intermingle more; united-front movements assume a more genu-
ine character and the Party exclusion policy is much less effective;
it is weaker there and our units, where they exist, become more
drawn into the class struggle and are able to approach nearer
toward equal terms with the Party within the general movement.
This last-mentioned development has afforded us some new
566 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
experiences and some new lessons from which we are drawing cer-
tain conclusions for new steps forward for the League.
But before I come to that, a word about the Chicago Free Tom
Mooney Congress and on the Illinois miners developments. The
Mooney congress had more than 1,000 delegates present, a fairly
good section being from trade unions. It had more of the real
appearance and substance of a united-front movement than any-
thing seen here for a long time. But the Stalinists, of course, had
the political domination. They tried to run it in their usual style
of speechmaking, to adopt an empty resolution and pack the lead-
ing committee to carry on the work under its exclusive control.
The Left Opposition, however, raised the question of program,
of broadening the united front, and proposed a concrete line of
activities. It compelled them to elect a resolutions committee, to
put comrade Cannon on the official slate, and to incorporate
about two-thirds of our proposals into the official resolution.
Cannon made a minority report for the resolutions committee
against the "nonagression pact," but the Stalinists were neverthe-
less compelled to put him on the official slate for the permanent
executive committee. A good section of the trade-union delega-
tion attended the Left Opposition congress caucus, among them
a block of delegates from the Illinois miners. It was the pressure
of this block of delegates which became so effective, even to the
point of threatening the Stalinists with withdrawal, should they
fail to include the Left Opposition on the permanent committee.
These delegates estimated the congress as having shown two dis-
tinct political forces, the official Party and the Left Opposition,
the former naturally being numerically the strongest. The
Lovestoneites made no impression whatever.
During these activities an agreement was also reached with
comrade Allard of the Illinois miners. He naturally wanted to
remain with the Left Opposition and carry out its policies. The
agreement is a compromise to the extent that it does not demand
from Allard that he shall stand out openly as a Left Oppositionist
at this time, but he is to make clear his position toward the Party,
to definitely take up the fight against the conservative block of
the union leadership, and to lead in the organization of a left wing
within the union. This fight is coming to a head as rapidly as any-
body could wish for. Allard has already been removed by the union
general executive committee from the editorship of the Progres-
Possible Leap Forward 567
sive Miner. The biggest local branch, composing 2,500 members,
at its subsequent meeting, with this whole executive committee
present, adopted a left-wing resolution in support of Allard and
against the removal. A left wing is crystallizing within the union.
The whole country is "falling in line" with the industrial
recovery efforts of the Roosevelt administration and with the
preparations for an offensive upon Europe. The recovery act and
subsequent developments will undoubtedly tend to facilitate union-
ization on a large scale with the general stream gravitating toward
the conservative unions and not toward the red unions, but nev-
ertheless with struggles developing. There are now many signs
pointing in that direction. Apparently the Stalinists intend to con-
tinue their RILU policy to be fitted into their present opportunist
trend. There are signs pointing toward a working-class awakening;
but in the main benefiting the Socialist Party, adding new left-
ward-developing recruits to its ranks, recruits which the official
Party cannot attract. It is our estimation that the objective condi-
tions are ripening for a new leap forward by the Left Opposition.
In accordance with this, our ideas are taking shape aided by
the recent experiences. Roughly speaking, it is an orientation in
the direction of placing more emphasis upon the creation of an
independent movement built around the Left Opposition as its
nucleus. We conceive of the creation of broad workers clubs,
patterned according to the possibilities of local conditions and
functioning as auxiliary organizations; in some places, the creation
of unemployment organizations upon our initiative. In connec-
tion with this and as a means of its realization, we are discussing
the creation of a mass agitation organ; naturally, maintaining our
political organ, the Militant. These ideas are so far only in the
discussion stage, but appear to meet with the agreement of the
membership and without any differences having developed at this
point. It should be possible to center the coming conference dis-
cussion around these issues and to bring them to their natural
conclusion. As we work these ideas into a concrete program, you
will of course be informed.
If the present course toward unity in the League succeeds,
which I believe is possible, we should be able to move forward.
4- 4- 4>
568
A Radical Change Is Necessary
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Albert Glotzer526
12 July 1933
I want to write you again about the very dangerous situation in
the League. The crisis is typical of the transition from one stage
of development into another. But there have been examples in the
history of human society when the crisis of transition became so
acute and absorbed so much strength, that society, instead of
marching forward, collapsed. The same result has been observed,
much more frequently, in the history of political organizations.
I am afraid that a similar fate threatens the League.
Everybody accepted the resolution of the plenum of the
International Secretariat. But nothing has changed. I do not con-
tend that the blame for this rests with any one individual or with
either of the two groups. The situation is such, that without new
factors or methods, the automatics of the internal struggle will
paralyze the best will. Comrade Cannon proposes a radical change
in the character of the work, beginning with transfer of the seat
of the National Committee. Comrade Shachtman showed me your
letter on this question and expressed some doubts on his own part
to the proposition. It is naturally impossible to assert that the pro-
posal is a panacea. Everything depends upon the material efforts
in the new direction. But the proposals open up a perspective con-
taining new possibilities and can become salutary under certain
conditions, especially if they receive general support.
The very fact of the transfer of the center into a new milieu
and into a new atmosphere will have a favorable effect. The most
disturbing point of friction lies in the relations between the
National Committee and the New York branch. The transfer of
the center will signify that the New York branch will become, to a
certain degree, more independent, but at the same time it will be
charged with more responsibility. Its energy must be concentrated
around revolutionary tasks in the great field of its activity. On
the other hand, the National Committee will devote the greater
Radical Change Is Necessary 569
part of its time and energy to directing the work among the min-
ers and the working masses in general.
Even should the work— in New York as well as in Chicago— be
actuated to a great degree by factional motives, it would neverthe-
less not have a disintegrating effect upon the League. Quite the
contrary. By winning over new worker elements, it can change
entirely the present complexion of the struggle, the internal atmos-
phere in the League. New tasks will engender new political ques-
tions, and new questions will produce new alignments. And that
would be the real salvation.
Some comrades say, quite sincerely, that the League is not pre-
pared for such a radical change in its activity (the transfer of the
National Committee, the new popular paper, the mass clubs, etc.).
But what is meant by "preparation"? On the existing basis, the
continuous preparing of a change is only the preparing for death.
There are situations in which a hazardous step is unavoidable.
I do not deny that there is some danger in the radical change, but
it is impossible to avoid a great danger without any danger.
All the other considerations (New York is the center of politi-
cal life, of the Party, the printing plant question, etc.) are of
secondary importance. The League does not desert New York, for
the New York branch continues to function there, and let us hope
it will extend and deepen its activities. The latest experiences of
the Comintern throughout the world show that we must turn our
face more in the direction of the masses than of the Party. The
printing plant question is a technical one and must be subordi-
nated to the political one.
I know from your letter that you personally agree with the
idea of the transfer to Chicago and I am glad to learn this. But it
is quite necessary that all your friends who take a position against
moving should understand that by such a purely negative stand
they will inevitably bar the road to the way out and compromise
their own group.
This letter is a purely personal one, but you may, if you find
it advisable, show it to your friends. I have not consulted the
International Secretariat about the questions involved, but I believe
that my views move along the lines of the latest decision of
the secretariat.
4- 4> 4>
570
I Won't Make an Issue of Chicago Move
Letter by Max Shachtman to Martin Abern527
13 July 1933
In four days we set sail for France and the news ought to reach
you in the public print before this letter does. The national con-
ference of the French Ligue is to be held August 11-13 and I plan
to attend it. From there, I shall take the first boat to New York
offered me by the French Line, which should bring me back to
the States before the end of that month.
Your June 28 letter I found rather instructive. That Swabeck
should reiterate his adherence to the Cannon faction is not too
surprising. Here, and in his conversations with me, he assured
me, of course, that he would do everything in his power to
ameliorate the situation in the League, and that in doing so he
would not follow any factional lines or course. Now whatever course
he actually does pursue is not of decisive importance in this sense:
If he follows the path he outlined here, well and good, for him-
self, for us, and for the League as a whole; if he follows an opposite
course, if he sinks— or is pushed back— into the old faction morass,
then it will not be so good, either for himself or for the League.
Swabeck really has a rare opportunity at the present time: to act
as a mediator in the present situation. Not in the "contemptuous"
sense of the word, of a man hopelessly attempting to reconcile
extremes, but of one cutting loose from personal and factional
ties and really trying to steer such an objective course as factions
are usually incapable of steering, regardless of how good their in-
tentions may be. Yet, taking Stamm— one of the most venomous
factionalists I have ever seen in or outside of the old Party fights—
under his protection is a disquieting sign, especially for Swabeck.
I cannot say that it is entirely unexpected. Trotsky has a good opin-
ion of Swabeck's honesty and sincerity, and there is undoubtedly
a solid element of those qualities in the man. But the addition of
that negative quality, which consists in an inability to stand on his
own feet which he thinks is overcome by the fact that he is pulled
Won 't Make an Issue of Move 571
along at every important turn by the firmer views and acts of
Cannon, makes a bad physiological-political admixture. Swabeck
has told me (1927 was the first time and when I met him in Paris,
he told me for— I think— the fifth time) often enough, with a sort
of defensive resentment, that the current opinion held about him
as to his blind support of Jim Cannon does not coincide with the
truth; in fact, he told me in Paris, with the openness of a man
released for a while from a certain restraint, that Cannon was very
subjective and reacted personally to political criticism, etc.; that
he did not believe in any one leader for the American League;
and more of the same. Knowing Arne and having heard the same
in one form or another from his lips before, I took it cum grano
salis. I have too frequently heard a man proclaiming at last his
superiority to the temptations of drink, his success in having bro-
ken himself of the habit, only to disappear from the midst of his
companions as soon as a saloon was passed.
Take, for example, his assertion that Trotsky believes the
majority is composed of the older labor element, experienced in
trade-union and mass work, whereas the minority consists of the
younger, inexperienced elements. I am writing this sentence just
after a three-minute conversation with LD, who happened into my
room. I had showed him your letter before and he read it over
carefully. When he was through, he urged me to read the "proto-
col" of the meeting at which Swabeck reported on the American
situation and Trotsky made his comments— so that I might know
what Trotsky actually said during the discussion with Swabeck.
Today, Trotsky repeated to me: "Did you read the protocol? I have
not corrected the stenogram of my remarks, but I remember dis-
tinctly that I expressed myself very cautiously (vorsichtig). I said,
as I have said to you on other occasions, 'Let us assume that this
or that is so' or 'I picture to myself the situation to stand this way
or that' (Ich stelle mir vor). Naturally, I do not know the com-
rades, or the composition of the groups; I have no statistics at
hand." And for that matter, how could such an assertion be made?
It is true in part, of that there is not the slightest doubt. Cannon,
Swabeck, Dunne, and Skoglund are older, and have been in trade-
union work more than you, Spector, Glotzer, and I. But to consider
you, let us say, and Spector, Edwards, Weber, Lewit— to mention
but a few— as "young, inexperienced" comrades would be to stretch
matters a little, eh?
572 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
As for what Swabeck so euphemistically calls the "organiza-
tional intransigence" of the majority, I continue to consider it of
tremendous importance. I call those "mistakes" of the Cannon
group the mistakes of bureaucratism (or as LD called it "sectar-
ian bureaucratism"), or to adopt the happy phrase of Weber,
"ultimatism" (you will note from the protocol that LD employed
exactly the same expression). For Swabeck to declare that the
Cannon group was declared correct on the "principled" or
"political" questions— when they have been shouting from the
housetops that there were no principled or political differences-
is to claim a victory in a battle that was never fought. It is in the
"organizational policy" of the Cannon group, which caused the
increasingly sharp situation in the League, that lies concealed a
good deal of what is wrong with the Cannon group. When it is
said that it pursued a policy of ultimatism toward the League, what
does that signify? What is one of the concomitants of ultimatism,
most frequently at any rate? It does not fall from the skies (as
Cannon would put it, there are no accidents in politics...) and it is
not some individual aberration. It is the characteristic of either
ignorance or incompetence or uncertainty. The ignorant leader
demands antedated acknowledgment of his leadership; the leader
uncertain of the correctness of his policies demands by ultima-
tum—and not on the merits of a discussion in which he can hold
his own fairly well— that his policy or leadership be acknowledged.
Ultimatism— in politics as a whole as well as in internal organiza-
tional politics— signifies that what has to be won in struggle
(ideological or otherwise) is considered as already established and
as something which must be recognized a priori. If Swabeck were
really objective, he would call a spade a spade, he would call his
mistakes ultimatistic, and, what is extremely important and sig-
nificant, he would trace this ultimatism not to some chance
phenomenon or cause, but to its direct root: the theory of gesta-
tion. The connection is not only obvious (il saute aux yeux, as the
French say: "It leaps to the eyes"), but it is inescapable, or as the
philosophers say, there is a logical, causal connection between the
two. The future will surely show how profound is the significance
of this connection, of that I am deeply persuaded; but only the
future will show it plainly and unmistakably to all. From this it also
follows that we, for our part, should avoid an ultimatism of
Won 't Make an Issue of Move 573
another sort: We cannot, it is now clear, demand of others that
they should acknowledge as a fundamental characteristic of the
Cannon group that which we by our experience, our reflection are
convinced is its distinguishing mark. You see, despite what the
gifted Vanzler calls my capitulation (!) to Cannon, I have not
changed my mind about what he is and what he stands for and
what he means for the Opposition. I have, I admit, changed my
mind some, under the influence of LD and the European com-
rades, on the question of the tempo at which my opinions and
yours will— more accurately, can— become the opinions of other
comrades. The "new" tempo demands patience and a long-range
view. And it ought to be plain that after what has happened in
recent times in world politics, the work of the Marxists in general
must now be adjusted on a basis that also requires patience and
a long-range view. Now as to some other questions, which are
more urgent.
I am enclosing to you the copy of the protocol of the discus-
sion mentioned above. I would have translated it for you under
ordinary circumstances, but I haven't even been in Prinkipo for
the last two days: running about in Istanbul to consulates, ship-
ping agencies, and the like. LD has given me the permission— very
graciously— to send it to you. I gave him my word of honor that it
would not be used for "factional propaganda," but would be sent
only for your information and for the other leading comrades. The
report of Swabeck's remarks is absolutely accurate, having been
checked by him in person. Trotsky's remarks, while of course rather
faithfully reported and entirely valid as a picture of his views at
that time, were not corrected by him. What is most instructive in
Swabeck's report, you will learn from reading it. If I still retained
the capacity of moral indignation at what Arne is capable of doing,
here would be an opportunity to give vent to it. Two examples:
1. After having accused us in the States of driving to a split, he
really threatens to split himself; 2. We are stated to have voted for
the co-optations at the plenum. Is it worth while taking up LD's
time with a refutation of such... ahem... exaggerations? I am think-
ing about it, and in all likelihood I shall leave LD a written
memorandum before my departure which will deal with a num-
ber of Swabeck's positive misrepresentations, shall I say?
More important than such pettifogging: the question of the
574 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
new "Cannon program." The enclosed copy of a letter by LD to
Al gives you some indication of how the matter stands so far as
the former is concerned. But permit me to elaborate.
I have already written you on LD's views concerning the move
to Chicago. He is thoroughly in favor of it for these reasons: orien-
tation toward the unorganized (but Communistically organizable)
masses, and away from the decaying Party (and in my opinion too,
it is decaying internationally as a Communist organization, the U.S.
not excepted); separation of the center from the New York branch,
the coincidence of the two causing the greatest amount of fric-
tion in the League. Now, I am far from convinced as to the
correctness of the argumentation; more exactly, I remain opposed
to the proposal. Not because of the so-called "print shop argu-
ment," which is entirely subordinate and technical, but for political
reasons. The Fosterites gave somewhat similar arguments in 1927,
but I recall that our faction voted for moving to New York, and
the Party did not become "less proletarian" as a result. On the
contrary, in certain respects, with the center in New York the Party
participated far more in the mass struggles throughout the land.
That despite much of the Fosterite "proletarian demagogy" for
Chicago. And you will recall that the notorious "Northwest orien-
tation," the Farmer-Labor Party maneuvers, the whole Pepperiade,
occurred under the Chicago-as-the-center period. 528 This does not
mean that a Chicago center necessarily leads to a petty-bourgeois
(i.e., opportunist) deviation; but it does mean that a Chicago cen-
ter does not necessarily lead to a "proletarian orientation." The same
holds true in connection with the problem of the friction between
the National Committee and the local branch. In New York, con-
trary to the tradition of the Communist and socialist movements
in that city, we have an overwhelmingly proletarian composition:
no doctors, dentists, lawyers, teachers, drugstore owners, and simi-
lar parasites. The petty bourgeois-arriviste element we learned to
detest in the Lovestone camp is concentrated in the single person
(all three form but one whole) of Stamm-Gordon-Clarke, i.e., the
local Cannon leadership (you may even add Basky, if you wish,
and to a certain degree, Field). Yet the NC majority is in violent
struggle with the New York branch. Because it is New York? That
is not even an important factor. If the Cannon group pursues the
same policy as it has in the past, after it has moved to Chicago, it
will engender the same friction with the membership of the Chicago
Won 't Make an Issue of Move 575
branch, and it would not surprise me to find its local leadership
there confined largely to the drugstore owner Mashow and similars.
But the miners? LD says that the miners is where we have our
opportunity now and it must be exploited to the maximum. Good.
But tomorrow we shall have struggles of a similar nature in that
hotbed of potential struggle, the most highly concentrated industrial
area in the entire world: along and around the eastern seaboard,
New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, upper Penn-
sylvania. Will we then move the center back to New York? Illinois,
contrary to some superficial views, is not the industrial center of
the U.S. In actual fact, Illinois is the agricultural center of the U.S.
(did you know that it is the largest corn-producing state in the
country?), geographically speaking. The industrial center of the
country is east of Pittsburgh. Not West Frankfort (tremendously
important as it is and will continue to be, tremendously impor-
tant, I repeat) will be the model or the central figure in the coming
struggles, but rather "Gastonia," i.e., the untrained, raw, new,
unspeakably exploited masses of the totally unorganized East (New
Jersey, with its textile, chemical plants, oil plants, metallurgy, is
alone a gold mine for tomorrow's battles) and the South. 529
Therefore, as summary, I consider: The move to Chicago—
despite the opinion of LD and my dear friends whose opinion I
value highly (Edwards, Giganti, Glotzer, etc.)— is politically incor-
rect. Do I conclude therefrom that I am going to fight the proposal
with all my might? Under ordinary circumstances, yes, absolutely.
Under present circumstances, no. Opposition would be misunder-
stood and the misunderstanding is understandable. LD says,
regardless of its motives, the Cannon faction is proposing a pro-
gressive move; even some of your friends welcome it and even claim
the original initiative (letter from Al); even assuming that Cannon's
motive is factional, I (i.e., Trotsky) say that it appears that the fac-
tion interests of Cannon coincide with the interests of the League
as a whole; he proposes a program and all you have is a negative
position?
This argumentation is sound at least to this degree: If, let us
assume, we were to defeat the proposal to move, the experience
would not be made and the lessons could not be drawn for all to
see. As the move would not (could not) be fatal to the League, it
is permissible to permit the experiment. Consequently, I draw I he
following conclusion: As for myself, I shall express myself in plain
576 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
enough speech that I consider— not the orientation to the masses—
but the question of moving to Chicago a political mistake, for this
and that reason. At the same time, I do not want to prevent the
majority from making the attempt. Result: I make my statement, I
abstain from voting against, and I do not vote for it, thus not as-
suming the responsibility (politically) for the moving or its
consequences. An abstention in this case is warranted and justi-
fied. Those comrades who are as firmly convinced as I am, but in
a contrary sense, like our Chicago friends, have of course the duty
and right to vote in favor. The question of moving to Chicago can-
not and must not become a factional issue.
But Cannon is turning his back on the Party, it can be said,
and I have said so. But in the first place, that is not so serious
today as it would have been a year ago: The change in quantity is
becoming a qualitative change. In the second place, a political ques-
tion cannot be evaded by mechanical measures, that is, the Party
cannot be "escaped" from, so to say, by moving away from it.
Stalinism is not a New York phenomenon, but an international
phenomenon, reaching even— even— to Illinois (as we pointed out
in the miners' discussion and as is being confirmed so clearly by
events). The Party is just as dead and just as alive, and just as ca-
pable of pernicious resuscitation, in New York, as in Chicago, as
in Seattle. Even a corpse— and it is not yet quite that in the United
States— if not decently buried can exude a most exasperating odor.
In Chicago or in New York, we shall have to deal with Stalinism to
one degree or another.
But he is also running away from the New York branch, and
there will actually be two centers established, it can be said fur-
ther. The fact is, there are practically two centers now: the Cannon
faction in the NC and the majority of the New York branch. As
for running away from it, Trotsky asks: Why should you be so con-
cerned? In Chicago, the majority will have to demonstrate its ability
to organize the masses into the League, and in New York the
branch will have the opportunity, unhampered by the direct fric-
tion with the NC, to demonstrate what it can do by itself, so to
speak. And so far as this particular point is concerned, Trotsky is
absolutely correct! I subscribe to his argument heartily. Without
the direct contravention of the work of the branch by the Cannon
faction leaders (I take it that the second layer of leaders— save the
mark!— will make a beeline to Chicago, if the center is moved, in
Won 't Make an Issue of Move 577
somewhat the same manner as the '49ers rushed to California
gold), the New York branch and the branches in the immediate
vicinity— existing and to be organized— will flourish like the pro-
verbial green bay tree. Trotsky has insisted that I go along to
Chicago, to work in the center. Much as I would like to, it appears
to me from here at least to be financially impossible. I exist grace
only to Billie's job, which is tenuous enough as it is. Should I give
up residing in New York, it means the end of Billie's job; for she
can't get another, either in New York or Chicago, and in Chicago
I shall not be able to find any work (something I can do in New
York); the resultant situation would only bring demoralization in
its train. I am not at all worried about New York developing a
truly startling activity, once the direct factional sword of Damocles
hanging over its head is removed. On that score, I really welcome
the idea.
Consequently, if I may permit myself to give you my counsel,
it would be: 1. not to tie anybody— under no circumstances— to a
faction vote on the question; 2. to try and postpone a final deci-
sion until my return; 3. to abstain— no vote against, no vote for— with
the declaration as to why no political responsibility can be assumed
for the step; 4. not to make an issue out of it. The recorded state-
ment and the experience of the future— combined— are more than
enough, as matters stand.
As for the other important point in the Cannon program, I
should be considerably surprised if any of our comrades should
oppose it. Make the Militant a more theoretical organ and estab-
lish a new popular organ for mass distribution? By all means! I
told Trotsky somewhat ruefully that this is a rather belated "dis-
covery," as we had proposed a year and a half ago to establish the
theoretical monthly review and convert the Militant into a popu-
lar paper, only to have the proposal sunk without a trace for
factional reasons. Trotsky quite naturally replied: If it is "your"
proposal, then all the more reason why you should endorse it,
even if somebody else makes it now, regardless of his "motives."
And that too is absolutely correct. Why in god's name should we
oppose the proposition, when it is entirely in harmony with the
line of action, the general orientation, that we have been fighting
for in the past period, even when the issues involved only vaguely
conveyed the essence of the dispute? Of course, when I say
"endorse" I mean to endorse the essence of the proposal. I am
578 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
not so sure but that the original proposal looking toward a simi-
lar transformation was the better one, i.e., to establish a theoretical
review and convert the Militant into a popular agitational organ.
In fact, I am more inclined to the old form of "conversion" than
to the one proposed by Cannon, although from a practical
agitational standpoint, it also has its merits. What I am categori-
cally opposed to is— as I understand it, I hope I am wrong— the
proposal that the mass paper be not officially the organ of the
League. We have no need or use for anonymous political organs
under present conditions. It is radically false. The popular organ,
like the theoretical organ, must be the organ of the League, openly.
Trotsky is in agreement with this view: "We have no reason to hide
ourselves," he remarked this morning. My only regret, to tell you
the truth, is that it was not we who took the initiative in this pro-
posal, how ever much the fact may be that we stood for it and
fought for it in 1932.
Now as to the so-called mass clubs. I do not, of course, know
the details of the proposition. But it is a field which permits a
considerable degrees of experimentation, and I hope that nobody
among us will be so permeated with sectarian conservatism as to
oppose the idea in principle after having reflected on the matter
to the end. In certain sections (perhaps New York and similar
localities), the clubs may prove to be sterile and burdensome. Else-
where, they may prove to be excellent recruiting grounds.
Remember that in the Illinois miners' dispute, we formulated our
ideas (even then a little narrowly in reaction to Cannon's com-
plete formlessness and ambiguity) in a manner that permitted the
organization of non-League workers clubs. Let me give you another
concrete example: It is quite possible— more than that, it is likely —
that in the beginning we shall have to do our organizing work
among the Negroes through some such medium. I have been think-
ing a lot about the Negro work while on my trip, and I can visualize
several approaches to the colored masses, one of which is a some-
what loose club form in which we have our leaven at work, moving
gradually and in accordance with developments from a reliance
purely upon our ideological superiority to the stage of organiza-
tional crystallization and control (control, of course, essentially
of the workers). No doubt, there will be manifested some liqui-
dationist tendencies in the carrying out of such a line; no doubt, a
lot of rot and light baggage will encumber the clubs; no doubt, a
Wont Make an Issue of Move 579
number of them will prove worthless. But we can more than afford
to make the experiment. There are many lessons to be drawn from
the Unser Kamf, Protomagia, and Chicago Militant clubs (my idea
of the clubs, of course, is a rather broader organization even than
those), and these lessons are not all negative, by any means.530 LD
has the impression that our comrades are stiffly opposed to the
club idea (which has no importance to him in itself, of course, but
only as a part of a brusque orientation away from internal faction
stagnation to broader fields of endeavor, admitting of experimen-
tation, trial by error, so to say, boldness of initiative, etc.). It is
significant, interesting, and instructive to hear what he has to say
on that score. You see, Field (about whom further down in this
letter) wrote him a putrid letter, opposing Chicago, the new paper,
the clubs. LD said to me: Of course, I value Field's qualities and
his capacities. But after all, he is a man without experience in the
class struggle, without experience in the Communist movement.
He came to us out of intellectual study and conviction. And it is
very significant that Field is in accord with you on these questions,
which involve a progressive move for the League. (I am not quot-
ing literally, only the essence, and that faithfully.) He concluded
jokingly, I vote for the Cannon faction. At the risk of being misun-
derstood (you won't misunderstand me, I know!) I say: Let's all
vote for Cannon in this question and not for Field. The latter's
talk about the need for "preparations" for the "turn," about the
fact that this is all sudden and that the League is not oriented for
it— is not merely factional but typically intellectualistic tommyrot.
The League has been prepared for the genuine, serious, organized
turn to mass activity for more than a year. We have been calling
for it— formally and by a recorded statement since the document
presented by us on the eve of the plenum— for almost a year and a
half. Regardless of this or that point, regardless of this or that
technicality in execution or even formulation— why in the name
of all that is holy should we become doubting Thomases now?
On the contrary, we should push forward in the turn, we should
not only champion it in theory, but in the daily work of the League,
for I am convinced that our comrades fit into it— not so well,
perhaps, as such noted labor leaders as Sam Gordon and Stamm,
but fairly well nevertheless. There is no need of becoming
wild-eyed "mass work" maniacs or of engaging in a contest with
Cannon to see who can propose a greater number of "mass
580 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
work propositions"; I need hardly emphasize this aspect of the
question.
LD showed me a letter from Field and LD's answer. The former
was really vulgar in its pathetic attempt to prove that the only real
supporters of the Gourov letter were the members of Field's fac-
tion (he claims ten, doesn't name them— although he probably has
them— but describes them as just one rung further down on the
ladder from Lenin himself). He emphasizes his own well-known
objectivity and indicates the superiority of his faction not by what
it has accomplished or proposes to accomplish, but by vile attacks
on the other groups. We, for example, are disintegrating.
Shachtman's lieutenants (!) are sabotaging the trade-union work
in NY, for which he proposes a "program" very solemnly copied
from some Communist organization handbook for Pioneers. LD's
answer is short and pointed. He writes him that his "third group"
won't help a goddamned bit to solve the situation! (Apparently
there are groups enough already!) As for his opposition to the
Cannon proposals, which he expounds very pompously, LD sepa-
rates himself from Field on this score too. I have a queer sensation
that the famous Field group, which started out with such lofty
aspirations and such surefooted confidence, has died aborning,
as we used to say out West. Really, we would be foolish to lose
more than a few nights' sleep over Field's factional elucubrations.
So much for the moment. I shan't be able to write till we get
to France— too busy with packing, etc. Shall I find a letter from
you to me, care of Naville, when I arrive in Paris? I cannot, by the
by, tell you how I regret your decision about your work in the
future, regret it very keenly. But that, like other matters, will have
to wait, I suppose, till I return. Warmest greetings to you and all
other stalwarts for whom the class struggle, and every other
struggle, is a matter to be solved not in days, but alas! in years,
and who do not grow impatient or change positions because of it.
581
Action Program of the Communist League
by the National Committee531
[August 1933]
This undated resolution was marked "adopted by the National Com-
mittee."532 The manifesto projected in point no. 1 appeared in the 30
September 1933 Militant.
In complete agreement with the proposals of comrade Gourov
to change the position of the International Left Opposition, and
with it of the League, from that of a fraction aiming at the reform
of the Stalinist parties and the CI to that of a completely indepen-
dent movement preparing the way for a new party, the NC sets
the following tasks as a program of action to be accomplished pro-
gressively in the next period:
1. The issuance of a public manifesto announcing the new course
of the League as soon as the League branches have had the
opportunity to study the material and to express themselves on
the question. The publication of the manifesto to signalize the
opening of the public campaign for the realization of our program
of action.
2. The removal of the national headquarters to Chicago.
3. The transformation of the Militant into a popular agitation
paper, to be sold at a cheaper price and appealing directly to the
mass of the American workers.
4. The establishment of a theoretical magazine to which the
heavier and longer articles will be transferred.
5. The acceptance of members into the League on a broader basis
than heretofore. Class-conscious workers agreeing with the general
program of Communism or desirous of becoming Communists
can be accepted even though they are not fully conversant with
the faction program of the Left Opposition.
6. The systematic establishment of united-front relationships and
joint class-struggle activities with other workers organizations, in
particular with those groups with which we have some points of
582 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
agreement, and devoting particular attention to the dissident left-
wing groups in reformist and centrist organizations.
7. The formation of nuclei within reformist and centrist political
organizations, in some cases even sending League members into
such organizations for this purpose.
8. The formation wherever possible of peripheral organizations
on a broad basis, which will require only of applicants for mem-
bership a recognition of the class struggle and agreement to
participate in it. The members of the League will work as frac-
tions inside these organizations and endeavor to influence them
in the direction of the League by ideological means.
9. The systematic registration of the League membership for en-
rollment in mass organizations of various kinds, above all the trade
unions which have a mass character.
10. The strengthening of the central apparatus of the League by
provision for the full-time employment of qualified comrades and
the maintenance of at least one field organizer.
11. A series of tours by NC members, beginning with a tour of
comrade Swrabeck and followed soon afterward by tours of com-
rades Shachtman and Cannon.
12. The collection of a special fund to finance the above program
of action and the execution of each project in order, as rapidly as
the means are provided.
583
Implementing the Action Program
Letter by Max Shachtman to Albert Glotzer533
7 September 1933
After the numerous letters I wrote to the comrades here during
my stay in Europe, it would be pointless to recapitulate my views
and the views of LD in particular in this letter. The more intimate
details which rarely find a place in correspondence will have to
be held in reserve for the time when I commence my tour and
have an opportunity to see the comrades in the various cities in
person. According to the present schedule, my tour ought to begin
in about six weeks, and I am just as impatient to see all our friends
as I understand them to be to see me. A few words, however, will
be in place about what has been taking place since my return.
1. I delivered a report to the New York branch, the frankness and
thoroughness of which can be gathered from the fact that most
of it, or a large part of it at least, consisted of lengthy excerpts
from the letters which I had sent here from Prinkipo. Not a single
one of the Cannon faction took the floor in the discussion, and
the only ones who were critical of it were the members of the so-
called Field group, who have maneuvered themselves into the
unenviable position of increasing the turbulence and violence of
their interventions in the New York branch in inverse ratio to the
diminution of the sharp faction fight between ourselves and the
Cannon group. Swabeck told me later that he had no fault to find
with my report.
2. The Gourov letters on the new orientation of the ILO, which
you must have received by now, are by far the most important thing
before the organization at the present time. I need hardly declare
here that they represent my point of view entirely. The New York
branch, by the way, to which I reported on the Gourov letters,
will in all likelihood go on record unanimously for the standpoint
unfolded in them. The tremendous historical significance of the
step we are taking so boldly leaves one almost breathless upon
reflection. We are taking a titanic task upon our shoulders and it
584 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
strikes me that this is just the right time for all closet philosophers
and pessimists to step aside before they are shoved aside.
3. The program of action, also, you must already have received. I
wrote vou before that I cannot agree with the arguments given
for moving the center to Chicago. I don't think they are tenable.
However, there is one argument for it, and it is on this ground
that I told LD, the National Committee, and the New York branch
to which I reported on the subject, that I would not stand in the
way of the execution of the proposal, that I would even help to
carry it out. even though I would not vote for it and thereby assume
responsibilitv for the step politicallv. The argument is that the
National Committee and the New York branch must be separated;
thev constituted the sharpest point of friction; the separation will
not only be good for both factions, but also for the League as a
whole. This is essentially shrewd argumentation and has met a
thoughtful reception from all our friends here, even those who
were the sharpest opponents of the transference of the center.
It has been decided to issue the Militant in Chicago as a two-
cents, same-size, popular mass organ for agitation among the
workers. I must say that I seem to detect a tendency already to
convert it into a sort of red Appeal to Reason, and I can't say that I
am overenthusiastic about that tendency developing too far. But I
am quite prepared to reserve judgment for a while, not to pre-
judge the question, and to allow several numbers of the popularized
Militant to appear before making up my mind as to what direction
it is heading toward and whether or not it is the right direction.
In addition, of course, the theoretical organ The New Interna-
tional (I think it is a strikingly appropriate name; I'm proud to
have thought of it— it was the name of Fraina's first left-wing paper
in this country) is to be issued, about the size of the Xation, 32
pages, selling retail at ten cents. Cannon is to edit the Militant
and I the theoretical organ.
The moving, the new Militant, and the magazine are to be
accomplished within two months and a special drive for funds is
being started, as you know. After some hesitation, the committee
is now in a mood for as swift as possible a shift to Chicago, with
which I am in accord. Cannon, Swabeck, Oehler, and in all likeli-
hood Stamm and Clarke (perhaps one or two others) will be leaving
for the West in a few weeks. Unfortunately, I am unable to join
Implementing the Action Program 585
them immediately, my personal conditions making this impossible.
However, there is nothing fatal about this; on the contrary, it has
some distinctly positive features. If everybody pulls out of New
York at one blow, it may cause tremendous damage to the New
York (and the whole eastern) movement. I myself am really anx-
ious to concentrate on some organizational work for a change and
devote myself at least for the coming period of several months to
building up the movement in New York and throughout the East—
and the prospects are truly magnificent. Thus, I am stating a sober
figure— agreed to by all the serious comrades with whom I have
spoken— that New York alone will have 200 members within six
months— with the new orientation and the added advantage of the
elimination or drastic moderation of the factional fight, toward
which we are bending all our energies. Now is the time for prov-
ing everybody and the proofs will be furnished most clearly in an
atmosphere of collaboration, absence of friction as much as pos-
sible, concentration on practical work.
My absence from the center for the coming period I cannot
regard with any particular alarm. It will get on well enough without
me, for the time being at the very least; besides, I shall be in con-
stant communication with Chicago; besides, again, you and Johnny
Edwards will probably both serve on the National Committee.
4. You ask about the committee taking a position on the NRA or
on the Party's open letter.534 I might add several other problems
which have been neglected (needle trades strike, etc.). You have
the same old story for a reply. You should be quite familiar with
the manner in which our committee functions by this time. As for
the miners' situation, it has— admitted now by all— blown up com-
pletely, with reaction 100 percent triumphant. Allard has betrayed
us again, having joined the CPLA. I have— despite comrade Trotsky,
who is wrong on the situation, I am convinced— renewed my
motion to expel Allard. So far the NC has not voted on it. Com-
rade Swabeck proposes that we make... another effort with Allard!
I admire his patience, if I cannot admire his politics. As for us, we
have nothing in southern Illinois. Please write me your views; I'll
reply in greater detail next time.
+ + 4>
586
A Big Mistake
Letter by Max Shachtman to Albert Glotzer535
19 September 1933
We have been unable to locate the Chicago local motions that Shachtman
opposes with such alarm in this letter. Glotzer subsequently named Joe
Giganti as their author.536 While the Chicago branch adopted the motion
for an immediate national conference, the motion to postpone the move
of the national headquarters failed in a tie vote. Glotzer insisted that the
local had never intended to postpone the move. A subsequent Chicago
branch meeting reiterated the call for a national conference, but adopted
(with Giganti opposed) a motion to make the move immediately. The
Chicago CLA had already secured a new office big enough to serve as
CLA national headquarters.
Tonight the New York branch elections take place and I am
concentrating all my attention upon them; consequently, I have
the time to write you only briefly and to cover but one point. How-
ever, it is a point of such overwhelming importance that everything
else pales beside it. If I write sharply I know you will understand
that it is a reflection of the concern I feel over what is involved.
1. I think you have made a tremendous mistake. I think that Joe
Giganti has made a similar mistake. I think that every one of the
comrades associated with both of you in the last branch meeting
action is equally responsible for the mistake. I refer to the motion
and vote on the question of the national headquarters to move to
Chicago and the proposal for the holding of an immediate national
conference.
2. Why must the national office move instantly to Chicago? In order
to avert a split in the Left Opposition. Have the Chicago states-
men taken this little trifle into consideration when they made
motions, talked, and finally voted? No, they probably thought the
prospect of a split to be nothing more than a phantasmagoria of
Trotsky or Shachtman. Trotsky told me (not once, but day in and
day out for three weeks!): "Unless the National Committee moves
to Chicago, unless it is separated from the New York branch, where
A Big Mistake 587
the greatest point of friction is located, the American League is
headed toward a split with express speed." Trotsky declared— and
he is 100 percent correct— that the National Committee (i.e., the
Cannon group, in essence) must be given the opportunity to or-
ganize the work of the League in Chicago unhampered by the
constant attacks from the New York branch, that the New York
branch (i.e., the minority group, in essence) must be given the
opportunity to show what it can do here unhampered by the con-
stant attacks of the Cannon group. If they continue, both under
the same roof, they will "supervise each other" so closely that they
will strangle each other and the League in the process. That is
the reason, and the only reason, why I told LD that while I did not
agree that Chicago was the more logical center for the movement,
I would nevertheless not stand in the way of the proposal to move
west, but would, on the contrary, work to convince all my friends
to give the majority the chance to go through with its proposal.
3. "But the moving doesn't mean anything without Abern and
Shachtman coming along to Chicago as well." Perfectly absurd!
a. We will have our representatives on the National Committee in
Chicago, that is, Glotzer and Edwards; b. Shachtman and Abern
will be in constant touch with the national office; c. If you take
away every leading comrade from New York at one single blow,
New York would be left without one single public speaker for a mass
meeting— ditto for the entire East, to say nothing of what else the
New York branch would suffer— unless you think that Joe Carter
or Morris Lewit or Philip Shulman could lead off at the mass meet-
ings. In discussing prospects for the League, as involved with the
moving, not a single Cannonite on the NC ever mentioned a word
about what would happen to New York if we simply all got up and
pulled out; that's understandable, because they don't care very
much. I regret, however, to see you in such touching harmony with
their ideas and outlook.
4. "But such an important orientation of the League should first
be taken up at a national conference." Ridiculous! "What will hap-
pen at a conference if it is held immediately, as you insist?" Trotsky
kept on asking me, until I began to realize that our insistence was
pretty poorly founded. What would happen? It is not hard to pic-
ture it. There would be next to no discussion of the new problems
of the League. There would be a violent cat-and-dog fight over
588 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
credentials, over what happened three years ago, and two years
ago, and— the danger of an immediate split would confront every
single delegate. Nothing more and nothing less. Do you comrades
in Chicago think that the simple adoption of the secretariat reso-
lution means that everything has been settled to the roots? No, it
has merely made possible the beginning of a solution of the inter-
nal situation. Nothing more. I said in the NC that the conference
should not be held right away, but that a few months should be
allowed before it, during which the League would be given a
breathing spell from the factional struggle, would be given the
possibility of engaging in some really independent and general
activity so that when the conference is finally called, it will look
to the future and not merely to the past. A conference now, and
have no illusions about it, dear Albert, would be a sad blow at the
League and its orientation and its prospects for advancement.
5. "But such a decisive turn in fundamental policy, such a thing
as moving to Chicago, ought to be decided by a conference." Why?
Please tell me why, because I am curious to find out. LD has al-
ready finished writing the public manifesto launching the new
international. Our delegates to the Paris "Left Socialist-Commu-
nist" conference have already issued a public statement calling for
the new international, etc., etc.537 But that is not good enough for
us. We are very formal and very correct. We have read the consti-
tution, which says it must be done differently. We want a conference
to proclaim the turn. Why? Nobody knows, except the constitu-
tion. Of course a conference would be the best place to proclaim
it, if there were a normal situation in the League. That's the little
trifle that Chicago has not noticed. There is no normal situation.
Besides: Exactly three-fourths of the membership of the League (New
York, Minneapolis, Boston, Newark, St. Louis, Kansas City, Berke-
ley, etc.— all unanimously without reservation) have already endorsed
the new turn and the program of action, including moving to Chicago!
Even to a meticulous comrade, that should be democratic enough,
it would appear to me.
6. "But why are you so excited and angered?" Because our good
friends in Chicago and Youngstown, despite what I thought was a
plain enough letter from me, gave Cannon precisely the pretext he
has been seeking for quite a while in order to delay moving for an indefi-
nite period! All in one day, we received the letter announcing the
Big Mistake 589
Chicago decision, a somewhat similar vote in New Castle, and al-
most the same thing from Youngstown, representing the views of
comrades who if multiplied by two would not, numerically, amount
to one-third of those who have already voted differently. Cannon
has immediately snatched this up to write a circular letter to the
League announcing that Swabeck and Oehler have already
changed their minds about moving now, that they are in favor of
a conference first and immediately, and that he, Cannon, is "lean-
ing" in their direction. Translated into English, Cannon has
decided to put off moving and has informed Swabeck and Oehler
of his decision. Translated into practice, it means that all our plans
for work in New York and the East— under nearly ideal conditions
of the absence of the Cannon group as a disruptive factor— are
instantly threatened. Cannon wants to stay here and "supervise"
us. We in turn will "supervise" him. Even if the old faction fight
does not break out in all its violence here as a result, at least you
will have that extremely tense atmosphere in which all effective
work is out of the question. Chicago will be piously reproachful at
the incurable faction fighters of the East and will continue to
repeat that if the national office were only in Chicago, all would
be well. In this way, practically everybody will be happy and the
League will be torn to little tiny pieces.
7. What do I propose (in agreement, of course, with all our friends
here, not only of our faction, but of others who were equally
alarmed by the latest developments) that you should do now? I
ask you to call immediately, today, to see Johnny, Joe, Norman, and
Natie, at the very least. That you show them this letter. Then that
a special meeting be called of the branch, if possible, or if that is not
advisable, to take up the question of the conference and the mov-
ing at the very next meeting and propose that the previous decision
be changed. That the branch, unanimously if possible, go on record
favoring the instant coming of the NC to Chicago and the postpone-
ment of any conference talk, because a conference now, despite your
best intentions and my best wishes, would be nothing but what I
described above. Anyone who is anxious for such a conference is
welcome to have it, but pardon me if I reserve the right to oppose
such a comrade. Finally, that the branch secretary, after such a
meeting, inform the NC by air mail that the branch has taken a
new decision, so that the shabby pretext of our newly baptized
590 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
"democrats" in the NC (who are so frightfully solicitous about not
violating the views of about 15 comrades in the League, even
though 150 have already voted differently), shall not continue
to exist.
8. It should be added, in conclusion, that there are undoubtedly
good reasons why Cannon has cooled off on the moving proposal.
One or two of them are referred to above. Others include: the
collapse of his big dreams about the southern Illinois fields, dreams
which revolved around the new columnist of the CPLA weekly,
our good comrade Gerry Allard; the fear that finances won't be
so easy in Chicago; F. Martin's information from Chicago that the
printing of the Militant will not be so cheap as Cannon first
reported; the report that various branches (NY, Boston, Philly,
Chicago, etc.) are taking the new turn seriously and are begin-
ning to take headquarters, i.e., establish the preliminary centers
without which real work is out of the question. But all these things
are of little or no significance— so far as we are, or should be, con-
cerned—in comparison with the most urgent need of the League:
Separate the national office from the New York branch and thus avert a
split which would destroy the Left Opposition in America.
I hope I have made myself comparatively clear and that you
and the other comrades will act promptly and correctly. This is
not a wild-eyed letter, but the result of a thorough discussion I
had with other comrades, who, like myself, are quite sober and
thoughtful. If my letter is needlessly harsh, pay no attention to
that aspect of it; it is not the important thing.
591
Trade-Union Problems in America
by Leon Trotsky
23 September 1933
This article was sent to the International Secretariat with the request
that the I.S. endorse and forward it to the sections in its name.538 Adopted
by an ILO plenum on September 26, it was published in the ILO's
English-language bulletin, International Bulletin of the League of
Communist Internationalists New Series no. 1 (April 1934).539
The question of work in the trade unions continues to be of
unusual importance in all countries. In the U.S. it arises on a wide
scale for the first time at a moment when the entire national
economic and political life is upset and when government policy
is giving an impulse to the trade-union movement. It is not at all
likely that government liberality with respect to the unions— not
to speak of the present policy of planning in general— will continue
for long. In any case one may certainly say that the liberalism of
the administration with respect to the trade unions will not at once
transform itself into liberalism on the part of the union burea-
ucracy with respect to Communists. Quite the contrary, not only
the reactionary band of Green and co., but also the bureaucracy
of the "progressive" trade unions will redouble their onslaughts
against the revolutionary wing in order to show the White House
that they fully merit its confidence and backing. There exists the
great danger that in the present period of deep mass ferment and
trade-union development, the Communists will again let themselves
be isolated from the workers organizations. The trade-union
bureaucrats can achieve this aim the more easily, because the
Stalinist bureaucracy has gravely compromised Communism in
the workers' eyes by its policy of ultimatism, commands, and
impotence; this compromising will inevitably affect us too.
Wherever they are expelling Communists from trade unions,
or may begin to do it tomorrow, it is not only permissible but even
obligatory not to unfold the banner of Communism prematurely
but to conduct "anonymous" revolutionary work. It may be objected
592 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
that such a method of work contains certain dangers within itself:
By hiding its banner, the organization can, without noticing it,
become unused to its own banner. Adaptation to an enemy and to
the prejudices of the mass conceal in themselves the danger of
degeneration into opportunism. All this is quite true. The party as
a whole must act with its banner unfurled and name things by their
right names. But in the given case we do not speak of the Party
(League), but of its picked detachments working inside hostile trade
unions. This is not at all the same thing. Communists working in
trade unions, of course, cannot in any case disavow their party,
that is to say, make statements opposed to its program and its de-
cisions. But the Communist in the trade union is certainly not
compelled to say everything that the party as a whole says.
The Communist working in a trade union is not forced to call
himself a Communist at the top of his voice. The Party (League)
can and should say fully in its press, in its mass meetings, in strike
meetings, and general meetings of trade unionists, that which
Communists inside the unions may not be able to say at any given
moment. It is necessary to make a wise division of labor, in which
the various parts of the political organization supplement one
another.
Of course, this does not mean that Communists working inside
trade unions can decide at their own pleasure the policy for work
in the unions: The whole political organization must decide what forms
of adaptation to the trade-union situation are permissible and suitable.
The more difficult revolutionary work in the trade unions be-
comes, the more strictly systematic should be party control on
its members in the trade unions. But this control can, and in the
majority of cases should, be under present conditions strictly
secret.
It is true that even when there is such control, "anonymous"
work in the trade unions can lead to a contraction of the horizon
and a lowering of the revolutionary level. There is only one means
of guarding against this: Communists must not be simply trade
unionists, but must at the same time do Party work outside the
unions, even if secretly in order not to compromise themselves
with the trade unions.
In many cases the Stalinists declared that they would agree to
work in the trade unions, but on condition that they be granted
in advance the right to have Communist fractions. Such "condi-
Trade-Union Problems 593
tions" are grotesque: To demand from the trade-union bureaucracy
which is hunting for Communists that the latter be benevolently
installed to work with the necessary comfort, threatening the
bureaucrats that, if they refuse, the Communists will "strike," that
is, refuse to do revolutionary work— to demand that is manifest
nonsense. We must know how to work in the unions without com-
fort and without the authorization of the bureaucracy.
It is clear that Communists must be united in a fraction, but
that fraction, while working on the basis of strict internal disci-
pline, must in no case appear openly as a fraction, should the
conditions be unfavorable to that (and in the majority of cases
this is just the situation).
The Party (League) clearly must have a platform for trade-
union work over any given period. It is necessary to know how to
translate this platform into the language of the trade unionists in
order to lead the masses forward more surely. The danger of what
we call "tailism" (a real and serious danger) will be all the better
avoided if the party as a whole will decisively supplement the work
of its trade-unionist fractions.
It is absolutely clear, on the other hand, that such careful work
in the unions should continue until the Communists have succeeded
in proving to the workers that they are not Stalinist bureaucrats,
obtuse ultimatists, but serious and able fighters who can be relied
on and who consequently are worthy of trust. The more the influ-
ence of the Communist fraction grows in the union, the more
boldly and openly will it fling out the banner of its party.
We sincerely hope that these basic considerations will be
entirely approved by you.
^ ^ ^
594
Cannon Is Reneging
Letter by Max Shachtman to Leon Trotsky540
5 October 1933
In this letter Shachtman mentions his first report to Trotsky after his
return, in which he asserted:
The situation in the League here has improved considerably since I left
for Europe. The atmosphere of violent factional strife has changed radi-
cally and there is every indication that if the present plans for work are
carried out to a fair degree, the internal fight will die down completely
in a cornparatively short space of time. I reported to the New York branch
on the plenum and my discussions with you, and I encountered a
virtually unanimous acceptance of what I had to say in my remarks.041
There is a problem which has arisen suddenly in the League
about which I want to write you, even if briefly and in haste. I
have already written you as to how matters stood in the League
following my return to New York and the report to the National
Committee and the local membership. We were able, following
these events, to arrive at a unanimous agreement in the National
Committee on a program of action for the organization, as well
as a united viewpoint on the new orientation of the International
Left Opposition. The question of transferring the headquarters
of the League to Chicago also encountered no particular difficul-
ties at that time, in accordance with our discussions in Prinkipo,
where I told you, as you will recall, that in spite of the fact that I
did not entirely agree with the proposal, I would see to it that it
did not become a subject of dispute in the League and that, so far
as I was concerned, I would attempt to facilitate the proposal of
the majority. We thereupon voted in the National Committee that
the Militant would be transformed into a more popular paper by
the end of October, that the theoretical organ would be issued at
the same time, and that simultaneously, the National Committee
would move to Chicago. To prepare the organization and the sym-
pathizers for this campaign, it was decided to send out on a
speaking tour comrades Swabeck, Shachtman, and Cannon, in the
order named (Swabeck has already started out).
Cannon Is Reneging 595
Subsequently, it was agreed, on my initiative, that I would have
to remain in New York for a little while for two reasons: first, per-
sonal problems which make my moving to Chicago immediately a
very difficult if not impossible thing; second, the abrupt removal
of all the leading comrades from New York would leave the branch
here without any outstanding comrades capable of directing the
work. For this reason, it was agreed that the branch in New York,
which has grown to 90 or more members, would be divided into
three working units, and that in the elections of the city executive
committee, I would take over the post of city organizer.
The only dispute that arose was in connection with the com-
position of the city committee. In an endeavor to arrive at an
agreement, I proposed that it be constituted out of a majority (four)
of those associated formerly with our group, two from the Cannon
group, and one more or less independent comrade. The Cannon
group proposed that none of the groups should have a majority
in the committee. In view of the sympathies of the New York
membership, I was unable to agree with the latter proposal. We
have, as you know, made no proposals for any organizational
changes in the National Committee; we took the position that the
Cannon group must retain its present majority there and accept
the main (but not the whole) responsibility for the leading of the
committee for the next period. In the same spirit, we proposed
that the New York organization's committee should not be sub-
mitted to organizational changes either— that is, the minority group
should be given the main (but not the whole) responsibility, so
that it could also be tested in the coming period. In this viewpoint,
I believe we followed the spirit of the discussion you and I had in
Prinkipo on the "convenient division" of the work: The National
Committee should be allowed to function from Chicago without
factional interference and disruption; whereas the New York
branch should be allowed to function in its own field in a similar
manner, so as to be able to show what it is capable of accomplishing.
The matter finally came before the branch membership and by a
vote of approximately two to one, our proposal was endorsed and
the city executive committee constituted accordingly.
You will remember my writing to you that on the basis of my
report to the National Committee and the agreement arrived at,
it was decided to postpone the national convention and move to
596 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
Chicago immediately. This was done so as not to throw the League
into a fight for convention delegates from each faction, conse-
quently converting the conference into a battleground of the
contending groups, which would result in a sterile assembly, fight-
ing over mandates and outlived differences, instead of discussing
the problems confronting the Opposition. This decision, too, was
in accordance with our discussions in Turkey.
Now, however, a change has taken place in this perspective.
At the last meeting of the National Committee, comrade Cannon
suddenly brought in a motion proposing that the moving to Chi-
cago be held up for several months and should not take place until
after a convention is held. He proposed an immediate convention,
an immediate opening up of a discussion in the League, and the
convention itself to be held this December. This means a radical
change in our outlook and the perspectives of the League's work.
I have not yet voted in the committee on this question. I intend to
propose that before it is carried into effect, the National Commit-
tee should consult with the International Secretariat and comrade
Trotsky in order to obtain their advice.
From a "faction" standpoint, if I may put it that way, I ought
to have no objection to an immediate conference and the post-
ponement of the move to Chicago. But from the standpoint of
the interests of the League, I do not think it is the correct step to
take. And that for the following reasons:
1. The new turn and the program of action of the League have
been endorsed so far by every single branch and member in the
country.
2. The proposal to move immediately to Chicago has been over-
whelmingly endorsed by the membership. In three branches, some
members expressed doubts about it (Chicago, Youngstown, New
Castle). I immediately wrote a personal letter to these comrades,
urging them to vote for the proposal of the National Committee
so as to put no obstacles in the road. I am glad to say that in all
three cases, the branches reconsidered their position and voted
unanimously for the proposal to move.
3. The only branch that has thus far proposed to hold the
convention immediately and then move to Chicago has been
the Philadelphia branch, which is controlled by the group of com-
rade Cannon.
Cannon Is Reneging 597
4. The new turn has been so enthusiastically accepted by the mem-
bership that the League now is doing more work than ever before
in its history. In New York we are concentrating on putting every
League member into a trade union (we placed six to seven com-
rades into unions in one week). In two unions, our comrades are
the decisive element in the organization of the unorganized cam-
paign. In other fields, the same story can be told. Our mass
meetings for the new international have been the largest in our
history. We are beginning to take new members in all three
branches here. We are starting negotiations with the Gitlow group
on the question of the new party.542 And so forth and so on. If we
announce immediately the convention call, it means that the fac-
tions will inevitably revive and begin the old struggle all over again,
fighting for delegates in order to see who will get the majority at
the convention. The convention itself will occupy itself mainly (per-
haps exclusively— that is the logic of the struggle) with mandate
questions and former disputes. The work of the League in the
meantime will inevitably lag and a reaction against the present
enthusiasm will probably set in.
I wrote my friends from Prinkipo that the main argument you
made, which convinced me to take the position I did, was that the
postponement of the convention and the move immediately to
Chicago would enable both the majority and the minority to carry
on League work in their respective fields and would avoid a con-
vention now at which the split danger would be tremendously acute.
I still incline to that view. I do not believe it necessary to expand
on this question in writing to you, because it is you who furnished
me originally with all the arguments which I am making now.
Comrade Cannon is arguing in letters to comrades that the
situation has now changed, that before the National Committee
can move to Chicago the internal situation must be stabilized. Your
argument in discussion with me was exactly the opposite: In order
that the internal situation be stabilized, the National Committee
must move to Chicago. The argument that the Shachtman group
took a majority in the city executive committee of New York holds
no water in my opinion. The elections were the most democratic
imaginable and the results simply expressed the opinions and
leanings of the great majority of the New York membership (circa
two to one). No factional abuse is being made of this majority to
even the slightest degree. I have been insisting upon all comrades
598 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
being active in the general work, and thus far not a single one of
the three branch meetings has taken place on a factional basis. In
the city committee itself, where I was unanimously elected city
organizer (with the vote of the two supporters of the Cannon group
also), we elected comrade Kitt (Cannon group) to the second most
important post in the committee— industrial organizer— and
comrade Clarke (also Cannon group) to the post of secretary of
the committee. (Comrade Weber is in charge of the agitprop work.)
Because I am concerned over the possible results of this new
move by the Cannon group in the National Committee, I am writ-
ing to you in the hope that you will find it advisable to express
your opinion. Perhaps you will write to the National Committee
officially or semiofficially, or else you may think it better to address
a private letter to comrade Swabeck, who is now unfortunately
supporting the proposal of comrade Cannon.
A convention now and no move to Chicago would, I feel, be
in contradiction with the discussions we had in Turkey toward the
end of my visit. I continue to doubt the advisability or profitabil-
ity of the new proposal. However, if it should be decided to hold
a convention, I do not think we shall stand in the way, because we
have no "private interest" to defend. I look forward anxiously to a
communication from you expressing your opinion.
^ 4> ^
The News Is Disquieting
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Arne Swabeck543
20 November 1933
I have received no news from you for a long time. The most re-
cent letters from America were rather disquieting. It seems— if I
understand the situation correctly— that your group is delaying the
transfer of the leadership to Chicago, but on the other hand, would
like to hold the national conference as soon as possible in order
to "decide" the leadership question. If that is the case, it means a
complete reversal of your group's previous position. All of us here
diligently and successfully supported your previous standpoint: no
Turn for the Worse 599
immediate national conference, transfer of the leadership to Chi-
cago, energetic mass work, and overcoming the internal differences
by this road. The International Secretariat committed itself to this
road. It is certainly understandable that material obstacles hinder
the transfer of the leadership (although you should have foreseen
those obstacles earlier), but it is much more difficult to under-
stand why you want to overcome the differences not by broadening
your political activities but by immediately convening a national
conference. Perhaps because you now hope to get 51 percent for
your own side?
I am writing to you in an entirely private and personal capacity
only to voice my reservations and concerns; I now await your re-
ply with great impatience.
^ ^ ^
A Turn for the Worse
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman544
25 November 1933
I am at fault before you, but deserve leniency. Sara has probably
written you that I was ill. For a month I was on complete rest and
so forth. And even now I find very difficult the political ques-
tions you have put to me. When you and Swabeck were in Europe
and at Prinkipo, there was still the possibility through detailed
discussions to form an opinion about the situation in the League
and a way out of it. Since then a number of months have gone by.
At first it seemed that the situation had turned sharply for the
better. But now, as I see from your letter, a worsening has set in
again. What are the reasons?
The plan that half a year ago won the sympathy of the Euro-
pean comrades— myself included— consisted of the following: The
conference is postponed, as in itself it cannot provide a way out
of the situation; all forces are directed into mass work under the
banner of the new orientation; the central committee is transferred
to Chicago, to a fresh atmosphere, in order to free up its hands as
well as those of the New York organization. The initiative for this
600 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
plan came in the main from the majority of the central commit-
tee. After the minority agreed to support this plan, it seemed to
me that the chances for success greatly improved. Now you write
that the majority of the central committee is postponing the trans-
fer to Chicago, but insists on hastening the conference. This plan
is directly counterposed to the previous one. What brought about
the change? In order to form an opinion, it is necessary to know
the circumstances better. I asked comrade Swabeck in a private
manner to inform me about the situation. This present letter is
also of a completely private and preliminary character. Of course,
I am extremely disappointed with this unfavorable turn of events,
but for the time being I am forced to refrain from any judgment
on the essence of the question.
Until today nothing further has been heard of the New Inter-
national. How is one to understand it? Just another financial crisis?
As I had occasion to convince myself, our American friends are
not very strong on bookkeeping: They start with a bang and then
accidentally discover that their cash box is empty. Or are there
perhaps some other reasons for it? 545
<>
Reasons to Postpone the Move
Letter by Arne Swabeck to Leon Trotsky546
20 December 1933
It is with sincere regrets that I acknowledge my failure to commu-
nicate with you. My recent tour was quite extensive and I was
entirely taken up with the activities and problems of the organiza-
tions in the various cities. But I also had the opportunity of getting
a very good picture of the conditions within the League. For the
future I shall promise to remedy my failure of the past and com-
municate more regularly.
The League is in a process of real growth and a serious, al-
though small, beginning toward entry into mass activities. To us
here— and I mean all of us, regardless of groupings (or former
groupings)— the picture it presents looks promising. The report
Reasons to Postpone the Move 601
which I am enclosing herewith, I believe, will convey an idea of its
growth and prospects.547
It is my opinion that when comrades write to you from
America and portray the true situation, they could not convey dis-
turbing thoughts. I feel quite confident in saying that we have made
steady though slow progress toward resolving our internal diffi-
culties, and essentially by the means of enlarging the scope of our
political activities. But this progress has not been without its dis-
turbing features to us here.
We adopted what we call our Action Program simultaneously
with, and in harmony with, our change of orientation toward a
new international and new parties. Essentially it contained the
ideas previously advanced, that is, of a definite entry into a mass
agitation stage, the popularization of the Militant, the establish-
ment of a theoretical organ, the strengthening of the League by
building peripheral organizations, and the transfer of the national
headquarters to Chicago. It contained these ideas with the addi-
tion, as we all considered proper, of the greatest emphasis on
measures toward mass activities. It is true that this was the pro-
gram of our group in the main advanced by comrade Cannon
prior to my return from Europe. These general ideas were con-
ceived to be simultaneously a means toward overcoming our
internal difficulties, and the support they received from yourself
and from the International Secretariat contributed very much
toward making them unanimous here. But we were well aware that
the steps contemplated could not be carried into life very speed-
ily, particularly not those depending directly upon material means.
We did not think it possible at all to take as the first step the one
of transfer of headquarters to Chicago. I personally was perhaps
the most outspoken in this respect, and I stated several times that,
in my opinion, it would require several months before we could
settle pressing obligations in New York and have sufficient mate-
rial means to make the transfer and assure the publication of the
Militant in Chicago, not having our own print shop there. Com-
rade Shachtman, who has maintained his position of not favoring
the transfer but affirming his support of it, has expressed as his
opinion that the transfer should have taken place already. But it is
not raised as an issue and could not very well be, inasmuch as the
material means have not yet been available.
To us today, as well as previously, the question of time of the
602 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
transfer appears purely as a practical proposition. The date will
be more delayed than we originally expected because our finan-
cial means suffered a relapse which we first have to overcome. But
in this whole question certain tendencies and features also emerged
which to us appeared very disturbing in character and caused us
considerable uneasiness in regard to the prospect of solving our
internal difficulties. Upon the return of comrade Shachtman and
myself I made the proposal that he, comrade Cannon, and myself
should pledge ourselves to remain full-time functionaries for the
League. Comrade Shachtman insisted that his economic condi-
tion would not permit it for some time to come. We all know by
experience the economic hardship which such positions impose;
nevertheless, we agreed only reluctantly, because of political rea-
sons, to comrade Shachtman's release. Later comrade Shachtman
proposed himself as the full-time organizer for the city of New
York. We welcomed that proposal, and it was carried out with the
recommendation of the National Committee. Next comrade
Shachtman proposed that when transferring to the headquarters
the theoretical organ, when established, should be published for
a time in New York and that he should remain there because of
the leadership needed in New York. Given such reasons, the pro-
posal did not seem to us to imply a temporary stay; nevertheless,
we agreed reluctantly that when the transfer would be made, he
could remain for a short time in New York (a few months). It would
be difficult at this stage of development and growth to conceive
of one leading comrade remaining away from the center of lead-
ership for any lengthy period of time, unless it is a matter of being
unavoidably absent on some special mission. Further in this chain
of events, we came to the elections of a new local executive com-
mittee for New York, now made up of three branches instead of
one. We have always, since the adoption of our unity resolution,
pursued the method of working by way of agreement in organiza-
tional questions. We could not in this case reach an agreement as
to composition of the local executive. We did not consider this so
serious, but far more serious appeared, to us, the many statements
made in the discussion by more outspoken comrades: "You take
the national office, we keep the New York organization," mean-
ing "you" the majority, "we" the minority. We looked upon all these
"incidents" as disturbing symptoms, but endeavored to give them
as little attention as possible and resolved rather to center all efforts
Reasons to Postpone the Move 603
on the expansion of political activities. In respect to this latter, we
have met with no disagreements but have been able to arrive at
mutual collaboration by all comrades concerned. Because of this,
we try to avoid ascribing any direct political significance to the
disturbing symptoms. Yet they do arise still today, despite the
progress we have made toward internal stability.
We are now making preparations for our national convention,
tentatively scheduled for the end of March. It does not now present
the question of bringing the question of leadership to a "decision"
in the sense that it would have at an earlier date, that is, in a purely
factional sense. We opposed a speedy convention at that time,
knowing that such a "decision" would be no solution whatever.
Upon our return from Europe, we had a tacit agreement to hold
this convention question in abeyance until such time as progress
had been made toward moderating and changing the internal
situation. Later, when we felt that such progress had been accom-
plished, we suggested a convention at the end of the year. Comrade
Shachtman replied that he desired a little time to consider the
suggestion. We postponed the question altogether until my return
from the national tour. The proposal now made for the convention
at the end of March is my proposal. It meets with the approval of
the membership as a whole; in fact, it is approved eagerly. Comrade
Glotzer supports it. Comrade Shachtman states that he has no
opposition but gives no reasons for saying neither yes nor no. Is
this because comrade Shachtman considers the time not now
opportune for raising the issue of deciding the leadership in the
old sense of the term, that is, in a factional sense, and that he will
rather stall for time? That I am not able to answer. It is such
symptoms recurring from time to time which have made me
hesitant about expressing an opinion and, as a matter of fact,
hesitant about writing until the road ahead would seem clear.
That there is not now a situation in the League favorable to a
return to the old internal basis is definite. I mean this in the sense
of speaking about the broad membership. Within the branches in
the country outside of New York, none of the comrades could be
enlisted for a reversal to the old situation. In New York none of
the newer members would be favorable. That means an advantage
and distinct progress. Even in New York, among the membership
section formerly involved in the internal struggle, the atmosphere
is a changed one. The division of the old branch has done its part
604 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
toward the present condition where the National Committee is
no longer as it was before tied up in the specific New York
problems— mostly internal— but has the possibility of functioning
more truly as a National Committee. But above all, the decisive
feature of our present situation is the fact that the great objective
tasks which we now face press for a serious discussion, convention
consideration, and solution. These factors are the best guarantee
against a return to the old situation and against a decision on the
old basis. They are the best guarantee for a serious, objective
convention. Still, of course, it is our view that the convention date
is also a question of mutual agreement and need not be settled by
a majority vote.
When considered seriously, there could be no reasons ad-
vanced from our side on a specifically internal basis for the holding
of the convention at this time. Were there such reasons, it would
be far simpler and more "convenient" to leave matters as they are
now. But entirely new problems are before us. New elements are
coming into the League in increasing numbers; the present
negotiations with the small groups orienting for a new party, when
resulting in agreement, will give us another face and serve to
further change our position. It calls for a greater consolidation
and stability of the League, as well as a greater clarification and
precision of our direction and tasks.
In addition to this, I want to touch upon what may soon prove
to be our most important problem. You will notice from my re-
port the action taken by the CPLA (Musteites) toward constituting
themselves a political party, a "revolutionary" party— the Ameri-
can Workers Party— to be finally launched by July 4 and to be
launched by them alone. This development requires serious but
not too long-drawn-out consideration on our part. In the first in-
stance the taking of this action was accelerated by our declaration
for a new party. There is room in America today— considerable
room— for a centrist party. The Musteites have very few trained
politicians; nevertheless, they have a quite well thought-out pat-
tern for a "revolutionary" party which fits the situation admirably
in the sense that it will have a broad appeal. The pattern is to be
"genuine" American— to build a party in America now, and bother
with the troublesome international questions later. The discredit
of the internationals will serve temporarily in their favor. Should
the Lovestoneites join in, which is not entirely out of the ques-
As Opportunities Grow 605
tion, they will have more well-trained politicians and organizers.
Meanwhile, the official Party is declining and decomposing, while
we are growing.
Will this Musteite decision change our position or, rather, our
tempo of development? We are just beginning to consider this.
We know that the groups which we can count upon for a new party
today and for some time to come are definitely defined and only
small splinters. The League is pretty much the direct basis for the
new party. Can we remain very long in transition? Can we not
better, more directly, and more speedily assemble the forces avail-
able by stepping forward openly, lay the party foundation, and
constitute the new party without much delay— possibly even be-
fore the American Workers Party finally emerges? What would
be the adverse factors involved in such a procedure? These are
the questions we will have to answer, and answer soon. Personally
I lean strongly toward an affirmative answer.
It seems to me that there are many important reasons for a
League convention now. It will have the advantage of occurring
right in the midst of a serious extension of our political activities.
This letter is far too long, but I felt it was necessary to make
an attempt to explain in detail. I hope you will excuse.
4> ^ ->
As Opportunities Grow, Internal Struggle
Will Diminish
Letter by Leon Trotsky to Max Shachtman518
30 January 1934
We received here the photo of the work by Diego Rivera and, as a
result, our entire house livened up with great happiness. Many
thanks from the entire household. The photo now stands on my
fireplace and, while sitting at my work, from time to time I look
at it with pleasure. Does Rivera plan to visit Europe in the spring
or summer? I would be very glad to get acquainted with him. Pass
along my warmest greetings.
606 CLA 1931-33: The International Intervenes
Sara will be leaving us tomorrow. It was truly a great idea that
you came up with a year ago to have her come to Prinkipo. I remain
very grateful to you for this.
I received a detailed letter from comrade Swabeck with an
enclosed report on his trip. I am of the impression that comrade
Swabeck is utterly sincere in his desire to help liquidate the old
struggle. In general he views very optimistically the opportunities
that are opening before the League and even the situation in the
League itself. He figures that with the influx of new members
and the growth of the League's successes, the danger of an exac-
erbation of the internal struggle diminishes. I can only be gladdened
by this.
I want to pose a question to you about Weisbord. If he were to
firmly commit himself to not attack the League and so forth, would
you consider it possible to merge the two theoretical organs, bring-
ing Weisbord into the editorial board as a minority, and to provide
him with a certain freedom of "discussion"? I am not putting for-
ward this proposal; I merely wish to inform myself of your views.549
If such a plan were feasible, the advantages would be obvious
not only for the relationship with Weisbord, but for relations with
other groups and individuals who would be convinced that the
League knows how to gather people and provide them with free-
dom of discussion, without, however, overstepping its principles.
607
Notes
See "Archival Sources: Key to the Abbreviations" in the References section
for the full information on archival collections cited here. See "Published
Works," also in the References section, for the full publication informa-
tion for works cited.
1. Cannon, History, 80-100.
2. "Comite international provisoire de l'Opposition Communiste de
gauche" [Provisional International Committee of the Left Communist
Opposition], 10 June 1929, SWP International Records, Box 1, F 1. In a
1980 lecture on the early ILO, George Breitman reported that represen-
tatives of the French, Chinese, Austrian, and Czech Oppositions, as well
as Trotsky for the Russian Opposition, attended the May-June meetings
that formed the ILO. See typescript 12, B Papers, Box 20, F 7.
3. Trotsky's writings from this fight were collected and published as In
Defense of Marxism; Cannon's as Struggle for a Proletarian Party. See
also International Communist League, "Bankruptcy of 'New Class' Theo-
ries" (1999).
4. Cannon to Theodore Draper, 31 January 1958, C Papers, Box 7, File
of Cannon-Draper Correspondence for 1958. Shachtman lamented the
1919 split in "American Communism: A Re-Examination of the Past"
(1957).
5. Reba Hansen to Joe Hansen, 4 December 1939, H Papers, Box 19, F 3.
6. Cannon to Charles Cornell, 4 April 1940, T Papers, 6206.
7. Cannon, History, 95.
8. Shachtman, Reminiscences, 210-211.
9. Swabeck, interviews by PRL, 6 and 18 November 1974, 1 March 1975,
15 May 1976; Stamm and Cowl, interview by PRL, 7 November 1976;
Oehler, interview by PRL, 7 June 1977; Lewit, interview by PRL, 21 April
1993; tape recordings, PRL. Stamm, Oehler, and Swabeck were stalwarts
of the Cannon faction; Cowl and Lewit supported Shachtman.
10. Glotzer, interview by PRL, 19-20 April 1993, 2 April 1997, 21 November
1998, tape recordings, PRL. The program for the memorial meeting
also named Valcourt as chairman of the Social Democrats of Greater
New York.
608 Notes for pages 5 to 8
11. Myers, Prophet's Army, 55-56. Myers' works are riddled with factual
inaccuracies; see "American Trotskyists: The First Years," where Myers
actually wrote that "Shachtman and Cannon got on amicably enough"
in the CLA.
12. Breitman can't be held accountable for the book, since it was
published after his death. His useful 1980 lecture on the first Cannon-
Shachtman fight, presented to the Socialist Workers Party's annual
gathering at Oberlin College, is in B Papers, Series II, Box 20, F 6.
13. Drucker, Shachtman, 56-58.
14. The Constitution of the CLA established the NC as the leading body
of the organization between conferences, and from 1929-32 the New
York NC members functioned as the equivalent of a political bureau,
acting in the name of the NC as a whole between plenums of the full
committee. In late 1932 a formal Political Committee was established by
poll of the full NC. But throughout the almost six years of the CLA's
existence, its members used several names to refer to their leading bod-
ies. The National Committee was often called the National Executive
Committee, and the New York resident body was variously referred to
as the NC, the NEC, or Resident Committee. It was almost never called
the Political Committee, even in 1933-34. To avoid confusion, we have
standardized all references to the National Committee and refer through-
out the text to the New York resident body as the "resident committee."
15. Shachtman's lengthy 1936 polemic gets not one mention in Drucker's
Shachtman. In 2000 "Marxist Politics or Unprincipled Combinationism?"
was reprinted, with a substantive introduction, by the Prometheus
Research Library.
16. See Shachtman, et al., "War and Bureaucratic Conservatism" (1939);
Glotzer (Gates), "Cannon as Historian" (1945); Shachtman, "25 Years of
American Trotskyism, Part I" (1954) (Part II was never published);
Wohlforth, "Struggle for Marxism in the United States, Part III" (1965);
Richardson, review of James P. Cannon and the Early Years of American
Communism (1992).
17. Cannon, "A Great Step Forward," Militant, 15 March 1931.
18. Cannon, "Draft on the Internal Struggle," July 1932, Communist
League of America, 147.
19. Cannon, interview by Harry Ring, 13 February 1974, typescript, 16.
20. Cannon, "The Problem of Party Leadership," 1 November 1943,
Socialist Workers Party in World War II, 374.
21. Shachtman, "Marxist Politics or Unprincipled Combinationism?";
Hansen, The Abern Clique.
Notes for pages 9 to 13 609
22. Trotsky's Critique is better known today under its published title,
The Third International After Lenin. Cannon read only the first and third
parts in Moscow. The second part, "Strategy and Tactics in the Imperi-
alist Epoch," was not distributed to the commission.
23. International Communist League, "Trotsky and the Left Opposition"
(2001), treats in detail the struggle in the Russian party in the 1920s.
24. Cannon, introduction to "Draft Program" by Trotsky, vi. This pam-
phlet included only the two sections of the Critique distributed to the
Program Commission. Unfortunately, Pathfinder's collection of Cannon's
1928-31 writings, Left Opposition, omits this introduction.
25. PRL, introduction to Early Years of American Communism, by Cannon;
Cannon, First Ten Years.
26. Edwards and Carlson were alternates on the CLA National Com-
mittee; Carlson was soon suspended for indiscipline and left the League.
27. Legien, "Belgian Trotskyists," 16-17.
28. Fischer and Maslow withdrew from the Leninbund within a few
months of its founding. In exile in Paris after Hitler's ascension to power,
they affiliated with the Trotskyists from 1934 to 1937.
29. Trotsky repeatedly defended Chen against ill-founded attacks by
younger members of the Chinese section; see Trotsky, "Two Letters to
China," 22 August and 1 September 1930, On China, 438-442. But cliquist
attacks on Chen continued in the section; see Niel Shih (Liu Jen Ching),
"Five Years of the Left Opposition in China: An Attempt to Explain its
Failure to Make Progress," A Papers, Section IV, Box D.
30. For the fight against Pablo, see International Communist League,
"Genesis of Pabloism" (Fall 1972). Cannon retired as national secretary
of the SWP in 1953. Though he retained the title of national chairman
until his death, he was kicked upstairs to "emeritus" status in 1965. For
the last decade of his life there was significant estrangement between
Cannon and the Farrell Dobbs/Tom Kerry leadership, in the end refor-
mist, in New York. In 1964 Cannon reportedly gave a speech at a West
Coast educational meeting against the party's accommodation to black
nationalism; the up-and-coming Jack Barnes, who subsequently led the
party down the road to quirky reformist secthood, threatened to expel
Cannon; see Robertson, speech at "James P. Cannon Memorial Meet-
ing, 27 August 1974." The Canadian academic Bryan Palmer, research-
ing a biography of Cannon, has uncovered evidence that Rose Karsner
was infuriated by Cannon's removal to emeritus status in 1965. "Don't
Strangle the Party," a collection of several of Cannon's letters from 1966-
67 that was edited by George Breitman, gives evidence of Cannon's dis-
satisfaction with the increasingly bureaucratic practices of the SWP.
610 Notes for pages 13 to 19
31. Andy Durgan's "Spanish Trotskyists" (1991-92), an apology for Nin's
break with Trotsky and orientation to Maurrn's Workers and Peasants
Bloc, covers the early history of the Spanish Opposition.
32. Benton, Chen Duxius Last Articles.
33. For "The Platform of the [United] Opposition," see Trotsky, Chal-
lenge 1926-27, 301-394; for Trotsky's "Letter," see Stalin School of Falsifi-
cation, 1-88.
Eastman had earlier published Since Lenin Died, an account of the
Bolshevik inner-party struggles from 1923-24. Christian Rakovsky read
the book in manuscript. The book reported the existence of Lenin's
Testament, but printed only excerpts from this and Opposition docu-
ments. The triumvirate of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin forced Trotsky
to deny its authenticity in a statement that appeared in English-language
Inprecorr on 3 September 1925 and later in the American Sunday Worker.
See "Letter on Eastman's Book," Challenge 1923-25, 310-315; see also
Deutscher, Prophet Unarmed, 201-202.
34. Trotsky, "Alarm Signal!" 3 March 1933, Writings 1932-33, 112.
35. Trotsky, "The Bloc of the Right and the Left," 21 November 1930,
Writings 1930-31, 57. In the new calendar established by the French Revo-
lution, Thermidor was the month in which the revolutionary Jacobins
were overthrown in 1794. Here Trotsky uses " Thermidor ian" to refer to
those favoring capitalist restoration in Russia. He later revised his use
of the analogy; see "The Workers' State, Thermidor and Bonapartism,"
1 February 1935, Writings 1934-35, 166-184.
36. Trotsky, "'Down with Stalin' Is Not Our Slogan," Autumn 1932, Writ-
ings Supplement 1929-33, 170-171. For a discussion of the Russian Left
Opposition in this period, see Broue, Trotsky, 626-639, 700-712. See also
Dauget, "Pierre Broue's Trotsky: Tailored for Perestroika" (1990-91).
E.H. Carr's seminal 14-volume history of the Bolshevik Revolution and
the Soviet Union through 1929 provides the most complete account of
the inner-party struggles.
37. Trotsky, "The Crisis in the German Left Opposition," 17 February
1931, Writings 1930-31, 147.
38. Trotsky, "Defense of the Soviet Republic and the Opposition,"
7 September 1929, Writings 1929, 262-303.
39. Trotsky, "Greetings to the Weekly Militant," 19 October 1929,
ibid., 370.
40. Legien, "Belgian Trotskyists," 26-28. Legien writes that a majority of
Van Overstraeten's group rejoined the Trotskyists in late 1933, after the
ILO made the turn to constructing new parties and a new international.
Notes for pages 19 to 21 611
41. Nin, letter to Trotsky, 3 December 1930, in Trotsky, Spanish Revolu-
tion, 371.
42. Trotsky, "Spanish Communism and the Catalan Federation," 8 July
1931, ibid., 152.
43. For excerpts of the Trotsky-Nin correspondence, see ibid., 369-400.
The subsequent political evolution of the Spanish Opposition is outside
the scope of this book, but it is important to note that they made a
disaster out of the most promising proletarian revolutionary develop-
ment in Europe since Germany in 1923, proving in blood the antirevo-
lutionary course pursued by those who sought to merge the Left and
Right Oppositions. Nin led the Spanish Trotskyists into a merger with
the BOC in 1935, forming the centrist POUM (Workers Party of Marx-
ist Unification). The POUM signed on to the Popular Front electoral
alliance in early 1936 and refused to put itself at the head of embryonic
organs of dual power during the Spanish Revolution of 1936-37. Instead
Nin joined the popular-front government in Catalonia, politically dis-
arming and demobilizing the masses before Franco's counterrevolution-
ary onslaught. The banning of the POUM and the murder of Nin in the
wake of the Barcelona workers uprising in May 1937— in a campaign of
terror spearheaded by the Stalinists— was the prelude to Franco's vic-
tory and the crushing defeat of the Spanish working class.
44. See Trotsky, "The Mistakes of Rightist Elements of the Communist
League on the Trade Union Question," 4 January 1931, Trade Unions,
130-138. Trotsky believed that Ligue member Pierre Gourget was the
author of the OU program. In his annotations to Trotsky-Rosmer
Correspondance (p. 177), Broue attempts to blunt the thrust of Trotsky's
criticisms by insisting that the OU program was actually written by teach-
ers federation leader Maurice Dommanget. Whether or not Gourget
wrote the program was immaterial to Trotsky's polemic against the
Ligue's subordination of its work to this ongoing bloc with rightward-
moving elements against the Stalinist CGTU leadership.
45. Gourget soon returned to the Ligue, but Gauche communiste continued.
46. Trotsky, "The Crisis in the German Left Opposition," 17 February
1931, Writings 1930-31, 148. Graef at the time claimed to lead an oppo-
sition within the Austrian Communist Party. He soon capitulated and
rejoined the Stalinist faction.
47. Frankel, "Die Haltung des Genossen Landau in der osterreichischen
und deutschen Fragen: Gedrangte Darstellung an Hand von Dokumenten"
[Comrade Landau's Role in the Austrian and German Questions: A Brief
Account on the Basis of Documents], 6 January 1931, T Papers, 16850, 1
(translation by PRL).
612 Notes for pages 22 to 25
48. Frank, Mill, Souzo, "To All the National Sections of the Left Oppo-
sition, to All the Organizations of the German Left Opposition," 15 May
1931, G Papers, Box 10. The I.S. announced plans to send Frank and
Souzo to Berlin to participate in a plenary meeting of the German lead-
ership and to create a commission to prepare for a German conference.
Landau's refusal to participate was in effect a break with the ILO.
49. Trotsky, "On the State of the Left Opposition," 16 December 1932,
Writings 1932-33, 33. Landau's bloody end in Spain, where he coordi-
nated the activities of the POUM's foreign supporters and was kidnapped
and murdered by the Stalinists in 1937, in no way invalidates Trotsky's
sharp censure of his unprincipled approach to politics. Hans Schafranek
downplays Landau's destructive role in the German Opposition in his
English-language biographical summary, "Kurt Landau" (1991-92).
50. Casciola, "Nicola Di Bartolomeo" (1995).
51. Cannon, notes for "Report on International] Situation of the Left
Opposition," C Papers, Box 27, F 1. The archive dates the speech to
25 February 1932, but this is impossible since it mentions events that
happened only later that year. It was probably given in February 1933.
52. "Comite international provisoire," see note 2, page 607.
53. Trotsky, "A Big Step Forward," April 1930, Writings 1930, 187. The
conference was attended by representatives of the French, German, Bel-
gian, Spanish, Czech, Hungarian, and U.S. Oppositions, as well as by a
Paris-based Jewish Opposition group, publishers of the Yiddish journal
Klorkeit. The Russian Opposition, Austrian, Mexican, Greek, Chinese,
and Argentine groups were unable to send delegates.
54. Trotsky, "Circular Letter Number One," 21 June 1930, ibid., 291;
see also "Circular Letter Number Two," 29 June 1930, ibid., 302.
55. Communist International, "Letter of Invitation to the Congress,"
24 January 1919, Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos, 6.
56. "Die Organisationsformen der internationalen Verbindung der Links-
opposition (Antrage einer Besprechung der unten gefertigten Genossen)"
[The Organizational Forms of the International Association of the Left
Opposition (Motions from a Discussion by the Undersigned Comrades)],
12 October 1930, S Papers, Box 4, F 2 (translation by PRL). The body that
was established following this meeting was often called the "International
Secretariat" as well as the "Administrative Secretariat." We will refer to
it as the Administrative Secretariat to distinguish it from later bodies.
57. "An Alle Sektionen der Internationalen Opposition (Uber die Ein-
berufung einer Konferenz der europaischen Sektionen)" [To all Sections
of the International Opposition (On the Convening of a Conference of
Notes for pages 25 to 27 613
the European Sections)], 12 October 1930, SWP International Records,
Box 1, F 2 (translation by PRL).
58. Copies of 1931 I.S. minutes are in the Cannon, Glotzer, Shachtman,
and Trotsky Papers.
59. Trotsky, "Reply to the Jewish Group in the Communist League of
France," 15 January 1932, Writings 1932, 26-30; "A Letter to the National
Sections," 22 December 1931, Writings 1930-31, 365-373.
60. The first set of minutes of this Berlin-based Secretariat, dated 7 Feb-
ruary 1932, is in the T Exile Papers, 16437. The core membership appears
to have been Sedov, Witte, and Roman Well. Thus the GPU had intimate
knowledge of its activities. Well's brother, Senin, often attended meetings.
Sedov had a visa to study mathematics in Berlin, and the ILO was
concerned that public mention of his political activities could jeopardize
his status. Landau accused the ILO of sending Sedov to Berlin as part
of the fight against Landau's leadership of the German section. Frankel
labeled Landau's accusation as "equivalent to denouncing him [Sedov]
to the bourgeois police" (Frankel, confidential letter to the I.S., 7 April
1931, T Papers, 11288; translation by PRL).
61. See Documents of the Fourth International, 15-46, for the documents
of the preconference.
62. International Communist League, "Trotsky in 1939-40: 'The IEC
Does Not Exist'" (1989).
63. Vereeken, GPU in the Trotskyist Movement. Using the excuse of GPU
infiltration, Vereeken seeks to discount every major political struggle
waged by Trotsky within the ILO.
64. Trotsky, "Mill as a Stalinist Agent," October 1932; "The Lesson of
Mill's Treachery," 13 October 1932, Writings 1932, 237-243.
65. Poretsky, Our Own People, 271-274. Zborowski confessed to his
activities as a Stalinist infiltrator after being exposed in 1955. Jack Soble
(A. Senin) was arrested in the U.S. in 1958 and convicted of espionage;
his brother Robert Soblen (Roman Well) was convicted in 1961. Sylvia
Franklin and Floyd Cleveland Miller testified at Jack Soble's trial.
66. Shachtman to Trotsky, 3 April 1930, T Papers, 5024. Shachtman
reported that the Trotskyists expelled from the Leninbund refused at
first to accept Landau on the leading committee. Shachtman wrote of
Landau, "He is the only one, or one of two, that has any theoretical
substance to speak of. His political line, in my opinion, is more nearly
correct than that of any other comrade." Naville added a handwritten
postscript saying he is "tout a fait de l'avis de Shachtman" [in complete
accord with Shachtman's position] (emphasis in original).
614 Notes for pages 28 to 32
67. Shachtman to Trotsky, 2 May 1930, T Papers, 5035. Rosmer also tried
to justify the suppression of the manifesto in a 25 April 1930 letter to
Trotsky. See Broue, Trotsky-Rosmer Correspondance, 138.
68. A.S., letter to CLA, 10 April 1931, G Papers, Box 1; minutes of the
resident committee, 27 April 1931.
69. Swabeck to Trotsky and I.S., 13 June 1931, T Papers, 5449; minutes
of the resident committee, 12 June 1931.
70. The publication of the Landau article in Lutte des classes is reported
in minutes of the Administrative Secretariat, 16 July 1931.
71. Minutes of the Second National Convention of the Communist
League of America (Opposition), 24-27 September 1931, PRL. The NC
elected was Abern, Cannon, V. Dunne, Glotzer, Oehler, Shachtman,
Skoglund, Spector, and Swabeck, with Oscar Coover, John Edwards,
J. Silver, and B. Morgenstern as alternates.
72. Shachtman to Trotsky, 30 September and 20 October 1931,
T Papers, 5049, 5051.
73. A series of translated quotations from letters written by Spanish OCE
leaders, probably addressed to Russell Blackwell, can be found in C
Papers, Box 20, F 1. Lacroix is quoted as writing on 14 April 1932:
"Shachtman himself saw that we were right in the criticisms we made of
Molinier and let Trotsky know about it.. ..Since then an internal struggle
has been set afoot against friend (amigo) Shachtman in which Trotsky
also participates." Andrade is quoted as writing on 2 May 1932, "It is
necessary to know this Molinier. He is an hijo de la mala madre [son of
a bitch].... When Shachtman was in Europe he was against Molinier and
disagreed with Trotsky and it is not particularly strange that the interna-
tional intrigue to annihilate Shachtman in America has been set afoot."
74. Cannon, "Results of the Party Convention," 15 March 1929, Left
Opposition, 135-141.
75. Cannon, "After Lovestone's Expulsion," 28 June 1929, ibid., 185-186.
76. Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia, 422.
77. Shachtman, Reminiscences, 200-206.
78. Cannon, History, 90.
79. Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 91.
80. Militant, 15 December 1928; 1 and 15 February, 15 April 1929.
81. Morris Lewit and Sylvia Bleeker, both former Fosterites, joined the
CLA in early 1930; in June a clot of some six New York YCLers came
over, and the Militant reports individual CP recruits in July and Novem-
Notes for pages 32 to 36 615
ber of the same year. In October 1931 a group of YCLers in Chicago
was expelled in solidarity with the ILO; also in fall 1931 a group of Greek
Trotskyists was expelled from the CP's New York Spartacus Club. In July
1932 the Chicago YCL provided another group of CLA recruits. Begin-
ning in fall 1932 and running through summer 1933, the Militant carried
frequent reports of CPers expelled for solidarity with the ILO position
on Germany.
82. Some CLAers remained active in the ILD until late 1931, when a
series of expulsions began in New York and Minneapolis {Militant,
26 September, 17 October 1931).
83. See "Cannon's Collaborators," Appendix 1 to Early Years of American
Communism, by Cannon, 544-558, for an account of the Cannon faction's
role in the "Save the Union" movement.
84. Facts and figures are from Bernstein, Lean Years, and Preis, Labor's
Giant Step.
85. Cannon, History, 98-99; Swabeck, autobiographical manuscript,
PRL, 348.
86. Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, 88.
87. Cannon, interview by Harry Ring, 13 February 1974, typescript, 21;
Walta Karsner Ross, interview by PRL, 22 November 1993. Sam Gor-
don in Barnes, et al., Cannon as We Knew Him, says that Karsner was
recovering from an illness when he first met her.
88. Cannon to Karsner, 2 September 1932, C Papers, Box 3, F 4; Karsner
to Cannon, 9 May 1933, C Papers, Box 3, F 6; Cannon to Karsner,
n.d., ibid.
89. Gordon in Barnes, et al., op. cit., 57-58.
90. Lewit, interview; Stamm and Cowl, interview.
91. Shachtman to Glotzer, 11 September 1929; Abern to Glotzer,
20 September 1929, G Papers, Box 1.
92. Glotzer, correspondence with Abern and Shachtman, September-
December 1929, G Papers, Box 1; Glotzer to Shachtman, 3 October 1929,
S Papers, Box 6, F 22.
93. Swabeck to Cannon, 5 December 1929, C Papers, Box 1, File "Cor-
respondence 1929 To and From JPC."
94. Cannon, miscellaneous notes, n.d., C Papers, Box 38, F 9. The folder
contains disparate partial notes, including some evidently written for
Cannon's unfinished reply to "Prospect and Retrospect."
95. Abern to Glotzer, 23 November 1929, G Papers, Box 1.
616 Notes for pages 37 to 42
96. Cannon, miscellaneous notes, op. cit.
97. Militant nos. 1-5, November 1928-January 1929.
98. See PRL, introduction to Early Years of American Communism, by Can-
non, 21-39.
99. Cannon, introduction to "Draft Program," by Trotsky, ix.
100. "Platform of the Communist Opposition," Militant, 15 February
1929; Swabeck, "The Labor Party and the Tasks of the Communists,"
Militant, 29 March 1929.
101. Cannon, "Differences on the Labor Party and Self-Determination,"
20 April 1929, Left Opposition, 162-163; Glotzer, interview, 19 April 1993.
102. Trotsky, "Prospects of the Communist League of America,"
26 March 1930, Writings Supplement 1929-33, 31-32.
103. Trotsky, "The Labor Party Question in the United States," 19 May
1932, Writings 1932, 95-97.
104. Shachtman, "Problem of the Labor Party" (1935).
105. Minutes of the resident committee, 24 September 1934. Cannon
insisted, "According to present trends a national labor party organized
by the trade unions is not out of the question."
106. "Discussions with Leon Trotsky on the Transitional Program,"
21 March, 19 and 31 May 1938, Trotsky, Transitional Program, 113-136.
107. Breitman, "The Liberating Influence of the Transitional Program:
The Labor Party Question," in Trotskyism in the United States, 109-126.
Unfortunately, the SWP maintained the formulation "labor party" instead
of using "workers party" to distinguish itself from British Labour Party
reformism.
108. "The Negro in the Class Struggle," (November 1903), Writings and
Speeches of Eugene V. Debs, (New York: Hermitage Press, Inc., 1948),
63-66.
109. Cannon, History, 229-243; PRL, introduction to Early Years of Ameri-
can Communism, by Cannon, 42-49.
110. Cannon, "Differences on the Labor Party and Self-Determination,"
op. cit., 162-163; Glotzer to Shachtman, 16 March 1929, S Papers, Box
6, F 22.
111. Trotsky to Cannon, n.d. [April 1929], T Papers, 7489.
112. Cannon to Trotsky, 29 July 1929, T Papers, 464.
113. K.M. Whitten, "Communism and the Negro Problem," Militant,
Notes for pages 42 to 45 617
14 June 1930; H [Oehler?], "Self-Determination: The Problem of Mobi-
lizing Negroes in the Class Struggle," Militant, 1 September 1930.
114. Swabeck, "Second National Conference Marks Step Forward,"
Militant, 10 October 1931.
115. Oehler, "The Negro and the Class Struggle," Militant, 30 April,
7 and 14 May 1932. See also Oehler, "A National Revolution in the South?
Discussion Article on the Negro Question," Militant, 22 October 1932.
116. Cannon, "Negro Question and the Scottsboro Case," 22 April 1932,
C Papers, Box 27, F 2.
117. For Swabeck's discussions with Trotsky, 28 February 1933, see
Trotsky, On Black Nationalism, 20-31. Shachtman went to Prinkipo in
spring 1933 with the intention of discussing his manuscript with Trotsky,
but the ILO's turn toward building new parties internationally occupied
Trotsky's time. In July the French government granted Trotsky a visa and
Shachtman accompanied him there, leaving to return to the United States
in August. In a letter written shortly after Shachtman's departure, Trotsky
reported that he had not yet read the document, but that he planned to
do so; see Trotsky to Shachtman, 22 August 1933, T Papers, 10311. The
copy of Shachtman's manuscript in Trotsky's papers at Harvard has none
of the waxy blue or red markings characteristically made by Trotsky when
he read a document.
118. Shachtman, "Communism and the Negro," n.d., T Papers, 17244,
33, 58.
119. This irresolution continued until the SWP's 1939 convention, where
a comprehensive thesis on black oppression was adopted. Written under
the guidance of West Indian intellectual C.L.R. James, the resolution
left open the possibility that black national consciousness and the
demand for a "Negro state" might arise in the future, and pledged the
SWP's support to the demand for "self-determination" in that case. This
was a significant step backward from Shachtman's 1933 document.
120. Cannon, "We Have to Build Anew," 14 August 1929, Left Opposition,
204.
121. Shachtman, Reminiscences, 349-350.
122. Cannon, circular letter, "Dear Comrade and Friend," 8 March 1929,
T Papers, 463.
123. No issues were published on 15 June, 15 July, and 1 September 1929.
124. Lewit, interview.
125. Swabeck to Cannon, 8 March 1930, C Papers, Box 3, F 3. See also
Swabeck to Cannon, 8 April 1930, ibid.
6 1 8 Notes for pages 46 to 48
126. Cannon, "Greetings to Leon Trotsky in Turkey," 1 April 1929, Left
Opposition, 148.
127. Cannon, Notes for Speech on Crisis in the CPA, 1929, C Papers,
Box 26, F 1.
128. Trotsky, "Greetings to the Weekly Militant" 19 October 1929, Writ-
ings 1929, 370.
129. Trotsky, "Prospects of the Communist League of America,"
26 March 1930, Writings Supplement 1929-33, 31-32; Cannon, "Deeper
Into the Party!", 26 July 1930, Left Opposition, 284-288.
130. Shachtman to Swabeck, to Dunne, to Spector, 26 April 1930,
S Papers, Box 6, F 22. Trotsky promised royalties from Yiddish and
English editions of My Life, Permanent Revolution, and History of the Russian
Revolution.
131. Minutes of Plenum of National Committee, 24-27 May 1930;
Cannon, "First Plenum of the CLA," 7 June 1930, Left Opposition,
256-261.
132. Cannon, "The 'Degeneration of the Old Guard'," 21 April 1932,
Communist League of America, 85-86.
133. Ibid., 88.
134. Some of Swabeck's internal circulars about the Expansion Program
are in G Papers, Box 8. The Militant published regular progress reports.
135. Trotsky to Shachtman, 14 December 1931, T Papers, 10302. The
money came from royalties from sales of his History of the Russian Revo-
lution. Trotsky later made clear that the stabilization of the Militant should
be a priority over the theoretical journal. See Trotsky, "The Weekly
Comes First," 10 February 1932, Writings Supplement 1929-33, 106-107.
136. Minutes of the resident committee, 15 March 1932.
137. The Militant reduced the number of pages in November and
skipped two issues in December 1932. Unser Kamf edited by Morris
Lewit, appeared 1 February 1932 to November 1933; Young Spartacus
was published as a monthly from December 1931 until the Trotskyists
entered the Socialist Party in 1936; Communistes began publication in
December 1931 and continued at least until November 1932.
138. Minutes of the resident committee, 3 February 1932, record
Swabeck in favor of the publication of Unser Kamf.
139. Minutes of the resident committee, 23 February 1931, record
Cannon's proposal that the CLA undertake to publish Trotsky's collected
Notes for pages 48 to 52 619
works; Swabeck moved that the League also undertake to produce a col-
lection of Marx and Engels letters. The League's early Trotsky pamphlets
were bound in a limited edition. In addition to Trotsky's Critique it
included: "World Unemployment and the Soviet Five- Year Plan" (August
1930); "The Turn in the Communist International and the Situation in
Germany" (September 1930); "Problems of the Development of the
USSR" (April 1931); "The Revolution in Spain" (January 1931); "The
Spanish Revolution and the Dangers Threatening It" (May 1931); "Com-
munism and Syndicalism" (a series written from 1923 through 1930);
and "Germany, the Key to the International Situation" (November 1931)
(titles and dates of authorship per Pathfinder editions).
140. Lewit, interview.
141. See Cannon, "Our Policy and Present Tasks," 23 December 1930,
Left Opposition, 296-312.
142. Unfortunately, few of Cannon's 1931 Militant columns are reprinted
in Pathfinder's collection, Left Opposition. Cannon wrote on issues ranging
from the ILO, to the League's advances under the Expansion Program,
to trade-union events, to polemics against the Lovestoneites and the CP.
143. Swabeck, autobiographical manuscript, PRL, 349.
144. Cannon, "The Situation Is Becoming Impossible," 31 December
1931, Left Opposition, 404-407.
145. Cannon, "After the Founding of the Left Opposition," 10 May 1930,
ibid., 251.
146. Shachtman, untitled notes, 22 September 1930, T Papers, 17235.
These were obviously written for the European ILO.
147. Shachtman, "25 Years of American Trotskyism" (1954), 17; Glotzer,
"James P. Cannon as Historian" (1945). Glotzer asserts that the Cannon
faction should have broken with the Comintern in 1925, when a cable
from the ECCI overturned the American Party's elections and gave the
minority Lovestone-Ruthenberg faction a majority on the Central Com-
mittee. But the numerical strength of the Cannon-Foster faction lay in
the opportunist-leaning Finnish Federation. A break with the CI at that
time, in the absence of a clear programmatic basis, could only have been
a split to the right.
148. PRL, introduction to Early Years of American Communism, by
Cannon, 68.
149. Cannon, "The Leading Cadre and Its Traditions," C Papers, Box
27, F 3.
150. Hass, "Trotskyism in Poland" (1995-96), indicates that the Polish
620 Notes for pages 52 to 58
ILO section was a bloc between Left and Right Oppositions from its
inception at the end of 1931. For the story of the Danish Trotskyists see
B0rge Trolle, "Danish Trotskyism" (1989). In a 10 May 1995 interview
with the PRL, Trolle spoke of attempting to unify his organization with
the Right Opposition even before World War II.
151. Shachtman to Trotsky, 2 May 1930, T Papers, 5035; Trotsky, "WTe
Should Proceed as Democratically as Possible," 18 August 1930, Writ-
ings Supplement 1929-33, 47.
152. Cannon, "The New Unions and the Communists," 30 November
1929, Left Opposition, 220-224.
153. "On the Proposal for a New Farmer-Labor Party Fraud," Militant,
1 November 1930. The article opposed the project because it united Left
and Right Oppositions and sought to create a two-class party.
154. O'Flaherty's alcoholism also played a part in his leaving the CLA;
he eventually returned to Ireland. Abern kept up a gossipy anti-Cannon
correspondence with him; see A Papers, Box 12, Fs 12-14.
155. See "We Must Endeavor to Collaborate With Naville and Rosmer,"
17 December 1930, for excerpts from Shachtman's letter to Trotsky.
Shachtman wrote that Weisbord's support was limited to four members,
including Russell Blackwell.
156. Swabeck to I.S., 19 July 1931, T Papers, 15513.
157. Shachtman to I.S., 25 July 1931, T Papers, 15409 (translation from
the French by PRL).
158. See Cannon, "Minority Maneuvers and Problems with Trotsky,"
October 1932; "For More Field Organizing," 5 November 1932; "The
International Delegate Question," and "Financing the International
Delegate," 20 December 1932; and "Our Delegate Will Be on the Boat,"
1 January 1933, Communist League of America, 166-178; 184-188.
159. Cannon, "Draft on the Internal Struggle," ibid., 139.
160. Cannon, "The Internal Crisis in the American League," n.d. [early
1933], C Papers, Box 27, F 3.
161. CLA Constitution (revised), Militant, 17 October 1931.
162. Swabeck, letter to all branches, 1 November 1932, PRL.
163. Rae Spiegel, Statement, attached to minutes of the resident commit-
tee, 7 June 1932; Swabeck to Boston Branch, n.d. [September/October
1932?], C Papers, Box 15, F 7; Konikow to NC, 21 September 1932, ibid.
164. Oehler to Cannon, 25 March 1933, C Papers, Box 3, F 5; Sifakis to
Cannon, 16 January 1933, ibid.
Notes for pages 58 to 64 62 1
165. Karsner to Swabeck, 24 May 1933, C Papers, Box 15, F 7; Karsner
to Cannon, 1 June 1933 and Abern to NC, 1 June 1933, C Papers, Box
3, F 6; Sara Weber to Glotzer, 17 July 1934, G Papers, Box 3.
166. Sedov to Swabeck, 23 October 1931, T Papers, 13229 (translation
from the French by PRL).
167. Swabeck to Cannon, 12 February 1933, B Papers, Box 9, F 4; Mar-
tin to CLA, 3 December 1934, S Papers, Box 6, F 3.
168. See Swabeck, letter to I.S. and Trotsky, 29 May 1933, T Papers,
15517, for his report on the trip to Germany.
169. Shachtman to Konikow, 6 January 1933, S Papers, Box 6, F 25.
170. Gould to Oehler, 26 October 1932, C Papers, Box 15, F 7.
171. Cannon, Communist League of America, 42-73.
172. Ibid., 71-72.
173. Cannon, History, 94.
174. Shachtman, "25 Years of American Trotskyism" (1954), 18.
175. "The Opposition in Davenport" and "New Militant Forces Join the
Ranks of the Left Opposition," Militant, 22 October 1932; "New Protest
Against Stalin Bureaucrats" and "Des Moines, Iowa— A New Battleground
for the Left Opposition," Militant, 26 November 1932.
176. Cannon, "For More Field Organizing," 5 November 1932, Commu-
nist League of America, 172.
177. Cannon, "Aftermath of the Needle Trades Convention," 21 and
28 June, 12 July 1930, Left Opposition, 268-283.
178. Hudson, Progressive Mine Workers; Bernstein, Lean Years, 358-390.
179. "Miners Protest the Expulsions," Militant, 1 February 1929. The
letter was signed by Angelo and six other miners.
180. Glotzer, "Reminiscences of JPC," G Papers, Box 34, 29-30.
181. Cannon, "The Return of Gerry Allard," Militant, 5 September 1931.
182. "The Mining Situation and the Tasks of the Left Wing," Militant,
1 March 1930.
183. Trotsky, "Progressives in the United Mine Workers," 15 March 1930,
Writings Supplement 1929-33, 30.
184. Shachtman to CLA National Committee, 16 March 1930, ( . Papci s,
Box 3.
185. Swabeck, "The Situation Among the Coal Miners," Militant,
12 April 1930.
622 Notes for pages 64 to 67
186. Cannon, "Communists and Progressives," 7 March 1931, C Papers,
Box 26, F 4.
187. "Draft of the Thesis on the Trade Union Question," Militant,
29 August 1931.
188. Trotsky, "The Mistakes of Rightist Elements of the French Com-
munist League on the Trade Union Question," 4 January 1931, Trade
Unions, 34.
189. "Discussions with Trotsky," 12-15 June 1940, Writings 1939-40, 251-
289. Trotsky noted a tendency of the Minneapolis Teamster paper, North-
west Organizer— edited by SWP supporters— to adapt to the so-called anti-
Stalinist "progressives" in the AFL unions. Inadvertently confirming this,
the SWP refused to give critical support to the CP's 1940 presidential
campaign. Trotsky made this proposal to capitalize on the CP's tempo-
rary left turn during the Hitler-Stalin pact.
190. Minutes of the resident committee, 27 April 1931. The resident
committee criticized the statement issued at the conference by CLA sup-
porters Angelo and Allard for not being sufficiently critical of the Howat-
Muste leadership. Cannon made up for the deficiency in his column,
"The Miners Convention," Militant, 1 May 1931.
191. "Miners Form New Union," Militant, 10 September 1932.
192. Swabeck, "A Reply to Comrade Allard," Militant, 17 September 1932.
A letter from Angelo in the same issue stressed the importance of fight-
ing anti-Communism in the PMA. At the same time, George Clarke had to
fight with CLA members in the coalfields who didn't want to publicly
support the CP's presidential ticket; see minutes of the resident commit-
tee, 29 September 1932. Cannon evidently wrote to Allard with criticisms
of the anti-Communism in the PMA's journal, Progressive Miner, in early
1933; Allard's 23 January 1933 reply, which attacked "you fellows in New
York... isolating yourselves from the masses of workers," is in C Papers,
Box 3, F 5. See also Oehler to Cannon, 7 March 1933, ibid.; Cannon, "Our
Work in the PMA" and "On Collaboration with Allard," 10 April 1933;
"Allard at the Turning Point," 20 April 1933; and "Red-Baiting in the Illi-
nois Mine Fields," 29 April 1933, Communist League of America, 249-259.
193. Cannon, interview by Harry Ring, 8 March 1974, typescript, 16-17.
194. Cannon, notes for a speech on the PMA, C Papers, Box 27, F 6.
195. Shachtman to Angelo, 3 March 1933, S Papers, Box 6, F 25.
196. Shachtman to Angelo, 6 January 1933; Angelo to Shachtman,
23 January 1933, ibid.
197. Cannon, "Report and Proposals on Illinois Miners Situation," n.d.
[early 1933], C Papers, Box 27, F 6.
Notes for pages 68 to 73 623
198. Cannon, interview by Harry Ring, 8 March 1974, typescript, 18.
199. Communist International, "Guidelines," 27-32.
200. "Resolution," C Papers, Box 42, F 6. For more on this resolution,
see Swabeck, "International Consultation Is Key," 12 May 1933.
201. See letters from Oehler to Cannon in C Papers, Box 6, F 3. In a
letter dated 29 May 1933, Oehler reported that he had organized a CLA
branch of four in Staunton, but added that the branch was underground
because of the witchhunt and asked Cannon not to send any internal
material there.
202. Alex Fraser to Oehler, 9 August 1933, C Papers, Box 15, F 7. Fraser
reported that he was planning to return to his native Scotland after being
beaten on the street by the local sheriff's brother-in-law.
203. Karsner to Cannon, 9 May 1933, C Papers, Box 3, F 6.
204. Cannon, "Internationalism and the SWP," 18 May 1953, Speeches to
the Party, 84-86.
205. Glotzer to Trotsky, 15 November 1932, G Papers, Box 3.
206. Cannon, "On Relations with B.J. Field," 6 October 1932, Commu-
nist League of America, 163-165.
207. Cannon, "The Problem of Party Leadership," 1 November 1943,
Socialist Workers Party in World War II, 362-363. Sam Gordon remembered
that the Cannon faction met in New York during this time, read the let-
ter addressed to Trotsky, and agreed to support Cannon if it came down
to it. See his essay in Barnes, et al., Cannon as We Knew Him, 72.
208. Cannon, "Internationalism and the SWP," Speeches to the Party,
86-87. Soon after his return to the U.S., B.J. Field was readmitted to CLA
membership, where he attempted to build his own "neutral" group in
the CLA's factional struggle, until his second and final expulsion in early
1934. See Cannon, History, 126-135.
209. Cannon, ibid., 183-184.
210. Shachtman, "25 Years of American Trotskyism" (1954).
211. Cannon, notes for speech on Germany, 10 March 1933, C Papers,
Box 27, F 4.
212. Trotsky, "It Is Impossible to Remain in the Same international' with
Stalin, Manuilsky, Lozovsky and Company," 20 July 1933; "For New Com-
munist Parties and the New International," 27 July 1933, Writings 1933-
34, 17-24, 26-27.
213. Casciola, "Pietro Tresso" (1995).
624 Notes for pages 73 to 85
214. Trotsky, "The Declaration of Four," 26 August 1933, Writings 1933-
34, 49-52.
215. Cannon, letters to all branches, 31 August 1933, PRL; 12 Septem-
ber 1933, T Papers, 13867; 16 September 1933, T Papers, 13866.
216. "The Lessons of the New York Hotel Strike," n.d. [March 1934],
B.J. Field, A. Kaldis, J. Carr, D. Lovet, A. Russell, P. Myers, E. Field, SWP
Records, Roll 32.
217. "Genesis of Pabloism," Spartacist no. 21 (Fall 1972); International
Communist League, introduction to Proletarian Military Policy,
Prometheus Research Series no. 2 (1989); Jan Norden, Yugoslavia, East
Europe and the Fourth International, Prometheus Research Series no. 4
(1993).
218. Cannon, "Draft on the Internal Struggle," July 1932, Communist
League of America, 138-142.
219. Shachtman et al., "War and Bureaucratic Conservatism."
220. Clarke, "Auto Crisis," 23.
221. Shachtman to Spector, 3 February 1930, S Papers, Box 6, F 22;
Trotsky to Spector, 26 March 1930, T Papers, 10497.
222. Clarke, "Auto Crisis," 23.
223. Cannon, "The Anti-Cannon Bloc," 30 April 1932, Communist League
of America, 103-104.
224. Glotzer, interview, 2 April 1997.
225. Cowl, "Report to the Minneapolis Branch on the Internal Contro-
versy (Synopsis)," n.d. [mid-July 1932], S Papers, Box 6, F 18.
226. Gordon to Cannon, 29 December 1932, C Papers, Box 3, F 4.
227. Trotsky, "The Social Composition of the Party," 10 October 1937,
Writings 1936-37, 490.
228. Cannon, Letters from Prison, 243.
229. Ibid., 297.
230. T Papers, 10279, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supplement
1929-33.
231. Shachtman to Trotsky, 3 April 1930, T Papers, 5034.
232. During Shachtman's visit to Prinkipo, Trotsky agreed to donate to
the CLA the American royalties from the Yiddish edition of his autobi-
ography, My Life. Shachtman was informed in Berlin that this would
amount to about DM 100,000.
Notes for pages 85 to 91 625
233. Abern to Trotsky, 30 March 1930, T Papers, 6. Abern reported on
the CLA's contact with Opposition members in South Africa and China,
and sent Trotsky a copy of the March issue of the American CP journal,
Communist, which contained "The Rising Chinese Revolution and the
Liquidation of Trotsky" by R. Doonping (C.T. Chi), a KMT supporter
who had been active in the CP's All-American Anti-Imperialist League.
234. Trotsky's letter to Harry Winitsky, a member of the American Right
Opposition led by Jay Lovestone, can be found in Writings 1930, 186.
235. T Papers, 10281, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supplement
1929-33.
236. Shachtman to Trotsky, 30 June 1930, T Papers, 5036; Trotsky,
"Circular Letter Number One," 21 June 1930, Writings 1930, 290-297.
237. Shachtman asked for Trotsky's opinion on an appeal by the
Lovestone group for a "united front" with the CLA and the CP in the
American trade unions.
238. Trotsky enjoyed fishing and was often accompanied by Charalambos,
a local man; Shachtman sent Trotsky a cabled fishing line as a gift.
239. T Papers, 10284, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College.
240. Frankel to Shachtman, 17 November 1930, T Papers, 12365. Only
the first page of the letter is in the archive. Frankel reported that Mahnruf
could muster six members in Vienna and 20 in Graz, while the Frey group
claimed 120 in Vienna and 20 in Graz. Both groups neglected work in
the CP in favor of orienting to the far larger Social Democracy.
241. The 22 February 1930 Militant announced the formation of a Mexi-
can Opposition group led by Russell Blackwell, former member of the
Central Committee of the Mexican party's youth group, who used the
party name Rosalio Negrete. Negrete was soon arrested and deported
from Mexico. By July he was acting as the CLA's Spanish secretary in
New York; see Abern to Trotsky, 7 July 1930, T Papers, 7. In October
Negrete sent Trotsky an open letter addressed by himself and Alexander
Golod to a politically undefined group of dissidents recently expelled
from the Mexican party; see Negrete to Trotsky, 31 October 1930,
T Papers, 3528.
242. Maurice Malkin, a former member of the Communist Party
and leader of the Furriers Union, was imprisoned for strike activity. He
adhered briefly to the CLA, but was expelled and rejoined the CP
in 1931.
243. The Weekly People was published by the Socialist Labor Party.
626 Notes for pages 92 to 98
244. T Papers, 10285, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supplement
1929-33.
245. Trotsky, "Open Letter to the Prometeo Group," 22 April 1930, Writ-
ings 1930, 191-209.
246. Trotsky's 25 November 1930 letter to Naville gave the following
characterization of Landau's preparations for the October conference
of the German section:
"Feeding on Rosmer's indignation (with your encouragement by the
way), he prepared in a rather peculiar way (the death of) the con-
ference. He made use of organizational tricks instead of organizing
it as the political expression of a revolutionary organization. Com-
rade Landau is mistaken if he thinks that the German Opposition
was constituted through his skillful behind-the-scenes artifices. No,
what is formed in such a way is only the Mahnruf, in other words
not much more than nothing. If the German Opposition exists, it is
a result of leaning on the international Opposition and support from
the latter."
Of the crisis in France, Trotsky insisted:
"The question today is not the Molinier-Naville quarrel. The only
important question is the trade-union question. The only crucial
document is Gourget's theses. Comrade Naville, do you approve
them or do you combat them? As for me, I rigorously combat them.
I am sure you understand that I did not break with the centrists of
Russia to take any responsibility for the confused centrist theses of
comrade Gourget. Should I do that, the 7,500 members of the
Opposition jailed or deported would be justified in branding me as
a traitor."
Despite Trotsky's demand for an immediate reply, Naville answered on
December 15, when he wrote, "I totally agree with you that it is abso-
lutely necessary to rectify our trade-union policy." With no clear answer
regarding his views on the Gourget theses, he reported that a public
discussion on the trade-union question had begun in La Verite. About
his role in the international, Naville insisted, "The secretariat functions
as it should. The fact that it was lagging behind in its functioning in
early November is not due to any bad will on my part." Trotsky's
25 November 1930 letter and Naville's 15 December 1930 reply are
published in Broue (ed.), Trotsky-Naville-Van Heijenoort Correspondence,
46-48, 49-50. Translation by PRL.
247. Grylewicz and Joko led the Trotskyists inside the Leninbund until
they were expelled in February 1930. Their small group merged with
the Wedding Opposition in April 1930 to form the United Opposition
Notes for pages 98 to 105 627
of Germany, section of the ILO. In "Circular Letter Number One"
(21 June 1930, Writings 1930, 293), Trotsky reported:
"Recently in the German section we have had sharp disputes that
ended in the withdrawal of comrades Neumann, Joko, and Grylewicz
from the leadership. This action, like a number of actions that
preceded it, really has the character of a genuine literary and bureau-
cratic intrigue of the classical type. The comrades mentioned gave
no hint of the principled reasons for their withdrawal."
248. T Papers, 5040.
249. The International Secretariat assigned Molinier and Mill to evalu-
ate the Austrian groups claiming adherence to the ILO. See "Problems
of the German Section," 31 January 1931, Writings 1930-31, 139-143.
250. G Papers, Box 3.
251. Frankel, "Die Haltung des Genossen Landau in der osterreichischen
und deutschen Fragen" [Comrade Landau's Role in the Austrian and
German Questions], 6 January 1931, T Papers, 16850.
252. Frankel to Shachtman, 6 January 1931, S Papers, Box 2, F 49.
253. This pamphlet contained "Strategy and Tactics in the Imperialist
Epoch," the section of Trotsky's Critique missing from the manuscript
Cannon brought back from Moscow in 1928.
254. Trotsky, "The Mistakes of Rightist Elements of the Communist
League on the Trade Union Question," 4 January 1931, Trade Unions.
255. Trotsky is referring to the Left Opposition's criticisms of the
Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Committee (1925-27). Tomsky was
the head of the Russian trade unions; Purcell of the British Trades
Union Congress.
256. In a 17 December 1930 letter, Shachtman had asked Trotsky to pub-
licly explain his 1925 repudiation of Max Eastman's book, Since Lenin
Died. In answer Trotsky probably forwarded his 11 September 1928 letter
to Russian Left Oppositionist, N.I. Muralov; see Trotsky, "Max Eastman:
A Friend of the October Revolution," Challenge 1928-29, 221-224.
257. Trotsky wrote, "The leading comrades in the United States inform
us that in the American League certain comrades— to be sure, only indi-
vidual ones (in the literal sense of the word)— speak for the bloc with
the Loves toneites in the name of 'mass work.' It is hard to imagine a
more ridiculous, a more inept, a more sterile project than this. Do these
people know at least a little of the history of the Bolshevik Party? Have
they read the works of Lenin? Do they know the correspondence of Mai x
and Engels? Or has all the history of the revolutionary movement passed
them by without leaving a trace? Fortunately, the overwhelming majority
628 Notes for pages 106 to 121
of the American League has nothing in common with such ideas." See
"The Mistakes of Rightist Elements of the Communist League on the
Trade Union Question," op. cit., 37-38.
258. T Papers, 5041.
259. T Papers, 10290, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College.
260. Trotsky, "The Crisis in the German Left Opposition," 17 February
1931, Writings 1930-31, 147-170.
261. A fire destroyed Trotsky's rented villa on the Prinkipo Islands,
forcing a move to the Constantinople suburb of Kadikoy, where the house-
hold remained for a year while the Prinkipo villa was repaired.
262. Shachtman had requested material for a projected book of Trotsky's
writings on China, published in 1932 as Problems of the Chinese Revolution.
263. Trotsky was writing his three-volume History of the Russian Revolution.
264. T Papers, 15410.
265. T Papers, 5043.
266. T Papers, 10291, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Excerpts from another translation in Trotsky, Writings
1930-31.
267. Trotsky agreed to turn over to the CLA the proceeds from sales of
the serialization rights to the first volume of History of the Russian
Revolution to foreign-language periodicals in the U.S. Shachtman sold these
rights to the liberal Yiddish daily The Day and to Ludwig Lore's German-
language New Yorker Volkszeitung. Trotsky was evidently concerned that
his German publisher, Fischer, might object to the latter sale.
268. Trotsky's History, serialized in the Saturday Evening Post, caused quite
a stir in the bourgeois press, which Shachtman reported to Trotsky. Boni
was Trotsky's American publisher.
269. T Papers, 10296, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supplement
1929-33.
270. In May the CLA published Trotsky's "The Spanish Revolution and
the Dangers Threatening It" under the title "The Spanish Revolution in
Danger."
271. Gourget inspired the split of Gauche Communiste, but he quickly
returned to the Ligue.
272. S Papers, Box 2, F 50.
273. T Papers, 5053.
Notes for pages 121 to 133 629
274. Frankel to Shachtman, 20 August 1931, S Papers, Box 2, F 50.
275. Trotsky, "A Letter to the National Sections," Writings 1930-31,
365-373.
276. Trotsky, "Reply to the Jewish Group in the Communist League of
France," 15 January 1932, Writings 1932, 26-30.
277. Shachtman is probably referring to a 19 November 1931 letter in
which Trotsky objected to the announcement that El Soviet had suspended
publication due to refusal to submit to censorship. This hid from the
working class the truth about its precarious financial situation. In a
28 November 1931 letter Trotsky wrote: "The misunderstanding arising
on the basis of the budget has become the object of an international
intrigue. I shall not conceal from you that this incident creates an
extremely unfavorable impression on me." Excerpts from both letters
are published in Trotsky, Spanish Revolution, 396-397.
278. Bela Kun, Jeno Landler, John Pepper, and Laszlo Rudas were exiled
members of the Hungarian Communist Party, notorious in the Comintern
for their cliquist infighting. Bohumir Smeral was the leader of the Czech
Communist Party.
279. Albert Treint and Suzanne Girault led the Communist Party from
1924 to 1926; they were expelled in 1927 for supporting the Russian
United Opposition.
280. The Confederation Generale du Travail Unitaire (CGTU) resulted
from a 1921 split in the main French trade-union federation, the
Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT). Although the Comintern lead-
ership opposed the schism, the CGTU was under the leadership of the
French Communist Party from late 1922. During the Third Period, it
was glorified as a "red" trade union and efforts to unify with the CGT
were condemned. By late 1931, CGT leader Leon Jouhaux was making
unity overtures to the CGTU. A pro-CGT right wing was active in the
Communist-led federation.
From its inception the French Left Opposition called for an amal-
gamation conference of the CGT and CGTU, with full freedom of dis-
cussion and the right of various parties to organize fractions within the
unions. However, there were evidently minor differences on how to apply
this line in the concrete circumstances of late 1931.
281. T Papers, 10301, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College.
282. T Papers, 10303, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Excerpts from another translation in Trotsky, Writings
1930-31.
630 Notes for pages 133 to 141
283. Mill's articles called for the unity of the Left and Right Opposi-
tion in a Communist Party united against the "bureaucrats of the CI."
See J. Obin, "What Is Happening in Spain?", Militant, 15 May 1931; "First
of May in Madrid," Militant, 1 June 1931.
284. In a 16 December 1931 letter to Trotsky (T Papers, 5054), Shacht-
man proposed that he approach a bourgeois publisher about printing a
biography of Stalin. To be included were "Stalin and the Red Army" by
N. Markin (Leon Sedov) (later published in Stalin School of Falsification,
205-229), and three recent articles by Trotsky: "A Contribution to the
Political Biography of Stalin" (ibid., 179-198), "Stalin and the Chinese
Revolution" (On China, 443-474), and "Stalin as a Theoretician" (Writings
1930, 308-334).
285. Trotsky donated $1,000 of the royalties from sales of volume one
of History of the Russian Revolution to push forward the CLA's proposed
theoretical journal. Regarding the Yiddish rights to volume two of the
History, Shachtman had mistakenly sold the serialization rights to both
volumes in May 1931, a fact he sought to conceal from Trotsky for most
of 1932. See Swabeck to Trotsky, 13 October 1932, T Papers, 5468.
286. T Papers, 8079, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings 1930-31.
287. Arne Swabeck explained the Miller affair in a letter to Trotsky,
"Shachtman Acted on His Own Authority" (22 January 1932).
288. T Papers, 10304, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College.
289. "To Help in Britain," 9 November 1931, Writings Supplement
1929-33, 98-99. Later a prominent Communist Party hack intellectual,
Montagu made propaganda films for the Republicans during the Span-
ish Civil War and the British government during World War II. He
authored a flattering 1942 portrait of Stalin and was awarded the Lenin
Peace Prize in 1959.
290. Shachtman to Trotsky, 16 December 1931, T Papers, 5054.
291. Trotsky, "Germany, the Key to the International Situation,"
26 November 1931, Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, 115-131.
292. Trotsky to Montagu, 31 December 1931, T Papers, 9281.
293. T Papers, 8081, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings 1932.
294. Swabeck to Trotsky, 11 February 1932, T Papers, 5459.
295. G Papers, Box 2. Copyright Stanford University.
296. This letter probably accompanied Abern's 19 January 1932 letter
Notes for pages 143 to 154 631
to Trotsky, T Papers, 10. Abern reported that Charles Malamuth, a former
correspondent for United Press who had spent a year in Russia and was
sympathetic to the Left Opposition, was planning to write a book on
Russia. He wanted to include a chapter on the Left Opposition and was
requesting biographical information on leading members, including
Rakovsky and Trotsky. Malamuth did not publish the book, but he sub-
sequently offered to translate Trotsky's works into English. At the time
of Trotsky's death, he was translating Trotsky's Stalin. Trotsky found his
preliminary translating work problematic, and Stalin, published post-
humously, is marred by Malamuth's social-democratic interpolations.
297. F.A. Ridley was at the time claiming adherence to the Left Opposi-
tion, but his views were far from the ILO. The Militant (31 October 1931)
published his "A Communist Party— The Problem of Revolution in
England," which represented the new British government as "the first
stage of British fascism, which only requires time to become fully articu-
late." For Trotsky's polemics against Ridley, see "Tasks of the Left
Opposition in Britain and India: Some Critical Remarks on Unsuccess-
ful Theses," 7 November 1931, and "What Is a Revolutionary Situation?"
17 November 1931, Writings 1930-31, 337-343, 352-355.
298. T Papers, 5458.
299. Leon Sedov (Markin) had moved to Berlin and the International
Secretariat had just been transferred there.
300. G Papers, Box 3.
301. In a letter to Swabeck supporting Abern's draft statement on the
international question, Spector referred to an earlier letter of complaint
about "the failure of the International Secretariat to function in either
political or administrative regard" and insisted, "The reorganization of
the I.S. is overdue." See Spector to Swabeck, 5 March 1932, G Papers,
Box 3.
302. Shachtman sent Spector a copy of his January 23 letter to Trotsky,
T Papers, 5056. He denied having received any letters from Trotsky while
in Europe, or having any substantial differences with him. For quota-
tions from this letter see the introduction to Shachtman, "A Bad Situa-
tion in the American League" (13 March 1932).
303. T Papers, 10305, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings 1932.
304. The complete, unexpurgated text of Engels' 1895 introduction is
published in Marx, Engels: Collected Works, vol. 27, 506-524. Alexander
Trachtenberg detailed Eduard Bernstein's deletions in Engels' original
manuscript in "The Marx-Engels Institute" (Workers Monthly, November
632 Notes for pages 154 to 173
1925), where he also reported on the work being done by David Ryazan ov
and the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow to discover and preserve the
literary heritage of Marx and Engels.
305. Vorwdrts was the official paper of the German Social Democratic
party (SPD); Die Neue Zeit was edited by Karl Kautsky.
306. Cannon, "Internal Problems of the CLA," 22 March 1932, Commu-
nist League of America, 42-73.
307. Cannon wrote an article objecting to the Militant's review of a new
biography, Lassalle, by Arno Shirokauro; see "Public Apology for Article
on Lassalle," 13 February 1932, ibid., 31-32.
308. Rosa Luxemburg, "Speech to the Founding Convention of the Ger-
man Communist Party," Rosa Luxemburg Speaks (New York: Pathfinder
Press, 1970), 400-427. This translation differs in detail from Shachtman's.
309. In their reply to this document, Cannon and Swabeck noted:
"If Cannon, with the full agreement of Swabeck, spoke at the national
conference on the concrete lessons of the fight against Landau-Naville—
after comrade Shachtman had overlooked this side of the question
in his report— and did not mention comrade Shachtman's name, nor
his half support of these elements, it was not because we lack the
right to speak openly, or because we wish to fight him with 'insinua-
tions' and 'hints.' It was only to warn him that we cannot agree that
our League should skip over these international experiences with-
out discussing what they really signified.
"These efforts to influence comrade Shachtman without appeal-
ing to the organization yielded absolutely no results. The breach,
which we did not yet consider unbridgeable at the conference,
became wider and our League became further compromised in the
international Opposition as a result of comrade Shachtman's conduct. ,"
See Cannon, "Internal Problems of the CLA," op. cit., 45-46.
310. T Papers, 5059.
311. T Papers, 5069. Shachtman reported that in the early 1920s the
American CP had published a pamphlet by Radek that defended Trotsky's
theory of permanent revolution.
312. At its March 15 meeting the CLA resident committee voted, "That
the new book by comrade Trotsky on Germany be published as speedily
as possible." Trotsky's "What Next? Vital Questions for the German
Proletariat," dated 27 January 1932 and serialized in the Militant March-
June 1932, was published in book form by Pioneer Publishers in Sep-
tember. See Trotsky, Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, 142-257.
Notes for pages 174 to 186 633
313. Differently edited version in Cannon, Communist League of America.
314. Trotsky, "Why Mill Should Be Removed," 29 December 1931, Writ-
ings Supplement 1929-33, 102-104.
315. On 12 June 1931, after Trotsky had criticized the CLA for not tak-
ing a position, the resident committee discussed the fight against Landau
and Naville. Shachtman was instructed to write a comprehensive resolu-
tion on the question, but Cannon's motion to publish this resolution in
the Militant lost. Instead, the committee mandated the publication of
"the conclusions" only. Shachtman did not write the resolution until just
before the CLA's Second National Conference. Published in the Mili-
tant on 19 September 1931, it was subsequently adopted by the confer-
ence. The resolution declared publicly for the first time that the CLA
"endorses the struggle conducted by our French section against the right-
wing group of Gourget and against the ambiguous attitude of other
members of the Ligue, such as Naville, who did not join in rejecting
categorically the ideas and conduct of this group, and whose attitude
instead comforted it, just as it comforted the Landau group in its
destructive work in the ranks of the German Opposition."
316. G Papers, Box 8. Copyright Stanford University.
317. PRL.
318. T Papers, 15514.
319. Cannon, "Internal Problems of the CLA," op. cit.
320. At the CLA's Second National Conference in September 1931
Shachtman proposed to add Louis Basky and Morris Lewit to the
National Committee as full members. Cannon strongly opposed the
move, which failed.
321. Cannon, "Internal Problems of the CLA," op. cit.
322. Ibid.
323. PRL.
324. Sharp disputes in the resident committee beginning in late 1929
over the weekly Militant and Cannon's partial withdrawal from CLA
activity led to the convening of a plenum in May 1930. See Glotzer, "The
Real Basis of Our Differences," 5 April 1932.
325. PRL.
326. Cannon, "Lay the Whole Matter Before the Membership," 10 April
1932, Communist League of America, 80-82.
327. Cannon, "The 'Degeneration of the Old Guard'," 21 April 1932,
ibid., 83-91.
634 Notes for pages 187 to 203
328. G Papers, Box 3. Copyright Stanford University. Glotzer reported
to Trotsky January 24 on the recent disputes in the resident committee,
reiterating that he disagreed with Shachtman on the situation in the
French Ligue (G Papers, Box 3). On February 10 Trotsky replied that
Glotzer's explanation had cleared up the "misunderstanding" over his
views on the Paris Jewish Group (T Papers, 8258). He wrote to Glotzer
again on February 26, noting, "Your letters are very valuable to me,
because they really serve as a guide for me to the activity of the Ameri-
can League" (T Papers, 8259).
329. See "Minutes of Plenum of National Committee of Communist
League of America, May 24-27, 1930," PRL. The minutes are sketchy
and they record no co-optations to the National Committee.
330. In March 1932 a New York Times interview quoted Trotsky as
believing that a labor party was inevitable in the United States. This
caused considerable confusion in the CLA, whose Second National Con-
ference in September 1931 adopted a position against raising the slogan
for a labor party. See Trotsky, "The Labor Party Question in the United
States," 19 May 1932, Writings 1932, 94-97.
331. T Papers, 16873.
332. Eight top leaders of the Canadian Communist Party (CPC) were
arrested on 11 August 1931 and charged under Section 98 of the Crimi-
nal Code with being members and officers of an "unlawful organiza-
tion" and part of a "seditious conspiracy." They were found guilty in
November. This was part of a wave of repression against the Canadian
workers movement, which included the breaking up of meetings, the
banning of literature, and over 700 arrests. The Militant defended the
CPC leaders and gave prominent coverage to the trial, which was attended
by Maurice Spector. In a February 1932 decision that upheld most of
the convictions, the Canadian Supreme Court virtually outlawed the CPC,
which functioned as an underground organization until Tim Buck's release
from prison in November 1934. Section 98 was not repealed until 1936.
333. Notorious as a sterile propaganda sect that engaged in little prac-
tical activity, the Proletarian Party (PP) originated as the Michigan
Socialist Party and adhered briefly to the Communist movement before
establishing a separate organization in 1920. In late 1931 the Proletar-
ian Party Opposition left the PP, advocating "mass work"; its Cleveland
and New York branches joined the Communist Party.
334. After the National Miners Union called a national strike on
1 January 1932, the ensuing repression all but destroyed the union in
the American coalfields.
Notes for pages 204 to 229 635
335. The Workmen's Circle was a Jewish labor organization that pro-
vided insurance benefits and organized Yiddish cultural and educational
programs. Affiliated with the Socialist Party, it expelled supporters of
the Communist Party in 1929.
336. A.C. Townley was a former member of the Socialist Party and
founder of the Non-Partisan League, an agrarian populist organization
that allied with Minnesota labor unions in 1918, creating the state Farmer-
Labor Party.
337. S Papers, Box 6, F 23.
338. See Introduction, 37-44.
339. PRL.
340. PRL.
341. G Papers, Box 3. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supple-
ment 1929-33.
342. S Papers, Box 6, F 23.
343. Cannon, "The Anti-Cannon Bloc," 30 April 1932, Communist League
of America, 101-107.
344. Cannon, "The Fight Is Here," 7 May 1932, ibid., 113-117.
345. Jack MacDonald, former national secretary of the Canadian Com-
munist Party, had just adhered to the Left Opposition. His statement
was published in the 28 May 1932 Militant.
346. T Papers, 8084, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supplement
1929-33.
347. Trotsky, "The Labor Party Question in the United States," 19 May
1932, Writings 1932, 94-97.
348. Trotsky, "Who Should Attend the International Conference?",
22 May 1932, ibid., 99-103.
349. G Papers, Box 3. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supple-
ment 1929-33.
350. Glotzer to Trotsky, 17 May 1932, G Papers, Box 3.
351. T Papers, 5061.
352. Trotsky, "Workers' Control of Production," 20 August 1931, and
"Factory Councils and Workers' Control of Production," 12 September
1931, Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, 77-87; "Some Ideas on the
Period and the Tasks of the Left Opposition," 28 July 1931, Writings
1930-31, 293-297.
636 Notes for pages 230 to 298
353. PRL.
354. Cannon, "Internal Problems of the CLA," op. cit.
355. Cannon, "Draft on the Internal Struggle," July 1932, ibid., 138-156.
356. Cannon, "After the Founding of the International Left Opposition,"
10 May 1930, Left Opposition, 251-255.
357. Cannon, "Our Policy and Present Tasks," 23 December 1930, ibid.,
296-312.
358. Bittelman's view that "American capitalism is about to reach the
apex of growth," its accumulating contradictions "leading to the down-
fall of American imperialism" was incorporated into "The Right Danger
in the American Party," a document jointly submitted by the Cannon
and Foster groups to the American Commission at the Sixth Comintern
Congress in July 1928. It was serialized in the Militant from November
1928 to January 1929.
359. "Thesis for the Pre-Conference Discussion," Militant, 25 July 1931.
360. Cannon, "American Syndicalism and Problems of Communism,"
15 February 1931, Left Opposition, 315-319.
361. Shachtman neglects to mention that this same resident committee
meeting voted down a motion by Cannon that the Militant publish a
comprehensive resolution on the international question as a signed state-
ment of the National Committee.
362. In a letter to Oehler, Cannon accused the Shachtman faction of
seeking Krehm's support; see "The Anti-Cannon Bloc," 30 April 1932,
Communist League of America, 101-107.
363. Trotsky, "Who Should Attend the International Conference?",
22 May 1932, Writings 1932, 99-103.
364. Spector had been part of a delegation that went to the office of
Ontario Premier Henry to protest the imprisonment of eight top lead-
ers of the Canadian Communist Party.
365. Before the plenum the Toronto branch split into two on Spector's
initiative, with one branch consisting of the Krehm group and the other
of Spector and his supporters.
366. The final resident committee resolution declared, "We do not rec-
ognize the split as necessary and already accomplished, and are in no
way willing at the present time to break off relations with the majority
of the branch as it has existed up till now, or to recognize the existence
of two branches." Noting the Krehm group also bore responsibility for
the situation, the resolution described Krehm and his followers as "some-
Notes for pages 298 to 336 637
what similar in composition and tendency to the Carter grouping in the
New York branch."
Regarding Spector's participation in the delegation to protest the
imprisonment of the eight CPC leaders, the resident committee noted
that Spector "should have taken an opportunity to speak, if for no other
reason than to distinguish the Left Opposition from the cringing, liber-
alistic program of the organizers of the delegation." However, the
committee noted that Krehm had "unduly magnified" the issue.
The committee recommended that the question of Spector's par-
ticipation in a mass organization be tabled until the atmosphere in the
branch was less factional.
367. S Papers, Box 6, F 16. The original is unsigned.
368. We have found no carbon or mimeographed copies of the docu-
ment in the available papers of other CLA leaders.
369. In 1924, with the backing of all factions, the American Commu-
nist Party came close to supporting Progressive Party presidential
candidate Robert M. La Follette. On Trotsky's insistence the Zinoviev
leadership of the Comintern turned the Party back from support to this
bourgeois candidate. After the elections, the Cannon-Foster group sought
to reorient the Party away from the petty-bourgeois La Follette forces,
advocating the dropping of the slogan for a farmer-labor party. See PRL,
Introduction to Early Years of American Communism, by Cannon, 25-39.
370. PRL.
371. Cannon, "Results of the June Plenum, "July 1932, Communist League
of America, 133-137.
372. Ibid.
373. S Papers, Box 6, F 23.
374. G Papers, Box 3.
375. T Papers, 10306, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supplement
1929-33.
376. T Papers, 5062.
377. Cannon, "Internal Problems of the CLA," op. cit.
378. Cannon quotes from the CLA's original translations of Trotsky's
letters.
379. At the July 7 resident committee meeting, Shachtman, Abern, and
Glotzer voted against Cannon's motion on the New York branch, which
was based on the plenum discussion.
638 Notes for pages 341 to 353
380. T Papers, 15428.
381. T Papers, 8090, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings 1932.
382. Cannon, "On Relations with B.J. Field," 6 October 1932, Communist
League of America, 163-165. The letter was drafted by Cannon and signed
by Swabeck as national secretary. On Field's expulsion see "Resolution
on Fields," n.d., G Papers, Box 8; also Glotzer to Trotsky, 15 November
1932, G Papers, Box 3.
383. CLA National Committee, "League Replies to Weisbord Letter,"
Militant, 1 and 8 October 1932. Trotsky's original letter to the CLS, dated
22 May 1932, was published in the 10 September 1932 Militant
(see Trotsky, Writings 1932, 104-109); the CLS's response, "Weisbord's
Reply to Trotsky's Letter," was serialized in the Militant on 17 and
24 September 1932.
384. Minutes of the resident committee, 12 September 1932.
385. Cannon, "Minority Maneuvers and Problems with Trotsky," Octo-
ber 1932, Communist League of America, 166-170.
386. T Papers, 5065.
387. Weisbord's document was published in CLA IB no. 4.
388. "Negotiations with Weisbord Suspended," Militant, 3 1 December 1932.
389. Minutes of the resident committee, 24 October 1932.
390. Trotsky, "A Letter to Weisbord," 13 October 1932, Writings 1932,
236.
391. George Bye, a literary agent, handled Trotsky's 17 September 1932
article, "Fourteen Questions on Soviet Life and Morality," first published
in Liberty magazine, 14 January 1933. See Writings 1932, 182-191.
392. Trotsky, Europe and America (1926).
393. G Papers, Box 3.
394. "Report to the Minneapolis Branch on the Internal Controversy
(Synopsis)," n.d., S Papers, Box 6, F 18.
395. Cannon, "Minority Maneuvers and Problems with Trotsky," Octo-
ber 1932, op. cit.
396. In practice the NC members resident in New York continued to
meet as the League's leading body. For clarity's sake we will continue to
refer to this body as the resident committee.
397. Trotsky, "A Duty to Speak," 20 October 1932, Writings Supplement
1929-33, 164.
Notes for pages 353 to 370 639
398. Trotsky, "Documents from Copenhagen," November 1932, ibid.,
175-180.
399. Cannon, "Our Delegate Will Be on the Boat," 1 January 1933, Com-
munist League of America, 184-188.
400. For more on the Morgenstern marriage, see Abern and Shachtman,
"Results of the Postplenum Discussion" (3 January 1933).
401. Zinoviev made the need to "Bolshevize" the Comintern's national
parties the watchword of the Fifth Congress in 1924, but the campaign
did not begin in earnest until the Fifth ECCI Plenum in March-April
1925. A key component of the bureaucratization of the Comintern,
Bolshevization mandated the reorganization of all Communist parties,
with small, easy-to-control factory cells and street nuclei replacing larger,
territorial forms of organization. In the American Party the foreign-
language federations were dissolved. Large membership meetings
became rare in all parties, and when they were held they were rubber
stamps for the expulsion of oppositionists rather than forums for open
political debate.
402. In September southern Illinois miners on strike voted to found a
new union, the Progressive Miners of America. At a September 15 meet-
ing the resident committee adopted Cannon's proposal that the League
raise $100 to send Clarke, Angelo, and Allard on a tour of the Illinois
mine fields in order to build League branches. Shachtman proposed
sending Swabeck instead; later in the meeting he changed his candidate
to Oehler.
403. G Papers, Box 3.
404. T Papers, 5470.
405. Trotsky, "Our Attitude to Weisbord," 27 May 1932, Writings Supple-
ment 1929-33, 115-116.
406. S Papers, Box 6, F 24.
407. We can find no record that Shachtman issued a formal, written
appeal against Swabeck's trip to Europe. Spector may be referring to
the New York local's resolution on the subject, attached to the Decem-
ber 15 resident committee minutes along with a protest resolution from
the Boston branch and a letter of opposition from Glotzer and Edwards
in Chicago. At that meeting the committee rejected Shachtman's motion
to reconsider sending Swabeck to Europe, voting instead to authorize
the secretary to reply to the protests.
408. The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation was a social-
democratic federation of farm and labor organizations launched in
Canada in August 1932. It evolved into the New Democratic Party.
640 Notes for pages 371 to 382
409. PRL.
410. Cannon, "Results of Discussion and Voting on the Plenum Resolu-
tions," 29 December 1932, Communist League of America, 179-183.
411. Cannon, "Our Delegate Will Be on the Boat," op. cit.
412. At the July 14 resident committee meeting Shachtman proposed
to immediately invite CLA members to present their views in the Inter-
nal Bulletin, implying the opening of preconference discussion. He
repeated the proposal on August 11, when his motion lost in favor of
Cannon's that "In accordance with previous decision, we consider this
question when the full committee convenes."
413. "Resolution by George Saul," 17 July 1932, G Papers, Box 7. Saul's
lengthy resolution charged the entire National Committee with "being
responsible for an unprincipled factional fight, the differences for which
could have and should have been made known to the Second National
Conference so that it could have acted upon a crisis within the NC before
that crisis became a basis for a division in the League." Insisting that
"along the present lines of Cannon vs. Shachtman there is little or no
hope for the serious business of uniting the League, Bolshevizing it, pre-
paring it with the tempo necessary for the historic tasks ahead," Saul
proposed administrative measures to mitigate the struggle, including the
division of the New York branch into three units.
414. At the July 14 resident committee meeting, Shachtman disputed
the wording of Cannon's motion reappointing him Militant editor as
recorded in the plenum minutes. Cannon insisted that the motion was
correct, and Shachtman's motion to amend the minutes was rejected.
415. Cannon's circular reported that the co-optations lost by a vote of
59 to 65, with 10 abstentions. See Cannon, "Results of Discussion and
Voting on the Plenum Resolutions," op. cit., 179.
416. The Progressive Miners of America (PMA) was founded at a con-
vention in Gillespie, Illinois on 1 September 1932. A second convention
was held in Gillespie on 3 October 1932. On September 29 Swabeck
reported to the resident committee that the CLA comrades in the mines
disagreed among themselves over raising the CLA's position in support
of the Communist Party's presidential campaign at the convention. The
resident committee voted unanimously to instruct the fraction to sup-
port the CP candidates. Basky and Swabeck voted against another
Shachtman motion demanding that the fraction raise the issue on the
convention floor.
417. When the NC broke off unity negotiations, the CLS organized a
public meeting to discuss the issue. At a special November 8 session the
resident committee adopted Cannon's motion characterizing this as "an
Notes for pages 384 to 397 641
additional hostile maneuver against the League" and instructing New
York CLA members not to attend. Shachtman and Abern opposed the
prohibition; a few branch members, including Petras, attended the CLS
forum despite the prohibition.
418. G Papers, Box 3.
419. Weber's "Japan: Its Rise from Feudalism to Capitalist Imperialism
and the Development of the Proletariat" was serialized in the Militant
from 24 September 1932 through 4 February 1933.
420. G Papers, Box 3.
421. "Opposition Youth at Chicago Conference," Militant, 7 January
1933.
422. During the 1919 steel strike, which he led as secretary of the AFL
steel committee, Foster testified before a redbaiting congressional com-
mittee that he had personally bought war bonds and advocated that
others do so. He was not a member of the Communist movement dur-
ing World War I. Lovestone was granted immunity for testifying in the
1920 trial of Harry Winitsky, a Communist leader prosecuted for crimi-
nal anarchy. Claiming that the Party leadership had ordered him to tes-
tify, Lovestone was formally cleared of any wrongdoing by a Comintern
investigation in 1925.
423. The conference was organized by the Stalinists in solidarity with a
Comintern-supported antiwar conference held in Amsterdam in August
1932. The Militant's first article omitted any mention of the ILO's sharp
declaration at Amsterdam, which condemned the Comintern's propa-
ganda bloc with liberals and pacifists as an abandonment of an
independent proletarian perspective (Trotsky, "Declaration to the Anti-
war Congress at Amsterdam," 25 July 1932, Writings 1932, 148-155), and
uncritically reported that SYC member Manny Geltman had accepted
election to the steering committee established by the Chicago confer-
ence. A subsequent article ("Confusion Marks Stalinist Policy on Fight
Against War: Student Conference Compromises Communism in Chicago
Edition of Amsterdam; Yield on Principled Positions," Militant, 28 Janu-
ary 1933) corrected the political deficiencies of the first, but Geltman's
participation on the steering committee remained a source of contro-
versy. At the January 23 resident committee meeting, Shachtman and
Abern abstained on Cannon's motion that Geltman demonstratively with-
draw from the steering committee; it was only on February 6 that they
acceded to his withdrawal.
424. PRL.
425. PRL.
642 Notes for pages 402 to 444
426. PRL. Differently edited version in Cannon, Communist League of
America.
427. PRL.
428. G Papers, Box 1. Copyright Stanford University.
429. Cannon, "The Left Opposition at Gillespie," 11 February 1933, Com-
munist League of America, 200-205.
430. Benjamin Gitlow had just split from Lovestone's organization to
found the Workers Communist League, which liquidated into the Socialist
Party in 1934.
431. "Verblin" was Albert Goldman, at the time a Party member and
sympathizer of the Left Opposition. In a 29 February 1933 letter to
Martin Abern, Glotzer wrote that Goldman was "carrying on some agi-
tation on the question of Germany, but appears to have been spotted by
the Party" (G Papers, Box 1).
432. S Papers, Box 6, F 19.
433. Minutes of the resident committee, 29 September and 24 October
1932. We have been unable to locate minutes of the meeting in mid-
September where the resolution was first discussed.
434. Minutes of the resident committee, 3 November 1932. Swabeck
reported that in the branch executive Oehler and Basky voted for the
resolution, while Capelis, Sterling, Petras, and WTeber opposed it.
435. Cannon, "External Advances, Internal Turmoil," 11 February 1933,
Communist League of America, 209-212.
436. S Papers, Box 6, F 19.
437. Cannon's motion on the branch division was passed unanimously
in the resident committee on 15 February 1933, with Shachtman abstain-
ing only on the provision to create a city committee to coordinate the
work of the three branches.
438. PRL.
439. Shachtman to Trotsky, 3 March 1933, T Papers, 5063.
440. Minutes of the resident committee, 18 March 1933. See Trotsky,
"Germany and the USSR," 17 March 1933.
441. PRL.
442. Cannon, "Resolution on the Red Army and the German Revolu-
tion," 1 March 1933, Communist League of America, 214-220.
443. Trotsky, Social Democracy and the Wars of Intervention in Russia (1922).
Notes for pages 448 to 460 643
444. PRL. Differently edited version in Cannon, Communist League of
America.
445. The quote is from the motion Shachtman submitted to the 28 March
1933 resident committee meeting. See Shachtman, "Motion on CLA
Delegate at Gillespie," 29 March 1933 (next document).
446. "Kincaid Miners Up for Trial," Militant, 25 March 1933. See also
Glotzer to National Committee, 20 March 1933, G Papers, Box 1.
447. For more on the April Gillespie conference, see Cannon, "For a
Realistic Policy at Gillespie," 30 March 1933; "Our Work in the PMA"
and "On Collaboration with Allard," 10 April 1933, Communist League
of America, 239-242, 249-252, 253-254. See also "2nd Gillespie Meeting:
Conference Again Rejects New Federation Plan," Militant, 8 April 1933.
448. Swabeck's report recapitulated the organizational disputes in the
League since the June plenum. See "Report Submitted to Preliminary
International Conference at Paris, 4 February 1933," SWP Records, Box
1, F 9. For a general account of the preconference, see Documents of the
Fourth International, 13-43.
449. Swabeck to Cannon, 15 February 1933, B Papers, Box 9, F 4.
450. "Protokoll der Besprechung am 27. Februar 1933: Uber die Lage in
der amerikanischen League" [Transcript of the Discussion on 27 Febru-
ary 1933, On the Situation in the American League], T Papers, nonexile
section, 3510, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of Harvard Col-
lege. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supplement 1929-33.
451. The Communist Party attempted to frame the CLA for murder
when two workers died after a melee at a Party street meeting in New
York in August 1932. Earlier that day CP thugs attempted to break up a
CLA meeting on the same street corner, but League supporters left the
area in disciplined formation long before the Party's own meeting was
attacked, presumably by neighborhood anti-Communist toughs. The
League's campaign for a public hearing and trial to investigate the
charges was endorsed by the Civil Liberties Union, the CPLA, and the
IWW. The Party dropped the issue; see "Stalinists in Monstrous Frame-
Up Against Left Opposition," Militant, 27 August 1932, and minutes of
the resident committee, 1 September 1932.
452. Eastman had publicly denounced dialectical materialism, taking his
first step on the road to anticommunism. See Trotsky, "Marxism and
Eastman," 4January 1933, Writings 1932-33, 68. The dispute was brought
to the 1 December 1932 resident committee meeting, which passed
Cannon's motion that the NC was "decidedly opposed" to the New York
branch inviting Eastman to speak under its auspices. The secretary was
644 Notes for pages 467 to 484
instructed to write a letter to that effect to the New York branch. Abern
counterposed his own motion that the NC had no objection to Eastman
speaking; Shachtman was not present at the meeting.
453. T Papers, 8002, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. The French-language original is missing the final page.
We have translated from the French through section no. 10, point b; the
remainder is taken from the English version in CLA Internal Bulletin no.
13 (29 April 1933). Another translation in Trotsky, Writings 1932-33.
454. T papers, 7982.
455. The small groups that united to form the Czech ILO section in spring
1932 split apart again by the time of the International Preconference. In
addition, Alois Neurath led a split, centered in the German-speaking area
of Czechoslovakia, from the Right Opposition, claiming solidarity with
the ILO. The preconference voted, "The existence of a genuine section
of the ILO in Czechoslovakia has become illusory. It would be an inex-
cusable mistake to tolerate a fiction. We must say what is: Under
the given conditions the international Opposition finds it impossible to
make a final selection among the existing Oppositionist elements in
Czechoslovakia. Therefore the preconference regards it as necessary to
declare all the groups in Czechoslovakia which count themselves in the
Left Opposition to be sympathizing groups." See preconference resolu-
tion on the Left Opposition in Czechoslovakia, Documents of the Fourth
International, 40-41.
456. T Papers, 10561, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Original in English. A differently edited version in
Trotsky, Writings Supplement 1929-33.
457. The poll established a New York committee of Cannon, Shachtman,
and Oehler; the results were recorded in the minutes of the resident
committee, 15 February 1933.
458. Cannon to Swabeck, 19 February 1933, C Papers, Box 3, F 5.
459. T Papers, 5474.
460. T Papers, 10308, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supplement
1929-33.
461. B Papers, Series III, Box 9, F 4.
462. The preconference reorganized the International Secretariat to
include a representative from the most stable European sections: the
Russian, German, French, Belgian, and Greek.
463. See Trotsky, "The Majority Has No Right to Impatience," 7 March
1933.
Notes for pages 486 to 503 645
464. Volunteering as a Russian stenographer for Trotsky, Sara Weber
served in this capacity from June 1933 through January 1934.
465. T Papers, 8265, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supplement
1929-33.
466. Differently edited version in Trotsky, Struggle Against Fascism in
Germany.
467. Trotsky, "The Tragedy of the German Proletariat: The German
Workers Will Rise Again— Stalinism, Never!", 14 March 1933, Struggle
Against Fascism in Germany, 375-384.
468. C Papers, Box 3, F 5. Differently edited version in Cannon, Com-
munist League of America.
469. Cannon, "Concessions to the Minority," April 1933, Communist
League of America, 246-248.
470. PRL.
471. Cannon, "Concessions to the Minority," op. cit.
472. PRL.
473. Cannon, "Deadlock in the National Committee," Communist League
of America, 243-244.
474. Communist League of Struggle, "To the National Committee,
Communist League of America (Opposition)," 15 February 1933, T
Papers, 13950.
475. "Joint Meeting of League and Weisbord Lays Ground for Close
Collaboration," Militant, 8 April 1933.
476. T Papers, 467.
477. Cannon, "Our Work in the PMA," Communist League of America,
249-252.
478. Shachtman put forward the motion. Minutes of the resident com-
mittee, 3 April 1933.
479. See Shachtman, "Motion on the Illinois Mining Campaign,"
24 February 1933.
480. T Papers, 5070.
481. Cannon, "The Anti-Cannon Bloc," 30 April 1932, op. cit., 101-107.
482. Jan Frankel wrote about the October 1930 German conference
in "Die Haltung des Genossen Landau in der osterreichischen und
deutschen Fragen" [Comrade Landau's Role in the Austrian and German
646 Notes for pages 503 to 511
Questions], 6 January 1931, T Papers, 16850. He described the confer-
ence as based not on delegates elected by proportional representation,
but on "membership lists with compromised mandates." He quoted Oskar
Seipold's account of the Ludwigshafen delegation at the conference:
"Frenzel (Ludwigshafen) had 31 votes at the conference, supposedly rep-
resenting 155 members. But when I was there recently, 1 determined that
the entire palatinate has onl\ about 60 (sixty!!) members, of which at least 20
percent are drunks."
483. Trotsky, "The Negro Question in America (The Discussion in
Prinkipo)," 28 February 1933, On Black Nationalism, 20-31.
484. Shachtman, "Communism and the Negro," March 1933, T Papers,
17244.
485. Trotsky's secretaries excerpted key sections of the extensive 1930-
32 correspondence of Trotsky and Andres Nin. This was published as a
special supplement to International Bulletin of the Communist Left Opposi-
tion no. 2/3 (April 1933) and reprinted as an appendix in Trotsky. Span-
ish Revolution. 369-400.
486. Abern's report was attached to the 3 April 1933 minutes of the
resident committee. He wrote that 12 issues of the triweekly Militant were
published, with an average press run of 6,000. The New York branch
distributed on average 2,000 copies of each issue and Chicago, 500. In
all, some 24,000 copies of the triweeklv were distributed.
487. B Papers, Series III. Box 9, F 4.
488. We have been unable to locate this letter.
489. B Papers, Series III, Box 9, F 4.
490. T Papers, 7987. in French, copvright 2001 The President and
Fellows of Harvard College. Another translation in Trotskv. Writings
1932-33.
491. B Papers. Series III, Box 9. F 4.
492. Resident committee meetings of 6 and 7 April 1933. See Cannon,
"Deadlock in the National Committee." op. cit.
493. The Stalinists were preparing to replav their successful Amsterdam
Congress against war with an international congress against fascism. The
congress was eventually held in Paris, 4-6 June 1933; Left Opposition
delegates were brutally excluded. See Trotsky, "A Declaration to the Con-
gress Against Fascism from Delegates of the International Left Opposi-
tion (Bolshevik-Leninists)," April 1933, Writings 1932-33, 173-182.
494. The I.S. plenum scheduled for May 6-7 was not held until
May 13-16.
Notes for pages 512 to 533 647
495. G Papers, Box 3.
496. PRL.
497. Glotzer described the Breeze article and Allard's reply in a 16 April
1933 letter to the National Committee, attached to the April 19 resi-
dent committee minutes. Cannon wrote the Militant's response to the
redbaiting attack. See "Red-Baiting in the Illinois Mine Fields," 29 April
1933, Communist League of America, 257-259.
498. Cannon, "Our Work in the PMA," op. ci-t.
499. PRL.
500. S Papers, Box 6, F 25.
501. Trotsky, "The Tragedy of the German Proletariat: The German
Workers Will Rise Again— Stalinism, Never!", op. cit., Trotsky insisted:
"It must be said clearly, plainly, openly: Stalinism in Germany has
had its August 4. Henceforth, the advanced workers will only speak
of the period of the domination of the Stalinist bureaucracy with a
burning sense of shame, with words of hatred and curses. The offi-
cial German Communist Party is doomed. From now on it will only
decompose, crumble, and melt into the void. German Communism
can be reborn only on a new basis and with a new leadership."
502. G Papers, Box 3.
503. T Papers, 10310, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Another translation in Trotsky, Writings Supplement
1929-33.
504. Sara Weber was about to depart for Prinkipo to serve as Trotsky's
secretary.
505. B Papers, Series III, Box 9, F 4.
506. "Resolution," n.d. [April-May 1933], C Papers, Box 42, F 6. This
resolution was probably completed by Rose Karsner, since Cannon left
New York in late April to attend the Mooney congress in Chicago.
507. Swabeck was stranded in Europe for a considerable amount of time
without funds. In a 24 May 1933 letter to Swabeck (C Papers, Box 15,
F 7), Rose Karsner explained:
"Your indignation directed at Jim for not supplying you with funds
for your return, while justifiable, is somewhat misdirected. You seem
to have forgotten the situation here and the elements we deal with.
Here are some of the facts on this particular point. Not very politi-
cal, but symptomatic of the character of our opposition.
"The day Jim and Max were to leave, Field went to Rivera for a
648 Notes for pages 534 to 552
$200 loan, which both Field and Jim understood was to be divided
thus: $150 to Max and $50 to be cabled to Prinkipo for your trip to
Paris. Jim's bus was leaving at 4:30 p.m. Max knew about it. They
were to have a small meeting before he left. Field brought the check
just as Jim and I were going out to lunch. Max was already waiting
for it outside. When we came out we found Field and Max and the
check which Field turned over to Max. Not thinking that Max would
act as he did, we went on saying we would be back soon and left
Max holding the check. When we returned, no Max, no Field, no
check. Time for catching the bus was approaching and still no Max.
Finally Jim had to leave, still thinking that Max would turn the money
into the office in the regular manner and get the sum allotted him.
Instead of that, Field turned up about 4:45. When I asked about
the money he was greatly surprised, stating that he had given Max
the check and that was all he knew about it. Max came back about
5:00. I asked him for the money and he informed me that he had
cashed the check, without even getting a receipt made out to Rivera
first, and that I was under a misapprehension. That he was to get
the entire amount, and that we were to raise another $100 for you
and him which was to be sent to Paris later. Marty later corrobo-
rated this statement, though Jim's note said definitely the other way.
Anyhow, he kept the full amount and went off."
508. A photocopy of notebook entries with partial, handwritten min-
utes of the plenum, in French, is in B Papers, Box 35, F 6.
509. G Papers, Box 3. Copyright Stanford University.
510. Cannon to Shachtman, 27 April 1933, C Papers, Box 3, F 6.
511. "LO Scores at Chicago Mooney Conference," Militant, 6 May 1933;
"National Mooney Meet Lays Basis for Broad Fight," Militant, 13 May
1933.
512. Glotzer to National Committee, 10 May 1933, G Papers, Box 1.
513. A Papers, Section IV, 11:42.
514. The May ILO plenum endorsed Trotsky's call for a new party in
Germany, but the majority of the German leadership opposed it.
515. Trotsky, "A Letter to the Politburo," 15 March 1933, Writings
1932-33, 141-143.
516. Shachtman made this proposal at the 11 August 1932 resident com-
mittee meeting. Shachtman and Glotzer voted in favor, Cannon, Gor-
don, and Oehler opposed. Abern and Basky were absent.
517. A Papers, Section IV, 11:42.
Notes for pages 552 to 583 649
518. Trotsky, "It Is Necessary to Build Communist Parties and an Inter-
national Anew," 15 July 1933, Writings 1932-33, 304-311.
519. "Right Wing Move to Expel Militants from PMA," Militant, 3 June
1933; "PMA in Perspective: A Review of the Past and Signs for the
Future," Militant, 24 June 1933. Angelo was expelled in October.
520. Trotsky, "The Left Socialist Organizations and Our Tasks," 15 June
1933, Writings 1932-33, 274-278.
521. Shachtman is referring to the League's printing press.
522. G Papers, Box 1.
523. ICOR sponsored immigration of Jews to Birobidjan. The Interna-
tional Workers Order was a federation of fraternal organizations formed
in 1930 from a split in the Workmen's Circle. It provided low-cost health
and life insurance and sponsored cultural and sporting events.
524. Eastman worked on a film about the Russian Revolution, Tsar to
Lenin; quarrels with his collaborator and the resulting lawsuits delayed
its release until 1937.
525. T Papers, 15519.
526. T Papers, 8266, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Original in English. Differently edited version in
Trotsky, Writings Supplement 1929-33.
527. A Papers, Section IV, 11:42.
528. The "Pepperiade" was the 1923-24 period of John Pepper's influ-
ence in the American Communist Party (then known as the Workers
Party). In fall 1923, the emerging Cannon-Foster faction insisted on
moving Party headquarters from New York to Chicago as part of their
successful effort to wrest control from the Lovestone-Ruthenberg-
Pepper faction. On Lovestone's initiative Party headquarters moved back
to New York in 1927.
529. Gastonia, North Carolina was the center of a militant CP-led tex-
tile workers strike in 1929.
530. The New York CLA organized the Greek workers group Protomagia
in fall 1932. Around the same time Chicago supporters of the CLA
founded the Friends of the Militant Club to organize fundraising and
other activities on behalf of the paper.
531. PRL.
532. We have been unable to locate minutes of resident committee meet-
ings between 7 April and 23 November 1933.
533. G Papers, Box 3.
650 Notes for pages 585 to 600
534. The June 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (NRA) was the
early centerpiece of the Roosevelt administration's economic program.
Drafted during a nationwide strike wave in the first months of 1933, the
NRA's Section 7. a. recognized the right of workers to organize unions,
bargain collectively, and pick their union representatives without com-
pany interference. A strike was sweeping the New Jersey silk industry at
the time Shachtman wrote this letter.
An "Open Letter to All Party Members" was adopted by the
Extraordinary National Conference of the CP in early July and published
in the 13 July 1933 Daily Worker. Complaining that "work in the refor-
mist trade unions has in general been neglected by the Communists,"
the letter advocated the united-front tactic and rooting the party in major
factories and industrial locations.
535. G papers, Box 3.
536. Glotzer to Shachtman and Abern, 23 September 1933, G Papers,
Box 1.
537. Shachtman is referring to "The Declaration of Four" (26 August
1933), submitted to a conference of left-socialist and Communist organi-
zations held in Paris, 27-28 August 1933. See Trotsky, Writings 1933-
34, 49-52.
538. Trotsky to International Secretariat, 22 September 1933, T Papers,
7996.
539. Differently edited version in Trotsky, Writings Supplement 1929-33.
540. T Papers, 5074.
541. Shachtman to Trotsky, 7 September 1933, T Papers, 5073.
542. The League's negotiations with Gitlow's Workers Communist
League soon deadlocked over the WCL's refusal to endorse "The Decla-
ration of Four" or make a clear statement against "socialism in one coun-
try"; see Cannon to Trotsky, 24 October 1933, T Papers, 471. Gitlow's
group joined the SP in 1934.
543. T Papers, 10562, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College.
544. T Papers, 10313, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. First three paragraphs translated from Russian by PRL,
final paragraph from English version in the archive. Another transla-
tion in Trotsky, Writings Supplement 1929-33.
545. The New International did not begin publication until July 1934.
546. T Papers, 5477.
Notes for pages 601 to 606 651
547. Swabeck reported that the League had added about 150 members
and a number of new branches in the past year; membership now stood
at 350 in 26 branches. The Spartacus Youth Clubs had nearly 200 mem-
bers. CLA workers clubs were active in Chicago and Kansas City, with
an Italian club in Chicago and Greek and Jewish clubs in New York.
Negotiations toward forming a new party were continuing with the Gitlow
group and the United Workers Party, a recent split from the Proletarian
Party centered in Chicago. See Swabeck, "Report on the Communist
League of America (Opposition)," 15 December 1933, T Papers, 17298.
548. T Papers, 10315, copyright 2001 The President and Fellows of
Harvard College. Translation from Russian by PRL.
549. Relations with Weisbord atrophied while leading CLA NC mem-
bers were out of town in spring and summer 1933. Cannon proposed in
September that the two groups hold a joint public meeting and appoint
committees on unification (Cannon to Glotzer, 25 September 1933, G
Papers, Box 2). Weisbord claimed to support the turn toward a new party,
but his public attacks on the League continued. After issuing a trade-
union thesis that endorsed the Stalinist "red" unions, the CLS physi-
cally attacked two CLA members, leading to a breakoff of negotiations.
See Swabeck, "Report of the Communist League of America (Opposi-
tion)," 15 December 1933, T Papers, 17298.
Soon after he wrote this letter to Shachtman, Trotsky met with a
youth representative of the CLS. He subsequently wrote to Weisbord:
"In your last letter of December 26 you declare that you are ready at
any moment to fuse with the League without any preliminary orga-
nizational demands whatsoever and that you agree in disputed ques-
tions to subordinate yourself to our international organization. All
this sounds perfectly good, and with this text in hand I would have
been ready to immediately raise the question before the I.S. on prac-
tical steps toward your unification with our American section.
"But in this very same letter you remark, as if in passing, 'We think
that the American League is not a true section of the Left Opposi-
tion, that it carries out policies entirely counterposcd to the spirit
of the new International.' If this is your opinion, how can you fuse
with the American League?"
— Trotsky to Weisbord, 29 January 1934, T Papers, 10861, transla-
tion from Russian by PRL.
Trotsky concluded that the plan for unification between the two
groups was no longer realistic. The Communist League of Struggle
flirted briefly with the Gitlow and Field groups in 1934.
652
Glossary
Abern, Martin (1898-1949) Joined SP youth in Minneapolis, 1912;
SP, 1915; I WW, 1916; served prison term for refusing to register
for WWI; founding American Communist, on central committee
almost continuously from 1920; national secretary of CP youth,
1922-24; CP Chicago organizer, 1924-26; ILD assistant national
secretary, 1926-28; delegate to CI Fourth Congress and YCI Third
Congress and elected to YCI executive, 1922; member of CP
Cannon faction; expelled from CP in 1928 for Trotskyism; found-
ing member of CLA and on NC, 1929-34; a leader of Shachtman
faction in 1931-33 fight; continued cliquist opposition to Cannon
thereafter; founding member of WPUS and on NC, 1934-36;
entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding member of SWP
and on NC, 1938-40; split from Trotskyist movement with
Shachtman in 1940; elected to NC of Shachtmanite Workers Party,
1940; remained inveterate cliquist in WP until his death.
Adler, Victor (1852-1918) Leader of Austrian Social Democracy;
launched its first newspaper, Gleichheit (Equality), 1886; represen-
tative of United Austrian Labor Party at First Congress of Second
International, 1889; member of Austrian parliament, 1902-18;
opposed Bernsteinian revisionism but sought conciliation;
supported Austria in WWI; foreign minister of Austria for several
days prior to his death.
Allard, Germinal (Gerry) (1908-1965) Miner active in "Save the
Union" campaign, Illinois coalfields, 1927-28; founder of National
Miners Union and organizer in Colorado; expelled from CP for
protesting Cannon's expulsion, 1928; supported Militant for a few
months but rejoined CP, 1929; left CP after disastrous NMU strike
and joined CLA, 1931; leader of PMA and editor of Progressive
Miner, 1932-33; left CLA to join CPLA, 1933; founding member
of WPUS, 1934; entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936; remained in
SP after expulsion of Trotskyists.
American Federation of Labor (AFL) Trade-union federation, pri-
marily of craft unions, founded in 1881, led by Samuel Gompers,
Glossary 653
1885-1924. In 1935 John L. Lewis of the UMW initiated the Com-
mittee of Industrial Organizations within the AFL to organize
workers along industrial lines, leading to a split and the formation
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1938. The two
organizations merged in 1955 to form the AFL-CIO.
American Workers Party (AWP) Successor organization to CPLA;
founded as Provisional Organizing Committee for the American
Workers Party in December 1933; led by A.J. Muste; AWP and af-
filiated unemployed leagues led successful Toledo Auto-Lite strike,
spring 1934; fused with CLA to form WPUS, December 1934.
Amsterdam Congress Stalinist-organized antiwar congress, an
opportunist bloc with liberals and pacifists, held in Amsterdam,
27-29 August 1932; ILO intervened to fight for political indepen-
dence of proletariat and against pacifist illusions.
Andrade, Juan Rodriguez (1897-1981) A leader of Madrid Young
Socialists who supported Russian Revolution and call for Third
International, 1918; founding member of Spanish CP and editor of
El Comunista, 1920-26; imprisoned in 1921, 1923, and 1924
for Communist activity; expelled from CP for support to Russian
United Opposition, 1927; founding member of Spanish Left Oppo-
sition and editor of its journal, Comunismo; founder of POUM and
member of its central committee and executive committee, 1935-
38; POUM representative to Madrid Popular Front Committee,
1936; with Franco's victory, fled to France, where he spent WWII
in concentration camps; attempted to revive POUM after WWII; be-
came a supporter of Pabloite Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire.
Angelo, Joseph A leader of National Miners Union from Spring-
field, Illinois; expelled from CP for protesting Cannon's expul-
sion, 1928; founding member of CLA; active in PMA, 1932-33;
expelled from PMA in anti-Communist purge, October 1933.
Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Committee An ongoing alli-
ance of the Russian trade unions with the British Trades Union
Congress (TUC), founded in 1925 and maintained by Stalin and
the Comintern as the TUC tops betrayed the 1926 British Gen-
eral Strike. The TUC walked out of the Committee in 1927.
Appeal to Reason Independent weekly, blending populist tradition
with socialism; published in Kansas, 1895-1917; only U.S. socialist
654 CLA 1931-33
journal ever to achieve circulation of more than half a million a
week.
Arbeiterstimme (Workers Voice) Biweekly organ of Communist Party
of Austria (Opposition), founded and led by Frey after his expul-
sion from Austrian CP; published 1927-33.
Archio-Marxists Organization expelled from Greek CP in 1924;
took name from its journal, Archives of Marxism, begun in 1923, that
sought to make Marxist classics available in Greek; grew close to
views of Russian Left Opposition during 1920s and began publish-
ing Trotsky's works in Greek; applied to join ILO in June 1930;
renamed Organization of Bolshevik-Leninists of Greece (Opposi-
tionists), fall 1930; represented on ILO I.S. by Myrtos, mid-1931 to
June 1932, and Witte, July 1932 to September 1933; Witte broke
with ILO over turn to building new parties and new international;
Archio-Marxists split, with majority under Vitsoris adhering to
Trotskyists while minority under Witte joined London Bureau, 1934.
Bartolomeo, Nicola Di (Fosco) (1901-1946) Joined Italian SP
youth, 1915; founding Italian Communist, 1921; imprisoned for
antimilitarist activity, 1922-26; in exile in France from 1927; sup-
ported Bordiga's Left Faction and expelled from Italian CP, 1928;
led pro-Trot skyist faction among Bordigists from 1930; joined New
Italian Opposition (NOI) in August 1931; metalworker active in
CGTU; with NOFs dissolution, formed group around journal La
Nostra Parola, 1934; entered Italian SP with ILO, 1935; fought in
POUM militia in Spanish Civil War, 1936-37; joined Molinier's
group upon return to France, 1938; arrested by French police,
1939; released in 1940, but was soon rearrested and handed over
to Italian fascists; released in August 1943, led a Naples group
that merged with Bordigist remnant of Italian CP to found Partito
Operaio Comunista, Italian section of Fourth International, 1945.
The POC was expelled from the FI for ultraleftism in 1948.
Basky, Louis (1882-1938) Veteran of 1919 Hungarian Revolution;
emigrated to U.S. and became leader of CP Hungarian Federa-
tion in 1920s; he and a group of supporters, expelled from CP in
1927-28, were independently won to Trotskyism by Russian
Oppositionists in New York; founding member of CLA; co-opted
briefly to CLA NC, 1932; founding member of WPUS; expelled
with Oehler in late 1935; a leader of Oehler's Revolutionary
Glossary 655
Workers League (RWL); expelled with Stamm from RWL in 1938,
shortly before his death.
Bernstein, Eduard (1850-1932) A leader of German Social
Democracy (SPD), 1875-1928; originator and chief proponent of
revisionist current holding that socialism could be brought about
by the peaceful evolution of capitalism; authored Die Voraus-
setzungen des Sozialismus {Evolutionary Socialism), 1899; with Kautsky,
Engels' literary executor; served in Reichstag several times between
1902 and 1918; adopted pacifist stand during WWI and voted
against war credits, 1915; joined Kautsky's USPD, 1917; rejoined
SPD, 1918; re-elected to Reichstag, 1920-28.
Bittelman, Alexander (1890-1982) Member of Jewish Bund in
Russia; emigrated to U.S., 1912; a leader of SP Jewish Federation
and founding American Communist; leader of CP Jewish Federa-
tion and Foster's chief factional lieutenant, 1924-28; CI represen-
tative to India, 1929-31; head of CP Jewish Bureau during WWII;
imprisoned under Smith Act in 1950s; expelled from CP as "revi-
sionist," 1959.
Blackwell, Russell (Rosalio Negrete) (1904-1969) Member of cen-
tral committee of Mexican Young Communist League, expelled
for support to LO, 1930; arrested and deported from Mexico, 1930;
in New York, acted as Spanish secretary for CLA contact with Latin
America, 1930; supported Weisbord in New York branch, Decem-
ber 1930; during period of evident demoralization left CLA in
early 1931; readmitted to CLA, January 1933; founding member,
WPUS; supported Oehler faction and expelled from WPUS, 1935;
founding member of Oehler's Revolutionary Workers League; in
Spain during Spanish Civil War, 1936-39; arrested and held by
Republican government for several months; broke with RWL after
return, arguing that Spanish Stalinism was embryo of fascism; a
founder of anarchist Libertarian League, 1954.
Blasco Pseudonym of Pietro Tresso.
Bleeker, Sylvia (1901-1988) Born in Byelorussia, became parti-
san of Bolsheviks, 1917; emigrated to U.S., 1920; met lifelong com-
panion, Morris Lewit, on ship; as milliner, active in NYC garment
unions; joined CP; supporter of Foster faction, 1925-29; attended
Muste's Brookwood Labor College, 1925-26; won to Trotskyism
656 CLA 1931-33
and expelled from CP, 1930; joined CLA, 1930; active in Needle
Trades Workers Industrial Union, 1930; editorial board, Unser
Kamf, 1932-33; supported Shachtman faction in CLA fight; with
Shachtman, went over to collaboration with Cannon, 1934;
founding member of WPUS; entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936-
37; founding member of SWP; supported Cannon in 1939-40
fight; manager of Pioneer Publishers during WWII; alternate SWP
NC member during WWII; in Europe with Lewit reestablishing
ties with local Trotskyists, 1947-48; NY branch SWP leader, 1950s;
retired from party activity, early 1960s.
Bordiga, Amadeo (1889-1970) Leader of left wing of Italian SP,
1918-21; founding leader of Italian CP, 1921; elected to ECCI,
1922; delegate to CI Fourth Congress, 1922, and Fifth Congress,
1924; leader of Left Faction of Italian CP opposed to New
Economic Policy in USSR, tactic of the united front, and struggle
for democratic demands; lost leadership of Italian CP, 1926;
imprisoned in Italy, 1926-29; expelled from Italian CP, 1930;
Bordiga's followers in exile, represented by Prometeo Group,
adhered to ILO, 1930-33; he abstained from political activity,
1930-43; thereafter resumed writing and participated in various
ultraleft groupings.
Bordigists Followers of Amadeo Bordiga in Italy in 1920s and
1930s; organized in exile as the Prometeo Group.
Brandler, Heinrich (1881-1967) Bricklayer; Social Democrat from
1901; member of Spartakusbund, 1915-19; founding German
Communist, 1918, and member of central committee, 1919-24;
leader of CP during aborted revolution of 1923; scapegoated by
Zinoviev and Stalin and removed from leadership, 1924; expelled
for organizing Right Opposition, January 1929; leader of Com-
munist Party Opposition (KPO), German section of Right
Opposition; leader of International Right Opposition in exile in
Paris after Nazi victory; KPO disintegrated after fall of France in
1940; spent WWII in Cuba; returned to West Germany in 1948.
Browder, Earl (1891-1973) SP member, 1907-12; worked with
Foster's Syndicalist League, 1912-15; rejoined SP as left-winger
after Russian Revolution; edited Workers World with Cannon
in Kansas City, 1919; imprisoned for conspiracy, 1919-21;
joined Communist movement, 1921; Foster factional lieutenant,
Glossary 657
1924-28; worked in Moscow and on CI assignment, 1926-28;
American CP general secretary, 1930-45; expelled for "opportun-
ism," 1946.
Buehler, August A. (Shorty) (1878-1934) I WW member from at
least 1913; supporter of SP left wing in Kansas City during WWI;
founding American Communist; leader of CP in Kansas City and
member of district executive committee; expelled for protesting
Cannon's expulsion, 1928; founding member of CLA; ran radical
bookstore in Kansas City.
Bukharin, Nikolai (1888-1938) Bolshevik from 1906; elected to
Central Committee, 1917; editor of Pravda, 1918-26; head of
Comintern, 1926-29; leading exponent of concessions to private
peasant enterprise, 1925-28; allied with Stalin against Trotsky-
Zinoviev United Opposition, 1926-28; ousted from leadership
posts, 1929; capitulated to Stalin and became Izvestia editor in chief,
1933-37; arrested, 1937; convicted in third Moscow Trial; executed.
Burnham, James (1905-1986) Philosophy professor at New York
University; was influenced by Sidney Hook and joined Musteite
AWP; founding member of WPUS and on NC, 1934-36; co-editor
with Shachtman of New International, 1934-40; entered SP with
Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding member of SWP and on NC, 1938-
40; ideological leader of SWP minority in 1939-40 faction fight;
broke with Marxism and resigned from Shachtman' s Workers
Party, May 1940; prominent cold warrior in late 1940s; founding
editorial board member of right-wing National Review, 1955.
Cannon, James Patrick (1890-1974) Joined SP, 1908; joined IWW,
1911; IWW agitator and organizer in Midwest, 1912-14; active in
Kansas City IWW, 1914-19; joined pro-Bolshevik SP left wing,
1919; founding American Communist and chairman of first legal
CP 1921-23; in Moscow 1922-23, serving on presidium of Com-
munist International, June-November 1922; CP central commit-
tee, 1920-28; coleader with Foster of Cannon-Foster faction, 1924-
25; led own faction, 1925-28; won to Trotskyism at CI Sixth
Congress, summer 1928; expelled in October for his views; found-
ing leader of CLA, 1929; principal leader and member of NC of
American Trotskyist organizations for next 25 years; indicted under
Smith Act, 1941; imprisoned, 1944; retired as SWP national sec-
retary in 1953; remained national chairman until his death.
658 CLA 1931-33
Capelis, Herbert Member of New York CLA branch from 1930;
dental technician; worked in ILD until expelled in 1931; co-opted
to National Youth Committee, January 1932; secretary of New York
CLA branch. 1932.
Carlson, Oliver National secretary of SP vouth from 1919; broke
with SP and went to Moscow in 1921, where he helped found Young
Communist International; national secretary of American CP
vouth group, 1922; representative to YCI in Moscow. 1923-24;
founding member of CLA and alternate member of NC, 1929,
but was suspended for indiscipline later that year; joined AWT,
1934: opposed fusion with CLA; became teacher and author.
Carmody, Jack Former Irish nationalist; member of CLA in
New York: toured Illinois coalfields for CLA, fall 1932; Cannon
supporter.
Carter, Joseph (1910-1970) Pseudonym of Joseph Friedman.
Joined SP youth, 1924; fought for unity with Communists and sup-
ported CP slate in 1927 elections; joined CP youth, 1928; leader
of City College of New York fraction: expelled from CP vouth,
1928; founding member of CLA; leader of SYCs and editorial
board member of Young Spartacus; generally supported Shachtman
faction in 1931-33 fight: founding member of WTUS and on NC,
1936; founding member of SWT and alternate member of NC,
1938-40; split from Trotskyist movement with Shachtman, 1940;
leading member of Shachtman's Workers Partv in 1940s; left
Shachtmanites in early 1950s.
Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) Chinese linguist and professor at Beijing
University; a leader of Mav 4 Movement against imperialism, 1919;
founding Chinese Communist and general secretary, 1921-27;
delegate to CI Fourth Congress, 1922; despite misgivings, acceded
to Stalinist policv of entering Guomindang and subordinating
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to nationalist leadership, the
policv which shipwrecked Second Chinese Revolution, 1925-27;
resigned from CCP leadership. 1927: won to Trotskyism and
expelled from CCP, 1929; led Trotskyist group around journal Pro-
letarian, which united with three other pro-ILO groups to found
Communist League of China, Mav 1931; arrested by Guomindang,
1932, and sentenced to 13 years; released in 1937; his relation-
ship to Trotskyist movement grew increasingly attenuated as Chen
Glossary 659
advocated "democratic" alliance with bourgeois forces against
Japan; broke with Trotskyism, rejecting defense of USSR, and
supported "democratic" imperialists in WWII.
Clarke, George (1913-1964) Expelled from CP youth, 1928; found-
ing member, CLA; Midwest field organizer, 1931-32; supporter
of Cannon faction; founding member of WPUS and on NC, 1934-
36; entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding member of
SWP and on NC, 1938-53; Detroit SWP organizer, 1938-39;
SWP maritime fraction in 1940s; editor of Fourth International,
1949-53; SWP representative in Europe and delegate to FI Third
Congress, 1951; coleader with Bert Cochran in 1953 split
from SWP.
Collinet, Michel (Paul Sizoff ) (1904-1977) Joined French CP youth,
1925; collaborated on La Lutte des classes, 1928; founding member
of La Verite, 1929, and Ligue Communiste, 1930; member of
executive committee of Opposition Unitaire; quit Ligue in opposi-
tion to Trotsky on trade-union question; founder and member of
Gauche Communiste and its successor, Fraction de la Gauche
Communiste, 1931-33; joined French SP, 1935; published POUM
French paper La Revolution espagnole, 1936; expelled from SP as
supporter of Pivert's left wing, 1938; member of Pivert's centrist
organization, 1938-39; member of Resistance during WWII; active
in Force Ouvriere, CIA-sponsored split from CGT, post-WWII;
author of several historical and sociological books.
Communist International (CI, Comintern) Also known as Third
International. International revolutionary organization founded
on Lenin's initiative in Moscow, 1919; national Communist par-
ties were sections of the international. Underwent degeneration
after 1923 as Stalin faction consolidated control of Soviet state;
dissolved by Stalin in 1943.
Communistes Greek-language journal published by CLA from
December 1931 through at least November 1932.
Confederation Generale du Travail Unitaire (CGTU) French
trade-union federation that originated in 1921 split from reformist-
led trade-union federation, Confederation Generale du Travail
(CGT); comprising syndicalists, anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists,
and Communists, affiliated with RILU in November 1922; under
660 CLA 1931-33
leadership of French CP from late 1923; returned to CGT in 1936
with the Stalinist turn to popular front.
Conference for Progressive Labor Action (CPLA) Founded in
1929 by Muste; heterogeneous group of leftward-moving workers,
unemployed, and intellectuals; changed name to American Work-
ers Party, December 1933. (See also AWP.)
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) Federation of indus-
trial unions originating in 1935 as Committee for Industrial
Organization of American Federation of Labor, led by Lewis of
UMW. ClO-affiliated unions were expelled from the AFL in 1938;
the two reunited in 1955 to form the AFL-CIO.
Coover, Oscar (1887-1950) Member of SP, 1904-07; electrical
worker and delegate to Minneapolis Central Labor Union, 1912-
24; joined Communist movement, 1919; local secretary of Rail-
road Shopmen's Strike Committee, 1922; blacklisted from indus-
try; expelled from Minneapolis CLU for Communist activity, 1924;
member of Minneapolis CP executive committee, 1922-24 and
1927-28; expelled from CP, November 1928; founding member
of CLA and alternate on NC, 1931-34; founding member of
WPUS, 1934-36; entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding
SWPer and leader of Minneapolis branch; one of 18 SWP leaders
imprisoned for opposition to WWII, 1944.
Cowl, Carl (1900-1997) Founding member of CP youth, 1919;
member of Minneapolis CP youth expelled for Trotskyism, 1928;
founding member of CLA; main Shachtman faction operative in
Minneapolis, 1932-33; founding member of WPUS; supporter of
Oehler faction, 1934-35; founding member of Oehler's Revolu-
tionary Workers League, 1935; expelled from RWL with Basky
and Stamm in 1938; part of Stamm's organization, also called
RWL, 1938 into 1940s; quit politics and became musicologist; in
1980s joined state-capitalist International Socialist Organization.
Dunne, Miles (1896-1958) Brother of William and Vincent Dunne;
won to communism while in U.S. army in WWI; founding Ameri-
can Communist and leading member of Minneapolis branch;
expelled from CP for opposing Cannon's expulsion, 1928; a leader
of Minneapolis Teamster strikes, 1934; organizer for Teamsters
and leader of strike in Fargo, North Dakota, 1934; editor of
Glossary 661
Northwest Organizer, secretary-treasurer and then president of Min-
neapolis Teamster Local 544, one of 29 leaders of Teamsters and
SWP indicted under Smith Act in 1941; acquitted in trial.
Dunne, Vincent R. (1889-1970) Brother of William and Miles
Dunne; founding member of I WW; joined Communist movement
in 1920; prominent Communist in Minneapolis labor movement;
supporter of Cannon faction; expelled from CP as Trotskyist, 1928;
founding member of CLA and on NC, 1929-34; founding
member of WPUS and on NC, 1934-36; central leader of 1934
Minneapolis Teamster strikes; entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936-
37; founding member of SWP and on NC from 1938; acting
national labor secretary, 1943; one of 18 SWP leaders indicted
in 1941 under Smith Act; imprisoned, 1944; leader of SWP until
his death.
Dunne, William F. (Bill) (1887-1953) Brother of Vincent and Miles
Dunne; SP member from 1910 and union leader in Butte, Mon-
tana; joined Communist movement, 1919; member of CP leading
body, 1922-28; representative to CI, 1924-25; alternate member
of ECCI, 1925-28; Daily Worker coeditor, 1924-27; close collabo-
rator of Cannon and coleader of Cannon faction, 1925-28;
remained in CP after Cannon's expulsion; expelled in 1946 for
"left deviationism."
Eastman, Max (1883-1969) SP member and Masses editor from
1912; member of SP left wing but did not join Communist move-
ment; publicized views of Trotsky's Left Opposition in U.S. in Since
Lenin Died and The Real Situation in Russia; translator of several
of Trotsky's books; helped finance early CLA; argued against
dialectical materialism in early 1930s and turned sharply right dur-
ing Moscow Trials; became Readers Digest editor during WWII.
Edwards, John Member of SP left wing in Michigan, 1919; found-
ing American Communist; delegate to Young Communist Inter-
national Second Congress, 1922; attended CI Fifth Congress, 1924;
member of brickmakers union in Chicago; expelled from CP, 1928;
founding member of CLA and alternate on NC, 1931-34; close
collaborator of Clotzer in Chicago, 1932-34; made pretense of
being in separate "Chicago group," but supported Shachtman fac-
tion on all essentials in 1931-33 fight.
662 CLA 1931-33
Felix (1900-1943) Pseudonym of Michiel Mazliak. Polish fur worker
active in French CP Jewish section; expelled from CP, 1928; mem-
ber of editorial board of Paz' Contre le courant, 1929; defended USSR
in Chinese Eastern Railroad dispute and joined Ligue Communiste,
1930; leader of Jewish Group; member of Ligue executive commit-
tee, 1931; initially supported Molinier on trade-union question, but
led Jewish Group in its efforts to collaborate with Rosmer, late 1931;
split to join Gauche Communiste, 1933; founder and member of
Union Communiste, 1933-39; arrested by Nazis, 1942; executed in
concentration camp, 1943.
Field, B.J. (1900-1977) Economist and statistician; joined CLA,
1931; expelled for indiscipline, 1932; visited Trotsky in Turkey,
1932; regained CLA membership, March 1933, and was assigned
to organize support for CLA among intellectuals; subsequently
assigned to CLA hotel and restaurant workers fraction; leader of
1934 New York hotel strike when he was expelled from CLA for
indiscipline; later formed League for a Revolutionary Workers Party
and published New International Bulletin irregularly from October
1935 to March 1937; expelled from LRWP and quit politics for
real estate. Following Field's expulsion, the LRWP vanished.
Fischer, Ruth (1895-1961) Founding member and leader of
Austrian CP, 1918; member of German CP left wing from 1919;
elected to central committee, 1923; promoted to coleadership of
party with Maslow after removal of Brandler, 1924; expelled from
German CP for support to Russian United Opposition, 1926; par-
ticipated in founding conference of Leninbund, April 1928, but
left a month later and sought i eadmission to KPD. as a consequence
of Zinoviev's capitulation to Stalin; in exile in Paris after Hitler's
victory, joined Trotskyists and was member of ILO I.S., 1934-36;
resided in U.S. from 1941; author of self-serving Stalin and German
Communism (1948).
Fosco Pseudonym of Nicola Di Bartolomeo.
Foster, William Z. (1881-1961) Member of SP, 1901-09; mem-
ber of I WW, 1909-11; founded Syndicalist League to "bore
from within" AFL, 1912; led 1919 Chicago meatpacking organiz-
ing drive and national steel strike; founded TUEL, 1920; delegate
to founding conference of RILU, 1921; joined CP, 1921; on CP
leading body from 1922; coleader with Cannon of Cannon-Foster
Glossary 663
faction, 1924-25; led own faction, 1925-28; passed over for party
leadership after Lovestone's expulsion in favor of Browder; CP
chairman, 1945-57.
Frank, Pierre (1905-1984) Engineer; joined French CP, 1925;
supported Russian United Opposition, 1927; founding member of
La Verite, 1929, and Ligue Communiste, 1930; member of execu-
tive committee, 1930-32; leader with R. Molinier of Ligue faction
that supported Trotsky on trade-union question; member of ILO
Administrative Secretariat, 1931; Trotsky's secretary, July 1932-April
1933; leader of French Trotskyists during entry into French SP, 1934-
35; expelled from Trotskyist movement with R. Molinier for pub-
lishing their own paper (La Commune), 1935; rejoined Trotskyists
briefly before being expelled again, 1936; coleader of centrist
Molinier group opposing French Trotskyists, 1936-39; condemned
to prison for antiwar activity, fled to Britain, 1940; worked with
Workers International League before being interned in Britain,
1940-43; founding member of reunified French Trotskyist organi-
zation, 1944; member of CC from 1946; member of I.S. of Fourth
International; part of revisionist current led by Michel Pablo that
destroyed FI, 1951-53; leading member of Pablo's United Secre-
tariat until retirement in 1979.
Frankel, Jan (1906-1984) Joined Czechoslovakian CP in 1923;
cofounder of Czechoslovakian Left Opposition, 1927; delegate to
first international ILO conference, April 1930; Trotsky's secretary,
April 1930-January 1933; sent to work in Germany as Hitler con-
solidated power, he was expelled from the country in February
1934; served on ILO I.S., 1934; led efforts to unify Czechoslovakian
Left Opposition groups, 1935-36; Trotsky's secretary in Norway,
June-October 1935 and again in Mexico, February-October 1937;
sole other witness besides Trotsky at 1937 Dewey Commission
hearings; moved to U.S. in 1937 and became member of SWP; left
SWP with Shachtman in 1940; member of Shachtman organization
until 1941.
Freiheit (Morgenfreiheit) Daily Yiddish newspaper published by
American CP beginning in 1922; gradually broke with CP during
Cold War; ceased publication in 1988.
Frey, Josef (1882-1957) Founder of Austrian Social Democrats'
student organization; editor for central SP publications before
664 CLA 1931-33
1914; officer in Austrian army in WWI; chairman of Viennese
Soldiers Council and commander of Red Guards, 1918; expelled
from SP for electoral support to CP, October 1920; leader of Aus-
trian CP from January 1921; expelled from CP as supporter of
United Opposition, January 1927; with Landau, founded Commu-
nist Party of Austria (Opposition), 1927; expelled Landau, 1928;
in competition with Landau's group, sought recognition as Aus-
trian section of ILO until 1932; renamed group Union of Struggle
for the Liberation of the Working Class and reorganized it as clan-
destine cells, 1934; emigrated to Switzerland, 1938; supported
"democratic" imperialists in WWII. His supporters continued as
a tiny sect long after his death.
Gauche Communiste Group formed in 1931 by split from Ligue
Communiste on trade-union question; led by Collinet and Claude
Naville (brother of P. Naville); collaborated with Rosmer; published
Le Bulletin de la gauche communiste', had international ties with
Landau.
Geltman, Emanuel (Manny Garrett) (1914-1995) Joined CLA in
1929; leader of New York SYC; supporter of Shachtman faction
in 1931-33 fight; founding member of WPUS, 1934-36; editor of
Young Spartacus, 1935; entered SP with Trotskyists and helped win
leadership of SP youth, 1936-37; founding member of SWP;
attended founding conference of Fourth International, 1938; split
from SWP in 1940 with Shachtman; in Shachtman's Workers Party,
managing editor of Labor Action, 1940-41, editor, 1941-43 and
1946-49; quit Shachtman's organization in 1953; with Irving
Howe, founding member of editorial board of anticommunist
Dissent magazine, with which he was associated until his death.
Gerard, Francis Pseudonym of Gerard Rosenthal.
Giganti, Joe Recruited to Communist movement in early 1920s
by Abern; member of barbers union; Foster faction supporter;
Chicago ILD secretary, 1928; expelled from CP in 1928 for writ-
ing a letter to Abern; joined Chicago CLA, 1930; founding mem-
ber of WPUS; expelled with Oehler in 1935; rejoined Trotskyist
movement a few years later, but left again with Goldman-Morrow
faction in 1946.
Glossary 665
Gitlow, Benjamin (1891-1965) Joined SP youth, 1907, and SP,
1909; founding American Communist; jailed for criminal
syndicalism, 1919-22; trade-union spokesman for Ruthenberg-
Lovestone faction; expelled with Lovestone in 1929; split from
Lovestone with supporters, 1933; briefly flirted with CLA
before joining SP, 1934; was government "witness" during anti-
Communist witchhunt trials in 1940s and 1950s.
Glotzer, Albert (Albert Gates) (1908-1999) Joined CP youth, 1923;
leader of Chicago CP district; member of CP youth national
executive, 1927-28; supporter of CP Cannon faction; expelled from
CP for Trotskyism in 1928; founding CLA member and on NC,
1929-34; member of editorial committee of Young Spar tacus, 1932;
supporter of Shachtman faction in 1931-33 fight; founding member
of WPUS and on NC, 1934-36; leading member of Abern clique;
entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding member of SWP
and on NC, 1938-40; split from Trotskyist movement with
Shachtman in 1940; leader of Shachtmanite organization, 1940-
57; entered SP-SDF with Shachtman, 1958, and shared his subse-
quent political evolution; a member of anticommunist Democratic
Socialists of America at time of death.
Goldman, Albert (1897-1960) Lawyer; left CP in 1933 in opposi-
tion to CI's failure to fight Hitler's ascension to power; joined CLA
but opposed fusion with AWP and joined SP instead; publisher of
Socialist Appeal, which he turned over to Trotskyists when they
entered SP in 1936; founding member of SWP and on NC, 1938-
46; Trotsky's U.S. attorney; chief defense counsel of 29 leaders of
Teamsters and SWP indicted under Smith Act, 1941; also a defen-
dant, he was imprisoned, 1944; coleader with Felix Morrow of
faction that sought accommodation to "democratic" imperialism,
1943-46; left SWP and joined Shachtman's Workers Party, 1946;
left WP and rejoined SP, 1948; became anticommunist and sup-
ported U.S. in Korean War.
Gomez, Manuel (1895-1989) Pseudonym of Charles Shipman
(Phillips). A founder of Mexican CP; delegate from Mexico to CI
Second Congress, 1920; representative of RILU in Central
America, 1920-22; active in Chicago CP, 1922-25; secretary for
CP-led Ail-American Anti-Imperialist League, 1925-28; supporter
of Cannon faction; remained in CP after expulsion of Trotskyists;
666 CLA 1931-33
expelled in 1932, but remained active in CP cultural activities until
1937; denounced by CP for opposing Moscow Trials, 1937; became
financial analyst and railroad executive.
Gordon, Sam (1910-1982) Won to Left Opposition as student at
City College of New York, 1928; wrote articles for Militant while
traveling in Germany, 1929; joined CLA, 1930; Cannon supporter
in CLA fight; worked on Militant staff, 1931; briefly co-opted to
CLA NC, 1932; field organizer in Pennsylvania, 1932-33; found-
ing member of WPUS and on NC, 1934-36; entered SP with
Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding member of SWP and on NC, 1939-
40; administrative secretary of Fourth International in New York,
1940-41; sailed in merchant marine during WWII; FI IEC in New
York, 1940-45, and in Paris, 1946-47; member of New York SWP,
1948-52; lived in England from 1952.
Gorkin, Julian (1902-1987) Pseudonym of Julian Garcia Gomez.
As member of Spanish CP youth, worked in Moscow in 1920s;
briefly joined OCE; became a leader of Maurin's Workers and Peas-
ants Bloc; a founding leader of POUM, 1935-39; POUM interna-
tional secretary from July 1936; tried and convicted of "conspiracy"
by Republican government, 1938; escaped from prison on eve of
Franco's victory and fled to France; joined Spanish SP in exile.
Gould, Nathan (1913-1977) Expelled from Chicago CP youth and
joined SYC, 1931; member of SYL NC and by 1935 SYL national
secretary; founding member of WPUS, 1934-36; entered SP with
Trotskyists, 1936-37; became secretary of Chicago Young Peoples
Socialist League, 1936; founding member of SWT; delegate with
Cannon and Shachtman at founding conference of Fourth Interna-
tional, September 1938; member of FI leading body and of SWP
NC, 1939-40; split from Trotskyist movement with Shachtman, 1940;
left Shachtmanites around 1954.
Gourget, Pierre (b. 1904) Pseudonym of David Barozine. Found-
ing member of French CP; member of executive committee of
CGTU woodworkers union; expelled from CP, 1925; secretary of
Souvarine's group, 1927; supporter of Paz' Contre le courant, 1928;
founding member of La Verite, 1929, and of Ligue Communiste,
1930; member of Ligue executive committee, 1930-31; signed
manifesto of Opposition Unitaire and was elected to its secretariat,
Glossary 667
1930; resigned from Ligue in opposition to Trotsky on trade-union
question and founded Gauche Communiste, 1931, but soon
returned to Ligue; rejoined CP, 1932.
Gourov Pseudonym of Leon Trotsky.
Grylewicz, Anton (1885-1971) Joined youth movement of Ger-
man Social Democracy (SPD), 1905; joined Kautsky's USPD, 1917;
was a leading Revolutionary Shop Steward in November 1918 Revo-
lution; part of USPD left wing that fused with German CP, 1920;
leader of Berlin district "left" headed by Fischer-Maslow; one of
hundreds expelled for supporting Russian United Opposition,
1927; founding member of Leninbund and leader of its Trotskyist
minority until his expulsion, February 1930; a founder and leader
of German ILO section, 1930-33; editor of ILO paper Permanente
Revolution, 1931-33; responsible for publishing Trotsky's writings
in German; in exile in Czechoslovakia, 1933-37, and in France,
1937-40, where he broke with Trotskyism; emigrated to Cuba,
1941-55; returned to West Germany, 1955, and joined SPD.
Howat, Alexander (1876-1945) Head of UMW District 14 (Kan-
sas), expelled by Lewis, 1921, but reinstated later in the decade;
member of ILD NC, 1925-28; president of insurgent Reorganized
UMW, 1930; expelled from UMW, 1930.
Industrial Workers of the World (I WW) Founded in 1905 as
revolutionary-syndicalist industrial union movement with partici-
pation of SLP; SLP withdrew, 1908; declined in aftermath of WWI
and Russian Revolution as some I WW militants joined CP.
International Labor Defense (ILD) Created by CP, 1925, to organ-
ize united-front defense for class-war prisoners regardless of political
affiliation; led by Cannon, 1925-28; dissolved into Civil Rights Con-
gress, 1946.
International Left Opposition (ILO) International organization of
Trotskyists, 1929-33; changed name to International Communist
League, August 1933, when Trotskyists ceased to function as ex-
pelled faction of CI and embarked on struggle to form new revolu-
tionary workers parties and new international.
Jewish Group Group of workers and trade-union leaders from
Jewish section of French CP who supported La Verite and joined
668 CLA 1931-33
Ligue Communiste in 1930; published Yiddish journal, Die Klorkeit;
initially supported Molinier on trade-union question; led by Mill
and Felix, broke with Molinier, late 1931, sought collaboration with
Rosmer, and withdrew from Ligue executive committee; most
remained in Ligue after Felix split to join Gauche Communiste in
1932; majority split from ILO in opposition to Trotsky's 1933 call
for new party and international; with Felix, remnants of Gauche
Communiste and other dissidents formed Union Communiste that
opposed defense of USSR, 1933-39.
Judd, Helen Member of Chicago CP and Cannon faction supporter
expelled in 1928; schoolteacher; founding member of CLA.
Kaldis, Aristodimos (1899-1979) Greek supporter of CLA; waiter
active in Amalgamated Food Workers organizing drive in New
York, 1933-34; expelled with B.J. Field for indiscipline during hotel
workers strike, 1934; left politics and became artist.
Kamenev, Lev B. (1883-1936) Bolshevik from 1903; Central Com-
mittee member from 1917; head of Moscow party organization;
allied with Zinoviev and Stalin in "troika" against Trotsky, 1923-
25; with Zinoviev allied with Trotsky in United Opposition, 1926-
27; capitulated to Stalin; executed after first Moscow Trial in 1936.
Karsner, Rose (1890-1968) Born Rose Greenberg in Rumania;
emigrated to U.S. as a child; joined SP, 1908; secretary of Max
Eastman's journal Masses during W WI; founding American Com-
munist; worked for Friends of Soviet Russia and Workers Interna-
tional Relief; her first husband, David Karsner, wrote authorized
biography of Debs; Cannon's companion from 1924; assistant sec-
retary of ILD; founding member of CLA; business manager of Mili-
tant, 1930; founding member of WPUS, 1934-36; entered SP with
Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding member of SWP; possessed sharp
political edge; active in Trotskyist movement until her death.
Kautsky, Karl (1854-1938) Leader of German Social Democracy
(SPD) and best-known theoretician of Socialist (Second) Interna-
tional in two decades before WWI; social-pacifist during WWI; split
from SPD to found centrist Independent Social Democratic Party
of Germany (USPD), 1917; opposed Bolshevik Revolution; reunited
with SPD in 1922.
Glossary 669
Keck, William Founding secretary of Progressive Miners of America
and member of SR
Der Kommunist Newspaper of United German Opposition, pub-
lished sporadically from April 1930 to July 1931, when it became
organ of Landau-led split; ceased publication in 1933.
Konikow, Antoinette (1869-1946) Joined Plekhanov's Emancipa-
tion of Labor Group in Switzerland, 1888; emigrated to U.S., 1893;
learned Yiddish to work among Jewish unemployed workers; a
founder of Workmen's Circle; member of SLP, 1893-1897; mem-
ber of SP, 1901-19; medical doctor and pioneer of birth control;
toured U.S. speaking against WWI for SP German Federation, 1917;
founding American Communist; went to Soviet Union as birth con-
trol specialist and was won to Left Opposition, 1926; formed Inde-
pendent Communist League, a Trotskyist group in Boston, 1928
founding member of CLA; founding member of WPUS, 1934-36
entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding member of SWP
frequent Militant columnist on woman question; honorary mem-
ber of SWP NC at time of death.
Korsch, Karl (1886-1961) Joined Fabian Society as student in Brit-
ain, 1912; drafted into German army during WWI and demoted
for opposition to war, 1914; member of Kautsky's USPD, 1917-
20; opposed CI's 21 Conditions but joined CP, 1920; published
Marxism and Philosophy, 1923; Minister of Justice in coalition gov-
ernment in Thuringia, fall 1923; edited CP theoretical organ Die
Internationale, 1924-25; deputy in Reichstag, 1924-28; delegate
to CI Fifth Congress, 1924; opposed Soviet-German commercial
treaty and was expelled from CP, 1926; argued that counterrevo-
lution had already triumphed in USSR; published ultraleft
Kommunistische Politik, 1926-28; dropped out of political activity,
1928; fled Germany, 1933; emigrated to U.S., 1936, and became
philosophy professor.
Krehm, William Journalist and member of CLA Toronto branch
who opposed main theses of CLA Second National Conference,
1931; led group in Toronto branch opposed to Spector's leader-
ship, 1932-33; split from CLA in support of Field, 1934; leader of
Field group in Canada, 1934-37.
670 CLA 1931-33
Lacroix, Henri (1901-1939) Pseudonym of Francisco Garcia Lavid.
Founding Spanish Communist; lived in USSR, 1925-27; joined Rus-
sian Left Opposition, 1927; a founding leader of OCE in exile in
Belgium, 1930; arrested several times upon return to Spain, 1930-
31; OCE general secretary, 1931-32; resigned post, March 1932,
and began battle against Nin on unclear political basis; expelled
from OCE for misuse of funds, June 1933; attempted to rejoin CP;
joined SP, September 1933; led division in Republican army
during Civil War; murdered by Stalinists as he tried to reach exile
in France.
Laf argue, Paul (1841-1911) Prominent leader and propagandist
of French and international working-class movement; a follower
of Proudhon, he was won to Marxism as member of First Interna-
tional; member of General Council of First International; mar-
ried Marx's daughter Laura, 1868, collaborated politically with
her until their joint suicide, 1911; participant in Paris Commune,
1871; helped establish First International sections in Spain and
Portugal, 1871-72; founder of French Workers' Party, 1879.
Landau, Kurt (1903-1937) Joined Austrian CP in 1921; became
leader, with Frey, of faction supporting Russian United Opposi-
tion, 1926; expelled, late 1926; cofounder with Frey of Commu-
nist Party of Austria (Opposition); expelled by Frey, April 1928;
founded Communist Opposition of Austria (Left Communists),
known as Mahnruf Group; moved to Berlin, 1929; a founder of
German United Opposition, March 1930; a leader of German ILO
section, 1930 to July 1931, when he left after struggle against his
destructive cliquism; leader of Marxist-Internationalists, published
Der Funke (Spark), 1931-February 1934; exiled in Paris, March
1933-36; coordinator of foreign supporters for POUM in
Barcelona, 1936-37; abducted and murdered by Stalinist agents,
September 1937.
Lassalle, Ferdinand (1825-1864) Participant in revolutionary
upsurge, 1848; associate of Marx; leading agitator for working class
in German political revival of early 1860s; founding president of
General German Workers Union, 1863; opposed struggle for
higher wages and advocated producers cooperatives and univer-
sal suffrage to achieve socialism; opposition to bourgeois liberals
led him into secret negotiations with Bismarck at end of his life.
Glossary 671
Marx and Engels never publicly broke with Lassalle while he was
alive, but criticized his views in Critique of the Gotha Program when
Lassalle's followers united in 1875 with Marxists to form the party
that became the German Social Democrats (SPD).
Leninbund Party founded in April 1928 by heterogeneous, mostly
pro-Zinoviev "lefts" expelled from German CP, 1926-27; led by
Urbahns after Fischer and Maslow resigned, May 1928, to seek
readmission to CP; published Die Fahne des Kommunismus {Flag of
Communism); sought affiliation with ILO, but differences arose
when Leninbund ran electoral slate against CP; broke with ILO
after Urbahns refused to defend USSR in Chinese Eastern Rail-
road dispute, 1929; Trotsky's supporters were expelled, early 1930;
fell apart after Hitler's ascension to power.
Leonetti, Alfonso (Souzo) (1895-1984) Joined SP youth, 1913;
founding member of Italian CP, 1921; editor of L'Ordine nuovo,
1921-22; delegate to CI Fifth Congress, 1924; elected to CP cen-
tral committee, 1926; worked clandestinely in fascist Italy until
1927; directed Italian CP antifascist work in exile from France;
opposed Third Period turn and with Tresso and Paulo Ravazzoli
was expelled from CP for Trotskyism and formed New Italian
Opposition (NOI), 1930; part of NOI majority that sided with
Naville against Molinier on trade-union question; member of In-
ternational Secretariat of Trotskyist movement, 1930-31 and 1933-
36; opposed entry of Trotskyists into SP; argued for support to
Stalinist Popular Front, 1935; left Trotskyist movement, 1936; par-
ticipated in French Resistance during WWII; admitted to French
CP, 1944 or 1945, but membership annulled on insistence of Ital-
ian CP; formally readmitted to Italian CP, 1962.
Lewis, John L. (1880-1969) Despotic leader of United Mine Work-
ers, 1920-60; principal leader of CIO, 1935-40.
Lewit, Morris (Morris Stein) (1903-1998) Participant as youth in
Russian Revolution; emigrated to U.S., 1920; met lifelong compan-
ion, Sylvia Bleeker, on ship; founding member of CP youth, 1922;
supporter of CP Foster faction; won to Trotskyism, expelled from
CP, and joined CLA, 1930; editor of UnserKamf 1932-33; supporter
of Shachtman faction in 1931-33 fight; went over to collaboration
with Cannon in 1934; founding member of WPUS and on NC,
672 CLA 1931-33
1934-36; entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding member
of SWP and on NC, 1938 through early 1960s; SWP acting national
secretary during imprisonment of SWP leaders under Smith Act,
1943-45; in Europe with Bleeker as member of IEC, 1947-48; with-
drew from active party leadership in early 1960s.
Liebknecht, Karl (1871-1919) Son of Wilhelm Liebknecht; co-
founder of Socialist Youth International, 1907; imprisoned for
Militarism and Anti-Militarism, 1907-08; deputy to Reichstag, 1912-
16; first member of Reichstag fraction of Social Democracy (SPD)
to vote against war credits, 1914; coleader with Luxemburg and
Leojogiches of Spartakus antiwar tendency in SPD during WWI;
imprisoned for antiwar activities, 1916-18; led Spartakus as part
of Kautsky's USPD, 1917-18; founder of German CP, December
1918; arrested and murdered on order of SPD government, 15
January 1919.
Liebknecht, Wilhelm (1826-1900) Participant in 1848-49 German
Revolution; emigrated to London and joined Communist League,
1850, beginning lifelong friendship with Marx and Engels; re-
turned to Germany, 1862; founding member of First International,
1864; founding leader of German Social Democracy, 1869; deputy
to Reichstag, 1867-70 and 1874-1900; imprisoned for opposition
to Franco-Prussian War, 1872.
Ligue Communiste de France French section of International Left
Opposition, founded in 1930; dissolved in 1934 when majority
entered French SP to win over its leftward-moving members.
London Bureau International federation of centrist parties that took
shape in May 1932 as International Labor Community; British
Independent Labor Party and German SAP were founding elements;
renamed International Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist Unity in
1935; POUM joined after its break with Trotsky; merged forces with
remnants of International Right Opposition in April 1939; dissolved
after Nazi invasion of France.
Lore, Ludwig (1875-1942) German Social Democrat; emigrated
to U.S., 1903; member of IWW and SP left wing during WWI; editor
of New Yorker Volkszeitung and leader of German federation; found-
Glossary 673
ing American Communist and member of central committee, 1921-
24; expelled from CP for defending Trotsky, 1925; member of
Muste's CPLA/AWP, opposed unity with CLA; founding member
of WPUS, 1934-35; expelled for social-chauvinist articles in New
York Post.
Lovestone, Jay (1898-1990) Joined SP as student at City College of
New York, 1917; founding American Communist and member of
central committee, 1919-29; Ruthenberg's chief factional lieutenant,
1923-27; after Ruthenberg's death, secretary of CP, 1927-29;
expelled from CP, 1929; founding leader of Communist Party
Opposition, later renamed Independent Labor League, American
section of Right Opposition; disbanded organization, 1940; became
anti-Communist AFL-CIO adviser, leading cold warrior, and CIA
collaborator.
La Lutte des classes (Class Struggle) Journal founded by P. Naville
in solidarity with Russian United Opposition, 1928; became theo-
retical journal of French Trotskyists after launching of La Verite,
1929; Trotsky broke with it over publication of article by Landau,
1931; became organ of Naville group when it split from Trotskyists
in opposition to entry into French SP, 1934-35.
Luxemburg, Rosa (1870-1919) Born of Jewish family in Poland;
founding member of Polish SP, 1892; with lifelong collaborator,
Leo Jogiches, split SP in 1894 to found group later known as Social
Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, which
opposed Polish national self-determination; joined German Social
Democracy (SPD), 1897; became SPD leader, known for opposi-
tion to Bernstein's revisionism; participated in 1905 revolution in
Russian Poland; with Karl Liebknecht, led Spartakus antiwar left
in SPD in WWI; imprisoned for antiwar activity, 1915-18; led
Spartakus as part of Kautsky's USPD, 1917-18; founder of Ger-
man CP, December 1918; assassinated on order of SPD govern-
ment, 15 January 1919.
MacDonald, Jack (1888-1941) Leader of 1919 Toronto metalwork-
ers strike and Ontario labor leader; cofounder with Spector of
Canadian Communist Party, 1921; represented Canadian CP at
CI Fourth Congress, 1922; although he acquiesced when Spector
was purged for Trotskyism in 1928, he was expelled in 1931;
674 CLA 1931-33
declared for ILO and joined CLA Toronto branch, 1932; retired
from active political work, 1936, but remained committed to
Marxism until his death.
Mahnruf Group Founded by Landau after his expulsion from
Frey's Communist Party of Austria (Opposition) in April 1928;
published Der Neue Mahnruf (The New Call) sporadically, 1928-
31; sought affiliation as Austrian ILO section, but was never
recognized.
Malkin, Maurice Founding American Communist and leader
of Furriers Union in New York; expelled as Trotskyist, 1928;
imprisoned for role in furriers strike, 1929-30; repudiated CLA
in October 1929 when Stalinist ILD threatened to withdraw from
his defense, but retracted his statement; expelled from CLA and
rejoined CP, 1931; expelled from CP, 1937; anti-Communist wit-
ness before Congressional Dies Committee, 1939.
Markin, N. Pseudonym of Leon Sedov.
Maslow, Arkadi (1891-1941) Joined German CP, 1919; leader of
Berlin left wing; promoted to coleadership of party with Fischer
after removal of Brandler, 1924; expelled from German CP for
support to Russian United Opposition, 1926; participated in found-
ing conference of Leninbund, April 1928, but left organization a
month later and sought readmission to CP, as a consequence of
Zinoviev's capitulation to Stalin; in exile in Paris after Hitler's vic-
tory, he joined Trotskyists, 1934-37; died in Cuba attempting to
get refuge in U.S.
Maurin, Joaquin (1896-1973) Teacher and regional leader of
anarcho-syndicalist National Confederation of Labor (CNT) in
Lerida, Spain, 1919-21; part of CNT delegation to founding con-
ference of RILU, 1921; led dissident CNT members and others in
founding Catalan federation of Spanish CP, 1921; elected to cen-
tral committee, 1923; attended CI Fifth Congress, 1924; arrested
and jailed, 1925-27; in exile in France, 1928-31; led Catalan Fed-
eration in break with CP, 1930; fused with other CP dissidents to
found Workers and Peasants Bloc (BOC), affiliated with Bukharin-
Brandler Right Opposition, 1931; led BOC in fusion with OCE to
form POUM, 1935; secretary general of POUM, 1935-36; elected
to Spanish parliament, 1936; arrested by Franco forces, July 1936;
Glossary 675
released in 1947 and lived thereafter in New York City, where he
argued POUM should have entered national Republican govern-
ment during Civil War.
Mill, M. (1905-1937?) Pseudonym of Pavel Okun. Ukrainian
immigrant in Palestine and Fiance, where he joined CP in 1920s;
a leader of Jewish Group, which supported La Verite and adhered
to Ligue, 1930; fluent in Russian, he was appointed administra-
tive secretary of ILO after a meeting in Prinkipo, October 1930;
as secretary he was source of political confusion, upholding Nin's
fusion course with Spanish Right Opposition and leading Jewish
Group into rapprochement with Rosmer; removed from post, late
1931; defected to Stalinists, 1932.
Molinier, Henri (1898-1944) Became Communist under influence
of brother Raymond; met Trotsky in Prinkipo and helped publish
Russian-language Bulletin of the Opposition, 1929; founding member
of La Verite, 1929, and Ligue Communiste, 1930; owner of debt
collection agency that helped finance Ligue; represented Trotsky's
literary interests in France, 1930-35; organized Trotsky's living
arrangements in France, 1933-35; entered French SP with Trotskyists,
1934; expelled from Trotskyist movement with brother for publish-
ing own paper, 1935; rejoined Trotskyists before splitting again, 1936;
member of centrist Molinier group, which opposed French
Trotskyists, 1936-39; from 1935 argued that USSR had become "state
capitalist"; leader of ex-Molinier group in France during WWII;
founding member of reunified French Trotskyist organization, 1944;
killed during attempted uprising when Nazis fled Paris, 1944.
Molinier, Raymond (1904-1994) Joined French CP youth, 1922,
and CP, 1923; expelled, 1924, and reinstated, 1928, as member of
editorial board of Souvarine's Bulletin Communiste; founding mem-
ber of La Verite, 1929; expelled from French CP and founding
member of Ligue Communiste, 1930; led fight in Ligue against
trade-union opportunism of Opposition Unitaire; member of Ligue
executive committee from 1931; dogged by rumors about activities
for brother's debt collection agency; requested to stop his commer-
cial activities by ILO plenum, August 1933; leader of Trotskyists
during entry into French SP, 1934-35; expelled from Trotskyist
movement with brother for publishing own paper, La Commune,
1935; rejoined Trotskyists before splitting again, 1936; led centrist
676 CLA 1931-33
group opposed to French Trotskyists, 1936-39; condemned to prison
for antiwar activity and fled France for London, 1940; left for
Argentina, 1941; active supporter of ostensible Trotskyists; returned
to France and joined French Pabloist organization, 1977.
Mooney, Thomas J. (1882-1942) SP member from 1907; Interna-
tional Molders' Union activist, elected to San Francisco Labor
Council, 1912; framed up on charges of bombing SF "Prepared-
ness Day" parade in 1916 and sentenced to death; execution stayed
in 1918 due to international campaign; pardoned in 1939.
Morgenstern, Bernard (1907-1981) Joined CP youth, 1925, and
CP, 1926; active in garment workers struggles in Philadelphia;
member of Philadelphia district committee of CP youth when he
was expelled for protesting Cannon's expulsion, 1928; founding
member of CLA and alternate on NC, 1929-32; Cannon supporter
in CLA fight; spent 90 days in jail on "sedition" charges, 1932;
resigned from NC after Shachtman made issue of his marriage by
a rabbi, December 1932; founding member of WPUS, 1934-36;
entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936-37; delegate to founding SWP
conference; dropped out of party soon after.
Muste, Abraham Johannes (1885-1967) Ordained as minister in
Reformed Church, 1909; pacifist in WWI, became national com-
mitteeman of ACLU; leader of textile worker strikes in Paterson,
New Jersey and Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1919; became director
of Brookwood Labor College, 1921; founder and principal leader
of CPLA/AWP, 1929-34; founding member of WPUS, on NC, and
national secretary, 1934-36; opposed entry of Trotskyists into SP,
1936, and returned to religion and pacifist activism; executive
director of pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1940s and 1950s;
established American Forum for Socialist Education, late 1950s,
attempting to broker regroupment among socialists; active oppo-
nent of U.S. imperialist war in Vietnam at time of death.
National Miners Union (NMU) Third Period "revolutionary"
union founded by CP, September 1928, in opposition to Lewis'
United Mine Workers; led strikes in Illinois coalfields, 1929; Penn-
sylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, 1931; and Kentucky, 1931-32; dis-
solved in 1933.
Naville, Pierre (1904-1993) Codirector of La Revolution surrealiste
from 1924; joined French CP youth and CP, 1926; secretary of CP
Glossary 677
student movement and editor of its paper; codirector of CP educa-
tional journal, Clarte, 1926-27; delegate to tenth anniversary
celebration of Russian Revolution, where he met Trotsky and
attended meetings of Left Opposition, 1927; expelled from CP, 1928;
transformed Clarte into pro-Opposition journal, La Lutte des classes,
1928; founding member of La Verite, 1929, and Ligue Communiste,
1930; alternate member of ILO International Bureau, 1930; initially
supported Rosmer and Gourget against Trotsky on trade-union ques-
tion; consistent opponent of R. Molinier in Ligue; expelled from
ILO for opposing entry into French SP, 1934; subsequently joined
SP with his own group and reunited with Trotskyists; expelled from
SP, 1935; a leader of French ILO section, 1936-39; delegate to
founding conference of Fourth International and elected to execu-
tive committee, 1938; broke with Trotskyists, 1939, in opposition to
entry into Pivert's centrist organization; active in left social-
democratic organizations post-WWII; known for his historical and
sociological works.
Neurath, Alois (1886-1952) A founder of German section of
Czechoslovakian CP; secretary of central committee, 1921-26; CP
deputy in Czechoslovakian parliament; member of ECCI, 1922-
26; delegate to CI Fourth and Fifth Congresses, 1922 and 1924;
supporter of Zinoviev; expelled from Czech CP and joined
Bukharinite Right Opposition, 1929; broke with Right Opposition,
1932; joined Trotskyists with supporters in 1937.
New Italian Opposition (Nuova Opposizione Italiana, NOI)
Group formed inside Italian CP in exile to oppose CI's Third
Period turn; its leading members, Tresso, Leonetti, and Paolo
Ravazzoli, were expelled from CP, June 1930; functioned as Ital-
ian section of ILO and published Bollettino dell 'Opposizione
Comunista Italiana', individual members joined French Ligue; NOI
majority around Leonetti and Ravazzoli sided with Naville on
trade-union question; Tresso sided with Molinier and was expelled
from NOI, April 1933; expulsions annulled by ILO plenum, May
1933; NOI disintegrated and Bollettino ceased publication, June
1933; Ravazzoli and supporters opposed call for Fourth Interna-
tional and broke with ILO; Italian Trotskyist organization was
reconstituted with Tresso, Leonetti, and new infusion of opposi-
tionists from CP, early 1934.
678 CLA 1931-33
Nin, Andres (1892-1937) Joined Spanish SP, 1911; traveled in
Europe and North Africa, 1915-17; joined anarcho-syndicalist
National Confederation of Labor (CNT), 1917; secretary general
of CNT, 1920-21; attended RILU founding conference, 1921;
member of RILU executive bureau, 1921-26; joined Russian CP,
1923; supporter of United Opposition, 1926-27; expelled from
CP, 1927; expelled from USSR, 1930; joined Spanish Left Oppo-
sition, 1930; general secretary, 1932-35; a founder and leader of
POUM, 1935-37; broke with Trotsky and became minister of jus-
tice in Catalan government, September-December 1937; arrested
and murdered by Stalinists, 1937.
Oehler, Hugo (1903-1983) CP district organizer in Kansas City,
1920s; supporter of CP Cannon faction; won to views of Left
Opposition following Cannon's expulsion; remained undercover in
CP for a year; helped lead CP work in 1929 Gastonia, North Caro-
lina textile strike; joined CLA, June 1930; member of NC, 1931-
34; supporter of Cannon in 1931-33 fight; in 1934 began ultraleftist
opposition, attempting to obstruct fusion with AWP and opposing
entry into SP; founding member of WPUS and on NC, 1934-35;
expelled, October 1935; founding leader of Revolutionary Workers
League, 1935-41; went to Spain and was active in Barcelona upris-
ing, May 1937; arrested and held by Republican government for 41
days; ceased to be RWL leader when he moved to Denver, 1941,
and Sidney Lens (Sid Okun) took over as acting national secretary;
RWL disappeared in 1950s.
O'Flaherty, Tom (1889-1936) Emigrated to U.S. from Ireland in
1912 and joined SP soon after; founding American Communist and
member of central executive committee, 1921-22 and 1925-27;
prominent journalist at Daily Worker and Labor Defender; supporter
of CP Cannon faction; expelled as Trotskyist, 1928; founding CLA
member; left CLA over support to Plentywood "Farmer-Labor
Party," 1930; returned to Ireland.
Opposicion Communiste de Espana (OCE, Communist Opposi-
tion of Spain) Spanish ILO section founded in exile in Belgium,
February 1930; changed name to Izquierda Communiste de Espana
(ICE, Communist Left of Spain), March 1932, reflecting differences
with ILO; fused with Maurin's Workers and Peasants Bloc to found
Glossary 679
POUM, September 1935; POUM broke with Trotsky and entered
Spanish Popular Front, January 1936.
Opposition Unitaire Initiated by Ligue Communiste within CP-
led Confederation Generate du Travail Unitaire, April 1930; was
a bloc with rightward-moving leadership of teachers federation
that had been recently expelled from CP; program condemned
by Trotsky as catering to opportunist and syndicalist prejudices
against Stalinist CGTU leadership.
Overstraeten, Eduard Van (War) (1891-1981) Led current in SP
youth in Belgium sympathetic to Russian Revolution at end of
WWI; founding Communist in Belgium; delegate to CI Second
Congress, 1920, and Third Congress, 1921, where elected to ex-
ecutive committee; when Belgian Communists united, he became
national secretary, 1921-28; imprisoned for opposing French
occupation of Ruhr, 1923; deputy in parliament, 1925-28; led cur-
rent sympathetic to Trotsky from 1925; expelled with substantial
minority for supporting Russian United Opposition, March 1928;
founding leader of Belgian Left Opposition; broke with ILO, re-
fusing to defend USSR in Chinese Eastern Railroad dispute and
arguing for founding new parties, 1930; abandoned politics and
became successful painter.
Pappas, Sebastian Activist in CP Food Workers Industrial Union;
expelled from CP for supporting Trotsky's opposition to Third
Period tactics in Germany, August 1932; joined CLA, October 1932.
Paz, Maurice (1896-1985) Joined French SP, 1919; founding mem-
ber of French CP, 1920; principal CP lawyer; published pro-Trotskyist
Contre le courant and expelled from CP, 1927; broke with ILO when
Trotsky condemned his dilettantism, 1929; returned to SP, 1931;
member of pacifist tendency that supported Petain, July 1940;
ceased all political activity during WWII; rejoined SP after WWII;
broke with Socialists in 1972.
Pearcy, Claud Miner from Gillespie, Illinois; elected president of
Progressive Miners of America at founding convention, September
1932.
Pepper, John (1886-1938) Pseudonym of Jozsef Pogany. Member
of SP in Budapest; helped lead failed Hungarian Revolution of 1919;
680 CLA 1931-33
fled to Moscow; sent to U.S., 1922; led American CP's orientation
to "Farmer-Labor" movement in alliance with Ruthenberg faction,
1923-24; recalled to Moscow, 1924; returned to U.S., 1928-29; over-
saw expulsions of U.S. Trotskyists; recalled to Moscow and removed
from CI posts, 1929; arrested during purges and executed.
Petras Former member of New York CP district Greek bureau,
expelled from CP Spartacus Workers Club for Trotskyism, November
1931; joined CLA; active in Food Workers Industrial Union until
expelled by Stalinists.
Pilsudski, Josef (1867-1935) Founded Polish SP, 1892; led right-
nationalist faction, 1906-18; led Polish legions under Austrian
command against Russia in WWI; headed Polish Republic, 1918-
23; directed expansionist war against Soviet workers state, 1920;
annexed large area of Byelorussia through Riga Treaty with USSR,
1921; led coup to establish military dictatorship in Poland, 1926;
leader of Polish state until his death.
POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista, Workers Party
of Marxist Unification) Centrist party formed in September 1935
by fusion of Spanish Trotskyists with Spanish section of Right
Opposition; joined Popular Front electoral pact and Catalan
Republican government, 1936; its treachery helped derail possible
proletarian revolution during Spanish Civil War.
Profintern Russian shorthand for Red International of Labor
Unions.
Progressive Miners of America (PM A) Union founded in Septem-
ber 1932 in southern Illinois as breakaway from Lewis' UMW;
opposed $5-a-day wage scale negotiated by Lewis, but signed own
contracts for $5 a day; initially included SP, CPLA, and CLA sup-
porters; dominated by UMW bureaucrats by spring/summer 1933,
when left-wingers were expelled; chartered by AFL in 1938 in
retaliation for Lewis' formation of CIO.
Prometeo Group Organization in exile of supporters of Bordiga's
Left Faction of Italian CP; publishers of journal Prometeo; loosely
affiliated with ILO in 1930, but Prometeo's opposition to struggle
for democratic demands and the united-front tactic led to a break,
formalized at ILO International Preconference in February 1933.
Glossary 681
Rakovsky, Christian (1873-1941) Socialist from early 1890s; leader
of Balkan Revolutionary Social Democratic Federation, pre-WWI;
collaborator of Trotsky; internationalist during WWI and delegate
to Zimmerwald antiwar conference, 1915; imprisoned for revolu-
tionary opposition to WWI and freed by Russian troops, 1917;
joined Bolshevik Party, December 1917; Bolshevik Central Com-
mittee member, 1919-27; delegate to CI First, Second, and Third
Congresses, 1919, 1920, and 1921; head of Ukrainian Soviet gov-
ernment, 1919-23; a founding leader of Left Opposition, 1923;
Soviet ambassador to Britain, 1923, and France, 1925; expelled
from Russian CP and exiled to Siberia, 1927; recanted, 1934, and
rejoined CP, 1935; expelled again in Stalin's purges; convicted and
sentenced to 20 years in third Moscow Trial, 1938; shot on Stalin's
orders, 1941.
Ray, George CLA member elected to National Youth Committee
at CLA second convention, September 1932; on editorial board of
Young Spartacus through at least October 1932; left organization in
1933.
Red International of Labor Unions (RILU, Profintern) Federa-
tion of trade unions associated with Communist International;
formed in Moscow in 1921.
Reorganized United Mine Workers Southern Illinois breakaway
from Lewis' UMW formed in 1930; led by Harry Fishwick, former
leader of UMW District 12; "progressive" unionists John Brophy
and Howat also participated; returned to UMW, March 1931.
Rosenthal, Gerard (Francis Gerard) (1903-1992) Worked with
Naville on La Revolution surrealiste; joined CP as supporter of Left
Opposition, 1927; as delegate to tenth anniversary celebration of
Russian Revolution, met Trotsky, 1927; helped transform Clarte into
pro-Opposition journal, La Lutte des classes, 1928; cosecretary of
Souvarine's group; expelled from CP, 1928; founding member of
La Verite, 1929, and Ligue Communiste, 1930; elected to Ligue
executive committee, 1930; Trotsky's lawyer from 1931; a leader
of Trotskyists during entry into French SP, 1934-35; expelled from
SP, 1935; on central committee of French Trotskyist organization,
1936-39; broke with Trotskyists over entry into Pivert's centrist
organization, 1939; member of Resistance during WWII; rejoined
682 CLA 1931-33
SP, 1945; remained active in social-democratic, antifascist, and
antiracist organizations.
Rosmer, Alfred (1877-1964) A leading anarcho-syndicalist in pre-
WWI France; editor of CGT paper La Bataille syndicaliste; interna-
tionalist opponent of WWI; worked with Trotsky in Paris; supported
Bolshevik Revolution, 1917; founding member of Committee to Join
the Third International, 1919; delegate at CI Second Congress and
member of presidium, 1920; member of ECCI in Moscow, 1920-
21; a founder of RILU, 1921; returned to Paris, 1921; delegate at
CI Fourth Congress, 1922, and Fifth Congress, 1924; member of
French CP central committee, 1923-24; editor of CP journal,
LHumanite, 1924; an early supporter of Trotsky, was expelled from
CP, December 1924; helped launch syndicalist-communist La
Revolution proletarienne, 1925; founding editor of La Verite, 1929,
and of Ligue Communiste, 1930; member of Ligue executive com-
mittee and of ILO International Bureau; resigned from Ligue over
debate on Opposition Unitaire, 1930; collaborated with Gauche
Communiste, 1931-32; resumed personal relations with Trotsky,
1936; active in support of Dewey Commission of Inquiry into Mos-
cow Trials, 1937; returned Trotsky's grandson to Coyoacan, 1939;
spent most of WWII in U.S.; published Trotsky's books in France;
supported Algerian independence; author of Moscow Under Lenin
(1949) and book on French workers movement during WWI.
Ruthenberg, Charles Emil (1882-1927) Joined SP, 1909; leader of
pro-Russian SP left wing and founding American Communist;
imprisoned for sedition, 1920-22; national secretary of CP, 1922-
27; leader of faction bearing his name and allied with Pepper and
Lovestone from 1923; died suddenly in March 1927 and was buried
in Kremlin.
Ryazanov, David (1870-1938) Pseudonym of David Goldendach.
Joined Russian populists, 1885; imprisoned for five years; won to
Marxism after release, organizer for Russian Social Democrats
from early 1890s; imprisoned again, 1891-92; sided with
Menshevik faction in 1903 split; active in trade unions in 1905
Revolution; in exile in Western Europe, began research on Marx
and Engels, from 1907; returned to Russia and joined Trotsky's
organization that fused with Bolsheviks, 1917; delegate to CI Sec-
ond Congress, 1920; named director of Marx-Engels Institute,
Glossary 683
1921; organized acquisition and publication of archival resources,
including extensively annotated Communist Manifesto (1922) and
first publication of several Marxist classics; purged from CP and
exiled to Saratov, 1931; killed in purges.
Satir, Norman Member of Chicago CLA; supporter of Shachtman
faction in 1931-33 fight; founding member of WPUS and on NC,
1934-36; member of Abern-Weber clique; entered SP with
Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding member of SWP; split from Trotskyist
movement with Shachtman, 1940.
Saul, George CP organizer and ILD secretary in Colorado, 1928;
organizer for National Textile Workers Union in South; indicted
for work in 1929 Gastonia, North Carolina strike; joined CLA, 1930;
took independent position in CLA faction fight, 1931-33; active in
CLA Detroit branch; expelled with Hugo Oehler, 1935.
Scottsboro Case A major civil rights battle of the 1930s; nine young
black men falsely accused of raping two white women in Alabama
in 1931; eight of nine sentenced to death in first trial; ILD made
case defining one in struggle for black rights in 1930s; after a series
of trials, Scottsboro Defense Committee accepted a plea bargain in
1937; four defendants were released, remaining five served lengthy
prison sentences; last defendant not released until 1950.
Second International Also known as Socialist International. Inter-
national organization of social-democratic parties formed in 1889;
after leaderships of various national parties supported capitalist war
aims in August 1914, Lenin called for new, third international,
formed in Moscow as Communist International, 1919. Second
International still exists as a federation of social-democratic and
populist bourgeois parties.
Sedov, Leon (1906-1938) Older son of Leon Trotsky and Natalya
Sedova; joined Russian Communist youth in 1917 by falsifying his
age; member of Russian Left Opposition, 1923-28; went into exile
with parents, acting as Trotsky's chief of staff, 1928-31; editor of
Russian-language Bulletin of the Opposition, 1929-38; elected to ILO
International Secretariat, April 1930, but unable to get visa for
France; moved to Berlin, February 1931, and joined German sec-
tion; member of I.S., 1932-37; moved to Paris, April 1933; accused
with father in first two Moscow Trials, 1936-37; wrote Red Book
684 CLA 1931-33
on the Moscow Trials, 1936; died after operation for appendicitis,
probably murdered by Stalinist agents.
Seipold, Oskar (1889-1966) Joined German Social Democracy
(SPD), 1909; a Russian citizen, served in tsarist army in WWI, was
captured by Germans, and became prisoner of war; remaining in
Germany, joined Kautsky's USPD, 1919; part of USPD left wing that
fused with CP, 1920; after aborted German Revolution, imprisoned,
1923-27; head of CP antifascist military organization in East Prussia,
1927-29; took CP seat in Prussian Landtag (parliament) after Ernst
Meyer's death, 1930; expelled from CP for pro-Trotskyist views,
February 1930, but remained in Landtag until 1932, delivering a
speech written by Trotsky in 1931; a founder and member of
German United Opposition, 1930-33; member of central commit-
tee, 1931-33; imprisoned by Nazis, March-December 1933; fled
Germany and lived illegally in Poland, 1935-45; politically inactive
after WWII.
Senin, Adolf (1903-?) Pseudonym of A. Sobolevicius. Stalinist
agent active in German section of ILO, 1930-31; brother of Roman
Well (R. Sobolevicius), also a Stalinist agent; leader of Leipzig
branch; "defected" to Moscow, leading pro-Stalinist split in German
section, late 1932; emigrated to U.S. during WWII and, under
name Jack Soble, led spy ring that infiltrated SWP; arrested, tried,
and convicted of espionage by U.S. government, 1957.
Shachtman, Max (1904- 1972) Joined CP, 1921, as member of Work-
ers Council; leader of CP youth, 1923-27; editor of ILD Labor
Defender, 1925-28; alternate member of central committee,
1927-28; supporter of CP Cannon faction; expelled for Trotskyism
in 1928; founding member of CLA and on NC, 1929-34; editor of
U.S. Trotskyist publications, including Militant and New International;
founding member of WPUS and on NC, 1934-36; entered SP with
Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding SWP member and on NC, 1938-40;
split from Trotskyist movement, 1940, in opposition to Trotskyist
position of unconditional military defense of Soviet Union; founding
leader of Workers Party and its 1949 successor, Independent Socialist
League; led liquidation of ISL into SP-SDF, 1958; remained leader
of SP, and became social patriot and supporter of Democratic Party.
Shliapnikov, Aleksandr Gavrilovich (1885-1937) Russian metal-
worker, joined Russian Social Democrats, 1901; Bolshevik from
Glossary 685
1903; imprisoned, 1905-07; emigrated to France, 1908-14; chief
organizer of Bolshevik Party within Russia, 1914-17; chairman of
Petrograd metalworkers union, 1917; party representative to
Petrograd Soviet, 1917; People's Commissar of Labor, 1917;
member of Bolshevik Central Committee, 1918-22; delegate to
CI Second Congress, 1920; leader of Workers Opposition faction,
1920-22; diplomatic post in Paris, 1924; early supporter of United
Opposition, but capitulated to Stalin, November 1926; expelled
from party, 1933; arrested and shot.
Sifakis, James Greek-born steelworker and activist in Pittsburgh
CP in 1920s; blacklisted for union activism; dropped out of CP
two months before expulsion of Trotskyists; joined CLA in 1929;
mainstay of Pittsburgh CLA branch.
Skoglund, Carl (1884-1960) Joined Swedish SP youth, 1905; black-
listed for union activity, emigrated to U.S., 1911; joined Scandi-
navian Federation of SP, 1914, and became Minnesota chairman,
1917; joined IWW, 1917; organized local of Brotherhood of Rail-
way Carmen, 1917; founding American Communist; blacklisted
as leader of 1922-23 rail strike; CP industrial organizer in Minne-
sota and member of Minneapolis district committee for most of
decade; generally supported Cannon faction; expelled from CP,
1928; founding member of CLA and on NC, 1929-34; leader of
Minneapolis Teamster strikes, 1934; founding member of WPUS
and on NC, 1934-36; entered SP with Trotskyists, founding mem-
ber of SWP and on NC from 1938; elected to executive commit-
tee of Fourth International, 1938; president of Teamsters Local
544, 1938-40; prosecuted under Smith Act and jailed, 1944; threat-
ened with deportation by U.S. government for rest of life.
Sneevliet, Henricus (1883-1942) Joined Dutch SP, 1902; emi-
grated to Dutch East Indies, 1913, where he founded Social Demo-
cratic Union, 1914, that later became Indonesian CP; deported
from Java, 1918; joined Dutch CP, 1919; delegate to CI Second
Congress and elected to ECCI, 1920; CI representative in China
and Far East, 1921-23; advocated Chinese CP entry into national-
ist Guomindang; returned to Dutch CP, 1924; left CP in sympathy
with Russian United Opposition, 1927; founded Revolutionary
Socialist Party, 1929, that joined ILO in 1933 after turn to build-
ing new parties and Fourth International; merged with another
686 CLA 1931-33
Trotskyist group to found Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party,
1935, maintaining membership in London Bureau as well as in-
ternational Trotskyist movement; differences over trade-union work
and Spanish Civil War led to break with Trotskyist movement, 1938;
deputy in Dutch parliament, 1933-39; arrested under Nazi occu-
pation, charged with maintaining banned political organization
and publishing literature hostile to Germany; convicted and shot.
Socialist Labor Party (SLP) American socialist party founded in
1877 and led by Daniel De Leon from early 1890s; influenced
by Ferdinand Lassalle. It came to emphasize passive, legalistic
propaganda to the exclusion of intervening in social struggles, the
SLP became an isolated sect by the 1920s.
Socialist Workers Party Founded by American Trotskyists on New
Year's Day 1938; under leadership of James P. Cannon, it was the
revolutionary party in U.S. until its descent into reformism,
1960-65.
Souvarine, Boris (1895- 1984) Joined French SP, 1916; polemicized
against Lenin, 1917, but became supporter of Russian Revolution,
1918; founding member of CP and elected to its central commit-
tee, 1920; delegate to CI Third Congress and elected to ECCI, 1921;
published Trotsky's New Course in France, 1924; expelled from
French CP at CI Fifth Congress, 1925; published Bulletin communiste,
1925, and launched Cercle Communiste Marx et Lenine, 1926;
argued that USSR had become "state capitalist" and that ILO should
abandon Comintern, 1929; Trotsky broke relations with him;
renamed group Cercle Communiste Democratique, 1930; turned
to anti-Communism around 1935 when he published Stalin; became
pro-imperialist social democrat.
Souzo Pseudonym of Alfonso Leonetti.
Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SAP, Socialist Work-
ers Party of Germany) Formed in October 1931 by left-wing group
expelled from German Social Democracy; in 1932 acquired split
from German Right Opposition that subsequently assumed leader-
ship of SAP; a signer of "The Declaration of Four," August 1933;
later moved right and opposed formation of Fourth International.
Spartacus Youth Clubs (SYC) Local youth groups of CLA; became
Glossary 687
Spartacus Youth League (SYL), youth group of WPUS, December
1934.
Spector, Maurice (1898-1968) Founder of Canadian CP, 1921;
national chairman, 1924-28; privately sympathized with Trotskyist
opposition from 1924; delegate to CI Sixth Congress in 1928 and
elected to ECCI; in Moscow he and Cannon agreed to build sup-
port for Trotsky at home; expelled from Canadian CP in late 1928;
founding member of CLA and on NC, 1929-34; supporter of
Shachtman faction in 1931-33 fight; leader of organization of
Canadian Trotskyists formed in 1934; elected to WPUS NC, 1936,
and SWP NC, 1938-39; resigned from movement in 1939.
Stamm, Tom Joined CLA, October 1930; supporter of Cannon
faction in 1931-33 fight; business manager of Militant', part of
Oehler faction, 1934-35; founding member of WPUS and on NC,
1934-35; expelled with Oehler, late 1935; a leader of Oehler's Revo-
lutionary Workers League (RWL); expelled with Basky from RWL,
1938; formed organization, also called RWL, that published Revolt
from March 1938 to January 1940.
Sterling, Max Joined CP youth, 1927; supporter of Lovestone
faction; expelled for Trotskyism and joined CLA, 1930; co-opted
onto CLA National Youth Committee, 1932; supporter of
Shachtman faction in 1931-33 fight; member of Abern- Weber
clique in WPUS, 1934-36; went with Muste to visit Trotsky in Nor-
way, summer 1936; subsequently went to Spain and sent reports
on Civil War to Trotskyist press; member of SWP, 1938-40; split
from Trotskyist movement with Shachtman, 1940; member of
Shachtman's Workers Party and leader of Bay Area branch; left
WP after WWII. Known later as Mark Sharron.
Swabeck, Arne (1890- 1986) Joined SP left wing, 1916; editor of SP
Scandinavian Federation weekly press; IWW member, 1918-20; a
leader of 1919 Seattle general strike; joined CP, 1920; delegate to
CI Fourth Congress, 1922, and represented American CP on ECCI;
member of CP Cannon faction; expelled for Trotskyism in 1928;
founding member of CLA and on NC, 1929-34; founding member
of WPUS and on NC, 1934-36; entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936-
37; founding member of SWP on NC, 1938-67; began to advocate
political support to Mao's Chinese Stalinists in late 1950s; expelled
688 CLA 1931-33
from SWP, 1967; briefly a member of Progressive Labor Party in
late 1960s.
Third Period According to Stalinist theory expounded in 1929,
the post-WWI periods of revolutionary upsurge (1917-23) and
capitalist stabilization (1924-28) were to be followed by a "third
period" of capitalist collapse and the victory of socialism. During
this time (1929-33), the Comintern adopted sectarian and
adventurist tactics.
Tomsky, Mikhail Pavlovich (1880-1936) St. Petersburg lithog-
rapher; joined Bolsheviks, 1904; helped establish Reval (Talinin),
Estonia Soviet of Workers' Deputies, 1905; delegate to Russian
Social Democratic conferences, 1906 and 1907; arrested and
imprisoned in Russia, 1908-17; a leader of Bolshevik organiza-
tion in Petrograd, 1917; member of Bolshevik Central Commit-
tee, 1919-36; delegate to CI Second Congress, 1920, and elected
to ECCI; general secretary of RILU, 1920; chairman of All-
Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, 1922-29; coleader of
Right Opposition with Bukharin and Rykov, 1928; capitulated to
Stalin, 1929; committed suicide under threat of arrest, 1936.
Trachtenberg, Alexander L. (1884-1966) Participant in 1905 Rus-
sian Revolution as Social Democrat; after arrest and imprisonment,
emigrated to U.S., 1906; active in SP student movement; head of
research department of Rand School of Social Science, 1915-21;
active in SP left wing during W WI; joined Communist movement
as part of Workers Council group, 1921; CP central committee,
1921-23; delegate to CI Fourth and Fifth Congresses, 1922 and
1924; founded International Publishers as CP publishing house,
1924, remaining its head until 1962; arrested for Communist activ-
ity, 1953 and 1956.
Trade Union Unity League (TUUL) Federation of "revolutionary"
trade unions initiated in 1929 in opposition to AFL as part of CP's
Third Period turn; replaced Trade Union Educational League as
CP's central trade-union organization; dissolved in 1934 as CP
turned toward class collaborationism of Popular Front.
Treint, Albert (1889-1971) Joined French SP, 1910 or 1912; co-
secretary of Committee to Join the Third International, 1919; found-
ing member of French CP and elected to central committee, 1920;
Glossary 689
CP general secretary, 1923-26; attended most plenums and con-
gresses of CI, 1922-26; supporter of Zinoviev and Russian United
Opposition, 1926-27; after Zinoviev capitulated, Treint was expelled
from CP and published Le Redressement communiste, 1928; joined
Ligue Communiste and elected member of executive committee,
1931; aligned with R. Molinier; resigned from Ligue, 1932; orga-
nized Effort Communiste linked with Urbahns' Leninbund, 1932-
33; rejoined SP, 1934; associated with Pivert's left wing, 1935-37;
worked with syndicalist tendency in CGT, 1937-39; retired from
politics in early 1940s.
Tresso, Pietro (Blasco) (1893-1943) Joined Italian SP youth, 1909;
opposed WWI with Italian SP majority; founding Italian Commu-
nist, 1921, and editor of CP journal La Lotta Communista; leader
of CP trade-union work, 1922-25; delegate to CI Fourth Congress,
1922; worked underground after Mussolini's seizure of power and
was arrested several times; elected to CP central committee, 1926,
and subsequently co-opted to political committee; left Italy for
France, 1927; delegate at CI Sixth Congress, 1928; opposed Third
Period turn and, with Leonetti and Paolo Ravazzoli, was expelled
from CP, 1930, and formed New Italian Opposition (NOI); joined
French Ligue; elected to Ligue executive committee, 1931; sided
with Molinier on trade-union question; elected to ILO I.S., Feb-
ruary 1933; expelled from Trotskyists, 1934, for opposing entry into
French SP; subsequently joined SP with Naville's group which re-
united with Trotskyists; expelled from SP, 1935; a leader of French
Trotskyists, 1936-39; elected to executive committee of Fourth
International at founding conference, 1938; arrested and impris-
oned by Nazis, 1942; murdered by Stalinists after taking part in
prison escape, fall 1943.
Unemployed Councils Federation of local organizations of unem-
ployed formed by CP, 1930; fought for local relief projects and
organized campaigns to stop evictions; led campaign for unem-
ployed insurance; organized national "hunger marches," 1931 and
1932; merged with unemployed movements led by SP and WPUS
to form Workers Alliance, 1936.
United Mine Workers (UMW) Industrial trade union of American
miners formed in 1890; led by Lewis, 1920-60; played key role in
formation of CIO in 1930s.
690 CLA 1931-33
United Opposition A bloc between Trotskyist Left Opposition and
supporters of Kamenev and Zinoviev, formed to fight Stalin-
Bukharin leadership within Soviet CP in April 1926; initially
included supporters of Democratic Centralists and Workers Oppo-
sition; bloc disintegrated after its program was declared incompat-
ible with party membership and supporters were expelled en masse
at Fifteenth Party Congress, December 1927.
Unser Kamf Yiddish journal published by CLA, February 1932 to
November 1933.
Unser Wort Exile journal of German Trotskyists, published
1933-41.
Urbahns, Hugo (1890-1946) Leader of pro-Zinoviev left wing of
German CP, along with Fischer and Maslow, 1922-27; expelled as
supporter of Russian United Opposition, 1927; founder and prin-
cipal leader of Leninbund, 1928-33; broke with ILO, refusing to
defend USSR in Chinese Eastern Railroad dispute, 1929; developed
view that USSR was "state capitalist"; after Hitler's victory, in exile
first in Czechoslovakia, then Sweden.
Vanzler, Joseph (John G. Wright) (1902-1956) Joined CLA, 1933;
son-in-law of Antoinette Konikow; chemist by training; owner of
company that manufactured contraceptive jelly; supported B.J.
Field group, but did not depart CLA over hotel strike; member of
WPUS, 1934-36; entered SP with Trotskyists, 1936-37; founding
member of SWP and elected to NC, 1939; translator of many of
Trotsky's works; member of SWP writing staff until his death.
Walker, John A. President of Illinois Federation of Labor who sup-
ported Reorganized United Mine Workers, 1930.
Weber, Jack (1896-?) Pseudonym of Louis Jacobs. Joined CLA
in 1930; supporter of Shachtman faction in 1931-33 fight; spokes-
man for Abern clique and alternate member of WPUS NC,
1934-36; supported SP entry and broke with Abern, 1936; found-
ing member of SWP and on NC, 1938 through at least 1940; left
SWP in 1944; contributed three articles to Shachtmanite New Inter-
national inl946-47, but does not appear to havejoined Shachtman's
organization.
Weber, Sara (1900-1976) Pseudonym of Sara Jacobs. Polish-born
Glossary 691
CLA member and wife of Jack Weber; served as Trotsky's Russian-
language secretary, June 1933-February 1934 and May 1938-
January 1939.
Weinstone, William (1897-1985) Socialist student leader at City
College of New York; founding American Communist and on central
committee, 1921-23 and 1925-28; supporter of Ruthenberg-
Lovestone faction, but allied briefly with Cannon faction, 1926-
27; remained in CP after Lovestone's expulsion; editor of Daily
Worker, 1931-32; prosecuted in 1953 under Smith Act and impris-
oned for two years.
Weisbord, Albert (1900-1977) SP youth leader, 1921-24; joined
CP, 1924; organizer of Passaic, New Jersey textile workers strike,
1926-27; supporter of CP Lovestone faction; expelled with
Lovestone, 1929; advocated unity of Trotskyists and Lovestoneites;
founded Communist League of Struggle, 1931; tried to gain entry
into ILO but was never accepted; visited Trotsky in Prinkipo, 1932;
worked with centrist POUM in Spain, 1937; disbanded CLS, 1937.
Well, Roman (1900-1962) Pseudonym of R. Sobolevicius. Stalinist
agent active in German section of ILO, 1930-32; brother of Adolf
Senin (A. Sobolevicius); member of I.S., 1932; leader of Leipzig
branch; "defected" to Moscow in pro-Stalinist split, 1932; emigrated
to U.S. during WWII where, as Robert Soblen, he became a well-
known psychiatrist; led Stalinist spy ring that infiltrated SWP; was
arrested on espionage charges, 1957; fled to Israel and commit-
ted suicide under threat of extradition to U.S., 1962.
Wicks, Harry (1889?- 1957) Government agent in Socialist and Com-
munist movements from 1919; SP member, 1915-19; joined CP,
1920; led split of those opposed to founding legal party; rejoined
CP, 1922; supporter of Ruthenberg-Lovestone faction; member of
central committee, 1922-23 and 1927-29; American representative
to RILU, 1928-29; CI representative to Australia and Philippines,
1930-32; expelled as spy, 1938; joined Lovestone's organization;
cooperated with FBI in anti-Communist investigations.
Witte (1901-1965) Pseudonym of Demetrious Giotopoulos. Leader
of Greek Archio-Marxists, 1923-46; replaced Myrtos as Greek rep-
resentative on ILO I. S., July 1932; I.S. member, Paris and Berlin,
1931-33; full-time I.S. secretary, 1933; removed for indiscipline,
692 CLA 1931-33
September 1933; opposed turn toward building new parties and
new international, 1933; led minority of Archio-Marxists into
London Bureau while majority affiliated with Trotskyists, 1934;
worked with POUM during Spanish Civil War and imprisoned by
Stalinists, 1936-37; fought in Greek Resistance to Nazi occupa-
tion, but opposed Stalinists during Greek Civil War, 1943-49;
became journalist.
Workers Party of the United States (WPUS) Revolutionary party
formed through fusion of Communist League of America
with Muste's American Workers Party, December 1934; dissolved
when cadre entered Socialist Party to win over growing left wing,
March 1936.
Young Spartacus Monthly organ of CLA National Youth Commit-
tee, 1931-34; SYCs, from April 1934; SYL, youth group of WPUS,
from December 1934 until the Trotskyists entered the Socialist
Party in 1936.
Zinoviev, Grigori Y. (1883-1936) Bolshevik from 1903; member of
Central Committee from 1907; close collaborator of Lenin during
WWI; head of Comintern, 1919-26; head of Leningrad party
organization; allied with Kamenev and Stalin in "troika" against
Trotsky, 1923-25; allied with Kamenev and Trotsky against Stalin
in United Opposition, 1926-27; capitulated to Stalin, 1928; impris-
oned, 1935; convicted in first Moscow Trial and executed.
693
References
Archival Sources: Key to the Abbreviations
A Papers
B Papers
C Papers
G Papers
H Papers
PRL
RWL Collection
S Papers
SWP International
Records
SWP Records
Martin Abern Papers, John Dwyer Collection,
Part Two, Wayne State University Archives of
Labor and Urban Affairs, Detroit, Michigan.
George Breitman Papers, Tamiment Library,
New York University, New York, New York.
James P. Cannon and Rose Karsner Papers,
1919-1974, Archives Division, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
Albert Glotzer Papers, Archives of the Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace,
Stanford University, Stanford, California.
Joseph Hansen Papers, Archives of the Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace,
Stanford University, Stanford, California.
Collection of the Prometheus Research Library,
New York, New York.
Revolutionary Workers League Collection,
Tamiment Library, New York University, New
York, New York.
Max Shachtman Collection, Tamiment Library,
New York University, New York, New York.
Socialist Workers Party Records, Archives of the
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and
Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
This archive contains the records of the Ameri-
can Trotskyist movement's participation in the
ILO and Fourth International.
Socialist Workers Party Records, 1928-1985,
Archives Division, State Historical Society of
Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin. This archive
694 CLA 1931-33
contains the records of the American Trotskyist
movement's domestic activity.
T Papers Papers of Lev Trotskii, bMS Russian 13.1, The
Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts. Unless otherwise noted,
all references are for the exile papers.
Published Works
This list is by no means a comprehensive bibliography of the period, but
rather gives the full citations for the works cited in our introduction and
notes. Some of the works listed are compilations of articles published years
after their original date of writing. When the date of authorship is of
significance, we have added it in parentheses after the title.
Barnes, Jack, et al. fames P. Cannon as We Knew Him: By Thirty-Three
Comrades, Friends, and Relatives. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976.
Benton, Gregor, ed. and trans. Chen Duxius Last Articles and Letters, 1937-
1942. Richmond, Surrey, Great Britain: Curzon Press, 1998.
Bernstein, Irving. The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker 1920-
1933. Reprint, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966.
Breitman, George, Paul Le Blanc, and Alan Wald. Trotskyism in the United
States: Historical Essays and Reconsiderations. Atlantic Highlands, New
Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1996.
Broue, Pierre. Trotsky. Paris: Fayard, 1988.
, ed. with Gerard Roche. Leon Trotsky, Alfred et Marguerite Rosmer:
Correspondence 1929-1939. Paris: Gallimard, 1982.
, ed. Leon Trotsky, Pierre Naville, Denise Naville, Jean van Heijenoort:
Correspondance 1929-1939. Paris: LHarmattan, 1989.
Cannon, James P. Don't Strangle the Party!, 2nd edition. Ed. George
Breitman. New York, Fourth Internationalist Tendency, 1991.
1st edition reprint, Spartacist (English edition), no. 38-39, Summer
1986.
The First Ten Years of American Communism: Report of a Participant
(1954-59). New York: Lyle Stuart, 1962. Reprint, New York: Path-
finder Press, 1973.
. The History of American Trotskyism: Report of a Participant (1942).
New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1944.
. Introduction to The Draft Program of the Communist International:
A Criticism of Fundamentals, by Leon Trotsky. New York: The Militant,
1929.
James P. Cannon and the Early Years of American Communism: Selected
References 695
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699
Index
Abern, Martin, 6, 44, 49, 76, 195, 211,
212, 243, 325, 339, 352, 355, 356, 361,
364, 368, 387-88, 405, 415, 462, 474,
537-38, 614, 631, 641, 646, 652g; and
1939-40 faction fight, 3-4, 8, 75; and
Cannon, 37, 50, 190-92, 246-48, 258,
560-61; on Cannon as CLA secretary,
59, 392, 395-402, 409-1 1; and Carter
group, 181, 270, 291-92, 337-38,
461; on CLA headquarters move to
Chicago, 74, 539-40, 561, 587;
cliquism of, 8, 54-55, 58, 79, 620;
expulsion of from CP, 10, 52, 252; and
ILD, 10, 33; and ILO disputes, 3, 144-
45, 174, 177, 179-80, 183, 188-89,
209, 224, 229, 236, 263, 280, 287, 300,
309-10, 318, 320, 327-28, 331-32; at
June 1932 CLA plenum, 287, 291-
95, 322; and PMA, 68, 513, 516-18,
553, 559; removal of from resident
committee, 59, 472-73, 482, 497, 508,
523, 544, 548-49; runs CLA national
office, 36, 191-92, 237, 239-43, 249,
410, 496; and Swabeck, 58, 392, 558-
59; and Trotsky, 85, 141; votes in resi-
dent committee, 56, 68, 155, 184, 268,
326, 353, 402, 403-04, 416, 424, 429,
495, 499, 637, 644; withdraws from
CLA activity, 46-47, 59, 76; and youth
work, 11, 60, 76-77, 157-58. See also
Shachtman faction
Adler, Victor, 277, 652g
AFL. See American Federation of Labor
Allard, Gerry, 63, 66-67, 203, 451, 452,
508, 539, 585, 590, 622, 639, 647,
652g; bends to anti-Communists in
PMA, 432-33, 513-18, 622, 647;
Cannon asks Trotsky's advice about,
69-70, 498-99, 508, 552-55; Cannon
makes deal with, 69, 536, 538,
566-67
American Federation of Labor (AFL),
34, 40, 51, 53, 62, 64, 65, 67, 70, 75,
412, 560, 561, 565, 652g
American Workers Party (AWP), 1, 74,
604-05, 653g
Amsterdam Congress, 455, 641, 653g
Andradejuan Rodriguez, 228, 229, 341,
614, 653g
Angelo, Joseph, 63, 67, 69, 70, 202-03,
387, 452, 513, 518, 539, 552, 555, 564,
621, 622, 639, 649, 653g
Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Com-
mittee, 253, 653g
Appeal to Reason, 584, 653g
Arbeiterstimme, 89, 100, 654g
Archio-Marxists (Greece), 25, 73, 487,
654g
AWP. See American Workers Party
Baker, John (Miller), 135, 146
Bartolomeo, Nicola Di, 22, 654g
Basin (CLA member), 208
Basky, Louis, 11, 282, 375, 381, 404, 574,
640, 642, 648, 654g; proposed for NC
membership, 29, 49, 56, 257, 293-95,
303, 354, 633
Bedacht, Max, 51
Berman (CLA member), 382
Bernstein, Eduard, 154, 161-64, 166-68,
208, 276, 277, 631, 655g
Bittelman, Alexander, 51, 252, 253, 636,
655g
Black oppression in U.S., 32, 37, 40-44,
503-04, 518, 530, 541-42, 551, 578,
609; Scottsboro case, 42-43, 683g
Blackwell, Russell, 614, 620, 625, 655g
Blasco. See Tresso, Pietro
Bleeker, Sylvia, 74, 78, 358, 379, 384-
86, 405, 510, 528, 562, 614, 655g
BOC. See Workers and Peasants Bloc
Bolshevik Revolution. See Russian
Revolution
700 CLA 1931-33
Bolshevik-Leninists. See Communist
League of America; International Left
Opposition; Left Opposition (Soviet
Union)
Booth (CLA member), 412
Bordiga, Amadeo, 2, 22, 83, 656g
Bordigists, 656g. See also Prometeo
Group
Bornstein (CLA member), 412
Brandler, Heinrich, 16, 50, 232, 251,
656g
Brandlerites. See Right Opposition
Breitman, George, 5, 607, 608, 609
Brinda.John, 206, 217
Brophy, John, 64
Browder, Earl, 31, 556, 656g
Buehler, Shorty, 204, 354, 657g
Bukharin, Nikolai, 9, 14-15, 30, 104,
252, 254, 255, 657g
Bukharinites. See Right Opposition
Bulletin of the Opposition, 58, 89, 91. See
also Left Opposition (Soviet Union)
Burnham, James, 3-4, 74-76, 79, 657g
Buzzy (CLA member), 412
Bye, George, 349, 638
Ltannon faction in CLA, 1, 5, 58, 74,
416-18, 458, 488, 557-59, 562-63,
583, 598, 600; attitude toward Trotsky,
480-85, 492-93, 495, 565; on Carter
group, 60-61, 188, 270-72, 278-79,
283, 311-12, 335-38, 366, 382, 464;
on CLA 3rd conference date, 462,
476, 482, 485, 495, 499, 504-06, 510,
589, 598-600; composition of, 4, 62,
78, 463, 571, 574; on co-optations to
NC, 56-57, 76, 293-95, 303-04, 312-
13, 340, 352-55, 372, 378-82, 387,
459-60, 463-64, 466-67, 473, 474,
523, 528, 544, 640; on Engels intro-
duction, 60-61, 153-69, 180-82, 195,
208, 313, 318, 331, 374; on June 1932
CLA plenum, 186-87, 218, 279-80,
306-14, 323-24, 326-40, 366, 372,
413, 414, 475-76, 558-59; Shachtman
faction's view of, 357-58, 373, 376-
77, 382-84, 391-92, 411, 500-03,
522-28, 572; on Swabeck's European
trip, 58-59, 363-66, 496; Trotsky's
view of, 361-62, 362-63, 381-84,
411, 463-65, 472-87, 507-08, 529,
546, 565
Cannon faction in CP (1925-28), 10-12,
30, 33, 37, 50-55, 65, 194-95, 221,
233, 248, 251-57, 304-05, 497, 522-
23, 525, 558, 574, 619, 636
Cannon-Foster faction in CP (1923-25),
51, 619, 637, 649
Cannon, James P., 1-3, 13, 32-33, 57,
64, 169, 183, 355, 356, 421, 582, 594,
614, 618, 657g; and 1939-40 faction
fight, 4-5, 79; and Abern, 3, 4, 37,
50, 190-92, 247-48, 257-58, 327; on
Allard, 63, 498-99, 513-15, 536, 622;
on black oppression, 37, 41-43; and
Carter group, 60-61, 157-60, 258-
59, 335; and CI, 8, 195; at CI 6th con-
gress, 9, 37, 41, 51, 254; at CLA 1st
conference, 35, 37, 190; at CLA 2nd
conference, 29, 194; on CLA head-
quarters move to Chicago, 6, 73-74,
472, 539-40, 556, 561, 568, 574-77,
584, 587-90, 596-98, 601; as CLA sec-
retary, dispute over, 59, 391-403,
408-11, 461-62, 465, 473; on "gesta-
tion" of CLA, 50-52, 251-57; at
Gillespie union conference, 67-68,
412, 433-34, 446, 448-51, 508-09,
531, 539, 643; and Glotzer, 3, 4, 37,
50, 192, 257, 327, 539; international-
ism of, 7, 22-23, 51; at June 1932 CLA
plenum, 283, 291-92, 294-96, 298,
306-14; on labor party slogan, 37-
38, 40, 51, 637; lessons learned from
CLA fight, 8, 80, 492-93, 495; and
Militant, 35-37, 45, 191-92, 195, 234,
240-42, 244-45, 247, 264, 295, 301,
305-06, 322, 462, 577-78; and
miners, 68-70, 381, 413-15, 495-96,
498-99, 506-09, 512-15, 530-32,
536, 553-54, 564, 590, 647; personal
crisis of, 35-37, 49-50, 54, 189-93,
238, 243-44; and "Prospect and
Retrospect," 55, 60, 230-31, 375,
391-92; and Red Army dispute, 421-
28, 435-48, 559; runs CLA national
Index 701
office, 189, 213, 237-42, 410; and
Shachtman, 3, 4, 37, 47, 48, 50, 59,
76, 192, 229-30, 247-48, 327; and
Shachtman faction, 55-56, 180-82,
184, 220, 229-30; Shachtman faction's
view of, 7, 50-51, 54, 185, 187, 208-
11, 224, 238-81, 298-306, 318-21,
323-25, 363, 369-70, 380, 384-90,
391-97, 398, 399-402, 408-11,
435-46, 500-03, 512, 518, 522-28,
546-47, 557, 559-61, 572-73; on
Shachtman in ILO, 2-3, 28-29, 144-
45, 169, 171, 174, 182, 188-89, 236-
37, 263-70, 299, 301-02, 309, 317-
18, 326-34, 376, 632; and Spector, 76,
190, 240; and Swabeck, 49, 195, 571;
as SWP leader, 1, 13-14, 74, 609; and
trade-union work, 70, 417-18, 560;
and Trotsky, 4, 8, 46, 70-71, 345-46,
495; votes in resident committee, 155,
177, 184, 306, 315, 326, 353, 371, 403,
416, 429, 448, 495-97, 499, 648; and
Weisbord, 345-52, 359, 466, 496-97,
651; on youth question, 77, 270-72,
311. See also Cannon faction in CLA;
Cannon faction in CP; Cannon-Foster
faction in CP; Communist League of
America; Socialist Workers Party
Capelis, Herbert, 282, 358, 560, 642,
658g
Carlson, Oliver, 11, 274, 609, 658g
Carmody, Jack, 525, 553, 658g
Carr (CLA member), 563
Carter group, 60-61, 188, 270-72, 278-
79, 283, 296, 311-12, 316, 366, 382,
464, 549; Cannon faction's view of,
334-38, 400, 458-59, 461, 475-76;
Shachtman faction's view of, 290-91,
293, 299, 302-03, 318, 320, 373, 376-
77, 380, 527
Carter,Joseph, 180, 276, 296, 311, 328,
378, 562, 564, 658g; Cannon faction's
view of, 61, 188, 258-59, 270, 458;
on Engels introduction, 60, 153, 156-
62, 195-96, 208-10, 313, 331; Shacht-
man's view of, 270-72, 278-79, 389,
587; as youth leader, 11-12, 77
Catalan Federation. See Workers and
Peasants Bloc
Cauldwell, Sylvia, 27
CGT. See Confederation Generale du
Travail
CGTU. See Confederation Generale du
Travail Unitaire
Charleroi Federation. See International
Left Opposition: Belgian section of
Chen Duxiu, 13, 609, 658g
Chiang Kai-shek, 13, 18, 439
China, 18, 31; Second Revolution in, 9,
13, 114,253
Chinese Eastern Railroad, 12, 18-19,
439
CI. See Communist International
CIO. See Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations
CLA. See Communist League of America
Clarke, George, 69, 77, 199, 204-05, 282,
354, 379, 394, 553, 574, 584, 598, 622,
639, 659g; proposed for NC member-
ship, 56, 293-95, 303
CLS. See Communist League of Struggle
Collinet, Michel, 342, 659g
Comintern. See Communist Interna-
tional
Communist International (CI, Comin-
tern, Third International), 1-2, 12,
27, 31, 65, 126, 195, 252, 352, 418,
422, 504, 530, 619, 629, 641, 659g;
2nd congress of, 24; 3rd congress of,
68; 4th congress of, 10; 5th congress
of, 208, 639; 6th congress of, 9, 37,
41,51, 237, 252, 254, 636; degenera-
tion of, 7-9, 55, 57, 113, 115, 129,
191, 284, 440, 468, 569; and Right
Opposition, 14-16, 31. See also Anglo-
Russian Trade Union Unity Commit-
tee; Red International of Labor
Unions; Third Period
Communist League of America (CLA),
1-4, 33, 35, 46, 52, 1 1 1, 149; 1st con-
ference of, 37, 38, 181, 188-90, 209,
236, 238-39, 371; 2nd conference of,
29, 38, 42, 65, 146, 181, 193-94, 214-
15, 226, 233, 251, 255, 257-60, 264,
269, 307, 308, 317, 371, 457, 522, 633,
702 CLA 1931-33
634, 640; and 3rd conference date,
359-60, 369, 371, 386-90, 456, 462,
465-66, 469-71, 499-508, 510, 512-
13, 524, 529, 534-35, 539, 595-99,
603; and black oppression, 41-42, 44,
209; Boston branch of, 11, 199, 213-
14, 366-67, 377, 379-82, 384, 387,
389-90, 405, 459-60, 476, 499, 588,
590, 639; Canadian branches of, 12,
199-201, 272, 388-89, 464, 502, 512,
524; and Cannon as national secre-
tary, 59, 392-403, 408-1 1; and Carter
group, 60-61, 188, 270-72, 278-79,
283, 290-91, 296, 299, 302-03, 311-
12, 316, 335-38, 366, 373, 376-77,
382, 458-59, 464, 549; Chicago
branch of, 201-02, 218, 245, 324, 377,
384, 387, 390, 405, 412-13, 448, 459,
527, 536, 563-64, 574-75, 579, 586-
90, 596, 646, 649, 651; and Commu-
nist Party, 30, 32, 38, 61, 72, 199-200,
201, 203, 207, 215, 232-33, 237, 421-
22, 428, 457, 460, 540, 565-66, 614-
15, 640, 643; and Engels introduction,
60-61, 153-69, 182, 208, 275-79,
292, 304, 313, 318, 322, 331, 374, 458,
631-32; Expansion Program of, 47,
49, 106, 214, 457, 619; finances of,
49, 58, 135, 353, 356, 363, 364-65,
397-98, 400-01, 403-05, 407-08,
409, 46 1 , 493, 5 1 1 , 533, 545, 582, 584,
590, 600, 601-02, 647-48; German
campaign of, 32, 61, 421-22, 457,
468, 497, 504; "gestation" of, 50-54,
194-95, 248, 251-60, 304-05, 457,
523, 525; headquarters move to Chi-
cago, 6, 73-74, 483-84, 539-40, 555-
56, 560-61, 568-69, 574-77, 581,
584-90, 594-603; and ILO, 2-3, 23,
27-30, 109-11, 133, 170-83, 188,
220-21, 264-70, 283-87, 289, 308-
11, 320, 326-34, 376, 633, 636; ILO
view of faction fight in, 455-79, 488-
89, 493-94, 504-06, 510, 534-35,
543-51, 591-93; impasse of, 1, 30-
33, 213; Kansas City branch of, 204-
05, 354, 377, 379, 413, 502, 512, 524,
588, 651; and labor party slogan, 38-
40, 196-97, 209, 253-55, 634; mem-
bership of, 10-12, 69, 199-208, 213-
14, 234, 457, 651; and miners, 6, 62-
70, 202-03, 233, 381, 413-15, 429-
34, 446, 448-52, 455, 468, 476, 495-
99, 506-10, 512-18, 522, 529-32,
538-39, 552-55, 558, 559, 562, 566-
67, 569, 575-76, 578, 585, 591-93,
622, 639, 640; Minneapolis branch of,
10-11, 53, 62, 205-07, 216-18, 233,
352-53, 379, 382, 403, 512, 522, 524,
588; and Minneapolis strikes (1934),
3, 62, 69, 74; National Youth Com-
mittee of, 158-60, 290, 302, 394; New
York branch of, 6, 60-62, 181, 242,
247-48, 258-59, 272-74, 290-91,
296, 302-03, 308, 311-12, 318, 334-
38, 357-58, 382-83, 389, 400, 405,
461, 472-73, 526-28, 539, 556-59,
561-63, 565-66, 568-69, 574, 576-
77, 583-87, 588, 594-95, 597-98,
602-03, 637, 646; organizational
practices of, 56-58; "peace treaty" in,
54, 73, 542-43; and proletarianiza-
tion of New York branch, 62, 416-
20, 459-60, 474, 483; publications of,
47-48, 214, 618-19; and Red Army
dispute, 72-73, 421-28, 435-48, 489-
91, 510; and Swabeck's European trip,
58-59, 352-56, 361-67, 384, 407-08,
477-78; and theoretical journal, 47-
48, 116, 234, 262, 561, 577, 581, 584,
594, 600-02, 606, 630; Toronto
branch dispute, 282, 296-98, 304,
313, 322, 368-69, 375, 378, 385, 564;
and trade-union work, 52-53, 65-66,
199, 206-07, 216-18, 366-67, 380-
81, 460, 476, 560, 591-93; and weekly
Militant, 33-34, 44-48, 189-95, 213-
14, 234, 238-51, 262; and workers
clubs, formation of, 560, 567, 578-
80, 582; youth leaders of, 11-12, 76-
77, 153, 158. See also Communistes;
Militant; National Committee, CLA;
resident committee, CLA; Spartacus
Youth Clubs; Unser Kamf; Young
Spartacus
Communist League of Struggle (CLS),
Index 703
345-46, 348, 349-50, 496-97, 640-
41, 651. See also Weisbord
Communist Party (Opposition) (Love-
stoneites), 16, 30-32, 48, 52-53, 65,
111, 130, 196, 219, 232, 251, 348, 415,
437, 439, 566, 604-05, 625, 627, 642.
See also Gitlow; Lovestone; Right
Opposition; Winitsky
Communist Party, Austria, 12, 61 1, 625.
See also Arbeiterstimme
Communist Party, Canada, 12, 199, 200-
01, 634, 635, 636
Communist Party, France, 20, 284, 629
Communist Party, Germany (KPD), 16,
18, 22, 61, 71, 284, 647
Communist Party, Great Britain, 136-
37, 630
Communist Party, Soviet Union, 2, 13,
17, 27, 50, 253, 281, 419
Communist Party, Spain, 19, 53-54, 611
Communist Party, United States, 2, 4,
8-10, 34-35, 39, 46, 54, 89, 127, 180,
456-57, 585, 605, 632, 635, 639; and
black oppression, 32, 40-44, 503-04;
and Cannon faction (1925-28), 10-
12, 37, 50-55, 65, 194-95, 251-57,
304-05, 497, 522-23, 525, 574, 619,
636; and Cannon-Foster faction
(1923-25), 51, 619, 637, 649; and
CLA, 30-33, 61, 72, 199-203, 207,
215, 232-33, 237, 421-22, 428, 457,
460, 540, 545, 565-66, 614-15, 640,
643; and farmer-labor party slogan,
37-38, 574, 637; and Foster faction
(1925-29), 30-32, 37, 65, 195, 252-
54, 574, 614, 636; and Freiheit, 415,
663g; and Lovestone faction, 16, 30-
32, 50-52, 195, 251-52, 254-55, 574,
619, 649; and trade-union work, 65-
66, 75, 380-81, 429-30, 433, 650; and
Unemployed Councils, 32, 44, 202,
207, 421, 472. See also Third Period;
Young Communist League
Communistes, 48, 198, 213, 215, 234, 261,
262, 273, 618, 659g
Confederation Generale du Travail
(CGT), 122, 130, 139, 629
Confederation Generale du Travail
Unitaire (CGTU), 20, 122, 130, 139,
284, 611, 629, 659g
Conference for Progressive Labor
Action (CPLA), 64-66, 70, 430-31,
585, 590, 604, 643, 660g
Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO), 40, 70, 75, 660g
Coover, Oscar, 11, 513, 614, 660g
Cort, Michael (Floyd Cleveland Miller),
27
Cowl, Carl, 5, 77-78, 206, 282, 323, 352,
387, 660g
CP. See Communist Party, United States
CPLA. See Conference for Progressive
Labor Action
Ualadier, Eduard, 552
Debs, Eugene V., 34, 40
Democratic Party, 34, 40
Dunne, Miles, 11, 217, 660g
Dunne, Vincent R., 4, 11, 62, 185-86,
206, 249, 257, 295, 300, 305, 324, 346,
353, 371, 382, 492, 571, 614, 661g.
See also Cannon faction in CLA
Dunne, William F, 10-11, 42, 661g
Eastman, Max, 10, 14, 91, 105, 116, 173,
460, 561, 610, 627, 643-44, 649, 661g
Edwards, John, 11, 38, 387-88, 395, 412,
513, 518, 539, 540, 571, 575, 585, 587,
589, 609, 614, 639, 661g
Eisenstein, Sergei, 136
Engels, Friedrich. See Communist League
of America: and Engels introduction
Etienne. See Zborowski, Mark
Jr ascism. See Germany: fascism's rise in
Felix, 25, 121-22, 130, 132, 133, 139-
40, 143, 209, 219, 224, 228, 280, 329,
333, 662g
FI. See Fourth International
Field, B.J., 74, 273, 369, 562-64, 574,
579-80, 583, 647-48, 651, 662g;
expulsions of, from CLA (1932,
1934), 70,345-48,350,623
Field, Esther, 563
Fischer, Ruth, 12, 23, 52, 609, 662g
704 CLA 1931-33
Fishwick, Harry, 63-64
Food Workers Industrial Union, 61
Ford, James, 34
Fosco. See Bartolomeo, Nicola Di
Foster, William Z., 34, 51, 55, 63, 249,
349, 393, 556, 641, 662g; and
Cannon-Foster faction in CP (1923-
25) 51, 619, 637, 649; and Foster fac-
tion in CP (1925-29), 30-32, 37, 65,
195, 252-54, 574, 614, 636
Fourth International (FI), 1, 13, 26-27,
73-75, 588, 601, 620. See also Inter-
national Left Opposition; Left Oppo-
sition (Soviet Union)
Fox (CLA member), 180, 338
Fraina, Louis, 584
Frank, Pierre, 25, 94, 121, 127, 130, 142,
226-27, 229, 265, 352, 504, 548-49,
612, 663g
Frank, Walter, 205
Frankel, Jan, 21, 25, 87, 90, 93, 102-04,
108, 112, 114, 121, 125, 173, 478-79,
613, 645, 663g
Freiheit, See Communist Party, United
States: Freiheit
Frey, Josef, 12, 22, 89, 100-02, 110, 255,
344, 546-47, 625, 663g
Friedman, Joseph. See Carter group;
Carter, Joseph
Oardanis (CLA member), 562-63
Gastonia, North Carolina, strike, 11, 42,
44, 575, 649
Gates, Albert. See Glotzer, Albert
Gauche Communiste, 19-20, 117, 342-
43, 628, 664g
Geltman, Emanuel (Manny Garrett),
394, 415-16, 526, 562, 641, 664g
Gerard, Francis. See Rosenthal, Gerard
Geretsky (CLA member), 199
Germany: fascism's rise in, 6, 21-22, 26,
58, 71-72, 103, 137, 421-28, 435-36,
441-43, 447, 457, 468, 489-91, 494,
497, 505, 555, 558, 647. See also Com-
munist Party, Germany; United Op-
position of Germany
Giacomi (NOI member), 73
Gigantijoe, 30, 325, 395, 412, 575, 586,
589, 664g
Girault, Suzanne, 129, 629
Gitlow, Benjamin, 31, 89, 597, 642, 650,
651, 665g
Glotzer, Albeit, 3-6, 11, 45, 47, 49, 78,
181, 210-11, 220-22, 236, 243, 245-
46, 256-57, 263, 323, 339, 361, 364,
388, 461, 479-80, 500, 506, 550, 571,
574, 614, 619, 639, 665g; on black
oppression, 41, 541-42; on Cannon,
5, 37, 50-51, 187-97, 224, 412-16;
on Carter group, 188, 270; and Chi-
cago student antiwar conference, 391,
394-95, 415, 641; on CLA 3rd con-
ference date, 369, 387, 586-88, 603;
and CLA headquarters move to Chi-
cago, 539-40, 556, 569, 575, 586-90;
cliquism of, 8, 54-55, 280, 298; on
"gestation" of CLA, 194-95; interna-
tional resolution of, 177-78, 183, 209,
300, 309-10, 318, 320, 327, 331-32,
337-38, 458, 541; and Jewish Group
(France), 141-44, 228-29, 330, 634;
at June 1932 CLA plenum, 283, 287,
292-95, 298, 326-28; on labor party,
38; and miners, 452, 513, 518, 536-
39, 647; moves to Chicago, 57, 76,
352; national tour report of, 197-208,
212-18, 223, 354, 379; visits Trotsky
(1931), 119-20, 140, 173, 187-88,
195-96, 261, 347, 363, 365; votes in
resident committee, 56, 145, 155, 174,
184, 267, 326, 352-53, 474, 637, 648;
on weekly Militant, 189-93; withdraws
from CLA activity, 212-13. See also
Shachtman faction
Goldberg (CLA member), 204, 387
Goldman, Albert, 72, 416, 642, 665g
Gomez, Manuel, 10, 665g
Gonzales (CLA member), 345
Gordon, Sam, 35, 61, 77, 144, 280, 282,
298, 370, 525, 574, 579, 623, 648,
666g; proposed for NC membership,
56-57, 293-95, 303, 388, 539. See also
Cannon faction in CLA
Gorkin, Julian, 348, 666g
Index 705
Gould, Nathan, 60, 412-13, 414, 589,
666g
Gourget, Pierre, 20, 28-29, 93-97, 99,
104, 115, 118, 529-30, 532, 611, 626,
628, 633, 666g
Gourov. See Trotsky, Leon
GPU. See Stalinists
Graef, Y., 21,611
Green, William, 34, 64, 591
Grylewicz, Anton, 97, 101, 103, 667g
.Hamilton (CLA member), 413
Hitler, Adolf. See Germany: fascism's
rise in
Hitler-Stalin pact, 3, 79, 622
Hoover, Herbert, 33-34
Howat, Alexander, 64, 66, 622, 667g
ICE. See Opposicion Communiste de
Espana
ICOR, 560, 649
ILD. See International Labor Defense
ILO. See International Left Opposition
Independent Socialist Party, Holland
(OSP), 73
Industrial Workers of the World (I WW),
10-11, 40, 271, 401, 411, 463, 643,
667g
International Labor Defense (ILD), 10,
32-33, 68, 448, 615, 667g
International Left Opposition (ILO),
1-3, 12-15, 17-30, 53-55, 103, 251,
283-85, 336, 351, 356, 423, 439, 503,
607, 625, 646, 667g; Administrative
Secretariat of, 25, 92, 612; April 1930
conference of, 2, 23, 83-85, 87, 92,
95, 133, 188, 329, 612; and Austria,
3, 12, 90, 99, 100-03, 110-11, 115,
546-47, 611; Belgian section of, 12,
18-19, 83-85, 111, 118; Chinese sec-
tion of, 13, 99, 100; and CLA faction
fight, 3, 6, 26, 455-56, 465-71, 476-
78, 485-86, 488, 493-94, 500, 504-
06, 510, 534-35, 540, 543-44, 548,
564, 568, 599, 601; Copenhagen
meeting of (1932), 26, 58, 353, 477;
in Czechoslovakia, 223, 469, 480, 489,
546, 644; and Greek Archio-Marxists,
25, 73; International Bulletin of, 7, 22,
24-26, 88, 92, 140; International
Bureau of, 23, 25, 28, 89-90, 102,
109; International Preconference of
(1933), 2, 22, 26, 58, 72, 353, 407-08,
455-56, 458, 462, 472, 477-78, 493,
644; International Secretariat, func-
tioning of, 25-26, 86-88, 95, 111,
119-20, 124-26, 179-80, 265, 286,
288, 479, 631; International Secretar-
iat and Germany, 21, 106, 109, 112,
115; International Secretariat, reorg-
anization of, 174-80, 613; May 1933
plenum of, 519, 530-36, 543-44, 559;
and turn toward Fourth International,
72-73, 552, 555, 581, 583-84, 588,
594, 601, 648. See also Fourth Inter-
national; Left Opposition (Soviet
Union); Ligue Communiste de
France; New Italian Opposition;
Opposicion Communiste de Espana;
United Opposition of Germany
International Workers Order (IWO),
560, 649
IWW. See Industrial Workers of the
World
Izquierda Communiste de Espafia. See
Opposicion Communiste de Espana
Jewish Group (Fiance), 25, 73, 121-22,
128-32, 139-42, 175, 178, 221, 224,
227-28, 285, 288, 330, 343, 634, 667g.
See also Ligue Communiste de France
Joel (CLA member), 564
Joko, 101, 103, 626
Jouhaux, Leon, 130, 629
Judd, Helen, 412, 668g
JValdis, Ai istodimos, 526, 563, 668g
Kamenev, Lev B., 9, 485, 610, 668g
Karsner, David, 35
Karsner, Rose, 10, 35, 47, 49, 59, 69, 536,
609, 647, 668g
Karsner Ross, Walta, 35
Kassan (CLA member), 204
706 CLA 1931-33
Kautsky, Karl, 154, 161-67, 276, 278,
632, 668g
Keck, William, 434, 450, 669g
Kitt (CLA member), 562-63, 598
Klement, Rudolph, 26
Kommunist, Der, 97, 100, 103, 669g
Konikow, Antoinette, 11, 59, 669g
Korsch, Karl, 439, 669g
KPD. See Communist Party, Germany
Krehm, William, 272, 297, 313, 322,
368-69, 378, 385, 564, 636, 669g
Kun, Bela, 127, 629
La Follette, Robert M., 37-39, 51, 304,
637
Labor party slogan, 37-40, 51, 196-97,
209, 219, 222, 226, 230, 253-55, 634,
637
Lacroix, Henri, 122, 134, 219, 224, 226,
228, 341, 345, 614, 670g
Lafargue, Paul, 154, 164, 670g
Landau, Kurt, 23, 89, 118, 132, 134, 144,
169, 171-72, 179, 188, 194, 229, 250,
269-70, 279, 285, 301, 375-76, 389,
445, 546-47, 612, 613, 670g; Cannon
faction on, 175-76, 334, 337, 633;
cliquism of, 20-22, 28, 54-55; and Oc-
tober 1930 German conference, 21,
96-97, 503, 645; Shachtman on, 2,
27-30, 79, 100-02, 106, 109-10, 112-
13, 130, 147, 224, 226-27, 265-67,
288, 318, 342-44, 613, 632; Trotsky
on, 90, 97-98, 102-04, 108-09, 114-
16, 218-19, 329, 348, 549, 626
Landler, Jeno, 127, 629
Lassalle, Ferdinand, 157, 670g
LD. See Trotsky, Leon
Left Opposition (Soviet Union), 1-2,
9-10, 14-17, 21, 23, 25, 84, 96, 124,
171, 235, 244-45, 253-55, 260, 344.
See also Bulletin of the Opposition;
Fourth International; International
Left Opposition
Lenin, V.I., 80, 110, 153, 157, 161-67,
276, 278, 314, 370, 426-27, 443, 580,
610, 627; on party organization, 357,
481-85, 554
Leninbund, 12, 18, 85, 101, 609, 613,
626, 67 lg. See also United Opposition
of Germany
Leningrad Opposition. See United
Opposition (Soviet Union)
Leonetti, Alfonso (Souzo), 22, 25, 96,
120, 612, 67lg
Lesoil, Leon, 12, 19
Lewis, John L., 33, 62-63, 66, 70, 203,
429, 513, 515, 552, 671g
Lewit, Morris, 4, 5, 45, 48, 74, 78, 90,
193, 358, 379, 384-88, 405, 510, 562-
63, 571, 587, 614, 618, 671g; pro-
posed for NC membership, 29, 49,
194, 257-60, 303, 317, 522, 528, 633
Liebknecht, Karl, 157, 672g
Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 154, 162, 242,
672g
Ligue Communiste de France, 70, 142,
186, 266, 286, 570, 672g; and CGTU,
139-40, 629; CLA on, 54, 174-80,
285, 309, 633; Gauche Communiste
splits from, 117, 611; ILO secretariat
depends on, 23, 87, 92, 119-20, 124-
25; Rosmer withdraws from, 86, 94-
96; Shachtman on, 98-100, 106-07,
117, 123, 126-31, 133, 147, 188-89,
209, 218-19, 227-28, 263, 288-89,
317, 329, 333-34, 341-43; trade-
union dispute in, 20, 92-94, 100, 104,
121-22, 129-30, 139-40, 142-43,
229, 264-65, 529-30, 611, 626, 629;
Trotsky on, 25, 29, 92-98, 121-22,
132, 290-91, 611, 626. See also Jewish
Group (France); Lutte des classes;
Opposition Unitaire; Ve'rite
London Bureau, 13, 73, 672g
Lore, Ludwig, 23, 30, 52, 91, 628, 672g
Lovestone, Jay, 10, 16, 30, 37, 249, 393,
641, 673g. See also Communist Party
(Opposition); Lovestone faction in
CP; Right Opposition
Lovestone faction in CP, 30-32, 50-52,
195, 251-52, 254-55, 574, 619, 649
Lovestoneites. See Communist Party
(Opposition)
Lurye, Minnie, 415
Lutte des classes, La, 88, 96, 230, 288, 673g
Index 707
Luxemburg, Rosa, 153, 157, 160-62,
168, 276, 277, 673g
Lyova. See Sedov, Leon
MacDonald, Jack, 232, 296, 368, 378,
635, 673g
Mahnruf Group, 20, 22, 89, 90, 100, 102,
115, 118, 625, 626, 674g
Makimson, Lista, 35
Malamuth, Charles, 141, 631
Malkin, Maurice, 91, 180, 273, 274, 338,
674g
Marc (French Ligue member), 128-29
Markin, N. See Sedov, Leon
Martin, F., 412, 590
Martin, Homer, 75
Marx, Karl, 80, 153, 161, 165, 208, 242,
276-78, 314, 619, 627, 632
Mashow.Joe, 412, 575
Maslow, Arkadi, 12, 23, 52, 255, 609,
674g
Matheson, Bill, 526, 562-63
Maurin, Joaquin, 19, 53-54, 226, 610,
674g
Militant, 28, 36, 58, 60, 86, 116, 118, 133,
139-41, 145, 198-204, 399, 457, 466,
540, 560-61, 567, 577-79, 584, 590,
594, 601; editorial board of, 462; fi-
nancing of, 14, 27, 33-35, 45-48, 85,
247, 356, 384-85, 396, 409, 545; and
German campaign, 72, 421, 437, 442,
448, 504, 511, 646; and miners, 63-
66, 432-34, 498, 518; and Mooney
defense, 536-38, 555; Shachtman as
editor of, 76, 144, 1 70, 2 1 1 , 295, 298,
301, 309, 325, 331, 405, 462, 640; ten-
sions over weekly, 33-34, 44-48, 189-
95, 213-14, 234, 238-51, 262. See also
Communist League of America
Mill, M., 90, 92, 94, 96, 100-02, 132, 144,
627, 675g; as ILO international sec-
retary, 25-26, 119-20, 125-26, 174,
176, 286, 288; and Jewish Group, 25,
121, 209, 285-86; and Opposicion
Communiste de Esparia, 19, 25, 133,
1 77, 289, 343; Shachtman on, 2-3, 30,
133-34, 147, 219, 221, 224-29, 329-
33, 549
Milton (CLA member), 358, 562
Molinier, Henri, 108, 675g
Molinier, Raymond, 24-25, 87, 90, 117,
139, 533, 614, 627, 675g; Shachtman
on, 99-101, 121-31, 227-29, 289,
342-43; and trade-union question,
20, 94, 121, 142, 626; Trotsky on, 92,
132, 224-25
Monatte, Pierre, 94
Montagu, Ivor Goldsmid, 90, 136-38,
630
Mooney, Thomas J., 68, 451, 495-96,
536-39, 555, 566, 647, 676g
Morgenstern, Bernard, 56, 78, 220, 304,
354, 371-72, 382, 385-86, 614, 676g.
See also Cannon faction in CLA
Muste, A J., 1, 348, 561, 676g. See also
American Workers Party; Conference
for Progressive Labor Action
Myrtos (Archio-Marxists), 25
National Committee, CLA (NC), 196,
218, 233, 279, 522; composition of,
11-12, 194, 257, 458, 471, 476-77,
486, 495, 497, 524, 608, 609, 614, 633;
and co-optation dispute, 56-57, 293-
95, 303-04, 312-13, 321, 352-55,
378-82, 387, 459-60, 465, 473, 474,
523, 528; June 1932 plenum of, 54,
60, 184-87, 282-323, 369-70, 387;
May 1930 plenum of, 46-47, 76, 181,
192, 236, 248, 249-50, 316, 633; polls
of, 56, 155, 174, 179, 184, 472, 496,
608, 644. See also Communist League
of America; resident committee
National Miners Union (NMU), 63-64,
203, 634, 676g
National Recovery Act, 34, 567, 585, 650
National Union of Miners (NUM), 66
Naville, Claude, 117
Naville, Pierre, 21, 55, 131, 144, 169,
171-72, 175-79, 188, 194, 221, 250,
270, 279, 291, 376, 445, 613, 632,
676g; in ILO, 23-25, 84, 87, 90, 285,
337, 534, 544, 580; Shachtman on, 3,
27-28, 30, 79, 99-100, 106-07, 134,
147, 218-19, 224, 226-30, 265-67,
269, 288-89, 301, 318, 329, 333,
708 CLA 1931-33
342-44, 549; and trade-union dis-
pute, 20, 121; Trotsky on, 2, 29, 92-
98, 104-05, 109, 115-18, 131-33,
141, 280, 626, 633
NC. See National Committee, CLA
Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union
(NTWIU), 62, 199, 200, 366-67, 380,
416, 476
Neumann, 97, 101, 103, 627
Neurath, Alois, 232, 644, 677g
New Economic Policy (NEP), 14-16
New Italian Opposition (NOI), 22, 73,
86, 88, 255, 677g
Nin, Andres, 2-3, 13, 19, 54, 79, 105,
110-11, 123-24, 134, 219, 224, 226,
228, 504, 541, 610, 611, 646, 678g
NMU. See National Miners Union
NOI. See New Italian Opposition
NRA. See National Recovery Act
NTWIU. See Needle Trades Workers
Industrial Union
V-ICE. See Opposicion Communiste de
Espana
Oehler, Hugo, 5, 11, 60, 202, 209, 218,
220, 295, 356, 362, 451, 492, 500,
523-24, 537, 642, 648, 678g; on black
oppression, 42; on Cannon as na-
tional secretary, 59, 397-402, 408-09;
on CLA headquarters move to Chi-
cago, 540, 584, 589; in CLA national
leadership, 57, 59, 186, 257-58, 353,
355, 614, 644; and miners, 33, 67, 69,
360, 410, 421, 434, 452, 495-96, 518,
538, 623, 639; Shachtman faction on,
185, 301, 305, 324, 358, 370, 388-89,
393, 406, 409, 540; splits from
Trotskyist movement, 77, 78. See also
Cannon faction in CLA
OTlaherty, Tom, 53, 208-09, 620, 678g
Opposicion Communiste de Espana
(OCE), 13, 19, 25, 52-54, 105, 121-
25, 145, 177-78, 223, 228, 286, 289,
325-26, 331, 341-45, 529, 549, 611,
614, 678g
Opposition Unitaire (OU), 20, 65, 93,
104, 139, 439, 611, 679g. See also
Ligue Communiste de France
Orland, Albert, 358, 526, 528
OSP. See Independent Socialist Party,
Holland
OU. See Opposition Unitaire
Overstraeten, Eduard Van (War), 12, 18-
19, 23, 52, 83, 95, 98, 115, 288, 344,
610, 679g
Pablo, Michel, 13, 74, 609
Papcun, George, 61
Pappas, Sebastian, 61, 526, 563, 679g
Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista.
See POUM
Paz, Maurice, 14, 22-23, 98, 121, 140,
179, 244, 255, 288, 344, 679g
Pearcy, Claud, 434, 450, 514, 517, 679g
Pepper, John, 52, 127, 190, 240, 252, 574,
629, 649, 679g
Petras, 358, 382, 528, 640-41, 642, 680g
Pfemfert, Franz, 85
Pilsudski, Josef, 443, 680g
PMA. See Progressive Miners of America
Pollak, 288
POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificacion
Marxista), 611, 612, 680g
Profintern. See Red International of
Labor Unions
Progressive Miners of America (PMA),
62-70, 75, 381, 412, 421, 429-34,
448-51, 498, 513-18, 530-32, 536,
552-54, 622, 639, 640, 680g
Proletarian Party, 201-02, 634, 651
Prometeo Group, 2, 22-23, 27, 29, 83-
85, 95, 110-11, 115, 130, 145, 226,
255, 264-65, 344, 680g.
Purcell, Albert A., 104, 627
Radek, Karl, 173, 632
Rakovsky, Christian, 18, 486, 631, 681 g
Ramloff, Billie, 577
Ray, George, 279, 296, 311, 320, 681g
Red Army (Soviet Union), 6, 71-72,
421-28, 435-36, 438, 440-48, 490-
91, 501, 510, 558-59, 562
Red International of Labor Unions
(Profintern, RILU), 567, 68 lg
Index 709
Reiss, Ignace, 26
Reorganized United Mine Workers
(RUMW), 63-64, 66, 681g. See also
United Mine Workers
Resident committee, CLA, 46, 76, 155,
184, 186, 249, 283, 316, 403, 416, 418,
452, 499, 648; Abern's removal from,
59, 472, 482, 497, 644; composition
of, 76, 192-93, 243, 257, 355, 458,
608, 644. See also Communist League
of America; National Committee
Revolutionary Socialist Party, Holland
(RSP), 13, 73
Ridley, F.A., 143, 631
Right Opposition (RO), 14-17, 19, 79,
89, 232, 348, 611, 620, 644; Trotsky
on, 16-17, 52, 88-89, 105, 219, 627.
See also Communist Party (Opposi-
tion); Lovestone; Winitsky
RILU. See Red International of Labor
Unions
Ritz (CLA member), 413
Rivera, Diego, 605, 647-48
RO. See Right Opposition
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 34, 40, 567
Rose, S.M., 273
Rosenthal, Gerard, 94, 68 lg
Rosmer, Alfred, 13, 23-25, 117, 144,
176, 265, 285, 682g; and Jewish
Group, 121, 128, 178; Shachtmanon,
27-28, 99-100, 134, 288, 329, 342-
44, 513, 549; Trotsky on, 92-96, 107,
118, 132, 224, 626; withdraws from
Ligue Communiste, 20, 86, 111
Roth (CLA member), 313, 369, 378
RSP. See Revolutionary Socialist Party,
Holland
Rudas, Laszlo, 127, 629
RUMW. See Reorganized United Mine
Workers
Russian Revolution, 11, 14, 18, 27, 31
Ruthenberg, C.E., 52, 619, 649, 682g
Ryazanov, David, 154, 156, 162-68, 276,
682g
JSacco, Nicola, 10, 451
Sacherow (CLA member), 412
SAP. See Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei
Deutschlands
Satir, Norman, 412-13, 589, 683g
Saul, George, 358, 374, 389, 526, 528,
562, 640, 683g
Schneiderman, William, 10
Schwalbe (CLA member), 411, 563
Scottsboro case. See Black oppression
in U.S.
Second International, 15-16, 60, 73, 208,
683g. See also Social Democratic
Party, Germany
Sedov, Leon, 23-26, 89-90, 141, 146,
613, 630, 683g
Sedova, Natalya, 552
Seipold, Oskar, 83, 98, 646, 684g
Senin, Adolf, 21, 26-27, 415, 613, 684g
Shachtman faction, 1-5, 54, 72, 220, 306,
315, 334, 371, 458-62, 465, 472-76,
479, 483, 492, 507-08, 529, 534, 549,
562-63, 589, 597, 600; on Cannon,
7, 56-57, 187-96, 208-12, 224, 237-
51, 260-65, 270-72, 274-75, 278-81,
298-306, 318-21, 323-25, 395-98,
408-11, 435-46, 500-03, 512, 522-
28, 546, 559-61, 572-73; Cannon
faction's view of, 55, 61, 74-75, 79-
80, 326-40, 364-67, 397-402, 458-
64, 475-76, 492-93, 510-11; on
Carter group, 270-72, 290-91, 302-
03, 320, 373, 376-77; on CLA 3rd
conference date, 359-60, 386-90,
499-503, 586-88, 603; composition
of, 4, 54, 61, 75-78, 195, 220, 229,
463, 480, 522, 546-48, 558, 571; on
co-optations to NC, 293-95, 303-04,
321, 352-55, 378-82, 387; on Engels
introduction, 275-81, 304, 313, 318,
322; on "gestation" of CLA, 50-52,
251-57, 304-05; on ILO disputes,
263-70, 301-02, 320, 376, 540-41; on
June 1932 CLA plenum, 298-308,
319-22, 339, 374-75; and miners, 63,
381, 508-09, 640; on Swabeck, 67,
256, 260-63, 274-75, 278-81, 298-
306, 318-19, 320-21, 354, 388; on
Swabeck's European trip, 353, 355-
57, 361-65, 367, 395, 406-08, 519,
550, 639; and trade-union work, 75,
419-20, 429-34, 446; on Trotsky's
710 CLA 1931-33
intervention in CLA, 499-507, 512,
518-28, 538-41, 550-51, 558, 570-
80, 586-87; Trotsky's view of, 463,
467-71, 477-80, 488-89, 507-09,
520, 525, 529-32, 546-51; on youth,
60, 77, 270-72, 337
Shachtman, Max, 1-6, 33, 71, 180-81,
187, 194, 212-13, 240, 247, 258, 411,
459-61, 466, 582, 684g; and 1939-40
faction fight, 4, 8, 74-80; and April
1930 ILO conference, 2, 85, 133; on
black oppression, 43-44, 503-04,
518, 530, 541-42, 551, 578, 617; on
Cannon, 3, 4, 37, 47, 48, 50, 59, 76,
160-61, 192, 229-30, 247-48, 324,
386, 389, 391-95, 572-73; on Can-
non as national secretary, 395-402,
409; on Cannon's personal crisis, 36,
50, 238-51; and CLA dispute on in-
ternational questions, 28-29, 144-45,
169, 171, 174, 182-83, 188-89, 236-
37, 263-70, 299-302, 308-11, 317-
20, 326-35, 376, 458, 632, 633; and
CLA headquarters move to Chicago,
568, 574-77, 584-90, 594-98, 601;
cliquism of, 54-55, 218-19, 220; on
co-optations to NC, 352-55, 387, 528,
573; on Engels introduction, 160-68;
in England, 29, 119, 133-34, 136-38,
143, 145; and ILO, 27-28, 30, 124-
26, 135-36, 147-48, 220-22, 224-30,
263-70, 287-89, 325-26, 366, 507,
540-41, 549, 558, 631; and ILO In-
ternational Bureau, 2, 28, 49, 89-91,
102, 133-38, 144-46; on ILO Inter-
national Secretariat, 110-11, 124-26;
at ILO May 1933 plenum, 534, 543-
44; at June 1932 CLA plenum, 283,
287-95; on labor party, 39-40; and
Ligue Communiste de France, 3, 20,
28, 79, 98-100, 106-07, 123, 125-34,
140, 142-43, 188-89, 218-19, 227-
30, 288-89, 634; and Militant, 37, 46,
76, 144, 147, 149, 170, 190, 193, 211,
225, 295, 298, 301, 305-06, 309, 317,
322, 325, 331, 405, 462, 577-78, 640;
and miners, 67-68, 429-34, 446, 452,
496-98, 506-08, 512-13, 516-18,
529-32, 539, 552-55, 562, 576, 578,
639, 640; and Opposicion Com-
muniste de Espana, 53-54, 79, 121-
24, 177, 226, 228, 289, 341-45, 614;
and Red Army dispute, 435-48; on
Swabeck, 58, 168, 229-30, 533, 544,
570-73; and trade-union work, 366-
67, 639, 640; and Trotsky visit (1930),
2, 27, 38, 42, 45, 64, 85, 148, 170-71,
196-97, 247, 624; and Trotsky visit
(1933), 54, 536, 543-56, 570-71, 594,
595, 599; and United Opposition of
Germany, 27, 79, 100-02, 106, 109-
10, 112-16, 134, 140,218-19,226-27,
229, 288; votes in resident committee,
56, 59, 155, 174, 177, 184, 326, 349,
402, 416, 424, 474, 495, 496, 637, 640,
641, 643-44, 648. See also Communist
League of America; Shachtman fac-
tion; Socialist Workers Party
Shliapnikov, Aleksandr Gavrilovich, 481,
684g
Shulman, Philip, 382, 563, 587
Sifakis, James, 208, 685g
Skoglund, Carl, 4, 11, 45, 185-86, 245,
282, 295, 300, 305, 324, 382, 492, 571,
614, 685g; on coal drivers, 62, 206-
207, 216-218. See also Cannon faction
in CLA
SLP. See Socialist Labor Party
Smeral, Bohumfr, 127, 629
Sneevliet, Henricus, 12-13, 685g
Sobolevicius. See Senin, Adolf; Well,
Roman
Social Democracy. See Second Inter-
national
Social Democratic Party, Germany
(SPD), 22, 71-72, 154, 161-62, 167,
632
Socialist Labor Party (SLP), 156, 163,
166, 276-77, 625, 686g
Socialist Party (SP), 1, 4, 10-12, 30, 34,
40, 65-66, 74, 381, 430-32, 555, 561,
565, 567, 635, 642
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), 1-5, 13,
58, 74-79, 617, 686g
Souvarine, Boris, 22-23, 96, 288, 686g
Souzo. See Leonetti, Alfonso
Index 711
Soviet Union. See Left Opposition
(Soviet Union); New Economic
Policy; Red Army; Right Opposition;
Stalin; Trotsky
Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutsch-
lands (SAP), 73, 686g
SP. See Socialist Party
Spanish Revolution, 19, 22, 29, 48, 105,
284,611
Spartacus Youth Clubs (SYC), 48, 205,
391, 537, 641, 651, 686g. See also Com-
munist League of America; Young
Spartacus
SPD. See Social Democratic Party,
Germany
Spector, Maurice, 9, 12, 46-47, 76, 91,
144, 190-92, 195, 251, 294-95, 462,
571, 614, 687g; and Cannon, 36, 221,
239-40, 249, 255, 369-70, 518; Can-
non faction's view of, 220, 464; and
ILO disputes, 179, 188, 224, 236, 280,
283-87, 299, 302, 320, 333, 631; and
Shachtman faction, 3, 54, 220-22,
229, 236, 304, 367-70, 458, 512, 550,
564; and Toronto CLA branch, 200-
01, 272, 296-98, 304, 313, 322, 367-
69, 378, 385, 464, 634, 636-37. See
also Shachtman faction
Stalin, Joseph, 9, 13-17, 27, 30-31, 41,
45, 51, 99, 110, 114, 129, 134, 157,
210-11, 219, 247, 252, 254, 255, 284,
370, 406, 548, 610, 630
Stalinists: disruption of Trotskyist move-
ment by, 26-27, 32, 83, 612, 613, 646
Stamm, Tom, 5, 61, 280, 282, 358, 363,
403-04, 536-38, 557-58, 563, 570,
574, 579, 584, 687g. See also Cannon
faction in CLA
Stein, Morris. See Lewit, Morris
Sterling, Max, 358, 562, 642, 687g
Stone (CLA member), 296, 311, 320
Swabeck, Arne, 4-5, 10, 48, 170, 188-
89, 194, 196, 299-300, 328, 335, 349,
353, 379, 404, 533, 547, 582-83, 594,
606, 614, 618-19, 687g; on black
oppression, 42-43, 503; on Cannon,
36, 49, 190, 193, 195, 246-47, 392,
571; on Cannon as national secre-
tary, 59, 392-93, 397-402, 408-10;
on Cannon's 1929 absence from
office, 36, 190, 243-44; on CLA 3rd
conference date, 462, 476, 485, 504-
06, 510, 603-05; on CLA headquar-
ters move to Chicago, 475, 483-85,
589, 598, 600-03; as CLA national
secretary, 28-29, 34, 47, 49, 53-54,
71, 110, 139, 193, 210, 222, 354, 405,
413, 600-05, 651; on co-optations to
NC, 352-54, 458, 463-64, 466, 474,
544; on Engels introduction, 60-61,
153-69, 180-82, 208, 313, 318, 331,
374, 458; in Europe, 455, 478-79,
530-35, 541, 544-46; European trip,
dispute over, 58-59, 353-57, 361-68,
384, 395, 406-08, 477-78, 488, 496,
503, 519, 550, 639; on Glotzer's tour
report, 212-16; at June 1932 CLA
plenum, 282-83, 286-87, 291-92,
296-298; on labor party, 38; and min-
ers, 33, 63, 360, 381, 410, 498, 507,
509, 510, 562, 585, 640; moves to
New York, 46, 49, 193, 213; and
Shachtman, 532-33, 544; Shachtman
faction on, 67, 76, 184-85, 187,
193-94, 209, 236, 242-48, 260-63,
270-72, 298-306, 318-19, 320-21,
324-25, 352, 370, 388, 414, 558-62,
570-73; Trotsky's discussions with
(1933), 6, 58, 70, 78, 456-67, 472-
77, 479-86, 492, 503, 541, 546, 549-
50, 558-59, 570-71, 573, 599; votes
on resident committee, 56, 155, 309,
349, 402; and weekly Militant, 45-47,
191, 195, 245-47. See also Cannon
faction in CLA
SYC. See Spartacus Youth Clubs
Teamsters Union, 1, 3, 62, 622
Third International. See Communist
International
Third Period, 15, 31-32, 41, 44, 53, 62,
63, 66, 72, 367, 429, 460, 476, 629,
688g
Thomas, Norman, 34, 430
712 CLA 1931-33
Tomsky, Mikhail Pavlovich, 15, 104, 485,
627, 688g
Townley, A.C., 205-06, 635
Trachtenberg, Alexander L., 154, 163,
631-32, 688g
Trade Union Unity League (TUUL), 433,
449, 688g
Treint, Albert, 25, 121, 128-30, 139, 224,
227, 229, 285, 288, 629, 688g
Tresso, Pietro (Blasco), 22, 548, 689g
Trotsky, Leon, 27, 161-63, 166-68, 191,
205, 209-1 1, 249, 276, 444, 562, 609;
and 1939-40 faction fight, 4, 78-80;
on April 1930 ILO conference, 27-
28, 83-87, 133; and black oppression
in U.S., 41-43, 503-04, 530, 542; on
call for new (Fourth) international,
72-73, 519, 552, 555, 581, 583-84,
588; and Cannon, 4, 8, 9, 46, 59, 70-
71; on Chinese Eastern Railroad, 12,
18-19, 439; on CLA 3rd conference
date, 465-66, 469-71, 482, 488, 504-
08, 598-600; on CLA Cannon fac-
tion, 7-8, 62, 463-74, 480-84, 508,
523-25, 547-49, 572; CLA, dona-
tions to, 47, 116, 134-35, 624, 628,
630; on CLA headquarters move to
Chicago, 473, 555-56, 568-69, 574-
77 598-600; on CLA publications,
48, 89-90, 103, 114, 117; on CLAs
role in ILO, 133, 135-36, 266, 308-
11,317, 365; on Communist Interna-
tional, 9-10, 14-17, 37-38, 51, 468;
on co-optations to CLA NC, 465-67,
473; in Copenhagen (1932), 58, 353,
361-64, 406-07, 460, 487, 552; on
Eastman, 105, 610, 627; on fascism
in Germany, 72, 424, 442, 489-91,
647; on Field, 70-71, 345-48, 579-
80; on French trade-union dispute,
20, 92-94, 104-05, 121, 264, 529-30,
611, 626; on Gillespie trade-union
conference, 68, 508-09, 538-39; and
Glotzer, 142-44, 148, 187-88, 195-
96, 224, 479, 556, 634; and ILO
founding, 1-2, 22-23, 607; on ILO
intervention in CLA, 467-71, 486,
500, 507-09, 529, 540, 548-50; on
ILO secretariat, 23-27, 86-89, 119-
20, 174, 289; on Jewish Group
(France), 121-22, 290-91; on labor
party in U.S., 37-40, 196-97, 219,
222, 226, 230, 637; on Landau, 21-
22, 28-29, 97-98, 103-05, 108, 114-
16, 118, 134, 626; and Militant, 46
118, 149, 295, 322, 325, 577; on Mill
25, 132, 133-34; on miners, 64, 68
508-09, 529-30, 553-55, 564, 575
585, 591-93; on Molinier, 92, 94
132, 224-25; on Naville, 2, 29, 92-
98, 104-05, 109, 115-18, 131-34
280, 626; on Nin, 19, 105, 341, 541
611, 646; on Prometeo, 22, 84, 88
on Red Army, 72, 448, 489-91; on
Right Opposition, 16-17, 52, 88-89
105, 219, 627; on Rosmer, 23, 92-96
118, 132, 134; and Shachtman, 79-
80, 139-40, 149, 170, 225-30, 325-
26; on Shachtman faction, 463, 467-
71, 477-80, 488-89, 507-09, 525,
529-32, 546-51; on Shachtman in
ILO, 2-3, 6, 27-30, 114-18, 132-41,
147, 218-19, 224-25, 325-26, 328-
30, 333-34, 505, 507, 529, 549-50,
558, 614, 631; Shachtman's discus-
sions with (1930), 27-28, 46, 64,
170-71, 250, 363; Shachtman's dis-
cussions with (1933), 544-51, 553-
56, 570-80; on Shachtman's opposi-
tion to Swabeck trip, 477-78, 488;
on Swabeck, 486, 549, 598-99, 606;
Swabeck's discussions with (1933), 6,
456-67, 472-77, 479-86, 492, 503,
541, 546, 549, 550, 558-59, 571, 573,
599, 617; on Weisbord, 70, 115, 140,
222-24, 345-49, 351, 359, 606, 651.
See also International Left Opposi-
tion; Left Opposition (Soviet Union)
Trotskyist Opposition. See International
Left Opposition; Left Opposition
(Soviet Union)
Trotskyists. See Communist League of
America; Fourth International; Inter-
national Left Opposition; Left Oppo-
sition (Soviet Union); Socialist Work-
ers Party
Index 713
TUUL. See Trade Union Unity League
U MW. See United Mine Workers
Unemployed Councils, 689g. See also
Communist Party, United States
Union Communiste, 73
United Mine Workers (UMW), 33, 62-66,
513, 515, 552, 689g. See also Progres-
sive Miners of America; Reorganized
United Mine Workers
United Opposition of Germany, 18, 20-
21, 23, 26, 58, 83, 124, 175, 415, 445,
489-90, 511, 612, 626-27, 645-46,
648; and call for new party, 72-73,
519, 546; Landau's leadership of, 20-
22, 27-29, 97-98, 100-03, 106, 265-
66, 285, 613; and Shachtman, 27-29,
108-10, 112-15, 134, 140, 218-19,
229, 269, 288, 329, 334, 633. See also
Kommunist, Der
United Opposition (Soviet Union), 2, 9,
12, 14, 113, 690g
UnserKamf, 47-48, 62, 78, 173, 187, 195,
198-202, 204, 207, 213, 215, 234, 258,
261-62, 273, 280, 318, 384-85, 405,
579, 618, 690g
Unser Wort, 511, 519, 690g
Urbahns, Hugo, 12, 18, 23, 52, 84-85,
98, 177, 179, 244, 255, 288, 344, 439,
690g
Vanguard, 378
Vanzetti, Bartolomeo, 10, 451
Vanzler, Joseph, 573, 690g
Vereeken, Georges, 19, 26, 613
Verite, La, 20, 24, 28, 89, 93, 95, 114,
117, 133,626
Votaw (CLA member), 512
Weiner, S., 563
Weinstone, William, 240, 691g
Weisbord, Albert, 111-12, 115, 140, 180,
196, 211, 233, 251, 298, 369, 389, 466,
564, 606, 69 lg; negotiates with CLA,
345-46, 348-52, 358-59, 496-97,
651; supporters of, in New York CLA
branch, 48-49, 53, 273, 338, 382,
460-61, 526; visits Trotsky, 70, 222-
24, 345-46. See also Communist
League of Struggle
Well, Roman, 21, 26-27, 98, 106, 108,
112-13, 415, 445, 613, 691g
Wicks, Harry, 428, 435, 437-39, 69 lg
Winitsky, Harry, 85, 89, 641
Witte, 73, 478-79, 534, 543, 613, 691g
Workers and Peasants Bloc (BOC), 19,
53,610,611
Workers Party of the United States
(WPUS), 60, 74, 692g
Workmen's Circle, 204, 635, 649
World War I, 12, 40, 41, 73, 426, 441,
442
World War II, 13, 16, 27, 74
WPUS. See Workers Party of the United
States
Wright, John G. See Vanzler, Joseph
rCL. See Young Communist League
Yolles (CLA member), 369
Young Communist League (YCL), 11, 32,
199, 201, 382, 386, 560, 614, 615
Young People's Socialist League-Fourth
Internationalist (YPSL-4th), 77-78
Young Spartacus, 47-48, 77, 153, 157-58,
195, 198, 202, 213, 215, 234, 261-62,
273, 279, 313, 318, 618, 692g
YPSL-4th. See Young People's Socialist
League-Fourth Internationalist
Walker, John A., 203, 429, 690g
War, struggle against. See Amsterdam
Congress
Weber, Jack, 358, 388, 416, 562, 571,
572, 598, 641, 642, 690g
Weber, Sara, 486, 499-500, 529, 599,
606, 645, 647, 690g
^iborowski, Mark, 26-27, 613
Zinoviev, Grigori Y, 2, 7-8, 12, 37, 51,
55, 99, 121, 129, 161, 167, 252, 255,
276, 427, 610, 637, 639, 692g
714
Photo Credits
1. RTsKhlDNI (Russian Center for Preservation and Study of Records
of Modern History) 2. Tamiment Library, New York University
3. Albert Glotzer 4. Bettmann/CORBIS 5. PRL 6. PRL 7. Tami-
ment Library, New York University 8. Morris Lewit 9. Albert
Glotzer 10. Vanguard Press 11. Theater Magazine 12. EFE 13. La
Breche 14. Franz Pfemfert 15. Archive of the Austrian Resistance
16. La Breche 17. Critique Communiste 18. Leon Trotsky Institute
19. La Breche 20. Basil Blackwell Inc. 21. Basil Blackwell Inc.
22. Pathfinder Press 23. PRL 24. PRL 25. Walter P. Reuther
Library, Wayne State University 26. Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne
State University 27. PRL 28. PRL 29. PRL 30. PRL, Associated
Press 31. Gerry Allard Papers, Illinois State Historical Library,
Springfield, Illinois 32. Gerry Allard Papers, Illinois State Historical
Library, Springfield, Illinois 33. Tamiment Library, New York
University 34. Benjamin Gitlow Papers, Hoover Institution Archives,
Stanford University 35. Bettmann/CORBIS, PRL 36. Bettmann/
CORBIS 37. Minnesota Historical Society 38. Minnesota Historical
Society 39. Albert Glotzer.
715
About the Prometheus Research Library
The Prometheus Research Library (PRL) is a working research
facility for a wide range of Marxist studies and the central refer-
ence archive of the Spartacist League of the U.S., section of the
International Communist League (Fourth Internationalist). Library
holdings include substantial materials on the organizations inspired
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The Library's collection, which does not circulate, grew out
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(1971-1980), and the ICL theoretical journal Spartacist in English
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The text of this book is set in ITC New Baskerville.
Composition was by Patricia Martino
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The book was printed at
Courier Stoughton
on 50# Glatfelter Offset Cream Text stock
and bound at National Publishing Co., a division of Courier.
Typeset, printed and bound entirely by union labor.
he "dog days of the movement "—that's how founding American
Communist and Trotskyist leader James P. Cannon described
JL. the early 1930s. This book sheds new light on the history of
Trotskyism, that is, authentic communism, by documenting the factional
polarization that the Communist League of America (CLA) underwent
during this period of stagnation.
The 1931-33 fight pitted Cannon and his supporters against the gen-
erally younger followers of Max Shachtman who were less experienced
in workers struggle. The dispute presaged the defining 1939-40 split in
American Trotskyism. In the later fight Shachtman, bowing to the anti-
Communist hysteria that accompanied the Hitler-Stalin pact, rejected
unconditional military defense of the world's first workers state, the Soviet
Union. Shachtman's defection was the first step on the road that led him,
by the early 1960s, to the open embrace of U.S. imperialism. Leon Trotsky
and Cannon led the 1939-40 struggle against Shachtman and his followers.
In 1931-33 the fight erupted when Shachtman opposed Cannon's
attempt to put the CLA on record against trade-union opportunism in the
French Trotskyist organization, and against the unprincipled maneuvers
of the would-be German Trotskyist leader, Kurt Landau. During this time
Trotsky sought to separate the genuine revolutionaries in the International
Left Opposition (ILO) from ultraleftist, centrist, and cliquist elements, as
well as Stalinist agents. As CLA representative to the ILO, Shachtman cod-
dled many of Trotsky's opponents. This book includes Trotsky's powerful
letters to Shachtman— some published for the first time— on formative
political disputes in the French, German, and Spanish ILO sections.
Shachtman soon capitulated to Trotsky on the international issues, but
the fight in the American Communist League escalated, fed by personal
frictions and grievances going back to 1929. Subjects of dispute included
Leninist methods of party organization, the potential role of the Soviet Red
Army in a proletarian offensive to beat back Hitler's ascension to power,
and the CLA's work in the Progressive Miners of America in southern
Illinois. Documents from both sides of the factional divide appear here,
including centrally "The Situation in the American Opposition: Prospect
and Retrospect" by Shachtman, Martin Abern, and Albert Glotzer, which
harps on many of the same organizational themes that obsessed the
Shachtman side in the 1939-40 dispute and later.
Unlike 1939-40, there were no well-defined programmatic differences in
the CLA. Trotsky intervened sharply in spring 1933 to end the destructive
impasse, helping to lay the basis for the subsequent six years of collaboration
between Cannon and Shachtman as the American Trotskyists took advantage
of new opportunities for growth that began in 1933.
ISBN 0-1b33A2A-fl-A
Marxism/Political Science/
American History
$19.95 ^ra^-«
9 '780963H382887
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